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Abstract 
In this thesis, I inquire into the prospects for a normative and scientific 
epistemology arising from the version of naturalism that dominates Dewey’s later 
work. I focus on questions such as: Are there peculiar features of Dewey’s 
naturalism that address important concerns of traditional epistemology, such as 
setting up normative criteria for justifying our claims to knowledge? Does his 
naturalism engender merging epistemology with science? How relevant are 
Dewey’s original views to contemporary debates in epistemology? 
In setting up Dewey’s position, which I call epistemological naturalism, I explore 
how the conceptions of reality and human experience in his naturalist metaphysics 
serve as a road-map for his epistemology. I explore how his arguments that the 
world is a mixture of interchanging stable and precarious events and his 
description of human experience as transaction within nature set the stage for 
defining all forms of inquiry as problem-driven. I also explore how this conception 
of inquiry leads to the conception of knowledge as ultimately practical and 
instrumental. I argue that Dewey’s instrumentalist and practical conception of 
knowledge is ideal for the traditional goal of epistemology identified as attainment 
of truth and avoidance of error. However, I also explore how his position 
challenges traditional epistemology by replacing the traditional theoretical or 
conceptual approach to knowledge with a practical and experimental approach, 
encouraging practical or empirical methodologies. I discuss how this approach to 
knowledge makes paradigms of knowledge in technological science more relevant 
to epistemology than those of the natural sciences.  
 I then focus on the continuity of Dewey’s original ideas in two ways: how they are 
preserved in Richard Rorty’s neo-pragmatism and how they are relevant to 
debates about knowledge in contemporary philosophy. On the connection 
between Dewey’s philosophy and Rorty’s neo-pragmatism, I explore how the 
similarities in Dewey and Rorty’s critique of traditional epistemology qualify the 
latter as a Deweyan. However, I argue that Rorty’s popular position, that 
Philosophy must transcend itself to cultural criticism has no basis in Dewey’s 
philosophy. 
I turn to consider how Dewey’s analysis of human experience, human-nature 
symbiotic relations and the social nature of knowledge can resolve some of the 
disagreements among contemporary social epistemologists on the nature and 
subject-matter of their inquiry. I also consider how Dewey’s instrumentalist 
conception of knowledge can contribute to contemporary debates on whether 
knowledge is a natural kind.  
The thesis is in two parts. The first part is a critical exposition of Dewey’s 
metaphysics and epistemology. Part Two relates Dewey’s views to contemporary 
philosophy. In Chapter One I articulate how most versions of naturalism are 
concerned with rendering philosophical views on knowledge and existence more 
tenable by appealing to science. Two main approaches are identified: radical 
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naturalists suggest the adoption of the ontology or methodologies of science, and 
moderate naturalists admit the usefulness of some of the methods and paradigms 
of science in some specific areas in philosophy. I argue that both positions involve 
controversial conceptions of how philosophy and science relate to each another. 
For instance, I explore how some radical naturalists ambiguously use the word 
“science”. I also discuss the objection that the radical position reduces philosophy 
to science. In Chapter Two I discuss Dewey’s naturalist conception of experience 
and reality, and in Chapter Three his theory of knowledge. These are the 
metaphysical and epistemological components of his naturalism. I explore how the 
empirical nature of Dewey’s metaphysics and the practical-experimental emphasis 
of his epistemology challenge traditional metaphysics and epistemology. 
The second part has three chapters. In Chapter Four I discuss similarities in Dewey 
and Rorty’s rejection of traditional theories such as foundationalism, 
representationalism and essentialism, and other related views which the duo 
described as absolutist conceptions of knowledge and truth, such as the Spectator 
Theory of Knowledge and the conception of the human mind as a mirror of nature.  
I disagree with Rorty’s conclusion that Dewey totally dismissed the preoccupations 
of traditional epistemology and metaphysics, a position Rorty described as 
therapeutic. I argue that Dewey replaces all theories he rejected with alternative 
naturalistic views. I conclude that this suggests continuity with traditional 
philosophy rather than envisaging a post-Philosophy culture as suggested by Rorty.  
In Chapter Five I consider how Dewey’s conceptions of the cause, nature, and goal 
of inquiry as ultimately a social affair resolve some disagreements between radical 
social epistemologists (such as Fuller) and moderate social epistemologists (such 
as Goldman and Kornblith) on the nature and subject-matter of social 
epistemology. From Dewey’s identification of problematic human transactions 
with nature as the common factor in all forms of inquiry, I consider the possibility 
of establishing what could be regarded as the basis for all human knowledge. The 
importance of this position is explored in terms of preventing relativism. In 
Chapter Six I compare Kornblith’s contention that knowledge is a natural kind with 
Dewey’s contention that knowledge is a natural transaction, and argue that the 
latter offers more tenable prospects for a normative scientific epistemology.  
My overall conclusion is that taking a Deweyan approach to knowledge engenders 
an inter-disciplinary approach which makes resources in sociology, anthropology, 
biology, and technological science relevant to epistemology. By defining 
normativity in terms of how knowledge is managed to facilitate successful human 
transaction within nature, epistemic claims are opened to empirical evaluation. 
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Chapter One: Understanding Dewey’s naturalism as a 
critique of other versions of naturalism 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on defining naturalism. This is essential to this thesis for two 
reasons. Firstly, the central argument running through this thesis is that naturalism 
offers the best prospects for establishing a normative scientific epistemology. 
Consequently, it is important to examine several attempts by naturalists to find a 
theoretical position that can be described both as philosophical and scientific.  
Secondly, there are many versions of naturalism, some of which are antithetical to 
one another (Bhaskar, 1998; Bilgrami, 2010; De Caro & Macarthur, 2004, pp. 1-36; 
Wagner & Warner, 1993). So, it is important to have an unambiguous 
understanding of what naturalism is before any exploration of naturalistic 
philosophy can start. For present purposes, several naturalists’ presuppositions 
will be examined, including their conceptions of what science is, the relationship 
between science and philosophy, and the goals of scientific and philosophical 
investigations. The ultimate goal is to contrast Dewey’s version of naturalism with 
other versions of naturalism and establish it as offering a more nuanced analysis 
and correspondingly a more tenable position. 
Consequently, this chapter offers a critical analysis of four prominent ways that 
naturalist and non-naturalist philosophers have attempted to define naturalism. 
These are: defining naturalism as a scientific position, a metaphysical (ontological) 
position, as a recommendation for the adoption of the methods of science in 
philosophy (methodological naturalism), and as a project targeting the 
naturalization of traditional epistemology or metaphysics. I explain naturalization 
in terms of the claim that one field can be reduced to the other or that some 
specific concepts in a field can be explained by concepts in another field. While it 
is commonly assumed that methodological naturalism and naturalization of 
traditional epistemology or metaphysics are identical, I explain that although they 
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are closely related, they are arguably different senses of naturalism, taking W.V.O. 
Quine’s Epistemology Naturalized as an example (1994a). 
While all naturalists and non-naturalists have tried to define, defend or criticise 
naturalism in connection to some conceptions of science or supposed methods of 
science, I critically examine what these philosophers mean by “science” and 
“methods of science”. I examine whether they mean a particular branch of science 
(for instance mathematical physics) or a broader sense of science (both the entire 
natural sciences and the entire social sciences). I also examine what these 
naturalists have in mind when they mention “the methods of science”, whether 
they mean the experimental (natural, controlled) methods of science, a posteriori 
or empirical methods, some specific models of explanation (such as Hempel’s 
covering law model) or something else.  
Further, given the fact that various definitions offered for naturalism involve both 
metaphysics and epistemology, I examine (i) what naturalists have in mind 
concerning traditional metaphysics- whether their positions imply continuation, 
modification, or elimination of traditional metaphysics and (ii) what naturalists 
have in mind concerning traditional conceptions of epistemology. Specifically, I 
examine naturalists’ positions on the relationship between epistemology and 
science, the role of scepticism, and the notion and importance of normativity in 
epistemology. On the question how naturalists conceive the notion and 
importance of the concept of normativity in naturalistic epistemology, I treat 
Quine’s attempt to naturalize epistemology as a classic example. 
However, it is important to note that the critique of naturalism in this chapter is 
guided by two goals: understanding and evaluating naturalism. The first goal, 
(which is a necessary condition for the second) is to establish some unambiguous 
definitions or analyses of naturalism. The second (which is more important, given 
the overall goal of this thesis) is to establish a naturalist position that could 
engender a normative scientific epistemology. My approach to both goals is to 
identify Dewey’s version of naturalism and evaluatively contrast it with other 
versions of naturalism. Consequently, a critique of several claims, presuppositions 
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and commitments that define other versions of naturalism, will be undertaken by 
contrasting them with Dewey’s views. The purpose is to establish naturalism as 
the background to Dewey’s philosophy and more importantly to argue that his 
version of naturalism offers the most informative analysis of naturalism by 
presenting radically new conceptions of cognitive fields such as epistemology, 
metaphysics, logic, language and science- redefining their scopes, objectives and 
relationships. These claims will define the goals of subsequent chapters in this 
thesis. 
This chapter has four sections. In the first, I briefly discuss some problems resulting 
from the many versions of naturalism. For instance, I will consider the tendencies 
among philosophers, as noted by De Caro and Macarthur, to regard naturalism as 
“a hopeless portmanteau term without any discernible core meaning” and 
consequently not a “particularly suitable candidate for philosophical examination” 
(De Caro & Macarthur, 2004, p. 3). In the second section I examine some 
arguments that naturalism is a non-philosophical position, an anti-philosophical 
positon or a non-substantive philosophical position. I consider G.E. Moore’s 
famous “naturalistic fallacy” as a good example. In the third section, I consider 
tenets of some versions of naturalism that point toward metaphysical theories 
such physicalism and materialism: naturalism as outright rejection of metaphysics 
comparable to the positivist programme, naturalism as conceptual analysis and 
empirical scrutiny of folk concepts, and Kornblith’s notion of naturalism as 
“studying the implications of science for metaphysics”. In the fourth section, I 
focus on naturalism and epistemology. I consider naturalism as a philosophical 
position stating that philosophy must be methodologically continuous with 
science. I also discuss naturalists’ views on the concept of normativity and 
problems of scepticism in epistemology. In each section, Dewey’s views will be 
explained. 
1.1 Understanding naturalism: the problems of many versions 
There are many positions in philosophy that have been described as “naturalistic”. 
Almost a century ago, Roy Wood Sellars commented on a “common naturalism” 
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that it is a “vague and general sort, capable of covering an immense diversity of 
opinion” (1922, p. i) In his recent assessment of naturalism (which implies that 
Sellars is still correct), Richard Gale may not have exaggerated when he noted that 
that there are as many conceptions of naturalism as people claiming to be 
naturalists (2010b, p. 55). Other writers like Lawrence Sklar  (2001, p. 1) and De 
Caro and Macarthur (2004, p. 3) have also noted this problem.   
These writers hold that the existing literature has shown a diverse use of the term 
“naturalism” which makes the concept or position appear meaningless, most 
especially with several conceptions of naturalism appearing to be antithetical to 
one another. This problem makes it reasonable to suspect that naturalists might 
not be addressing any substantive philosophical issues at all. My contention is that, 
although the many meanings of naturalism are problematic, it still constitutes a 
legitimate and interesting subject-matter for philosophical investigation. More 
specifically, I will contend that there are several unifying doctrines in naturalism, 
such as ontological naturalism and methodological naturalism. However, these 
doctrines only facilitate the identification of different versions of naturalism and 
do not engender a monolithic positon. My strongest contention, however, is that, 
we can make fundamental sense of what naturalism is by concentrating on the 
problems that made naturalism, arguably, the currently most popular 
philosophical position. 
Wagner and Warner have observed that, the need to re-define “the relations 
among a range of human endeavours such as philosophy, science and art”, informs 
the preoccupation of philosophers and philosophers of science on naturalism 
(1993, p. 1). Wagner and Warner and other philosophers such as Akeel Bilgrami, 
discuss some specific historical occurrences that marked the need to redefine 
these human endeavours. These include the establishment of physical science as 
a substantially autonomous institution between 1600 and 1850 and Kant’s 
reassessment of philosophy and the rise of social sciences (Bilgrami, 2010, pp. 23-
24; Wagner & Warner, 1993, p. 1). Consequently, throughout this chapter, I focus 
on philosophers (both naturalists and anti-naturalists) grappling with questions 
that relate to the identity or autonomy of philosophy in an age of science. This 
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problem is succinctly described by Roy Bhaskar as a dilemma between on one 
hand, the belief that “all ideas, including purely philosophical ones, are to be 
susceptible of scientific explanation”, and on the other, believing “philosophy to 
be irreducible and essential, Inter alia, to science” (1998, p. ix). I start my 
discussion of naturalism by considering whether it is a philosophical position. 
1.2 Understanding naturalism as a non-philosophical, anti-philosophical, or a 
non-substantive philosophical position 
Several philosophers have argued that naturalism is a non-philosophical or 
covertly anti-philosophical position.  G.E. Moore’s objection to moral naturalism, 
which he dubbed “the naturalistic fallacy” provides a good example.  According to 
Moore, any attempt to analyse moral concepts like “good” in terms of natural facts  
such as “pleasant” or “desirable”, or to draw ethical conclusions from natural facts, 
is fallacious (1903, p. 10). Moore’s explanation is that the normative significance 
of natural properties must be established before the viability of naturalism can be 
considered as a philosophical position in moral philosophy. Erin also argues that 
naturalism in ethics is an attempt “to analyse the nature and content of morality 
without relying on evaluative concepts, or at least none other than those 
employed in the natural and social sciences” (2004, p. 259). While he agrees that 
it could be useful to find out how moral notions could figure into empirical theories 
and explanations, he argues that a moral philosopher must engage in substantive 
moral reasoning that can illuminate the nature of our moral aims and judgements 
(Erin, 2004, p. 274). 
Similarly, George Santayana and Richard Rorty were indignant at Dewey’s desire 
to establish a system of thought that is both naturalistic and metaphysical (Rorty, 
1977; Santayana, 1951). Santayana was amazed that Dewey could claim to be 
pursuing a metaphysics that is naturalistic because (for Santayana) “metaphysics” 
and “naturalism” have “contradictory characters”. According to Santayana, in 
metaphysics there is common acknowledgement of the existence or reality of 
disembodied powers, immaterial functions and absolute mind independence of 
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material conditions. He argues that naturalism denies the existence of such 
entities (Santayana, 1951, pp. 343-344).  
In his critique of Dewey’s Experience and Nature, Rorty argues that he cannot see 
Dewey’s naturalism (naturalistic metaphysics) as a legitimate philosophical 
position because there is no sense in which “it could be assimilated to the genre 
which includes the central books of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Spinoza’s Ethics, 
Royce’s The World and the Individual, and similar paradigms” (1977, p. 45). Rorty’s 
point is that naturalistic metaphysics as presented by Dewey does not address any 
substantive metaphysical problem that one can clearly identify.  He argued that 
Dewey’s naturalism is best understood as a “therapeutic” stance. A therapeutical 
stance sees traditional problems in philosophy (like the mind-body problem and 
subject-object distinction) as pseudo- problems, created by human errors and 
delusions. The solution to these problems is dismissing rather than solving them 
(Rorty, 1977, pp. 46, 49,54). Rorty’s suggestion is that naturalism is essentially an 
anti-philosophical position, and he wanted to associate Dewey’s position with the 
project of replacing philosophy with literary or cultural criticism.  
In contemporary discussions of naturalism, philosophers such as Kim (1985), 
Stroud (1985) and Goldman (1993b) have argued that naturalism as presented 
popularly by W.V.O. Quine is not to be regarded as philosophy, but as psychology 
or psycholinguistics. One description of naturalism offered by Quine is: 
Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology, 
and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human 
subject. This human subject is accorded a certain experimentally controlled input-
certain patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies, for instance- and in the fullness 
of time the subject delivers as output a description of the three-dimensional external 
world and its history (Quine, 1994a, p. 25). 
Critics such as Kim have argued that Quine is urging us to abandon the 
preoccupation of traditional philosophers on how to justify our beliefs (which is 
known as traditional epistemology) and focus on the processes that are involved 
in the formation of our beliefs, which is an aspect of empirical psychology (Kim, 
1994, pp. 39-41) For Stroud, Quine is urging us to study human beings and their 
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knowledge in the same way that one would study an amoeba, a plant or anything 
else in nature (2004, p. 25). The point they all share is that Quine’s “naturalized 
epistemology” is either an anti-philosophical or reductionist position (an attempt 
to reduce epistemology (philosophy) to psychology (science), or scientism, the 
belief that science alone is the pathway to genuine knowledge. 
Sorrel and Maffie also argued that naturalism as presented by Quine is anti-
philosophical and rests on undue scientism. In Sorrel’s explanation of “scientism”, 
he makes a distinction between an old sense and a new sense. The old sense, 
includes instances of how great philosophers (like Bacon and Descartes) and 
economic theorists (like Karl Marx) admitted that natural science or the exact 
science is the most valuable, authoritative, serious or beneficial part of human 
learning and recommended that all human cognitive enterprises must have some 
kind of footing in science as a necessary condition for having similar success (Sorell, 
1991, pp. 1, 76). Here, philosophy can benefit from the methods and paradigms of 
science without losing its autonomy or identity. The second sense of scientism, on 
the other hand, is relatively new and more specific. It is a belief shared by some 
philosophers that philosophy needs to be “replaced by science”. Sorell identifies 
this new scientism as “naturalism” (1991, pp. 3-4, 177). He calls this “ the 
replacement thesis” (1991, pp. 37, 133-140). It is in this sense that Sorell (like 
Stroud and Kim) sees naturalism as a threat to philosophy (1991, p. 177): 
According to the view of epistemology that I am arguing for, traditional philosophical 
questions occupy the centre of the field, and there is room for questions continuous 
with these that have been suggested by empirical psychology or evolutionary theory. 
The view entails that epistemology and empirical psychology can influence one 
another, but it stops short of implying that epistemology contains or is contained by 
empirical psychology, and carries no suggestion that work on any unresolved issue 
from traditional epistemology should be stopped (Sorell, 1991, p. 139). 
Sorell’s contention is that, whatever advantages philosophers can derive from 
using the methods of science and applying some of its paradigms, philosophy is 
not science. He is sceptical about the adequacy or even the relevance of science 
concerning issues such as the cognitive status of aesthetic feelings (1991, pp. 56-
57), moral values (1991, pp. 151-158), fine arts and their value (1991, pp. 59-61). 
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The question is, to what extent can a naturalist hold some subject-matters in 
reserve concerning the adequacy of science? 
In his critique of naturalism, Maffie makes a distinction between a “strong version” 
of naturalism which he calls strong or “eliminative naturalism” and moderate 
naturalism. He identifies two prominent ideas in eliminative naturalism. First, the 
idea that we no longer understand science as just one form of possible knowledge, 
but as the only paradigm of knowledge, which he called “one dimensionalism” 
(1995, p. 12). Secondly, the presentation of science as “self-validating” which he 
called “dogmatic methodism” (1995, p. 15). Maffie contends that these ideas are 
scientistic fallacies and constituted an illegitimate expansion of science into 
epistemology (1995, p. 1). Moderate naturalism, in contrast,  “upholds the non-
identity of epistemic ends, norms, and concepts with scientific evidential ends, 
norms, and concepts” (1995, p. 12). Maffie believes that, based on moderate 
naturalism, epistemology is contrasted with science in the sense that 
epistemologists’ interest lies in “acquiring truths that are rooted in the 
instrumental utility of true beliefs and disutility of false vis-a-vis the satisfaction of 
our ends”. He believes this fact insulates epistemologists’ interest from 
“arbitrariness” or “idiosyncrasies” (1995, p. 5).1 For him, 
Such an anthropology of epistemology approaches human epistemic practices in an a 
posteriori manner paralleling anthropological and sociological approaches to cultural 
practices such as magic, religion, and law. It adopts an anthropologically distanced or 
‘strange’ view of epistemology, seeking to understand its nature, aims and province 
in terms of life circumstances in which it is organically situated and sustained (Maffie, 
1995, p. 5). 
In essence, Maffie’s interest lies in a kind of naturalism that will make 
epistemology (philosophy) continuous with science without losing its normative 
and evaluative dimensions as conceived in traditional epistemology (1995, p. 20). 
                                                     
1  For Maffie, weak sense naturalism rejects a number of theses that an anti-naturalistic 
epistemology endorses: that epistemology employs evidential norms and standards epistemically 
higher than science, employs sui generis, a priori methods or evidence, proceeds from vantage 
points independently of findings in science, yields results epistemically firmer and higher than 
science and prior to science (1995, pp. 2-11). For him, moderate naturalism suggests “a 
fundamental reorientation in our study of epistemic practices: one more akin to an historically-, 
socially-and cognitively-minded anthropology than to mathematics”. (1995, p. 5) 
9 
 
By rejecting some features of traditional philosophy, such as seeing a priori 
method as a paradigmatic route to the acquisition of truths and seeing philosophy 
as epistemologically prior and foundational to science, Maffie hopes to 
differentiate his position from some traditional positions that accept the idea that 
scientific paradigms are essential or useful in philosophical investigations but 
decline subscription to naturalism.  
Arguably, philosophers such as Sorell, Kim, and Maffie, who are critical of 
scientistic tendencies in philosophy, identify Quine’s version of naturalism in 
particular, and naturalism in general, with Hempel- and Oppenheim’s quest for 
the “unity of science” in which attempts were made to reduce all cognitive 
enterprises to science. Hempel et al wanted to establish that only explanations 
that conform to the deductive nomological model of explanation (which is a model 
of explanation in science) are to be regarded as genuine explanations (Hempel & 
Oppenheim, 1948). In this regard, the reason for the arguments for eliminative 
naturalism and the quest for the DNM model of explanation in all cognitive fields 
will be an attempt to grant science what Maffie calls “epistemic monopoly” 
(Maffie, 1995, p. 1).  
If naturalism is defined as an “anthropology of epistemology” as suggested by 
Maffie, how can it escape the kinds of criticisms raised against Quine’s naturalized 
epistemology? It should be noted that many epistemologists have argued that 
while both psychology and anthropology are descriptive cognitive fields, 
epistemology is essentially normative (Goldman, 1993b; Kim, 1994; Kornblith, 
1983, 1994b; Stroud, 1985).  This is a problem that both Maffie and Sorell did not 
address. What of Maffie’s idea that a naturalistic stance in epistemology 
necessitates the adoption of an approach that seeks to understand each 
phenomenon in terms of the life circumstances in which it is organically situated 
and sustained (1995, p. 5)? 
Arguably, this position resembles Dewey’s version of naturalism. One of the 
fundamental tenets of Dewey’s naturalism is expressed in the claim that 
everything: the different stages in the development of science, philosophy, songs, 
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culture, magic, religion, and so on, are “growth-processes”, having the same 
naturalist account with “the growth from infancy to maturity, or the development 
of a melodic theme” (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 224-225). For him, they are responses, 
at different stages, emanating from human transactions with nature.2 Dewey’s 
naturalist model of “growth”, as noted by Thomas Alexander, is that, “growth is 
the genuine realization of possibilities between the organism and its environment” 
(T. M. Alexander, 1987, p. 32). Dewey’s strongest naturalist claim is that every 
human transaction finds origin in some symbiotic relations with nature, a natural 
account that explains cultural differences in terms of contextual, superficial or 
circumstantial differences in the modes of responses and consequently “growth”. 
Thus, unlike Dewey’s more comprehensive account, Maffie did not explain how 
such cultural-based naturalist epistemology will address the problem of cultural 
relativism that is bound to confront his anthropological epistemology. It is in this 
sense that Dewey’s naturalism promises a more comprehensive account of 
naturalism. 
If naturalism is a philosophical position, what kind of position is it? Some 
naturalists have seen it as a substantive theoretical position that offers answers to 
metaphysical or ontological questions in philosophy. This is what I explore in the 
next section. 
1.2.1 Naturalism and Metaphysics 
There are several different conceptions of naturalism as a metaphysical position 
in philosophy. In this section, I consider naturalism as a rejection of 
supernaturalism, and as a physicalist or materialist position. I consider how these 
positions raise questions concerning the identity, autonomy or substantiveness of 
the discipline of philosophy in the age of science. Consequently, I discuss how 
these different metaphysical understandings of naturalism generate problems 
                                                     
2 Dewey describes changes in organisms and nature, as a result of the symbiotic relations to be 
understood naturalistically as “a more extensive history of nature” (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 225). 
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such reductionism and eliminativism. I start by exploring the idea that naturalism 
opposes supernaturalism. 
1.2.2 Understanding naturalism as a rejection of supernaturalism. 
The rejection of supernatural entities (such as God, gods, ghosts, spirits, souls, and 
vital spirits) has been considered by some philosophers as the simplest and most 
common definition of naturalism (Dupre, 2004, pp. 36-38; Kai, 2001) . From this 
point of view, entities in the physical world like human beings, chairs, rocks, stones, 
and other physical entities are regarded as “natural” or “material”. Events 
involving any of these entities in space and time are called natural events. Given 
the fact that these physical entities are subject to laws of nature, they are said to 
lie within the normal course of nature. Supernatural entities on the other hand are 
said to be immaterial things existing outside the normal course of nature. 
According to Dupre, antisupernaturalists reject the idea that supernatural entities 
exist as immaterial things, which are not “space-occupiers” and whose physical 
engagements in the material world cannot fall into the subject-matter of physics. 
From this position, one can easily define naturalism as a theory that affirms that 
only material entities or natural things exist (2004, p. 37). 
Dupre noted that there are “perfectly respectable immaterial entities like 
concepts, numbers or hypotheses”. He is not alone in this opinion.  In the 
philosophy of mathematics, debate is on-going between scholars who believe that 
mathematical objects (numbers and sets) have some type of objectively real status 
that we can access in some ways, on one hand, and those who believe that 
mathematics is obviously not about anything but a self-contained system of 
discourse, on the other. Several philosophers subscribe to Plato’s theory that 
mathematical objects are outside physical space, abstract, eternal, unchanging, 
and necessarily existing (Howell & Bradley, 2001, pp. 65-66; Maddy, 1992, p. 21; 
Putnam, 2001, p. 150; Quine, 1981a)    If mathematical objects are immaterial and 
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are nonetheless accepted as ontologically real, then, the argument of the anti-
supernaturalists that only material objects exist will become weakened.3  
In addition, Dupre raised the possibility of considering immaterial entities like “the 
concept of revolution” and immaterial phenomena like “class struggle” as having 
causal powers (in the sense of being harbingers of changes in the world), but he 
seems to have conceded (too easily) this possibility on the ground that this “sense 
of causal power” is not acceptable in naturalism (or better still, in physics) (Dupre, 
2004, p. 37). However, it could be argued that the conception of “cause” and the 
enumeration of causal agencies in physics are different from what obtains in 
anthropology, sociology or history. If quantum mechanics tells us that what 
actually occupy space are not physical entities but waves (Dupre, 2004, pp. 37-38), 
then, we have no reason to accept that an entity needs to be material before it 
could exist or be a legitimate causal agent. So the antisupernaturalists’ 
conceptions of “natural” and “material” are controversial. The rejection of 
supernatural entities, according to Dupre, is based on the controversial premise 
that the ontological account offered by physics (and no other science) is correct 
(2004, pp. 55-58). 
In Stroud’s view, the naturalist position that only material or physical things exist 
is not acceptable, since it will imply that there are no psychological facts. The fact 
that people do have thoughts, beliefs, and care about things, according to him, is 
a pointer to the fact that the world is more than physical things alone (2004, p. 
27). His more biting argument, however, is that naturalists’ claim that only physical 
things exist is not a conclusion that is arrived at naturalistically, because it contains 
a claim that goes beyond all the physical facts said to be available to the naturalists 
(2004, p. 27).  
                                                     
3 The disagreement seems to rest on different notions of “immaterial” and “physical”. A similar 
argument ensued in science. A scientist may argue that an electron is “immaterial” because “it is 
so much smaller as to be appreciable by our methods of measurement of material masses” 
(Bousfield & Bousfield, 1927). Others may argue that despite its sizelessness or masslessness, it is 
“material” or even “physical”, because it is observable. 
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Philosophers such as Plantinga have also argued that a naturalist who denies the 
existence of the creative deity but accepts contemporary evolutionary theory, is 
irrational. He argues that if naturalism is associated with the metaphysical thesis 
or view that only natural objects, kinds, and properties are real, then naturalists 
would have a problem incorporating into their thesis the evolutionary theory that 
human beings have been able to avoid extinction because of certain mechanisms 
they have been endowed with that enable them to adapt to varying and hazardous 
circumstances of nature (2002, pp. 1-12). His point is that evolutionary theorists 
have been able to explain how some mechanisms enabled human beings to 
survive but that Christian theism has explained why the mechanisms have been 
put there in the first place by an intelligent God. For Plantinga, naturalism needs 
evolutionary theory to be theoretically relevant, but evolutionary theory includes 
a clause that turns out to be a defeater for naturalism. However, it is notable that 
the theory of intelligent design is controversial in a way that evolutionary theory 
is not. However, exploring this argument is not part of present purposes. What is 
important is that it is very hard to get a non-controversial definition of what 
naturalism is, simply by rejecting supernaturalism.  
Turning to naturalists such as Dewey makes the attempt to understand naturalism 
as a rejection of supernaturalism more problematic. For instance, Dewey rejects 
natural/supernatural distinctions as one of the dualist themes that he 
emphatically describes as dialectical “classificatory devices”. (Other classifications 
include: body/mind, nature/man, object/subject and appearance/reality). He 
contends that bifurcations emanate from traditional metaphysics, which he 
describes as dialectical, transcendental, unempirical, and consequently non-
naturalistic. Regarding these “classificatory devices” and the numerous pseudo-
problems they created, he writes: 
The most widespread of these classificatory devices, the one of greatest appeal, is 
that which divides existence into the supernatural and natural.... There is a long story 
between the primitive forms of this division of objects of experience and the 
dialectical imputation to the divine of omnipotence, omniscience, eternity and infinity, 
in contrast with the attribution to man and experienced nature of finitude, weakness, 
limitation, struggle and change… One realm is the home of assured appropriation and 
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possession; the other of striving, transiency and frustration… It pleases man to 
substitute the dialectic exercise of showing how the “finite” can exist with or within 
the “infinite” for the problem of dealing with the contingent…. Wisdom then consists 
in administration of the temporal, finite, and human in its relation to the eternal and 
infinite, by means of dogma and cult, rather than in regulation of the events of life by 
understanding of actual conditions (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 48-49). 
Dewey’s reason for his rejection of a natural/supernatural bifurcation seems to 
shed more light on what naturalism is than merely seeing naturalism as a rejection 
of supernaturalism. For him, the distinction between natural and supernatural is 
arrived at through a priori reasoning and conceptual analysis (1925, pp. 1-36). Thus, 
it is dialectical rather than empirical and experimental. The distinction is 
consequently superficial and artificial. Naturalism, for him, necessitates focusing 
on what he calls “the inclusive integrity of experience” (1925, p. 11). For him, this 
reveals that man is part of nature and all his experience (esthetical, intellectual, 
moral, social, cultural and religious) emanates from symbiotic relations with 
nature. Consequently, Dewey thinks that his account of human experience offers 
natural explanations or bases for phenomena such as supernatural experience and 
phenomena.  
In Experience and Nature, Dewey’s central argument is that only a naturalistic 
metaphysics that uses empirical methods of inquiry, appeals to evolutionary 
theories, and to other paradigms in the sciences, can give a correct account of 
experience, reality or existence. For him, a consistent naturalist will reject any 
bifurcation between nature and human experience. The refusal lies in resisting any 
dialectical interpretation of the multifaceted manifestations of nature in terms of 
tagging precarious things (or phenomena) as “natural” and stable things as 
supernatural in the sense of being outside nature. According to him, for a 
naturalistic study of nature, “the starting point is precisely the existing mixture of 
the regular and dependable and the unsettled and uncertain” within nature (1925, 
p. 49). This is one of the most fundamental tenets of Dewey’s naturalism. 
However, in spite of Dewey’s dismissal of natural/supernatural and 
transcendental/natural distinctions,  he seems to rely on a distinction between 
transcendental and non-transcendental to differentiate his version of metaphysics 
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from the traditional metaphysics he criticises, most especially in his bid to 
establish an empirical and practical metaphysics (1925, pp. 36, 140, 184-185, 305). 
Consequently, the rejection of transcendentalism can be stipulatively interpreted 
to affect not only idealist non-empirical claims that Dewey rejects, but empirical-
scientific claims that he would like to hold sacrosanct. For instance, just as it can 
necessitate the rejection of any metaphysical theories (for instance, Hegel’s 
idealist’ theory of absolute spirit) or epistemological theories (for instance, a 
conception of an absolute truth that relates to no particular context), it can also 
necessitate the rejection of scientific theories (for instance, the theory of “black 
holes” in science, evolutionary theories that precede human history) on the 
ground that they involve “transcendental” claims. The suggestion is that 
conceptualising naturalism as a dismissal of supernatural/natural or 
transcendental/non-transcendental distinctions may not significantly increase our 
understanding of what naturalism is. In chapters 2 and 3, a deeper exploration of 
Dewey’s’ naturalistic metaphysics and epistemology is expected to shed more 
light on his version of naturalism. I now turn to another attempt to understand 
naturalism as a physicalist position. 
1.2.3 Understanding naturalism as a physicalist or materialist position 
Several philosophers have described naturalism as the most prominent among 
philosophical theories in recent time, for instance, Wilfrid Sellars (1979). According 
to him, naturalists give full and unqualified credence to science in respect of answers to 
questions concerning the kinds of entities that exist. Naturalists often expressed their 
confidence in scientific ontology by appealing to the statement often credited to 
Wilfrid Sellars that “science is the measure of all things, of what is that is, and of 
what is not that it is not” (Kornblith, 2014b, p. 105). 
This trust in science usually covers two interrelated aspects: acceptance of the ontology and 
of the methodologies of science. For instance, Macarthur identifies the ontological thesis in 
naturalism as stating that “the only things that there are in the world are those things that are 
presupposed or posited by the successful sciences (2010, p. 125). Several philosophers have 
agreed that scientific knowledge and methodologies are more reliable than what obtains in 
other disciplines such as philosophy (Wagner & Warner, 1993, pp. 1-2), or maintained a 
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stronger claim that “our beliefs are ultimately justifiable only by the methods of science” 
(Baker, 2013, p. xvi).  
Others have seen the prominence of naturalism in its possibility of reshaping the 
entire human cognitive endeavour: methodologies, paradigms and the 
relationship between different cognitive disciplines (Wagner & Warner, 1993, p. 
1). Here, science becomes the paradigm of knowledge and every account of what exists must 
be countenanced by science. However, as pointed out by De Caro and Macarthur, there is a 
specific ontological account mostly favoured by naturalists - an account of (empirical) causal 
influence on physical processes (2010, p. 4). Consequently, the possibility of naturalism is 
interpreted as the possibility of identifying a branch of science with this particular credible 
ontology to serve as a paradigm for knowledge. However, philosophers who are anti-
naturalists argue that naturalism is synonymous with scientism- the pejorative description of 
science as the only true form of knowledge. But for some naturalists, scientism is not as 
derogatory as often implied.4 Is naturalism synonymous with scientism? If it is, how can seeing 
naturalism as scientism be philosophically interesting? If it is not, what is the distinction 
between them?5 
1.2.3.1 Extreme naturalism: Understanding naturalism from the idea that 
physics is the image of science 
Macarthur discusses how some philosophers see physics as the only irreducible 
and legitimate science (2010, p. 128). He cites their major reason; that “the only 
entities there in the world are those posited by (current or idealized) physics and 
that this makes the ontology of microphysics, “the only science worth taking 
seriously”. Consequently, physics is regarded as the image of all natural sciences. 
Macarthur identifies the version of naturalism that is based on this view as 
extreme (2010, p. 126).   
                                                     
4 While acknowledging the pejorative connotation of scientism, Jerry Fodor defines it differently, 
as comprising two claims: ‘that the goals of scientific inquiry include the discovery of objective 
empirical truths” and that “science has come pretty close to achieving this goal at least from time 
to time”. He defines scientism as “the scientist’s philosophy of science”. This is a phrase credited 
to Hilary Putnam (2002, p. 30). 
5 One might disagree that scientism and physicalism are the same thing. For instance, one might 
claim that scientism is methodological while physicalism is ontological. The question is: How does 
this stance shed light on naturalism? 
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Wagner and Warner observed that physics assumed a leading or autonomous role 
between 1600 and 1850 which led it to be regarded as the first among other fields 
of science such as chemistry and biology. With the success of science and physics 
being assumed as the ‘face’ of science, there is a tendency to give credence to 
physical theories and the ontological account they favour.  
We take naturalism to be the view only natural science deserves full and unqualified 
credence. ‘Physicalism’ would seem to connote a narrower view that privileges 
specifically physics, as opposed to natural science in general (Wagner & Warner, 1993, 
p. 1) . 
Consequently, for Wagner and Warner, “underlying the ontological approach is 
the idea that reality is physical reality” and more importantly, “the thrust of 
naturalism, on this view, is that we should believe only in physical things” (Wagner 
& Warner, 1993, p. 12).  
Wagner and Warner give another explanation for how treating physics as the only 
science worth taking seriously, works, using the truths in physics to measure truths 
in other scientific and non-scientific discourses. For instance, disciplines such as 
philosophy and folk psychology (that deal with claims involving intentional and 
epistemological notions) can be regarded as non-naturalistic by pointing out the 
differences between the claims and discourses those disciplines favour and what 
physics does. For Wagner and Warner, “the naturalists compare our intentional 
descriptions with descriptions in the language of physics and find the former 
deficient in point of precision, clarity, empirical power, and the like. Folk 
psychology is judged as science and falls short”. The suggestion in this explanation 
is that naturalism recommends that any ontological account (metaphysics, 
biological, etc.) that is incompatible with the ontology of micro-physics is either 
eliminated or reduced to physics. Here, incompatibility is defined in terms of 
positing ontology that physics will regard as recalcitrant: 
A naturalist would characteristically claim that such key philosophical notions as mind, 
cause, self, or knowledge are indeed important objects of study but that their serious 
use requires, at least in the long run, “naturalization.” That is, such notions are to be 
defined strictly from terms of established science (perhaps science of the future). 
Alternatively, one might hold that naturalistic counterparts or analogs of these 
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notions should ultimately replace them. Either way, the commitment is to making our 
talk of mind, self, and allied notions scientific (Wagner & Warner, 1993, p. 3).   
The main suggestion is that naturalization is always the focus when naturalists are 
dealing with philosophical problems. The process of naturalization is defined 
essentially as re-describing philosophical concepts or phenomena strictly in 
scientific terms with the scope of ‘science’ recognized within microphysics. This 
reductionism takes two forms: naturalization and elimination. For instance, to 
“naturalize” the functioning of the human mind, we must re-define it in some 
terms such as neurons firing in the brain, rather than giving a philosophical 
explanation by ascribing some cognitive powers to the human mind. To naturalize 
the philosophical concept ‘knowledge’ we can define it in terms of some cognitive 
processes. In this regard, to “naturalize” a concept simply means to redefine it in a way that 
is free from a priori or common-sense conceptualizations (Wagner & Warner, 1993, p. 3). For 
Macarthur, naturalization as “semantic projects” aims “to reduce or explain the concepts in 
some supposedly problematic area of discourses … in favour of scientifically kosher 
concepts”(2010, p. 125).  The alternative is to drop problematic concepts (such as 
“mind “or “consciousness” in philosophy of mind and “knowledge” in 
epistemology) altogether by replacing ‘mind’ with the neuroscientific concept of 
human brain and ‘knowledge’ with cognition, which are their analogs in science.   
David Macarthur also identifies three ideas that served as “ideological props” for 
extreme metaphysical scientific naturalism: (i) strict physicalism, the metaphysical 
doctrine stating that “all that exists in the world are posits of physics as it stands”: 
(ii) the metaphysical idea that the world has a single causal structure (causal 
fundamentalism), and (iii) the metaphysical idea that the sciences must constitute 
an ultimate unity (the unity of science) (2010, pp. 130-131). 
How instructive is this version of naturalism? If naturalism advocates that we 
believe only in physical things, is the truth of physicalism vindicated? I don’t think 
so, because we need first to establish the truth of this version of naturalism. At 
best, it will vindicate the claim that naturalism is a metaphysical theory. For 
extreme naturalists, naturalism defines a new conception of philosophy or a new 
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preoccupation for philosophers. It also defines a new conception of the 
relationship between science and philosophy. 
I think the picture of naturalism from our discussion so far is sketchy. For instance, 
if naturalism recognises physics as independent and the only image of science, it 
means that other sciences are reducible to physics. It will affirm the theses 
Papineau described as “the internal completeness of physics (1993, pp. 13-16). 
However, the fact that mathematics is indispensable in microphysics seems to 
suggest that the supposed completeness of physics is not correct. For Macarthur, 
the failure of the deductive nomological conception of science is another factor 
that renders false the notion of physics as the only image of science. For him, the 
deductive nomological conception of science was “built around generalizing the 
case of an idealized physics” (Macarthur, 2010, p. 129).  
In addition, noting the importance of evolutionary theory and genetics in 
contemporary sciences, Macarthur points out the growing consensus that biology 
is another distinct paradigm of science (2010, p. 128). He concludes that “the 
failure of the programs to reduce all science to physics implies that naturalist 
ontology must reflect whatever scientific explanations are successful, whether or 
not they lie outside the domain of physics” (2010, p. 130). So, this contentious idea 
that physics is the image of science can’t give us a firm grip on what naturalism is.  
Moreover, Macarthur contends that the program of naturalization implies the 
assumption that there is a stark divergence between what Sellars called “the 
scientific and manifest image of the world”. He argues that: 
If the world is nothing but the world-as-posited-by-the-sciences then we confront the 
problem of how to “place” items that appear in the more expansive manifest image 
in the restrictive world that science has supposedly revealed to us (Macarthur, 2010, 
p. 126). 
Macarthur’s argument is that science need not be defined as radically opposed to 
common sense “experience” of the world. Put differently or in a wider perspective, 
the contention is that the reductionist or eliminativist stance of radical ontological 
naturalism poses a threat to metaphysical theories that recognise both physical and non-
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physical aspects of reality, such as dualism and double-aspect theory. If naturalism is 
synonymous with physicalism, it follows that all non-physicalist theories must be reduced to 
physicalist theories or eliminated. However, it is arguable that one-stance views on issues are 
rare in critical philosophy. For instance, in philosophy of mind, the argument about the 
possibility of explaining human consciousness through the activity of the brain is arguably 
inconclusive. More importantly, the relevance of physicalist theories in some domains in 
philosophy such as morality, aesthetics and language is not clear.   
Dewey’s naturalist metaphysics suggests that naturalism is not synonymous with 
physicalism. He disassociates his naturalism from physicalism (or reductive 
materialism) by rejecting the monist view that strictly identifies human mind as 
brain or reducible to physiological processes. He sees human mind as evolved from 
and remaining rooted in material existence (J. Dewey, Sidney, & Nagel, 1994). In 
addition, physicalism or reductive materialism offers a uniform or reductionist 
view about reality that is not compatible with Dewey’s pluralist conception of 
reality.  For him, physicalism or materialism is just one of the numerous ways of 
describing aspects of nature that feature in human transactions within it.  
However, his stronger argument is that a naturalist inquiry need not start with 
highly technical philosophical theories (such as physicalism, materialism and 
behaviourism) or with distinctions between physical, chemical, biological or 
behavioural regions of science because these are special or technical coinages (or 
divisions of the subject-matters of inquiry or functional categories) which are 
developed at some advanced “stages of inquiry” (J. Dewey & Bentley, 1949, pp. 
65, 299) which he calls “secondary” and cognitive” human experience. For Dewey, 
the natural starting point is the primary experience in which humans have crude, 
non-reflective or non-cognitive transaction within nature (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 7). 
Thus, a naturalist account of reality must go beyond physicalism or materialism 
and focus on what he calls the “inclusive experience”(J. Dewey, 1925, p. 11). This 
includes: 
what men do and suffer, what they strive for, love, believe and endure, and also how 
men act and are acted upon, the ways in which they do and suffer, desire and enjoy, 
see, believe imagine… (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 10). 
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Dewey’s point is that physicalism cannot provide a complete picture of human 
experience within reality. Thus, it arguable that Dewey’s naturalism explores the 
“foundation” of human environment-organism transaction and how it informs all 
cognitive human endeavours: politics, magic, morality, religion, music, and what 
he calls esthetics. This refutes the assumption noted by Macarthur in radical 
naturalism that the world posited by science radically opposes the world of 
common sense.  I discuss Dewey’s naturalist conceptions of reality and human 
experience in depth in Chapter 2 showing his conception of how human 
transactions in nature provides the basis for understanding how all cognitive 
human efforts complement one another. I also offer a deeper discussion of 
Dewey’s account of how human secondary or cognitive experience provides a 
framework for epistemological naturalism in chapter 3. I now turn to discuss the 
version of naturalism that recognizes the combination of physics, biology, and 
chemistry (hard sciences) as providing the correct picture of reality. I examine the 
suggestion that this version offers new and deeper analyses of naturalism beyond 
physicalism or eliminative materialism. I also discuss how Dewey’s naturalism 
challenges this view through his instrumentalist conception of science. 
1.2.3.2 Understanding naturalism from the contention that the ontology in 
“hard” or natural sciences provides the only pathway to reality 
Macarthur, Wagner and Warner noted the narrowness of science that is implied 
in the idea that physics is the only science worth taking seriously. According to 
them, “the self-described physicalists also endorse chemistry, ecology, 
neuroanatomy, and the like”, consequently, the supposed demarcation between 
physics and other natural sciences is questionable (Macarthur, 2010, p. 126; 
Wagner & Warner, 1993, p. 1), . In addition, Wagner and Warner note that, 
“science”, apart from its scope, means the recognition of an acceptable standard 
for empirical and experimental methodologies, paradigms, and goals (1993, p. 9) 
Perhaps, these are what all natural sciences have in common and  are not the 
monopoly of any field in natural science. For instance, the theory of natural 
selection has become a standard paradigm of knowledge in the sciences although 
its origin can be traced to evolutionary biology. There is also the common saying 
22 
 
that mathematics is the language of all sciences. Thus, what is called “science” is 
not physics alone but the combination of all fields of natural sciences.  
What are the impacts of this enlarged scope of science on our understanding of 
what naturalism is? First, the view that naturalism can be explained through the 
tenets of physicalism (for instance, the idea of supremacy of the ontology of 
microphysics) will be untenable. For instance, if mathematics is accepted as 
science (as the language of hard sciences) and mathematical objects such as 3, +, 
and x are abstract (in terms of being non-spatial and non-causal (not entering into 
causal relations with other objects) as argued by philosophers such as Plato, 
Russell (1959), Quine (1980) and Putnam (1971), then the idea that the ontology 
of microphysics is complete will be false.6 More importantly, the presumption that 
strict adherence to physicalism provides an explanation of what naturalism is will 
become problematic. 
Secondly, it is arguable that a version of naturalism that recognizes only physics, 
chemistry, and biology as “the science” on the presumption that only through the 
ontology of the natural sciences can reality be known, is endorsing the elimination 
or reduction of the human or “soft” sciences such as sociology, anthropology, 
history, and demography. In this sense, Alex Rosenberg will be correct in stating 
that naturalism is a position defending the positivist insight that objective 
knowledge can be certified “independent of its social and psychological context” 
(1996, p. 3). However, Rosenberg seems to be wrong when we consider various 
attempts that have been made to convey a “naturalist framework” into social 
sciences. Such attempts include: (i) considerations on the possibility of applying 
natural laws to the study of society, culture, economics (K. Russell, 1971, pp. 3-17) 
and historical explanations (Hempel, 1965, pp. 35-48) and (ii) the possibility of 
objective or value-free inquiries in social sciences (Winch, 1958). However, I will 
not evaluate the success of these attempts. 
                                                     
6 It is important to note that philosophers such as Kitcher (1984) and Maddy (1990) have also 
attempted a rejoinder that mathematical objects are about physical objects. However, this debate 
is not part of the scope of this thesis. 
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It is arguable that, like the version of naturalism that endorsed the ontology of 
micro-physics discussed earlier, this version also can be challenged as a 
reductionist program because it implies the imposition of the modes of 
explanation in the sciences (deductive or causal models of explanation and 
laboratory experimentation) on social sciences despite having subject-matters 
that are significantly different from natural sciences. The reductionist challenge 
can also be extended to the idea of a value-neutral social sciences, reducing value-
laden social sciences to value- free ones.  
What is Dewey’s view in reference to the idea that the truth of the ontological 
accounts offered by natural science is sacrosanct? Fundamental to Dewey’s 
philosophy is his naturalistic and instrumentalist conception of science, in which 
natural sciences are naturalistically explained as means towards “human survival”. 
According to Dewey, 
Neither science nor technology is an impersonal cosmic force. They operate only in 
the medium of human desire, foresight, aim and effort. Science and technology are 
transactions in which man and nature work together and in which the human factor 
is directly open to modification and direction (J. Dewey, 1968, p. 26). 
However, given Dewey’s instrumentalism, technological or engineering sciences 
become his model of science.  He writes: 
What is sometimes termed “applied” science, may then be more truly science than is 
what is conventionally called pure science.  For it is directly concerned with not just 
instrumentalities, but instrumentalities at work in effecting modifications of existence 
in behalf of conclusions that are reflectively preferred (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 134). 
Thus, for Dewey, a philosopher is a naturalist when she recognises the 
instrumentality of all human cognitive endeavours. This instrumentalism is 
defined in recognition of the fact that every attempt to understand nature began 
from some problematic human experience that cognitive endeavours are meant 
to resolve. In addition, nature is inherently an instrument to be manipulated or 
modified in order to enhance human survival. This is perhaps the greatest 
challenge to the two versions of naturalism that we have discussed in two ways. 
Another challenge is that Dewey’s account of human raw encounter or transaction 
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within nature (naturalist metaphysics) precedes science and consequently 
provides a natural starting point for all cognitive inquiries. More importantly, there 
are cognitive and non-cognitive aspects of this transaction that engender both 
value-free and value-laden inquiries. Consequently, there is no need to reduce one 
aspect of this transaction to another. In chapter 2, I discuss Dewey’s account of 
how scientific and non-scientific inquiries complement one another.   
1.3.2.3 Broadest naturalism: Understanding naturalism from the perspectival ontologies of 
both natural and human sciences 
The third popular naturalist position discussed by Macarthur admits that the 
sciences comprise both the hard sciences (physics, chemistry and biology) and 
some human sciences: “those that are pulling their explanatory weight seriously” 
(Macarthur, 2010, p. 126). Macarthur suggests that we take the position of the 
naturalists who recognise both natural sciences and some human sciences as more 
credible (broad scientific naturalism). 
What are the consequences or implications of the idea that disciplines such as 
economics, sociology and anthropology are included in the scope of “science” for 
our understanding of naturalism? Debates in contemporary philosophy of the 
social sciences seem to favour the idea that physicalism is not a consensus in social 
sciences.7 Consequently, there will be different perspectives on ontology: while 
micro-physics will represent a perspective on ontology, behavioural psychology 
may emphasise a different aspect. 
How does this shed light on our attempt to define naturalism? One suggestion is 
that naturalism will be a position that encourages philosophers to appeal to any 
paradigms in any field of the sciences. For instance, David Papineau, like Wagner 
and Warner, recognises the paradigmatic roles that the ontology of science plays 
                                                     
7 In these debates, philosophers such as David Papineau have argued that physicalism forms a 
consensus in the social sciences (Papineau, 2009, pp. 103-123). Others, such as Philip Gorski have 
argued that consensus in respect of physicalism is weak in areas of human sciences such as 
behavioural economics. His contention is that, while “actors” qua persons are directly observable, 
phenomena such as “desires’. “beliefs” and “opportunities “in the human sciences where 
phenomena such as human “desires”, “beliefs” and “opportunities” that feature as important 
subject-matters are not (Gorski, 2009, pp. 147-196; 179). 
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and how scientific categories are needed to explain the behaviour of matter, which 
indicates that “the continuity of philosophy and empirical science is 
uncontentious”. However, he notes that this fact does not imply “that 
philosophical issues are not different from kinds of issues normally addressed by 
natural scientists” (Papineau, 1993, pp. 2-3). Commenting on the work of Brian 
Leiter on Nietzsche’s naturalism, Christopher Janaway and Simon Robertson agree 
that Nietzsche is not a substantive naturalist in terms of defending that “only the 
properties picked out by the laws of physical sciences are real”, but that he seeks 
“to reveal the causal determinants” of human phenomena by locating them in, 
and explaining them mainly in terms of, “physiological and psychological facts 
about persons” (Janaway & Robertson, 2012, pp. 5-6).8 Thus, from this view, a 
naturalist is a philosopher who is at home with science “once she realises how 
central it is to her ongoing effort to understand the world” (Maddy, 2007, p. 2). 
Consequently, the suggestion seems to point at a quest for an interdisciplinary 
approach to gaining knowledge as our best understanding of what naturalism is. 
The problem with understanding naturalism in this sense is that, some 
philosophers who are often referred to as anti-naturalists due to their notion of 
that irreducibility of philosophy (such as Hilary Putnam and Donald Davidson),9 are 
disposed to the idea of philosophers’ appealing to paradigms in the sciences. In 
addition, Macarthur notes that some philosophers who are scientific naturalists 
(such as Frank Jackson, David Armstrong and David Lewis) understand “scientific 
naturalism” “as being opposed to certain traditional or outmoded forms of 
metaphysics but not to metaphysics as such” (Macarthur, 2010, p. 129). In 
Conscious Mind, David Chalmers contends that the physicalist or scientific 
                                                     
8 It should be noted, however, that, while Janaway and Robertson think that Leiter interprets 
Nietzsche’s locating and explaining human phenomenon in terms of ‘physiological and 
psychological facts about persons’ as equivalent to reducing the bulk of human phenomena to 
‘psycho-physiological states and process’, they are sceptical about this supposed reduction (the 
‘substantive’ or radical interpretation of his naturalism) based on the suggestion that it might be 
very difficult to read Nietzsche as a subscriber to some systematic, mechanistic, or scientistic views 
about human beings (Janaway & Robertson, 2012, pp. 3, 6).  
9 For instance, Putnam pursues the argument that “the idea that philosophy is not to be identified 
with science is not to deny the intimate relation between science and philosophy” (Putnam, 2010, 
p. 94). 
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approach to the nature of consciousness can only provide explanations concerning 
how consciousness works in the brain but not what consciousness irreducibly is. 
He tagged what the scientific approach can explain as the “easy” problem while 
the problem presumed to be beyond science is tagged the “hard” problem 
(Chalmers, 1996). Thus, what is problematic about defining naturalism is how to 
distinguish between naturalists and their rivals once they admit that physicalism 
only applies to some aspects of metaphysics or that some aspects of philosophy 
are irreducible to science. 
Consequently, it is notable that philosophers are bothered concerning how 
substantive or autonomous philosophy can be in any naturalistic quest for the 
adoption of interdisciplinary approaches. Is philosophy autonomous, superfluous 
or an appendage to science? Apparently, all the versions of naturalism we have 
considered so far are incapable of showing how to defend the substantiveness of 
philosophy in a naturalistic formulation. It is in this sense that turning to Dewey’s 
version of naturalism becomes important, most especially in the sense in which he 
explores how scientists, naturalist metaphysicians and naturalist epistemologists 
can play equally substantive roles in human cognitive endeavours and quests for 
survival in the world.  
In Experience and Nature, Dewey’s approach takes three important steps toward 
the establishment of a metaphysics and an epistemology that complement 
scientific endeavours. Firstly, he rejects the traditional dichotomy between 
humanity and nature on the ground that naturalism teaches us that man is part of 
nature. Secondly, he argues that human experience points to the precarious and 
settled aspects of nature. For him, “it is not experience which is experienced, but 
nature – stones, plants, animals, temperature, electricity… Things interacting in 
certain ways are experience….” (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 4). Seeing experience as 
subjective consciousness of particular individual human beings, as traditional 
metaphysics does, is unnaturalistic. Thirdly, he argues that we have primary-
cognitive and secondary-cognitive components of experience. The non-cognitive 
experience form the subject-matter of a naturalistic metaphysics while the 
cognitive aspects form the preoccupation of science and thus creating a “division 
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of labour” between the two cognitive endeavours (1925, pp. 113-123). Finally, he 
concludes that experience is the only subject-matter for both science and 
philosophy. For him “the natural sciences not only draw their materials from 
primary experience, but they refer it back again for test” (1925, p. 7). I discussed 
these arguments in detail in chapter two where Dewey’s metaphysics was 
extensively explored. I next will turn to discuss the possibilities of understanding 
naturalism from epistemological claims of naturalists. 
1.3 Naturalism and epistemology 
In this section, I discuss the possibility of understanding what naturalism is from 
philosophers’ quest for the adoption of the methods of science in philosophical 
investigations. This quest is often described as methodological naturalism. I will 
also discuss the views of some naturalists on two specific questions dominating 
traditional epistemology. The first is: In the age of science, what is the fate of the 
normative concerns of epistemology? The second is: What is the position of 
naturalism on the problems of scepticism? I start with the former.  
1.3.1 Understanding naturalism from philosophers’ quest for the adoption of 
scientific methodologies 
Methodological naturalism is another prominent theme that has arisen in defining 
naturalism. It is often described as naturalists’ quest for the adoption of scientific 
methods in domains such as philosophy and is usually treated as a corollary of 
ontological naturalism. For instance, while MacArthur defines the ontological 
claim of naturalism in terms of commitment to only those things that are the 
objects of successful scientific inquiry, he defines the methodological claim as “the 
only genuine and irreducible form of knowledge or understanding is that resulting 
from the methods of inquiry of the successful sciences” (2010, p. 125).  Steve 
Clarke defines naturalism as involving a primary commitment to scientific 
methodology and to the idea that any naturalistic ontological commitments must 
be compatible with this primary commitment (2009, p. 127). What is implied in 
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these definitions is that the methodological claim is a necessary precondition for 
the ontological. 
However, there is disagreement among naturalists on whether the 
methodological claim applies to all cognitive endeavours. Consequently, I discuss 
the position of naturalists who insist on the use of scientific methods alone. I call 
this radical methodological naturalism. I also discuss the position of those who 
defend the usefulness or relevance of some non-scientific methods. I call this 
moderate methodological naturalism. Rather than evaluating the plausibility of 
any of these classifications, my focus is on the extent to which we can understand 
what naturalism is all about from their respective positions. 
1.4.1.1 Radical methodological naturalism and the problems concerning the 
idea of a unified scientific methods 
Many naturalists claim that the methods of inquiry in the natural sciences are the 
only genuine sources of knowledge and understanding. Successful discovery of 
laws and the nature of nature are often cited as the reason for this claim. The 
effectiveness of scientific methods is often attributed to the use of explanations 
involving only natural causes and natural processes. Apart from the claim that only 
methods of science can give genuine and irreducible forms of knowledge, another 
claim often made about the success of science is that the methods of the natural 
sciences are applicable to all cognitive endeavours. For Akeel Bilgrami, naturalists 
claim that “there is nothing in the world that is not countenanced by the method 
of natural science” (2010, p. 2). This is a radical position. One consequence is that 
other non-scientific methods such as the use of analysis and intuitions in 
philosophy, are often regarded as non-empirical or non-scientific and 
consequently are regarded as incapable of leading to empirical truths about the 
empirical world (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 1-36).  
However, this view faces several problems. One is how to account for subject-
matters that do not fall under the scope of sciences in a non-reductive or non-
eliminative way. We have already discussed how naturalists are confronted with 
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the challenge of explaining non-empirical mathematical and abstract entities 
which are non-empirical (De Caro & Macarthur, 2010, p. 4). Consequently, I will 
not repeat the argument here. I only note the continued elusiveness of what 
naturalism amounts to. 
Sheldon discusses a different problem confronting radical methodological 
naturalists- the vagueness of what are innocently called “scientific methods” and 
the “success of science” (1977, pp. 372-373). Sheldon meant that scientific 
methods are many and have different levels of success. Non-naturalists, such as 
Richard Rorty, have been noted for their arguments that there is no such thing as 
“scientific method”. According to a position credited to him by Wagner and 
Warner,  
Scientists attack their problems using procedure tied to a specific context and theory. 
For example, a basic method in recursion theory is to try to reduce a question to the 
halting problem. A method of elementary mechanics is to ignore “small” forces, such 
as friction or the gravitational pull of distant stars. Such methods have no general 
application: it is nonsense to look for methods common to recursion theory, 
mechanics, and population biology. On the other hand, poets, historians, and bridge 
players have their context-specific methods, too. So, there is no useful distinction 
between scientific and non-scientific methods… Rorty would of course agree that 
designers of radio telescopes should not rely on poetry or commonsense physics. But 
on this view, science is just a set of beliefs and techniques used to solve certain 
problems…. Philosophical naturalism therefore makes no sense (Wagner & Warner, 
1993, p. 5). 
It seems there is no specific definition for “scientific methods” or succinct 
definition of what “science” is.  Consequently, it is arguable that merely stating 
that naturalists recommend the adoption of the methods of science, does not 
provide a clear-cut explanation of what naturalism is. I now discuss moderate 
methodological naturalism. 
1.4.1.2 Moderate methodological naturalism 
Moderate methodological naturalists rate the methods of science as more 
successful than other methods of inquiry. Consequently, many of them 
recommend that certain tenets in the methods of science be incorporated into 
other modes of inquiry such as philosophical methods. Emphasis has been placed 
30 
 
on the advantages of the empirical nature of scientific methods in terms of 
repeatable testability and the advantages inherent in the experimental aspect of 
the scientific methodology (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 1-36). However, what makes this 
position moderate is the contention that some non-scientific methodologies are 
nonetheless indispensable in certain subject-matters such as meaning, God (and 
other supernatural entities), moral facts and values, because the use of scientific 
methods (such as observation, experimentation or repeatedly testing or falsifying 
hypothesis) are not applicable. Bunge describes naturalists admitting such 
limitation as weak methodological naturalists (2010, p. 101). 
How useful is this version of naturalism? Firstly, I argue that it fails to shed light on 
the difference between naturalism and anti-naturalism. For instance, while 
naturalist philosophers such as Goldman (1993a), Kitcher (2002), and Kornblith 
(2014a) admitted that both a priori and scientific methods are relevant in 
philosophical investigations because it has both scientific and non-scientific 
subject-matters 10 , Roy Bhaskar  contended that positing “a cleavage in the 
method between the natural and social sciences” and grounding  it “in a 
differentiation of their subject-matters” points to an anti-naturalist tradition (1998, 
p. 1).  
The contention is that if moderate methodological naturalism admits that other 
non-scientific methods can be used along with the adopted methods of science, 
we need to ask: To what extent can non-empirical methods be used in a 
naturalistic philosophical investigation without compromising the naturalistic 
stance? Also, which method is better in situations where the use of non-scientific 
methods (such as analysis) leads to answers that are incompatible with science? A 
position stating that both scientific and traditional methods of philosophy are both 
                                                     
10  For instance, Goldman argues that the methods of science (empirical investigation and 
experimentation) are indispensable in establishing how our belief-forming processes produce 
beliefs that are true and a priori method of analysis is indispensable in determining how reliable 
these processes are (Goldman, 1993a, 1993b). 
31 
 
indispensable in philosophical investigations seems to imply that there are 
subject-matters in philosophy that methods of science are inadequate to solve.11  
In addition, philosophers, such as Donald Davidson, have been categorised as anti-
naturalist (or non-naturalist) for arguing that normative element is irreducible to 
human disposition and causal tendencies (Bilgrami, 2010, pp. 31-32).12 However, 
Davidson’s consistent preoccupation with causal explanations shows that he is 
comfortable with applying some scientific methods and paradigms in solving some 
philosophical problems. 13  The suggestion is that one does not need to be a 
naturalist to recognise or admit the usefulness of scientific methods.  
It is at this point that turning to Dewey’s version of naturalism is instructive. Dewey 
is in agreement with the idea that philosophical methods (such as dialectics, 
intuition, analysis) are inadequate for a naturalist and empiricist account of the 
knowledge of the empirical world.14 At best, he believes that these methods can 
be heuristically useful at the preliminary stages of investigations. However, he 
does not agree that only scientific methods can lead to truths about the world. He 
agrees that scientific methods of experimentation provide the paradigm for what 
he calls objective or cooperative investigations or inquiries (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 28). 
However, in his acknowledgement of the fact that not all subjects of inquiries can 
be approached through laboratory investigations, he endeavoured to establish a 
method that is consistent with his naturalistic tenets, which he called denotative 
empirical method. Dewey’s introduction of the denotative empirical method 
enhances the possibility of a metaphysics that is substantive and at the same time, 
                                                     
11 One of the ways used to draw the line between science and epistemology (and presenting the 
former as independent of the former), is stating that the former is essentially descriptive and the 
latter is essentially normative, and there is no way we can derive the normative from the 
descriptive (Kim, 1994; Stroud, 1985). 
12 James Pearson also contrasted Davidson with Quine by describing the position of the former as 
Humanism and the latter as Naturalism. He argues that their differences are irreconcilable 
(Pearson, 2011). I will not discuss his arguments here. 
13 For instance, he was preoccupied with how thinking can cause, without embracing Cartesian 
dualism, a position usually described as “Anomalous Monism”(Davidson, 1992). 
14 Dewey focused on this argument in the first chapter of Experience and Nature (J. Dewey, 1925, 
pp. 1-36). 
32 
 
complements science rather than being a rival. I discuss this method in detail in 
Chapter three under Dewey’s naturalistic epistemology. 
Dewey rejects the supposed contrast between naturalism and common sense. In 
seeing all human cognitive endeavours as actuated essentially by problematic 
situations 15  and recognising their instrumental framework and purpose, he 
defines both science and common sense as “transaction”. Firstly, he presents the 
idea of a symbiotic relationship between man and nature which refutes the notion 
of dualism between man and nature.16 It also indicates that activities from either 
make both undergo what Dewey calls a change of locus (J. Dewey & Bentley, 1949, 
p. 270).  For instance, a mutual change of locus takes place when human pollution 
causes climate change and climate change necessitates new human adaptational 
needs. Secondly, “transaction” is used more profoundly to portray the idea that 
all human cognitive efforts (science, common sense, arts, magic and so on) and all 
social institutions (religion, societies, and so on) “express nature exuberantly” (J. 
Dewey, 1925, p. 51). These are fundamental naturalistic theses in Dewey’s 
philosophy. Specifically, on common sense and science, he writes, 
The discussion that follows is appropriately introduced by saying that both common 
sense and science are to be treated as transactions. The use of this name has negative 
and positive implications. It indicates, negatively, that neither common sense nor 
science is regarded as an entity – as something set apart, complete and self-
enclosed. ... Positively, it points to the fact that both are treated as being marked by 
the traits and properties which are found in whatever is recognized to be a 
transaction: a trade, or commercial transaction, for example (J. Dewey & Bentley, 
1949, p. 270) . 
The suggestion is that science and common sense are both modes of inquiry, 
although scientific knowledge is qualitatively superior and noted for incomparable 
                                                     
15 For Dewey, the word “problematic” covers variety of occasions for inquiry. It covers situations 
“designated by such adjectives as confusing, perplexing, disturbed, unsettled, indecisive; and by 
such nouns as jars, hitches, breaks, blocks – in short, all incidents occasioning an interruption of 
the smooth, straightforward of course of behaviour and that deflect it into the kind of behaviour 
constituting inquiry” (J. Dewey & Bentley, 1949, p. 315).   
16  This symbiotic relation is often described by Dewey as human ‘transaction within nature’. 
Ontologically, it means that human beings are parts of the constituents that make up what we 
called ‘nature’. Epistemologically, transaction refers to “the history of the knower as himself 
developed and known within the known cosmos of his knowledge”(J. Dewey & Bentley, 1949, pp. 
136-137). My contention is that no dualism is implied in the use of this concept. 
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records of success. What these modes of inquiry have in common, however, is that, 
while each may address different questions, both ultimately originated from 
“interaction into which living creatures enter in connection with environing 
conditions” (J. Dewey, 1991, p. 118) and are ultimately characterised with the goal 
of how to understand and control nature.17 As rightly noted by Ronald Tobey, 
Dewey’s philosophical assumption is that “scientific method was only a more 
refined version of the common man’s method of thinking and the objects of 
science (such as atom and photons) were of the same kind as objects of common 
sense (shoes, cabbages)” (1971, p. 131). 
One fundamental point to be noted is that Dewey’s naturalist conception of 
science is different from what we have seen in previous naturalist positions. The 
difference is deeply rooted in Dewey’s identification of the origin of all human 
cognitive endeavours in some problematic human encounters with nature or in 
nature. (I discuss this view further in chapter four under Dewey’s naturalistic 
notion about science). Generally, Dewey’s focus on the conception of man as an 
inseparable part of nature necessitates huge differences between Dewey’s 
naturalism and other versions we have considered so far. His naturalism has been 
described as humanistic naturalism (Bupp, 2001). I now turn to discuss some views 
of naturalists on the normativity of epistemology and the problem of scepticism. 
The purpose is to see how they can shed light on what naturalism is. 
1.3.2 Naturalism and the problem of normativity and scepticism in epistemology 
In this section, I consider views presented by some naturalists on two problematic 
issues in epistemology- normativity and scepticism. The question about 
normativity is related to scepticism in terms of how the former (theories of 
justification) are regarded as providing solutions to the latter (scepticism or doubt 
about discovery of knowledge). Attention will be on how some naturalists (such as 
                                                     
17 Explaining the difference between common sense and science in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, 
Dewey writes that “the difference between them resides in their respective subject matters, not 
in their basic logical forms and relations, that the difference in subject-matters is due to the 
difference in the problems respectively involved, and finally, that this difference sets up difference 
in the end or objective consequences they are concerned to achieve” (J. Dewey, 1991, p. 118). 
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Quine in his project of naturalizing epistemology) address these issues. Their 
positions will be contrasted with the positions of some mainstream philosophers 
on one hand, and Dewey’s position on the other hand. The purpose is to examine 
the extent that views on these specific epistemological problems can provide more 
detailed understanding of what naturalists are committed to. 
Several philosophers have argued that the preoccupation of epistemologists is 
essentially that of exposition and defence of theories of justification of our beliefs 
(Goldman, 1993b; Kim, 1994; Kornblith, 1983; Stroud, 1985). The main idea behind 
this is the contention that epistemology is essentially a normative discipline. For 
Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, “normativity concerns what we should or 
ought to do and our evaluations of things and states of affairs” (2010, p. 1). One 
significance of seeing epistemology as essentially normative is that the feature is 
often used in contrasting discipline with the sciences as disciplines which “describe 
how things are, particularly the causal powers or causal regularities that exist in 
the world” (De Caro & Macarthur, 2010, p. 1). Another significance of a normative 
epistemology (for traditional epistemologists) is that a discipline committed to the 
establishment of norms is important to convince sceptics that the attainment of 
knowledge is possible. Consequently, epistemology is considered a discipline 
preoccupied with looking for necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge.  
 If naturalism is identified as a theory about human knowledge, how is the concept 
of normativity accounted for in naturalism? What is the naturalistic attitude to 
scepticism? De Caro and Macarthur consider the challenge of normativity a 
concern for naturalists when they write: 
… If one follows modern Scientific Naturalism in supposing that natural science, and 
only natural science, tells us what there is in the world, then there seems to be no 
room for the existence of normative facts-or at least this will be so insofar as they 
cannot be reduced to the kinds of objective, causal facts with which natural science 
deals (De Caro & Macarthur, 2010, p. 1). 
The challenge posed in the passage is that if norms are irreducible to causal facts, 
then they are either phenomena that scientific methods cannot address or they 
are outside the scope of science. Thus, if the phenomenon of norm or justification 
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is irrelevant to science, how are scientific truths granted? This will be a challenge 
to any naturalism that presents the ontology of science as complete. 
In Quine’s naturalized epistemology, the impression he created is that naturalizing 
epistemology does not affect its normativity. For him, the normative concern 
continues: 
The relation between the meagre input and torrential output is the relation that we 
are prompted to study for somewhat the same reasons that have prompted 
epistemology; namely, in order to see how evidence relates to a theory, and in what 
ways one’s theory of nature transcends any available evidence (Quine, 1994a, p. 25). 
Quine’s point is that a naturalist is worried about how human theories or claims 
(which go beyond stimulation of nerves) can be justified by available evidence. 
Toward this end, naturalism encourages epistemologists to regard the theory of 
how our sensory receptors are stimulated as the only evidence for our theories of 
knowledge (1994a, pp. 25-26). Put differently, the truth of our judgements (our 
awareness of these stimulations) are to be verified through what science reveals 
about these nerve endings. This is a reversal of the traditional position in which 
stimulations of the senses are regarded as “unconscious data” and consequently 
non-verificational. For instance, conscious three-dimensional apprehension takes 
priority over two-dimensional reception (Quine, 1994a, p. 26). Thus, for Quine, 
naturalizing epistemology indicates the replacement of traditional methods of 
justification by a priori rules with scientific modes of justification. 
The naturalistic philosopher begins his reasoning within the inherited world theory as 
a going concern. He tentatively believes all of it, but believes also that some 
unidentified portions are wrong. He tries to improve, clarify, and understand the 
system from within. He is a busy sailor adrift on Neurath’s boat (Ouine, 1981, p. 72).  
In addition, unlike some traditional epistemologists who have argued that 
epistemology arose as a response to the universal sceptics who claimed that 
knowledge is impossible and consequently strive to refute the sceptics by trying 
to establish foundational beliefs (Chisholm, 1977; Hamlyn, 1970), naturalists, such 
as Quine, see this particular traditional concern as reification of sceptical doubt or 
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challenge (1994a, p. 20). Demanding justification, Quine argues, is a normal 
practice in any scientific inquiry: 
For we can fully grant the truth of natural science and still raise the question, within 
natural science, how it is that man works up his command of science from limited 
impingements that are available to his sensory surfaces (Quine, 1974, p. 3). 
Here, Quine’s point is that science provides the “foundation” or the starting point 
for any inquiry about knowledge. Consequently, his contention is that the idea of 
challenging or doubting the possibility of knowledge in general is absurd. However, 
he admits that there is possibility or legitimacy of “self-doubt within science” 
(Quine, 1974, p. 3). This self-doubt in science, however, does not go beyond self-
censorship or self-questioning for reassurances. Genuine doubts could emerge 
when one starts thinking about the possibilities of errors such as sensory illusions, 
the exactness of some experimental operations and so on.  For him, these are 
procedural challenges that necessitate the need for science to “defend itself from 
within”. As rightly noted by Michael Williams, the doubts or sceptical challenges 
recognised by Quine are those that come to light in the process of or as 
consequences of scientific inquiry (1996, p. 305).18  
Here, two points are important. First, with epistemology naturalized, the notion 
of normativity or intelligibility in science, governed by natural laws becomes the 
arbiter of truth. In effect, there is no need for the a priori or non-scientific starting 
point19 that foundationalists in traditional epistemology were busy searching for, 
arguably without success.20 Secondly, a naturalist epistemologist is a fallibilist. Like 
traditional epistemologists, his target is to attain truth and avoid error.  
                                                     
18 However, one can wonder, as Michael Williams did, how sceptical reasonings that do occur in 
the course of finding in experience some recalcitrant examples that force one to modify one’s 
theory and approach can possibly be the same as “the kind of reasoning that would lead one to 
think that nothing we believe is ever so much as justified” (Williams, 1996, p. 305). However, I will 
not address this challenge to Quine here. 
19 The argument is that there will be circularity if science justifies its claims internally (for instance, 
justifying perception by referring to scientific claims about the functions of human eyes and brain). 
20 The common theme in foundationalism is that there are some beliefs that are epistemologically 
more secure or justified than the others and, consequently, are important as evidence for other 
less-secured beliefs. These secured beliefs are called basic beliefs. There are many versions of 
foundationalism based on the degrees of security attributed to these basic beliefs (Chisholm, 1980; 
Goldman, 1993b; Kornblith, 1985). 
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Several arguments have been raised against “naturalized epistemology” in 
contemporary epistemology. One of the most prominent is that epistemology 
cannot be naturalized because it is essentially justificatory while science is 
essentially descriptive. More important, “norms” are regarded as creations of 
sentient human beings and consequently not part of nature. For instance, it does 
not make sense to ask if the radiation of the retina or the stimulation of nerves is 
justified, ought to be so and so, or not. On the other hand, any norm-related 
phenomenon needs a conscious human being to determine necessary and 
sufficient conditions for its attainment and more importantly, to ascertain when 
those conditions are met. If epistemology is essentially normative, the argument 
goes, then a naturalist has a field of study on his hands which is beyond his 
naturalistic approach. Critics like Kim, Stroud and White have argued that 
epistemology without norms is epistemology in name only. Writing about how the 
norm-consciousness of traditional epistemology cannot be captured in a 
naturalized epistemology, Kim writes: 
It is an essential part of the business of naturalized epistemology, as a theory of how 
beliefs are formed as a result of sensory stimulation, to find out what particular beliefs 
the given cognizers have formed. But this is precisely what cannot be done, if our 
considerations show anything at all, unless the would-be naturalized epistemologist 
continually evaluates the putative beliefs of his subjects in regard to their rationality 
and coherence subject to overall constraint of the assumption that the cognizers are 
largely rational. The naturalized epistemologist cannot dispense with normative 
concepts or disengage himself from valuation activities (Kim, 1985, p. 41). 
The point Kim is making here is that theories about how beliefs are formed are 
different from theories about how beliefs are justified. Although Kim will agree 
that the two processes are not mutually exclusive, yet, the latter, which is the 
preoccupation of epistemologists, is not reducible to the former. More 
importantly, Kim’s argument is that naturalized epistemology takes the rationality 
of the epistemic agent or knowing subject for granted and consequently begs the 
question about whether knowledge is possible or not, while traditional 
epistemology does not. Let us consider these four statements: 
(1) Water boils at 30 degrees centigrade. 
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(2)Anything that goes up without support must come down 
(3)You ought to know that you need a warm house to survive winter 
(4) I know that Wellington is the capital of New Zealand because I have been there. 
Kim’s argument is that statements 1 and 2 are descriptive while statements 3 and 
4 are normative and evaluative. Statement 3 presupposes that there is a particular 
way (which is the right way) of doing x which the agent is capable of doing because 
“ought” implies “can”. Statement 4 is a variation of statement 3 in the sense that 
the “right to know” has a corresponding duty to prove or justify. Kim’s conclusion 
is that if the statements and subject matter of naturalized epistemology are 
radically different from what obtains in traditional epistemology, it makes no 
sense to see the two as rival solutions to the same problem or to see one as 
reducible to the other. If naturalized epistemology is really an epistemology, his 
contention continues, a separate theory of normativity must be provided by the 
naturalist epistemologist. 
However, some naturalists have responded that a thorough-going naturalistic 
account of knowledge needs no (separate) theory of justification outside the 
scientific system for the establishment of truth. Some of these philosophers have 
defended this claim on the ground that the concept of justification, like science, is  
descriptive (Janvid, 2004, p. 40). Others have defended the claim on the ground 
that the concept of normativity (like some notions in philosophy such as 
consciousness, mind, value, and so on) has been naturalized (Maffie, 1990, p. 10; 
1995, p. 10). His argument is that if “normativity” is all about how to ascertain 
proof or validation for a claim, then science has it in its methodologies and 
empirical validations.  
In addition, some scholars such as De Caro, David Macarthur, and Barbara Trybulec 
have described traditional notions of norms as unrealistic or obsolete. Trybulec 
argues that “naturalism should satisfy its own standard of valuable, rational beliefs 
and it has nothing to with mysterious, infallible and a priori sources” (2008, p. 26). 
De Caro and Macarthur write that: 
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… Any form of naturalism will be opposed to Platonism about norms, where this is 
understood as the view that normative facts hold wholly independently of human 
practices (say, of reason giving) and are, as it were, simply there anyway to be 
discovered. For similar reasons, it will be opposed to a Moorean non-naturalism that 
holds that our access to normative facts is by way of a sui generis epistemic faculty of 
intuition directed at just this kind of fact (Caro & David, 2010, p. 3). 
The point that these philosophers are making is that the concept of a norm in 
traditional philosophy has been reified in such a way that it has become an 
abstract phenomenon like Plato’s “Forms”, “The Good” or imaginary self-
sustaining objects like “Mermaid”, “Pegasus” or  the “philosopher’s stone”. What 
a naturalistic philosopher is expected to do is to reconceptualise this concept to 
reflect the product of natural human affairs. 
I think Dewey’s naturalism raises some challenges against Quine’s version of 
naturalism, specifically, his naturalizing project. 21  Before discussing these 
challenges, I will discuss three points on which their positions are compatible. 
Firstly, Quine’s identification of the nature-human contact as the basis for his 
naturalism is compatible with Dewey’s position. Dewey’s calls this the nature-
human symbiotic relation. In addition, Quine’s naturalistic “strategy”, the 
necessity of dislodging “first philosophy” for naturalism to take off, is also 
compatible with Dewey’s view about the need to reject transcendental 
metaphysics. The third point is Quine’s contention that, as far as naturalized 
epistemology is concerned, sceptical doubt is an internal problem, within the 
operations of science. Dewey is also against what he called “pathological doubt”. 
Dewey contends that, our genuine sceptical doubts are consequences of failures 
in our previous experimentations which increase our yearning for more 
pragmatically successful methodologies and theories.  These ideas are discussed 
in detail in chapter 3. 
I will now state their disagreement on those three points. First, Quine’s distinction 
between the “meagre input” and the “torrential output”, and more specifically, 
                                                     
21  There are several instances where Quine and Dewey have mutual agreement on some 
framework on naturalism. A good example is their reservations on the plausibility of regarding 
knowledge as a natural kind, based on their critique of essentialism (J. Dewey, 1991, p. 295; Quine, 
1994b). I discuss this point in chapter 7.  
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his contention that the “input” is all the naturalized epistemologist has to begin 
the construction of his theory is not compatible with Dewey’s position. This 
position contradicts Dewey’s naturalism in the sense that it is based on a dualist 
ontology in which human and nature are regarded as distinct and separable. 
Dewey regards the “input” from nature and the “output” from the human species 
as transaction or symbiotic relation where both situations are only meaningful 
when treated as mutually entailing. This is one of the essences of Dewey’s 
metaphysics. 
Incidentally, Dewey sees this “metaphysics” as providing the road map for 
epistemological investigations. A naturalistic epistemological investigation begins 
during finding solutions to problematic situations that ensue during the “natural 
transactions”. In this sense, naturalism need not dislodge epistemology from its 
metaphysical foundations, challenging Quine’s preoccupation with replacing the 
metaphysical foundation of epistemology with psychology and linguistics. 
Specifically, Dewey is against the presentation of metaphysics as essentially 
antithetical to science. I discuss Dewey’s view on how metaphysics can provide 
the road-map for epistemology and science in chapters 2 and 3. 
1.4 Chapter summary    
This chapter focused on naturalism. Given that naturalism is generally believed to 
be a philosophical position, this chapter aimed to identify a version of naturalism 
that unambiguously and substantively defended this claim. The chapter 
articulated Dewey’s version of naturalism and showed how it provided a rich 
framework for naturalism and how it met some challenges that other versions of 
naturalism are inadequate to resolve.  
The chapter started by considering naturalism as an anti-philosophical, non-
philosophical or non-substantive philosophical position. I considered Moore’s 
critique of naturalist approaches to the identification of moral facts, Santayana’ 
objection to Dewey’s naturalist metaphysics and critics’ rejection of Quine’s 
proposal to develop a naturalized epistemology. In my assessment, I concluded 
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that these philosophers were only against some versions of naturalism. In section 
two, I discussed naturalism as a rejection of supernaturalism. While this view 
appears to be a less controversial understanding concerning what naturalism is, I 
observed some problems. For instance, I considered how Dewey’s rejection of 
natural/supernatural bifurcation shed more light on what naturalism is. I 
explained Dewey’s rejection as a consequence of his rejection of dualism which he 
attributed to a non-naturalistic metaphysics. For him, the distinction between 
natural and supernatural is arrived at through a priori reasoning and conceptual 
analysis. On this point, it is dialectical rather than being empirical and 
experimental. The distinction is consequently superficial and artificial. 
Alternatively, naturalism necessitates focusing on what he calls “the inclusive 
integrity of experience”. For him, this focus reveals that man is part of nature and 
that all his experience: esthetical, intellectual, moral, social, cultural, religious, and 
so on, emanate from the symbiotic relations with nature. Consequently, questions 
about what is material or non-material, physical or transcendental, become moot. 
In section three, I considered naturalism essentially as a physicalist position. This 
consideration is one of the consequences of philosophers’ acceptance of the 
credibility of the ontological account of science, according to which physics and its 
physical theories appeared to be the image of science. I considered how 
metaphysics will become impoverished by becoming a monistic theoretical 
position- if physicalism defines naturalism. However, given that there are many 
disciplines in science, I considered different ontological accounts, ontology 
according to micro-physics, ontology in biological sciences and human sciences. I 
explored the possibility of physicalism being a consensus in all the sciences as 
problematic. Consequently, I was able to establish that physicalism (in its 
eliminative or reductionist forms) cannot provide an acceptable analysis of 
naturalism. I considered Dewey’s views about science and found a version of 
naturalism that does not involve reduction or elimination, either of one science to 
the others or philosophy to science. I discussed Dewey’s naturalist metaphysics 
which presents all human cognitive endeavours as essentially problem-solving and 
instrumental. I also discussed how this view avoids the problem of choosing the 
42 
 
ontology that represents all sciences. There is only one ontological account: 
metaphysics. This is defined as a comprehensive account of human transaction 
which provides the base for a more technical scientific ontology. However, given 
the instrumentalism that occupies the centre-point of Dewey’s naturalism, I 
discussed his choice of engineering technology as the image of science. 
Finally, in section four, I considered some naturalists’ views about what a 
naturalist epistemology should look like in terms of methodology and topics. I 
started with the question concerning the appropriate method(s) for philosophy. I 
considered the views of some naturalists who believe that a naturalist 
epistemology has only the methods of the sciences to appeal to in epistemological 
investigations- radical methodological naturalism. I found this position 
problematic because it seems to involve reductionism or eliminativism, both 
ontologically and methodologically, because there is a tendency to abandon non-
scientific methods. This makes the consideration of moderate methodological 
naturalism seemingly more attractive. However, there is a question for a 
moderate naturalist, who either recognises other methods and/or, perhaps, 
recognises other non-scientific subject-matter: To what extent can this moderate 
position be sustained without becoming “half-hearted” naturalism? I found this 
question a significant challenge to moderate naturalism. It is at this point that I 
turned to Dewey’s version of naturalism and the advantage it has over other 
versions, by developing a method that is distinct from scientific methods and 
which complements scientific methods by prioritising the empirical and 
experimental tenets of science. 
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Chapter Two 
The nature and scope of Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics 
2.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, I extend the exploration of Dewey’s naturalism from the general 
analysis of its tenets sketched out in the previous chapter, to how those tenets 
play out in terms of providing answers to some general and specific problems that 
philosophers are preoccupied with in metaphysics. The problems I explore include 
his naturalistic views on issues such as the nature of reality and human experience 
and the human mind. From his naturalistic positions on these specific issues, his 
positions on more general issues were derived, such as: defining the scope, 
methodology and goals of metaphysics. For instance, I explore how his position 
engenders a conception of an empirical metaphysics that: (i) serves as the 
“foundation” of theories of knowledge and (ii) complements science.  I discuss 
how this “foundational role” ascribed to naturalistic metaphysics by Dewey is 
significantly different from the foundational roles usually ascribed to the “first 
philosophy” or traditional metaphysics. I also explore how he appeals to 
evolutionary theories in developing an instrumentalist conception of all human 
cognitive endeavours (science, metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and so on).  
I start the chapter by noting many interpretations or assessments of Dewey’s 
position on metaphysics, most of which are incompatible with each other. At one 
extreme, we have the self-proclaimed apologist, Rorty, who argues that Dewey’s 
position is an explanation of why nobody needs a metaphysics rather than itself a 
metaphysical system (Rorty, 1982, p. 72). Thus, following Rorty, the suggestion is 
that we can categorize Dewey with philosophers like Hume, Kant and the 
positivists who have described metaphysical discourse as useless, impossible and 
meaningless, respectively. At the other extreme, we have critics like Santayana 
and Scott who argue that although Dewey was interested in constructing a 
substantive metaphysical system, he was not successful. Scott interprets Dewey’s 
naturalist metaphysics as an attempt to see Hegel’s radical idealistic philosophy 
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from an empiricist perspective. Consequently, he describes his work as a 
naturalized Hegelianism (Scott, 2010). Santayana, on the other hand, argues that 
Dewey’s idea of a naturalistic metaphysics is a contradiction (1951). For other 
critics, Dewey’s metaphysics is a failure because it does not address the questions 
about existence that philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Descartes 
regarded as the most important questions in metaphysics (Cohen, 1931, p. 196; B. 
Russell, 1939, p. 139; Santayana, 1951). Between these extreme positions, we 
have philosophers such as Shook who argue that Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics 
offers a new method of doing traditional metaphysics (Shook, 2004).  
Consequently, the focus of this chapter will be on how Dewey’s position on 
metaphysics can be understood. Is he offering a new metaphysics or attempting 
to reconstruct traditional metaphysics? In answering this question, I take a cue 
from suggestions made by Santayana and Piatt, one of his critics and one of his 
apologists, respectively. Santayana observes that whatever Dewey aimed to 
contribute to philosophy through his version of metaphysics was rendered 
obscure or muddled by his half-hearted and “short-winded” naturalism. For him, 
the naturalist metaphysics that Dewey aspired to is impossible (1951, p. 253). In 
Piatt’s observation, “much of the difficulty in understanding Dewey would be 
obviated if more attention were paid  to his naturalism and less to his empiricism” 
(1951, p. 107). However, Shook has a different opinion about Dewey’s naturalism. 
He contends that his later thought “elaborated a thoroughgoing naturalism” (2000, 
p. 7). The cue from these scholars is that everyone seems to agree that naturalism 
is at the centre of Dewey’s philosophy. However, it must be noted that Dewey’s 
critics and apologists have interpreted and assessed his philosophy based on the 
particular version of naturalism they subscribed to.  
On Dewey’s naturalist metaphysics, I explore the differences and similarities 
between his version and traditional metaphysics. On differences, I focus on two 
ways he redefines the relationship between metaphysics and science in particular 
and between metaphysics and other human cognitive endeavours in general. For 
instance, Dewey claims that science and metaphysics have only nature as their 
subject-matter and consequently rejects the demarcation between traditional 
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metaphysics and science. Secondly, in his rejection of the notion that metaphysical 
knowledge is a priori, Dewey introduces what he calls denotative empirical 
methodology to facilitate empirical and naturalist metaphysical investigations. 
From this conception, Dewey envisages a metaphysics that complements rather 
than rivals science. I also discuss his claim that metaphysics provides the ground-
map for epistemology- a claim that emphasises his view that these areas in 
philosophy are inseparable. 
On the similarities between his version of metaphysics and traditional metaphysics, 
I discuss Dewey’s preoccupation with some concerns of traditional metaphysics; 
such as trying to answer questions about the nature of reality, experience and 
human nature. I will call this “the continuity thesis”. In addition, I explore some 
similarities between Dewey’s metaphysics and the project of traditional 
philosophy known as “first philosophy”. Dewey identifies the subject-matter of his 
metaphysics (the study of the human-nature transaction and what he calls generic 
traits of existence) and contends that his naturalist metaphysics serves as the 
foundation of science (in fact, of all human cognitive endeavours). Philosophers 
such as W.V.O. Quine and Penelope Maddy have interpreted the traditional 
construal of Metaphysics as “first philosophy” in terms of a firm foundation sought 
for science (Maddy, 2007; Quine, 1994a). Consequently, it is important to know 
how Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics is different from the “first philosophy”, 
which has been construed by many scholars as anti-science. It is also important to 
know how the “continuity thesis” is consistent with the suggestion that Dewey’s 
naturalist metaphysics is radically new.  
This chapter has two sections. In the first section, I discuss Dewey’s naturalist 
conception of human experience. I discuss how Dewey explores the primary and 
non-cognitive aspect of human experience as the subject-matter of his naturalist 
metaphysics in Experience and Nature. I compare his conception and analysis of 
“experience” with the traditional accounts offered by philosophers such as Locke 
and Russell. In the second section, I discuss how Dewey’s notion of naturalism and 
subscription to evolutionary theory influenced his notion of reality. I discuss his 
conception of a dynamic and multi-faceted reality as well as his theory of generic 
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traits of existence. I compare his account of reality with the popular accounts in 
metaphysics exemplified by Platonic Forms, Aristotle’s Substance, Kant’s 
Noumena and Descartes’ mind/body dualism. In discussing Dewey’s naturalist 
ontology, I pay specific attention to his argument that both realists and idealists 
are wrong in carving nature into two opposing aspects: human/nature, mind/body, 
subject/object, and reality/ appearance. In addition, I examine Dewey’s 
naturalistic metaphysics in the light of three popular and orthodox realist positions, 
naïve realism, metaphysical realism and scientific realism. The chapter establishes 
that Dewey’s position transcends the claims made by the adherents of these 
positions. Finally, I step back and examine the overall consistency of Dewey’s 
theories of experience and reality in reference to claims of critics such as Gales, 
Santayana and Murphy that these theories are mutually inconsistent.  
2.1 Dewey’s naturalist account of human experience 
In this section, I explore Dewey’s conception of the nature of human experience. I 
will start by exploring how his theory of experience is a radical challenge to 
traditional accounts of experience in terms of a mode of knowing characterised by 
subjective and sporadic events. I explore two explanations he offered for the 
traditional misconstrual of Experience. The first is that the traditional notion of 
Experience is based on wrongly construing it as synonymous with perception or 
awareness. The second is that the traditional conception of Experience is a 
consequence of a non-naturalist theory of existence or reality that alienates the 
human species and their experience from nature. 
On the constructive side, I discuss Dewey’s analysis of experience as “a double-
barrelled word” (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 10). I explore his explanation of this double-
barrelledness in terms of how two distinctions can be made within experience, as 
human encounter with nature. Firstly, the distinction between “primary” and 
“secondary” experience. Secondly, the distinction between the process of 
experiencing (epistemological sense of experience) and what I call “the 
transactional sense of experience” (metaphysical or ontological sense of 
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experience)22. I discuss the rationale behind these distinctions in terms of Dewey’s 
three contentions. Firstly, that experience is not only a mode of knowing. It is also 
a mode of existence. Secondly, that a naturalist account of human experience is a 
pointer to how a naturalist metaphysics is possible. Thirdly, that such a naturalist 
account invariably will point at nature (in its entirety) as the only subject-matter 
for both science and metaphysics and that this is one of the reasons why he 
anticipates a naturalistic metaphysics that complements science rather than being 
a rival to it. I start the discussion with Dewey’s rejection of the conception of 
experience as exclusively a mode of knowing- a position he regarded as prominent 
in traditional philosophy. 
2.1.1 Dewey’s rejection of the traditional conception of human experience as 
only a mode of knowing 
The very first warning that Dewey issues in Experience and Nature is that one may 
fail to understand his naturalistic metaphysics if the way he used some concepts 
in ways that are radically different from their usual signification in traditional 
metaphysics is not understood. The most fundamental among these concepts is 
experience (1925, pp. 1-5). Writing about experience was misconstrued in 
traditional philosophy, Dewey writes: 
Experience, they say, is important for those beings who have it, but is too casual and 
sporadic in its occurrence to carry with it any important implications regarding the 
nature of Nature. Nature, on the other hand, is said to be complete apart from 
experience. Indeed, according to some thinkers the case is even in worse plight: 
Experience to them is not only something extraneous which is occasionally 
superimposed upon nature, but it forms a veil or screen which shuts us off from 
nature, unless in some way it can be “transcended.” So something non-natural by way 
of reason or intuition is introduced, something supra-empirical…One can only hope 
in the course of the whole discussion to disclose the meanings which are attached to 
“experience” and “nature” (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 1). 
                                                     
22 An objection can be raised that this distinction is not tidy enough on the ground that the process 
of knowing is also transactional in the Deweyan sense. However, the point of the distinction is 
based on Dewey’s contention that experience is more encompassing than a model of knowing. 
While Dewey is not drawing a rigid demarcation between these two distinctions (just as he does 
not between epistemology and metaphysics), his distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive 
experiences makes it clear that these aspects are still distinguishable.  
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According to him, in traditional philosophy, experience was regarded as a 
phenomenon outside nature or some kind of subjective consciousness that is 
inherently relative to individuals and some particular circumstances or contexts. 
Consequently, it is usually designated as unempirical and immaterial. More 
importantly, it is regarded as non-natural, in the sense of being distinct from 
natural processes such as the functioning of human biological systems. Dewey 
identifies three reasons for this (mis)conception. Firstly, Experience was widely 
associated with perception which in turn was seen as a private or subjective affair 
or phenomenon. For instance, experiencing an object (such as a chair in a corridor) 
is typically interpreted to mean awareness of the primary and secondary qualities 
of chairs such as colour, weight, hardness and so on.  Secondly, “activities” 
involving perception or sensation of this chair are contextual because they occur 
intermittently. Thirdly, for traditional philosophers, imagining the existence of a 
world without an experiencing agent is logically possible. Consequently, a theory 
of reality emerged in which there is a distinction between what is experienced and 
the experiencing agents. Consequently, ontologically, experience was taken to be 
incidental.  
How fair is Dewey’s description? I think Dewey was right in saying that both 
empiricists and idealists in traditional philosophy were wrong in their denial of the 
natural connection between “experience” and reality on one hand and in their 
failure to recognise that there is an ontological (in addition to methodological) 
connection between “experience” and knowledge. He is right that this erroneous 
conception of experience creates several pseudo problems for traditional 
philosophers. A good example is the question confronting the empiricists: If 
experience is the route to knowledge and experience is subjective, how is 
objective knowledge possible? A debate between two empiricists, W.T. Stace and 
A.J. Ayer, on the danger of relativism as a consequence of the subjective nature of 
human experience, brings Dewey’s argument on point.  Stace writes:  
I cannot experience anything except my own experience. I can see my red but I can 
never see yours. I can feel a pain in my leg. But I can never feel the pain in your leg. I 
can feel my emotions but not yours…I cannot see through your eyes nor you through 
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mine… All knowledge, all philosophy must be based upon experience… Therefore, all 
knowledge must have had its beginning in my self-enclosed personal experience. This 
original solipsism is utterly inescapable except by prejudice or refusing to see it (Stace, 
1932, p. 67) . 
Stace’s argument is that, due to the subjectivity that is inherent in immediate 
experience, our ontological and epistemological accounts of the world must begin 
as a relativist’s account. We may strive to reach a kind of inter-subjectivity later 
on, but the relative starting point is a human predicament. This problem arises 
because, according to him, what we call experience are our subjective reports 
about the external world. The implication is that there is a huge gulf between our 
experience of what nature is and human-independent Nature itself, that we 
cannot objectively cover. The force of his argument rests on his seemingly 
unassailable claim that it is impossible that the same experience should be part of 
the history of two separate selves.  
In his rejoinder, Ayer disagreed with the premise and conclusion of Stace’s position. 
For him, Stace’s premise that personal or immediate experience is completely 
closed to objectivity is challengeable. For him, the problem (which he conceded to 
be genuine) lies in our human inability as language users to make the transition, 
linguistically, from the individual’s “self-enclosed personal experience” to the 
“common social world”. Experiences, according to him, are not only shared in 
varying degrees, but manifestations of other people’s experiences such as pain are 
empirically observable and verifiable as well (Ayer, 1955, pp. 136-146). In addition, 
Ayer argued that Stace’s conclusion inevitably involves a self-contradiction. If 
knowledge must necessarily originate from my self-enclosed personal experience 
and nobody else’s, Ayer notes, then knowledge will not begin from anybody’s 
personal experience since every individual will have equal obligation or right to 
the beginning of knowledge (1936, p. 145). From this debate,23 we can summarise 
                                                     
23 It is important to remark that my focus at this point is not to defend either side of the debate 
(between Ayer and Stace). What I intend by bringing it up is to state how the concept of experience 
was conceived in traditional philosophy and the problems that ensued. My focus is on the question 
what makes Dewey say that Experience as traditionally conceived is untenable?  My interest is in 
what makes Dewey reject impressions, sense data or intuited essences as paradigmatic of 
Experience. 
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the basic features of experience as traditionally conceived as: (i) the word 
“experience” is exclusively a verb (ii) it was held to indicate subjective or relative 
reports about the world (iii) it was held to be outside of the fabric of nature.  
However, Dewey argued that this conception of experience is wrong. 
In more recent times, phrases like ‘what it’s like’ has been popularly used, not only 
to express the subjectivity of experience (consciousness) but to qualify it as 
“phenomenal” or “queer”. In Nagel’s famous article “What is it like to be a bat”, 
the central argument is that human experience is subjective and mysterious. He 
compares human experience with the aural experiences bats get from their sonar, 
that he believes nobody can know  unless the person is also a bat (1974, pp. 435-
450). A similar position was held by Colin McGinn (1982). 
A Deweyan response to Nagel’s conception of experience and the problems 
associated with it is that it came about as a result of “unempirical methods” used 
by philosophers that tore apart the operations and states of experiencing (1925, p. 
11). Dewey argued that the error in the conception of experience that dominates 
the Stace/Ayer debate (and the traditional philosophy it stands for as proxy) was 
rooted in the notion that experience is nothing but perception. Using one 
unidentified empiricist philosopher to serve as a proxy for empiricists such as 
Locke, Russell and Hume who also have theorised experience as collections of 
atomic sensations or perceptions, Dewey writes: 
To illustrate the nature of experience, an author writes: “When I look at a chair, I say 
I experience it. But what I actually experience is only a very few of the elements that 
go to make up a chair, namely the color that belongs to the chair under these 
particular conditions of light, the shape which the chair displays when viewed from 
this angle, etc.” Two points are involved in any such statement. One is that 
“experience” is reduced to the traits connected with the act of experiencing, in this 
case the act of seeing… The other point is that, even in such a brief statement as that 
just quoted, there is compelled recognition of an object of experience which is 
infinitely other and more than what is asserted to be alone experienced (J. Dewey, 
1925, pp. 17-18). 
Dewey’s contention here is that experience is not synonymous with perception. 
With perception and experience taken as synonymous, both are treated as 
phenomena that are subjective and occur sporadically and circumstantially. 
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However, for Dewey, there are aspects of having an experience of a chair that are 
more long-lasting than the sporadic process described as “perceiving a chair”. 
People sit on chairs and trip over them. There are also numerous activities in 
experiencing chairs that involve collective or shared activities among individuals; 
such as designing them. These instances point to the fact that experience is not 
identical with or reducible to perception. However, Dewey’s stronger argument is 
that “the utility of using chairs” (and other things) is a quality and as legitimate as 
sensible qualities such as weight and colours. More importantly, this utility, for 
him, is non-relational and consequently is as natural as any of the sensible qualities 
cherished by the traditional philosophers. For Dewey,  
If we recognize that all qualities directly had in conscious experience apart from the 
use made of them, testify to nature’s characterization by immediacy and finality, 
there is ground for unsophisticated recognition of use and enjoyment of things as 
natural, as belonging to the things as well as to us. Things are beautiful and ugly, lovely 
and hateful, dull and illuminated, attractive and repulsive. Stir and thrill in us is as 
much theirs as are length, breadth and thickness. Even the utility of things, their 
capacity to be employed as means and agencies, is first of all not a relation, but a 
quality possessed; immediately possessed, it is as esthetic as any other quality (J. 
Dewey, 1925, p. 91).   
Dewey’s point is that we can understand experience from an ontological 
standpoint in which it is depicted as the control and utilization of nature rather 
than merely perceiving it. This view is fundamental in Dewey’s description of 
human-nature symbiotic relations which he calls “transactions”. However, it must 
be noted that Dewey’s contention that “the utility of things” is a natural 
phenomenon (non-relational quality) is intended to establish a connection 
between his naturalist conception of experience and his naturalist conception of 
reality. Reality, to Dewey, is evolving. Experience, understood from the standpoint 
of control and utilization, expresses this dynamic and instrumental nature of 
reality. I discuss this view in detail in the section 2.2.  
Consequently, in Experience and Nature, Dewey is preoccupied with distinguishing 
between the “process of experiencing” (in the sense of perception, awareness, 
which basically is epistemological) and the totality of experience (in terms of 
transactional relation, which Dewey sees as ultimately metaphysical or 
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ontological). Thomas Alexander put these notions in a good perspective when he 
writes: 
For those who believe that “experience” must refer to some sort of immediate 
perceptual event causally arising from nature or for those who hold that the primary 
relation of experience to nature is determined in terms of knowledge, Dewey’s 
attempt to construct a metaphysics must appear to be incomprehensible and 
unnecessary. But when experience is understood from Deweyan standpoint, as 
involved, meaningful, and shared response to the world and to each other, the 
possibility of such project not only is recognized but is seen to be necessary. To keep 
experience from being taken in a subjective and reductionistic manner, one requires 
a theory which will maintain its situational and transactional features in full view (T. 
M. Alexander, 1987, p. xvii).  
Alexander’s point is that mainstream philosophers were unable to understand 
how a metaphysics can be constructed from experience because they have an 
incorrect conception of experience and they started from a wrong question: How 
is knowledge possible from sporadic awareness or sensations classified as 
experience? Dewey was able to construct a metaphysics from his notion of 
experience because of his ability to articulate larger issues that serve as harbinger 
for the quest for knowledge. For the rest of the chapter, I will focus on these 
“larger issues” and examine how exploring them can produce a substantive 
metaphysics as claimed by Dewey and his apologists. I will start by discussing 
Dewey’s contention that questions and doubts raised against the idea that 
experience is part of nature are typically a philosophical problem caused by the 
use of unempirical methods and subscribing to unnaturalistic metaphysics. 
2.1.2 Dewey’s contention of Experience as the subject-matter for science and 
philosophy 
In Experience and Nature, Dewey was attracted by the conception of what 
experience is in science, and explored how to incorporate it into philosophy. 
Consequently, in Experience and Nature he juxtaposes the conception of 
experience in philosophy (where it is treated as an unnatural phenomenon) with 
the conception of experience in science (where Dewey believed it is accepted as 
part of nature). In his attempt to show that science provides justification for seeing 
experience as a substantive part of nature, Dewey writes: 
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In the natural sciences there is a union of experience and nature which is not greeted 
as a monstrosity; on the contrary, the inquirer must use empirical methods if his 
findings are to be treated as genuinely scientific. The investigator assumes as a matter 
of course that experience, controlled in specific ways, is the avenue that leads to the 
facts and laws of nature. He uses reason and calculation freely; he could not get along 
without them. But he sees to it that ventures of this theoretical sort start from and 
terminate in directly experienced subject-matter. Theory may intervene in a long 
course of reasoning, many portions of which are remote from what is directly 
experienced. But the vine of pendant theory is attached at both ends to the pillars of 
observed subject-matter (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 2). 
From this passage, we can see that for Dewey, the manipulation of the material 
world is nothing over and above the manipulation of experience. The fact that 
“experience” can be controlled in some specific ways to create effects in the 
physical world, for Dewey, is a pointer to the fact that Experience is part of nature. 
“Experience” in this Deweyan sense is a noun and not a verb. 24   Considering 
further this noun-sense of “Experience”, Dewey writes: 
If the empirical method were universally or even generally adopted in philosophizing, 
there would be no need of referring to experience. The scientific inquirer talks and 
writes about particular observed events and qualities, about specific calculations and 
reasonings. He makes no allusion to experience; one would have to search a long time 
through reports of special researches in order to find the word. The reason is that 
everything designated by the word “experience” is so adequately incorporated into 
scientific procedures and subject-matter that to mention experience would be only 
to duplicate in a general term what is already covered in definite terms (J. Dewey, 
1925, pp. 5-6). 
This passage suggests that Dewey believes that philosopher’s doubt or outright 
rejection of the possibility of experience being a part of nature has been rendered 
obviously false by its prominence in science. He contends that the unempirical 
methods used in philosophy contributed to how philosophers missed the true 
nature of Experience. Dewey argues that from the conception of experience in 
science, we can talk about nature as materials of experience which can be seen, 
touched and observed. We can refer to these materials in past, present and futuric 
tenses. More specifically in science, the word “experience” is rarely used. The 
                                                     
24 “Experience” in traditional philosophy was conceived verbally. For instance, in the statement “I 
experience X” in which “X” may be a pain-sensation. 
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reason is that it is regarded as a general term for a series of particular events and 
qualities that are observed.  Again, Dewey writes: 
We begin by noting “experience” is what James called a double- barrelled word. Like 
its congeners, life and history, it includes what men do and suffer, what they strive 
for, love, believe, and endure, and also how men act and are acted upon, the ways in 
which they do and suffer, desire and enjoy, see, believe, imagine- in short, processes 
of experiencing. … It is “double-barrelled” in that it recognizes in its primary integrity 
no division between act and material, subject and object, but contains them both in 
an unanalysed totality (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 10-11). 
In this passage, Dewey advances from his initial argument that experience is a part 
of nature to a stronger one that it is “no infinitesimally thin layer or foreground of 
nature but that it penetrates into its depth”. His point is that there is an all-
encompassing nature of experience that has been denied or overlooked by 
traditional philosophers. Consequently, he rejects the strict identification of 
experience with the physiological and psychological processes that characterise 
our awareness of the stimulation of our senses or sensory nerves and identifies 
another phase of interaction which involves social activities. These social activities 
cover the entire life and history of human species, activities such as religion, 
science, culture, and society. Dewey depicts the “private” and the “integrated” or 
social aspects of human experience in his distinction between primary and 
secondary experience. This is my focus in the next section. 
2.1.3 Dewey’s distinction between primary and secondary experience  
In Experience and Nature, Dewey distinguished between two aspects of human 
experience: the primary and the secondary. His aim was to demonstrate that 
experience is a process and that different stages in the process mark the 
distinction between the subject-matters of his naturalist metaphysics and his 
naturalistic epistemology. He writes:  
That the subject-matter of primary experience sets the problems and furnishes the 
first data of the reflections which constructs the secondary objects is evident; it is also 
obvious that test and verification of the latter is secured only by return to the things 
of crude or macroscopic experience-the sun, earth, plants animals of common 
everyday life. But just what role do the objects attained in reflection play? Where do 
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they come in? They explain the primary objects, they enable us to grasp them with 
understanding, instead of just having sense-contact with them (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 7). 
Again, he writes:  
The distinction is one between what is experienced as a result of a minimum of 
incidental reflection and what is experienced in consequence of continued and 
regulated reflective inquiry. For derived and refined products are experienced only 
because of intervention of systematic thinking. The objects of both science and 
philosophy obviously belong chiefly to the secondary and refined system (J. Dewey, 
1925, pp. 6-7).  
Dewey’s point is that there are two stages in human experience. The first stage is 
when sense-contacts with the world are made- when things in the world are had, 
used, and enjoyed. For him, some aspects of these actions or events, marking 
everyday human activities, may be sporadic or subjective. An example is an 
individual savouring a taste of an apple or enjoying a particular musical genre. The 
most important mark of primary experience, for Dewey, is immediacy- actions 
performed with minimal reflection. However, he noticed that these sense-contact 
experiences do not provide a comprehensive understanding of reality or how 
things are related as a whole. The incomprehensiveness is explained as an absence 
of informed, continued and regulated inquiries. This is the primary stage of the 
human experience which Dewey described as non-cognitive. The absence of 
detailed understanding in the primary experience, to address problematic 
situations, actuates the secondary experience. The secondary experience is 
distinguished by systematic thinking and continued regulated reflective inquiry. 
The cognitive secondary experience constitutes Dewey’s naturalistic epistemology. 
This will be the focus of chapter three. 
2.2 Primary experience and the construction of a naturalistic metaphysics 
Two points are to be noted in Dewey’s distinction between primary and secondary 
experience. First is his emphasis that the study of primary experience constitutes 
the subject-matter of his naturalistic metaphysics. The second point is that the 
subject-matter of metaphysics (primary experience) “sets the problems and 
furnishes first data for reflection which constructs the secondary objects”. In 
56 
 
addition, test and verification of the secondary experience (science, philosophy) 
can be secured “only by return to things of crude or macroscopic experience”. This 
implies that primary experience plays the role of “foundation” for secondary 
experience, both by being prior and then by playing an evidential role.  
In reference to primary experience, Dewey usually refers to these activities as 
“doing” and “suffering” (1925, p. 22) or “action-undergoing” (1925, p. 23). These 
are Dewey’s technical coinages meant to emphasise specific overt actions in which 
we humans go “experimenting and putting ourselves in the way of having our 
sense and nervous system acted upon in ways that yield material for reflection” 
(1925, p. 22). Consequently, these experimenting activities meant for 
“consummations” are contrasted with mere activities that Dewey usually refers to 
as “disconnected doing” or “disconnected suffering”. The difference between 
these two set of activities is that while the former are actuated by human needs 
and desires to adapt or readjust for survival, the latter are not. In addition, Dewey 
was able to show how these two aspects of experience are connected when he 
writes: 
That the physiological organism with its structures, whether in man or in lower 
animals, is concerned with making adaptations and uses material in the interest of 
the life-process, cannot be denied. The brain and nervous system are primarily organs 
of action-going; biologically, it can be asserted without contravention that primary 
experience is of corresponding type. Hence, unless there is a breach of historic and 
natural continuity, cognitive experience must originate within that of a non-cognitive 
sort. And unless we start from knowing as a factor in action and undergoing we are 
committed to the intrusion of an extra-natural, if not supernatural, agency or 
principle (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 23). 
In this passage one can see the fullness, compactness and organic complexity of 
experience in Dewey’s metaphysics. As rightly noted by Murphy, Dewey used his 
identification and analysis of the content of experience to demonstrate how 
experience is continuous with the rest of nature in that it is both a consequence 
of purely natural (physical, biological and social) interactions and also a fair sample 
of what natural events really are (1951, p. 219). For Campbell, this in-depth 
analysis of experience in Dewey’s work and its novel inclusion of content in terms 
of social interactions offers Dewey the opportunity to argue that experience is a 
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continuous natural phenomenon and not an equivalent of random encounter or 
transient passage as held by mainstream philosophers (Campbell, 1995, p. 70).  
For Dewey, there are several interlinked traits that define the processes of 
experiencing and perception is just one of them.25 Just as we perceive things, they 
are also enjoyed, endured, loved, hated and used. Second, Experience denotes 
interaction between organism and environment. In this interaction, Dewey laid 
emphasis on what we can call human agency. First, humans are naturally part of 
nature. In addition to being part of nature, human agency interacts with nature in 
a kind of symbiotic relation. Nature acts on him by impinging on or affecting his 
senses in certain ways. The human agent responds by acting on Nature as well, 
reforming or manipulating and controlling the constituents of nature. This is the 
hallmark of Dewey’s naturalism. His naturalism describes experience as the 
product of environment-organism transactions. 
Dewey strongly believes that with this symbiotic relation between Nature and 
human agency, in which humans act, simultaneously, both as the subject and part 
of the object in the affairs of nature, it doesn’t make sense to stick to the linguistic 
dichotomy between subject and object, act and material (or, to talk about an 
independently existing Nature) that featured so prominently in the analyses of 
experience and Nature in traditional or mainstream philosophy. This is because 
the boundary that those designations were meant to outline has been rubbed off 
in the symbiotic relation between man and Nature. 26  The third point is that 
experience (as rightly noted by traditional philosophers) involves awareness of 
                                                     
25 It is reasonable for critics to challenge Dewey on what he meant by “processes of experiencing” 
and “act of experiencing”. The way the two phrases were used in Experience and Nature arguably 
did not shed light on the distinction between the conception of experience as perception on one 
hand and the conception of experience as involving more than perception on the other hand that 
Dewey intended. However, apparently, the two phrases are not synonymously used. “Acts of 
experiencing” seems to indicate the use of the senses in apprehending the constituents of the 
external world. Thus we can talk about act of seeing, tasting, smelling, and etc. (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 
17). The “processes of experiencing” on the other hand seems to indicate what we call the history 
of humanity.  
26 Traditional philosophers were sceptical about experience having content that can be seen as 
parts of independent reality on the ground that they are relative to individual psychology and 
varying perceptual circumstances surrounding experiencing nature. Good examples abound of 
how differences in experiences of taste and perception of colours are attributed to differences in 
physio-psychological states of the subjects or conditions that the experiences occur. 
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nature. However, this awareness does not begin and end with reflection on nature 
as the traditional philosophers erroneously believed. It includes awareness of 
purposes and plans, the desires and emotions (which Dewey referred to as 
“functions” and “comprehensive activities” ), through which the constituents of 
Nature are administered and transformed (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 11).  
Consequently, we can say that Experience for Dewey does not only denote an 
epistemological term as held by traditional philosophers, it is fundamentally an 
ontological term for him. Traditional philosophers debated the nature of 
experience in the context where the concern is exclusively about how we can 
justify our knowledge claims about the external world. 27   Consequently, 
experience was construed exclusively as an epistemological term. For Dewey, the 
primary fallacy of Western philosophy manifests in this belief that all types of 
experience are to be read as ultimately a form of cognition.  This fallacious 
understanding of experience, according to Dewey, was based on an equally false 
premise that knowledge is the only relationship we can have with reality. Dewey 
called this conception of experience an intellectualist’s fallacy (1925, p. 21). On 
the contrary, for Dewey, experience denotes both cognitive and non-cognitive 
interaction with reality. He contends, however, that we interact first, directly with 
macroscopic structures of the world in terms of having, using, eating, enjoying, 
phenomena presented by reality before we bother to have systematic cognitive 
operations concerning them.  
Three questions are important. How does this focus on the subject-matter of 
primary experience constitute a metaphysics? If it is accepted as a legitimate 
metaphysics, how is the foundational role ascribed to it in relation to other 
cognitive inquiries, different from those ascribed to metaphysics (as first 
philosophy) in traditional philosophy? What makes it naturalistic? Dewey provides 
two answers to the first question. First, both the sense-contact primary experience 
                                                     
27 The common belief espoused by empiricist philosophers in the traditional setting like Locke, 
Hume, and Hamlyn was that basic beliefs can be established from sensation or impression to serve 
as indubitable foundations of knowledge. Hamlyn’s position is a good proxy for these empiricist 
foundationalists. See Hamlyn, D. W. (1970). The Theory of Knowledge, in O’Connor D.J. (ed.) 
Modern Introductions to Philosophy (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd.), Page 35. 
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and the secondary cognitive experience define human transaction within nature 
or human existence in nature. This is a substantive concern in metaphysics. Second, 
Dewey presents the distinction between raw contacts with nature (primary 
experience- in which he sees humans are “users”, “feelers”, and “imaginers”) and 
the refined cognitive inquiries and manipulation of nature (secondary experience- 
in which humans are knowers) as lead-in into the understanding of what he calls 
“traits of existence” which is the general subject-matter of his naturalist 
metaphysics. This was discussed in detail in section 2. His answer to the second 
question is that, while traditional metaphysics (as first philosophy) is construed as 
a quest to construct a foundation for science from some indubitable subjective 
experiences (such as Cartesian Cogito), Dewey’s conception of the foundational 
role of metaphysics is anchored on empirical and social concerns. For instance, in 
a comment concerning Dewey’s notion of experience “as a process”, Alexander 
writes: 
“Experience” for him meant a process situated in a natural environment, mediated 
by a socially shared symbolic system, actively exploring and responding to the 
ambiguities of the world by seeking to render the most problematic of them 
determinate (T. M. Alexander, 1987, p. xiii). 
Alexander’s point is that Dewey’s naturalistic conception of experience is closely 
linked to or mutually entailed his naturalistic theory of reality or nature. The 
naturalistic themes that fundamentally define these conceptions include: (i) 
nature and man are inseparable (ii) that experience is of nature and consequently 
both have the same basic features. Both are dynamic and characterised by stable 
and precarious events. I discuss this view in depth in section 2.2. In addition, the 
relation between his notions of experience and reality also reveals a metaphysics 
in terms of the conception of the nature of a human species that evolves. Humans 
are presented as natural problem solvers, who embark on experimental inquiries 
with the purpose of manipulating nature for survival.28 This conception of the 
nature of the human species influenced Dewey’s naturalist conception of the goals 
                                                     
28 However, it must be noted that this problem-solving trait, which arguably human species share 
with other animals such as beavers, does not define the entire history of humanity. Dewey 
identifies some experiences which he calls “esthetic”; experiences that are not embarked upon to 
solve problems but are ends in themselves. 
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of metaphysics, epistemology and science. These issues were discussed in chapter 
three (Dewey’s naturalistic epistemology). For present purposes, I consider some 
objections against Dewey’s conception of human experience. 
2.3 Some criticisms of Dewey’s naturalistic conception of human experience 
Several objections have been raised against Dewey’s conception of experience. 
These include that it is ambiguous (Bernstein, 1961, p. 9; Murphy, 1951, p. 221), , 
that he reduces reality and experience to processes or events (Gale, 2010a, p. 121), 
that he identifies experience with existence (Boisvert, 1988, p. 57), and that his 
analysis of experience shows why nobody needs a metaphysics (Rorty, 1982, p. 
72). However, since most of these objections are either against his theory of 
existence or his version of metaphysics in general, I will examine most them at the 
end of this chapter. For present purposes, I will focus only on the objection that 
Dewey’s notion of experience is ambiguous. 
2.3.1 The objection that Dewey’s notion of experience is ambiguous 
Several critics of Dewey seem to agree that he has a point in contending that 
experience is more than perception. However, some have challenged his 
conception of “Experience”, most especially, the way it was presented as a 
necessary background to existence. The idea is that the analysis of experience 
provided by Dewey is too open-ended, to the point that anything may count as 
part of Nature. Although Sleeper is an apologist of Dewey,  he succinctly states the 
way this objection is often couched: “Dewey has written that experience denotes 
just this wide universe… everything without discrimination, so that experience 
ceases to have meaning” (Sleeper, 1986, p. 106). 
The question is: What is the basis for this objection? What are the implications? 
Bernstein contends that Dewey’s notion of experience betrays his latent 
subscription to idealism while claiming to be empiricist. For Bernstein,  
The pivotal point of Dewey’s rejection of idealism is in his insistence that experience is 
far more extensive than knowing…. But in his polemical defence of the integrity of 
experience, Dewey claimed so much for experience that it became difficult to see 
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what was not experience, what if anything controlled and limited experience. It 
looked as if Dewey, who had so many harsh words about idealism, was serving it up 
in another form (Bernstein, 1961, p. 9). 
Bernstein’s argument is that in a typical empiricist and non-idealist account of 
“experience”, there is always a distinction between what an epistemic agent is 
consciously aware of (regarded as “experience”) and what reality is (what the 
awarenesses are all about). Consequently, for him, traditional philosophers were 
able to draw rigid lines between what is part of nature (objective) and what is 
exclusively about an agent’s psychology or private sensations about nature 
(subjective experience). However, in Dewey’s conception of experience, as the 
objection goes, both what the agent is aware of and what he is not conscious of 
are legitimately regarded as part of his experience, rendering experience 
boundless and consequently beyond the reach of empirical investigation.29 The 
impression created by Bernstein is that Dewey’s conception of experience is 
indistinguishable from idealist philosophy such as Hegel’s conception of Absolute 
in which there is identity of Nature and Spirit. What this implies, according to 
Bernstein, is that Dewey’s philosophy offers neither what Nature really is nor what 
experience really denotes, and Dewey’s claims to empiricism and naturalism are 
suspect. 
The objection that Dewey’s analysis of Experience and its relation to Nature is 
vague is also defended by Murphy in a slightly different way. According to him, 
Dewey used “Experience” to indicate two incompatible themes in his philosophy. 
The first indicates the joint linking the experience of the human species to a world 
which antedates their existence. The second is that Dewey used “Experience” to 
indicate “the immediate terminus and resolution of all inquiry, including inquiry 
into the relations between humans and the world (Murphy, 1951, p. 221). Murphy 
thought that the incompatibility of these themes in Dewey’s philosophy was made 
                                                     
29  At first glance, this objection appears to be an epistemological constraint rather than a 
metaphysical one. And given the fact that Dewey seems to be interested primarily in the 
ontological denotation of the concept of experience rather than its epistemological denotation, 
this objection seems to lose its bite. However, as the analogy of the geologist (who was cited above 
by Dewey) goes, there is the implication that Experience as conceived by Dewey antedates the 
existence of humans. In this case, the objection becomes more potent because it has to do with 
ontology. 
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evident by the tension it creates between Dewey’s metaphysics and epistemology. 
If it is true that experience antedates the existence of humans, then, it must 
necessarily be false that experience is the outcome or termination of human 
inquiry. There is “an unhappy discrepancy between experience as it ought to be if 
its place in the natural world is to be made intelligible, and experience as it must 
be if Dewey’s epistemology is correct” (Murphy, 1951, p. 221).  
The implications of Murphy’s objection were more widely explored by Shook.  
According to Shook, the role played by the “World” in Dewey’s theory appears in 
two incompatible ways. In the first we have a presentation of Experience in which 
the World is like a stadium in which experience takes place. In this conception, the 
world is primary in determining the proper relationship between humans and the 
world. In the second sense, we have the World (and activities in it) occurring within 
human immediate experience (Shook, 2000, pp. 8-9). In this second sense, the 
world is regarded as dependent on immediate experience. This renders his 
naturalism is suspect.  
In response to this objection, Sleeper offers two arguments. Firstly, he contends 
most critiques of Dewey’s conception of experience are done in reference to the 
ideas traditionally associated with the concept and consequently miss the radically 
new denotation of the concept intended by Dewey. Consequently, Dewey’s 
conception of experience cannot be examined independently of his entire 
naturalistic philosophy. According to him, “experience” in mainstream philosophy 
is conceived as a method and should not be confused with Dewey’s conception of 
“experience” as a distinctive subject-matter of metaphysics (Sleeper, 1986, p. 106). 
By “method” he meant a method of knowing. According to Sleeper, the traditional 
conception necessitates a distinction between experience (as a method) and 
nature (as an object of inquiry) and consequently, the idea of an independently 
and antecedently existing reality becomes sacrosanct. However, he contends that 
Bernstein and other critics are wrong in expecting Dewey to subscribe to the idea 
that there should be some limiting conditions imposed by reality on experience on 
the ground that this is the very fact that Dewey is contesting. For Dewey, the 
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experiencer and his experience are integral parts of reality that cannot be 
separated (Sleeper, 1986, p. 109).  
The second response from Sleeper is an explanation about the historical 
development of Dewey’s philosophy. According to him, most criticism of Dewey’s 
notion of experience is caused by failure to note the significant differences 
between stages that characterised the development of Dewey’s philosophical 
thought and equally the failure to appreciate the novelty of its climax. According 
to Sleeper, Dewey’s later work evolved from an idealistic background and 
transformed into a thoroughgoing naturalism and radical empiricism. According to 
this view, the development of Dewey’s thought comes with modifications of 
previous ideas to engender a much matured and consistent position. Other Dewey 
apologists such as Boisvert (1988, pp. 45- 62), T. M. Alexander (1987, p. 58) and 
Margolis (2002, p. 112) also subscribe to this view.30  According to Sleeper,  
There can be little doubt that, overall, the notion of the real as transformational 
derives from both Hegel and Darwin. But Dewey makes the genetic history of his 
ontology explicit, and that ontology is explicitly his own. He accepts neither Hegel’s 
conception of change as dialectical nor Darwin’s notion of adaptation to a relatively 
stable environment.… Moreover, he pointed out that experimental knowing is 
nothing new, that the logic of experience has been there all the time. It is just that 
the metaphysics of the common man has been ignored by philosophers (Sleeper, 
1986, p. 122). 
Sleeper’s point is that Dewey’s later work manifests a transition from idealism to 
an empirical position influenced by evolutionary biology. His stronger argument is 
that Dewey was able to develop a distinct philosophical position out of several 
traditions that influenced the development of his thought. The suggestion is that 
Dewey’s notion of experience must be examined within the context of Dewey’s 
later work. My position on this debate is this. Given that Dewey’s conception of 
                                                     
30  Dewey’s philosophy is usually divided into three stages: the early, middle and later works. 
Boisvert identified three phases: Idealism, Experimentalism and Naturalism. See Boisvert, R.D. 
(1988). Dewey’s Metaphysics. New York: Fordham University Press. Boisvert argues that most 
critics failed to comprehend Dewey’s Metaphysics on the ground that they failed to see how Dewey 
tactically altered his original Kantian outlook. He contends that critics argued that Dewey remained 
an idealist, and explicitly compared him to Kant (Page 46). Shook identifies two stages: Dewey’s 
early career, characterized by allegiance to Hegel’s idealism, and his post-1925 thought in which 
he elaborated a thoroughgoing naturalism (Shook, 2000, pp. 7,10). 
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experience is interwoven with his other metaphysical theses (such as his theories 
of reality and human mind), I argue that Sleeper’s suggestion is fair enough; that 
the meaningfulness of Dewey’s theory of experience should be decided by 
examining the consistency and meaningfulness of his metaphysics as a whole. 
I conclude that Dewey’s conception of experience offers a framework for a 
naturalistic metaphysics that is empirical and more importantly, that 
complements science. However, since his conception of experience is intertwined 
with his conception of reality, the plausibility of his version of metaphysics is not 
assessable until a matching naturalistic theory of reality is presented. This is what 
I examine in the next section. 
2.4 Dewey’s naturalist metaphysics; from the conception of experience to the 
conception of reality  
2.4.1 Introduction: 
In this section, I discuss how Dewey moves from his conception of experience to 
his conception of Reality or existence. Consequently, I discuss how his theory of 
experience is closely linked with his theory of existence. More specifically, I discuss 
how, for Dewey, facts about Experience are manifestations of the nature of reality. 
Such facts include: (i) that the constituents of reality are both precarious and 
stable (ii) that reality is dynamic and evolving and pointing to the fact that reality 
is a process and (iii) that reality is an instrument for multiple control. I discuss his 
contention that all these claims are made evident by evolutionary theories. I also 
discuss these claims as the bedrock of his version of naturalism.  
More generally, in my discussion of Dewey’s conception of reality, I dwell on two 
important facts. Firstly, given that most objections against Dewey’s conception of 
reality border on the challenge that he is more of an idealist than a realist, I explore 
some theses regarding realism with the purpose of establishing those that Dewey 
identifies with. However, I contend that his position on reality renders obsolete 
the traditional dichotomies between realism/anti-realism and materialism/anti-
materialism. Consequently, I explore how he struggles to differentiate his position 
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from traditional positions such as realism, physicalism and materialism. I discuss 
his approach to these dichotomies in terms of adopting evolutionary theories in 
answering several ontological questions that have interested traditional 
philosophers. I examine his argument that most of these questions are dissolved 
as pseudo problems or solved, when the root-causes of these problems are 
empirically and naturalistically investigated. Secondly, I discuss his contention that 
traditional philosophy became encumbered with several dualist theses, as 
consequences of non-naturalistic metaphysics. These dualist theses include 
metaphysical distinctions between appearance and reality, man and nature, body 
and mind, and natural and supernatural.  
2.4.2 Dewey’s critique of traditional conceptions of reality 
In this section, I discuss Dewey’s critique of traditional conceptions of reality. I will 
explore his arguments that traditional metaphysics inherited its ontological 
account from the Greek culture which is dominated by certain religious and 
cultural foregrounds. I also discuss his contention that the imposition of these 
religious-cultural themes on Greek ontological accounts gave rise to some 
essential features of traditional metaphysics, such as: (i) a conception of reality 
that is static and uniform (ii) the emergence and dominance of an unempirical and 
transcendental metaphysics, and (iii) a conception of metaphysics that is 
antithetical to science. 
2.4.2.1 Dewey’s rejection of the identification of reality with what is stable 
and complete 
In Experience and Nature, Dewey’s conception of experience serves as the axis for 
his theory of reality. Both conceptions constitute the ground from which his 
naturalistic metaphysics is developed. In one of numerous instances where he 
uses his notion of experience as a pointer to reality, he writes:  
As against this common identification of reality with what is sure, regular and finished, 
experience in unsophisticated forms gives evidence of a different world and points to 
a different metaphysics. We live in a world which is an impressive and irresistible 
mixture of sufficiencies, tight completenesses, and order, recurrences which make 
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possible prediction and control, and singularities, ambiguities, uncertain possibilities, 
processes going on to consequences as yet determinate (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 43).  
Two fundamental claims in the passage are: that Reality is recurrent and that it 
consists of a mixture of both precarious and stable. Consequently, Reality, for 
Dewey, is dynamic and inherently pluralistic. In his explanation of the dynamic 
nature of reality, Dewey contends that “the stablest thing we can speak of is not 
free from conditions set to it by other things”. Thus, “even the solid earth 
mountains, the emblems of constancy, appear and disappear” (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 
61). His point is that nothing is permanently fixed because reality or nature keeps 
on evolving. Consequently, he concludes that “every existence is an event”  (1925, 
p. 61). His major point is that the dynamic nature of reality is neither an indication 
of some deficiencies peculiar to human understanding nor suggests any sceptical 
doubt about the possibility of discovering knowledge, as suggested by the 
philosophers (such as Heracleitus) who have acknowledged the permanence of 
change. 
In his contention that reality is pluralistic and dynamic, Dewey rejects the 
traditional practice of regarding what is unstable or changing in the physical world 
as appearances or imitations of what is real, as found prominently in Plato’s 
conception of reality. In addition, monistic ontological theories such as 
materialism or physicalism are rejected because a reality with plural features will 
render any monistic view inadequate.31  Another important aspect of Dewey’s 
conception of reality is that changing phenomena are not to be regarded with 
trepidation. The pluralistic and dynamic nature of reality points to its instrumental 
nature - as an instrument for multiple control. According to Dewey: 
                                                     
31 Dewey compares the supposed distinction between the “matter” of the materialists and the 
“spirit” of the idealists with the distinctions made by those who regard the map of America, on one 
hand,  as “certain basic relationships among the activities of the citizens of the country defined by 
properties and processes that influence the rate and direction of change and the literalists, on the 
other hand, who regard the map as something external, a fixed, rigid framework to which all 
changes must accommodate themselves” (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 63). He concludes that “what we call 
matter is that character of natural events which is so tied up with changes that are sufficiently 
rapid to be perceptible as to give the latter a character of rhythmic order, the causal sequence (J. 
Dewey, 1925, p. 63).  
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The conjunction of problematic and determinate characters in nature renders every 
existence as well as every idea and human act, an experiment in fact, even though 
not in design. To be intelligently experimental is but to be conscious of this 
intersection of natural conditions so as to profit by it instead of being at its mercy (J. 
Dewey, 1925, p. 61). 
For Dewey, what is common in all traditional metaphysics is “the bias in favour of 
the fixed, certain and finished”(1925, pp. 25, 43). He regards this as an instance of 
selective emphasis “which introduces partiality and partisanship into 
philosophy”(1925, p. 24). He contends that Aristotle came nearest to developing 
a naturalistic metaphysics at two historical points. Firstly, when he acknowledges 
contingency and change in his physics. Secondly, when he admits pluralistic 
features of the world in his distinctions between worlds of Forms and ideas, on 
one hand, and in his theory of natural ends, on the other hand. However, these 
tendencies towards a naturalistic ontology were surrendered for a bias for the 
fixed and stable and for “a theory of the superiority in Being of rounded-out fixities” 
(J. Dewey, 1925, p. 43). Dewey notes that “Kant assigns all that is manifold and 
chaotic to one realm, that of sense, and all that is uniform and regular to that of 
reason” (1925, p. 45). He also notes the popularity of philosophers who 
acknowledged the fluxity of nature, from Heracleitus to Bergson, but contends 
that even they betray the intensity of the craving for the sure and fixed (1925, p. 
45). Finally, he contends that most modern philosophies are either monistic or 
dualistic, instead of pluralistic. 
Dewey identifies three consequences of this bias for what is uniform and regular. 
Firstly, an incomplete account of the world is given by non-naturalistic 
metaphysics because some experiences (events and activities) in the world are 
regarded as unreal or un-natural - arbitrary lines are drawn between nature and 
human experiences. Secondly, by constructing a metaphysics on the ontological 
account with some peculiarities supposedly beyond the grasp of science (the study 
of Being qua Being - a Being of all-rounded fixities), traditional metaphysics 
estranged itself from scientific knowledge. Finally, Dewey contends that the 
features of this ontological account engender what he pejoratively calls “arbitrary 
intellectualism”(1925, p. 21). Arbitrary intellectualism comes in, according to 
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Dewey, when experiences showing the manifestations of nature and testimony of 
the characteristics of natural events are abandoned for reflective analysis that is 
based on presuppositions about what exists (1925, p. 20). The description of a 
table mentioned earlier from the perspective of a non-naturalistic metaphysics 
suffices as a good example. From this perspective, the collection of sense-data 
became the only aspects of the table that we have the right to be sure of. What 
makes this version of metaphysics un-naturalistic, according to Dewey, is the 
failure to note that philosophy is not about understanding nature alone but 
understanding how it can be manipulated or used as instrument for multiple 
controls.   
Another important point to be noted is that Dewey sees a naturalistic metaphysics 
as a reconstruction of traditional metaphysics rather than rejection. This is a 
contention he was defending in his later work, although self-acclaimed apologist 
Richard Rorty has a different view.32 I address this contention at the end of the 
chapter. However, there is one question that is important at this point: How 
comparable (and plausible) is Dewey’s conception of reality with modern and 
contemporary ontological theories? Can his position be categorised as a realist or 
idealist, an empiricist or a rationalist position? Answers to these questions are 
considered in the next section. 
2.5 Dewey and some modern positions on the nature of reality 
Introduction: 
Modern and contemporary discussions on the nature of reality have been 
dominated by positions such as materialism, physicalism, and realism. There are 
also anti-realist positions such as idealism, constructivism and so on. Consequently, 
it is important to compare and contrast Dewey’s views on reality with some of 
these positions. However, it is arguable that most critics have concentrated on 
                                                     
32 Rorty interprets Dewey’s position on metaphysics as an explanation of why nobody needs a 
metaphysics. He calls this stance therapeutic- a stance that arguably dismisses any preoccupation 
with metaphysical problems as unnecessary (Rorty, 1982, p. 72). 
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Dewey’s claim to realism more than any other position33. Consequently, in this 
section, I explore some theses on realism and try to figure out a thesis that 
expresses Dewey’s notion of reality. I skip the consideration of Dewey as a naïve 
realist on the ground that he is obviously not. Rather, I consider metaphysical 
realism, scientific realism and the rejection of realism. 
2.5.1 Understanding Dewey’s conception of reality as a metaphysical realism 
Metaphysical realism has been variously defined through two claims; a claim 
about what entities exist and a claim about their independent nature (Brock & 
Mares, 2007; Devitt, 1984; Marsonet, 2002; Putnam, 1981, p. 49; 1990). The claim 
that something exists, as obvious as it is, seems to be the only non-controversial 
ground that unites all realists. However, Brock and Mares called this general 
converging point “the existent axis” (2007, pp. 11-33) and a “minimal realist” 
position (2007, p. 11) and Devitt called it a “weak realism” (1984, p. 15). The main 
point is that, saying metaphysical realists affirm that some entities exist is too 
general to distinguish their position from other versions of realism.  
However, several philosophers have taken saying something exists objectively as 
a stronger metaphysical realism (Brock & Mares, 2007; Williamson, 1995, p. 746). 
Brock and Mares interpreted this notion of “objective existence” as “mind-
independent reality” (2007, pp. 34-35). For Marsonet, some philosophers take the 
“independence” theme to be a pointer to some factors about reality that cannot 
be described by science (2002, p. 1). 34 Philosophers such as Putnam have added 
other theses such as: (i) that there is only one description of the way the world is 
                                                     
33 Critics have concentrated on how to establish Dewey’s metaphysics as representing an idealist 
position rather than that empiricist-realist or naturalist position that he claims to subscribe to 
Reichenbach (1939), Santayana (1977), and Piatt (1951).  
34  Some other scholars have seen the idea of a mind-independent reality as a “carving” and 
“cutting” conception of reality and argued that these are misleading metaphors (Hilpinen, 1992, p. 
1). These scholars argued that the motivation behind the establishment of a mind-independent 
reality is to attain the true picture of the world. This motive, according to them, is a wild goose 
chase because each realist approach has been confronted with endless controversies (Hilpinen, 
1992, p. 1), (Putnam, 1990, pp. 3-29). Some philosophers such as Devitt even believe that when 
the existence and independency themes of realism are added together, it only points at an 
“undifferentiated, uncategorised external world and not at a particular existence (Devitt, 1984, p. 
15). His point is that realism has nothing to do with truth (Devitt, 1984, pp. 34-46).  
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that is true and (ii) that such truth involves some kind of correspondence relation 
between claims and the world (Putnam, 1990).  
There is another way of describing metaphysical realism that I think can be more 
instructive, in terms of its methodological approach to ontological questions. 
Exploring how Kant shifted from a metaphysical realist to an empirical realist 
(Rockmore, 2004, p. 2), Rockmore notes that one of the most fundamental 
differences is abandoning intuition-based strategy for an empirical approach 
(2004, p. 71). According to him, what is common to a transcendental idealist and 
a metaphysical realist in their discussions about “a thing-in-itself”, is the 
acceptance that perceptual experience or empirical observation is inadequate as 
an approach to understanding what an object is fundamentally made of - leaving 
the use of intuitive reasoning as the only viable strategic approach (2004, p. 1). A 
detailed discussion of the development of Kant’s thought and the critique offered 
by Rockmore will not be attempted here. For present purposes, my target is to 
identify some basic ideas about metaphysical realism and consider how Dewey fits 
in.  
In Experience and Nature, Dewey’s contends that the goal of natualistic 
metaphysics is the “detection and the desription” of what he called the “generic 
traits of existence”. He defines these traits in terms of “characteristics or qualities 
shared by all existences” (1925, pp. 51-52, 60). This idea seems to suggest the 
“one-way description of the world” that Putnam ascribed to metaphysical realsim. 
It also seems to suggest the idea of metaphysical realism described by Marsonet: 
identifying “factors about reality that cannot be described by science”. Are these 
suggestions strong enough to establish Dewey’s subscription to metaphysical 
realism? I think they are not. Some of Dewey’s theses on naturalism, his insistence 
that reality is pluralistic, his rejection of the conception of a world that is 
independent of human beings (independent of human experience), his rejection 
of mind/body dualism or nature/human dualism, and his insistence that only 
empirical method can lead to the discovery of knowledge of the world are out-
right negations of the ideas about metaphysical realism that we have considered 
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above.35 If Dewey’s view on reality cannot be classified as metaphysical realism, 
what about scientific realism?  
2.5.2 Understanding Dewey’s conception of reality as a subscription to scientific 
realism 
Philosophers have identified several theses as defining scientific realism. For 
instance, Paul Churchland considers it from the perspective in which theoretical 
understanding of entities in science is contrasted with commonsense knowledge 
of entities. According to this perspective, knowledge of theoretical entities such as 
molecules, nuclei, and electro-magnetic waves, is different from our common 
sense knowledge of objects such as apple, tables, kitchen pots and sand. More 
importantly, “theoretical understandings” are regarded as artificial, speculative 
and essentially stable while the latter is natural, manifest and autonomous 
(Churchland, 1979, p. 1). Churchland’s main point seems to be ascertaining the 
supremacy of science over common-sense. John Watkins provides a succinct view 
about this attitude to the scientific view of the world. According to him, what is 
asserted by the doctrine of scientific realism is “the omnicompetence of physics”. 
According to this view, “all meaningful questions about matters of fact are in 
principle answerable by a completed physics- if there are questions which appear 
to be unanswerable by physics this is only because physics is as yet far from being 
completed” (Watkins, 1996, p. 219). However, philosophers of science such as 
Richard Boyd have identified some theses that arguably are more popular or more 
fundamental. According to him: 
By “scientific realism” philosophers mean the doctrine that the methods of science 
are capable of providing (partial or approximate) knowledge of unobservable 
(‘theoretical’) entities, such as atoms or electromagnetic fields, in addition to 
knowledge about the behaviour  of observable phenomena (and of course, that the 
properties of these and other entities studied by scientists are largely theory-
independent) (R. N. Boyd, 1988, p. 188). 
                                                     
35 The conception of an objective, mind-independent reality violates Dewey’s naturalism at various 
points. First, it violates his social and functionalist theory of mind which is discussed in one of the 
subsequent subsections in this chapter. Second, it violates his Instrumentalism which shall be 
discussed with Dewey’s Epistemological naturalism in the next chapter.  
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While Boyd’s view about realism points at the supremacy of the scientific world-
view, it does so from a specific point- the ability to engender knowledge of 
unobservables. What makes his position more “realistic” rather than merely 
arguing for the supremacy of science is his claim that, in spite of the 
unobservability of theoretical entities such as atoms and electromagnetic fields 
(which makes scientists “routinely modify or extend operational ‘measurement’ 
or ‘detection’ procedures”), scientific knowledge about them is theory 
independent in the sense that it reflects objective facts about nature. Scientific 
realism, construed in Boyd’s sense, is usually contrasted with a non-realist position 
stating that theoretical entities in science are constructions. One of the strongest 
arguments from philosophers holding constructivist views of science (in 
philosophy of science and feminist science), noted by Andre Kukla, is their 
counterfactual argument stating that in those instances where entities are 
constructed, the scientific world-view reflects only choices counterfactually made 
and not objective reality (Kukla, 2000, p. 1). The point of philosophers holding a 
constructivist view is that the scientific world-view could have been other than it 
is (what they are presented to be).  How does Dewey’s position fit with any of 
these theses of scientific realism? 
In our previous section, we discussed how, in Experience and Nature, Dewey 
contends that secondary experience (in which the objects of science and 
philosophy belong) is meant to enlarge our understanding of the non-cognitive 
transactions with reality which characterise primary experience. However, what I 
intend to draw attention to at this point is how he describes the “characters of 
objects of science” in a way that suggests the notion of scientific realism provided 
by Richard Boyd. He writes: 
First, immediate things come and go; events in the direct way of seeing, hearing, 
touching, liking, enjoying, and the rest of them are in rapid change; the subject-matter 
of each has a certain uniqueness, unrepeatedness. Spatial-temporal orders, capable 
of mathematical formulations are, by contrast, constant. They present stability, 
recurrence at its maximum, raised to the highest degree… The second character of 
objects of science follows from this feature. The possibility of regulating the 
occurrence of any event depends upon the possibility of instituting substitutions. By 
means of the latter, a thing which is within grasp is used to stand for another thing 
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which is not immediately had, or which is beyond control. The technique of equations 
and other functions characteristic of modern science is, taken generically, a method 
of thoroughgoing substitutions. It is a system of exchange and mutual conversion 
carried to its limit (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 119).  
But is Dewey’s position on reality exclusively defined by scientific realism? It seems 
the answer is negative.  Firstly, contrary to Churchland’s observation that scientific 
realists hold the object of science as engendering “stable and autonomous’’ 
theoretical understanding”, Dewey contends that in validating theoretical entities, 
theories concerning scientific objects are referred back to the objects of crude 
experience for check and confirmation. This view also contradicts Watkins’ 
explication of scientific realism in terms of the “omnicompetence of physics”. 
Turning to Dewey’s conception of reality within the ontological account provided 
in his naturalistic metaphysics, raises further doubt concerning the credibility of 
interpreting his position to be scientific realist in particular and realist in general. 
For instance, he writes: 
Yet, philosophers, and strangely enough philosophers who call themselves realists, 
have constantly held that the traits which are characteristics of thinking, namely, 
uncertainty, ambiguity, alternatives, inquiring, search, selection, experimental 
reshaping of existential conditions, do not possess the same existential character as 
do the objects of valid knowledge. They have denied that these traits are evidential 
of the character of the world within which thinking occurs (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 60).   
Is Dewey extending the theoretical approach to unobservable entities in science 
to un-observable entities in metaphysics? Or, is he contending that a realist need 
not be a scientific realist in Boyd’s sense? It seems that a scientific realist (such as 
Boyd) will not consider Dewey’s claim that the characteristics of thinking (and 
other esthetic experiences such as emotion and feeling) are deeply rooted in the 
character of the world within which thinking occurs, as espousing scientific realism. 
The rejection will be based on the argument that “the characteristics of thinking” 
mentioned by Dewey are not comparable with the unobservable but ‘theoretically’ 
detectible characters of atoms and electromagnetic fields. Here it seems Dewey is 
not a scientific realist.  
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In addition, there are several other passages in Experience and Nature where 
Dewey’s discussion of “refined objects of science” suggests that they are 
“constructions” or “instruments” for understanding the objects of crude 
experience. Although Dewey claims that the referents of scientific terms are what 
the scientists share with the lay man - the sun, stone and so on, nonetheless, the 
refined objects of reflection in the natural sciences are regarded only as pathways 
or means of knowing and controlling the crude objects of immediate experience. 
The objects of knowledge in scientific theories are seen as abstractions from crude 
and immediate interaction with reality. Scientific objects are responses to 
problems and needs that arise in the encounter with nature. Scientific objects, for 
Dewey, are essentially about the process of knowledge. As Shook nicely puts it, 
the process of knowing, for Dewey, “essentially requires the purposive 
manipulation of natural things in the environment (2000, p. 7). These descriptions 
seem to suggest a constructivist view. 
Reichenbach provides an objection against Dewey’s conception of scientific 
objects from another perspective. According to him, Dewey’s conception of 
scientific objects either affirms that relations are ontologically as real as objects or 
dissolves scientific objects into relations of “qualitative” objects. Reichenbach 
quotes from Dewey’s Quest for Certainty: 
The physical object, as scientifically defined, is not a duplicated real object, but is a 
statement … of the relations between sets of changes the qualitative object sustains 
with changes in other things (Reichenbach, 1939, p. 164).  
How does this add to the denial of Dewey being a scientific realist? I think 
Reichenbach is pushing Dewey into a dilemma: either he concedes dualism in 
terms of admitting that scientifically defined objects and the objects perceived by 
a lay man are two different sets of things, or he agrees that scientifically defined 
objects do not exist beyond the scope of scientific inquiries. Reichenbach seems 
to think that admitting the first horn of the dilemma will render Dewey’s 
naturalism inconsistent and that the second horn will render his position a denial 
of scientific realism in particular and realism in general. I think Dewey denies both 
horns of the dilemma. Let us explore Dewey’s answer to the first horn.  
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Reichenbach believes that Dewey was afraid of duplication of things that could 
lead to the conception of transcendental things such as Kant’s “things – in- 
themselves” (1939, p. 168). I think Reichenbach’s suspicion is right. However, he 
seems to have missed Dewey’s analysis of scientific objects as “refined objects” of 
primary experience specifically in terms of how how both are continuous. The fact 
that a scientist will not see any duplication in the idea of water being H₂0, seems 
to confirm Dewey’s contention that there are some problems in philosophy (such 
as Reichenbach’s challenge) that are typically philosophers’ problems - different 
from problems of men (J. Dewey, 1968).  
Dewey noted that philosophers have not been able to make a distinction between 
reality and the objects of their reflections and recognise the connection between 
them as has been done in science. According to him, while some philosophers have 
identified “sense-data”, “substance”, “sensibilia”, etc., as their objects of 
reflection and were busy looking for the reality behind them without any success, 
some have taken these objects of reflection as reality. The common error that 
Dewey noted as the cause of these problems is that philosophers have either failed 
to acknowledge the priority or precedence of the ‘reality’ that led to those 
philosophical reflections in the first place or regarded the objects of reflection as 
primary and independent of what they are about. Consequently, objects of their 
reflections are defined as necessarily antithetical to reality itself. A good example 
that Dewey most likely has in mind is Plato, who defined reality (Form) as having 
characteristics that are the exact opposite of “appearance”.36 Dewey attributed 
the failure of philosophers to the failure to use either the scientific method of 
investigation or the method that he called “denotative empirical methodology”. 
Let us turn to the second horn of Reichenbach’s dilemma. In Logic: The Theory of 
Inquiry, Dewey actually contends that “relation” has a legitimate ontological status. 
However, this claim is specifically explained in the context of his naturalistic 
conception of logic, as an ontological account of reality. While this issue will be 
                                                     
36 Plato was led from his observation of imperfections in the physical world to theorize about a 
world of Forms that is perfect.  
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taken up more extensively in Chapter Four, it is prudent to provide an instructive 
hint for the present purposes.  In Logic, Dewey contends: 
The functional correspondence, or conjugate relationship, of involvement and 
implication, kinds and categories, characteristics and characters, generic and 
universal propositions, signifies, to sum up, that they represent cooperative divisions 
of function in the inquiry which transforms a problematic situation into a resolved 
and unified one. The internecine war between empiricists of the type of Mill and the 
school of rationalism will continue as long as adherents of the one school and of the 
other fail to recognize the strictly intermediate and functional nature of the two forms 
of propositions as cooperative phases of inquiry. But the needed recognition cannot 
be effected until the field of logic is taken to be as broad as that of controlled inquiry. 
The relations of terms and propositions in discourse is such as to make possible purely 
formal statement - purely formal in the sense that it is the very nature of ordered 
discourse to deal with possibilities in abstraction from existential material (J. Dewey, 
1991, pp. 278-279).   
Dewey’s point is that laws of thought, logical rules and symbols are pointers to 
relations between objects in the world in which human relations to other objects 
in nature forms an integral part. Among these relations, Dewey is interested in 
material ones which he is citing as cases of relations having ontological status.  
Sleeper puts Dewey’s view in a more succinct way:   
Dewey’s theory of inquiry, of which logic in its more formal character is an integral 
part, is based on the proposition that existential relations among individual entities 
are disclosed by the means employed in inquiry. Among such means Dewey is quick 
to identify acts of inference, for it is only by actually making inferences that the two 
most fundamental forms of existential relations are discovered. These two relations 
are involvement and that between the sign and what is signified. Both are relations 
of causal interaction involving individual existences and the existential conditions of 
the situations in which these interactions take place (Sleeper, 1986, p. 160). 
Sleeper’s point is that the act of inference marks a causal relation (plays a 
transformational role) between a problematic situation and the envisaged non-
problematic or settled situation. Inferences in this context are not restricted to 
formal reasoning, but are actual overt transformational activities. Consequently, 
he contends that we can read Dewey’s theory of logic as a theory of ontological 
commitments to existential propositions. For him, “it is an ontology of existent 
objects of knowledge, of the relations of those objects, and of the kinds that are 
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instituted by means of those relations, an ontology that is pluralistic and 
relativistic …” (Sleeper, 1986, p. 161). 
 However, what I take to be the most substantive argument for the claim that 
Dewey is not a scientific realist lies in Dewey’s emphasis that natural science, like 
any other cognitive endeavour using reflective analysis, cannot provide an 
ontological account that is exhaustive, as when reflection occurs involving a 
natural phenomenon (whether in science or philosophy), a finite aspect of it is 
focused on and reflected upon while the larger aspects of it are relegated to the 
background.  On the incompleteness of any ontological account of nature that 
involves selective emphasis, Dewey writes: 
The favouring of cognitive objects and their characteristics at the expense of traits 
that excite desire, command action and produce passion, is a special instance of a 
principle of selective emphasis which introduces partiality and partisanship into 
philosophy…. But in ordinary matters and in scientific inquiries, we always retain the 
sense that the material chosen is selected for a purpose; there is no idea of denying 
what is left out, for what is omitted is merely that which is not relevant to the 
particular problem and purpose in hand (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 24). 
Thus, for Dewey, the acknowledgement of selective emphasis in natural sciences 
puts it on a more reliable epistemological path to the truth about reality than we 
have in philosophy, because of the acknowledgement that the objects of 
knowledge are chosen on an instrumental basis rather than on the belief that they 
are all there is. This acknowledgement, Dewey argued, protects science from 
“conversion of eventual functions into antecedent existence: a conversion that 
may be said to be the philosophic fallacy” (1925, pp. 27-28). However, this 
closeness of science to the truth about reality notwithstanding, Dewey’s argument 
continues that a substantial part of reality is left out in scientific reflection and 
theorization when the question about the complete or more detailed picture of 
reality is raised. Dewey notes the danger inherent in every selective emphasis. 
There is the assumption that those aspects that are left out do not exist.  For 
Dewey, 
It tends to be assumed that because qualities that figure in poetical discourse and 
those that are central in friendship do not figure in scientific inquiry, they have no 
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reality, at least not the kind of unquestionable reality attributed to the mathematical, 
mechanical or magneto-electric properties that constitute matter. It is natural to men 
to take that which is of chief value to them at the time as the real (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 
24). 
Was Dewey looking for a Metaphysics that could rival science?  Or, was he looking 
for a cognitive endeavour that we can call the metaphysical foundation of science? 
I think the reading of Dewey as holding a constructivist position on the objects of 
knowledge in science seem to suggest that Dewey was looking for a metaphysical 
foundation for science. A kind of “divide and rule” relationship between science 
and philosophy seems very appealing where science is engrossed with questions 
of knowledge while philosophers are engrossed with questions about ontology. 
Metaphysics becomes the foundation of science in the sense that the need to 
answer the question what exists (ontology) takes precedence over the need to 
answer the question what do we know or how do we know or who has the right 
to claim to know (epistemology). 
However, I think the answer to both questions is No. The envisaged naturalistic 
metaphysics is not supposed to be a rival to science. Unlike in modern philosophy 
where it is often assumed that the advance of physical science has created a 
serious metaphysical problem, Dewey argued that the objects of natural science 
are not metaphysical rivals of historical events but rather, they are means of 
directing the latter (1925, pp. 112, 123). This point is evident when Dewey writes: 
The features of objects reached by scientific or reflective experiencing are important, 
but so are all the phenomena of magic, myth, politics, painting, and penitentiaries. 
The phenomena of social life are as relevant to the problem of the relation of 
individual and universal as are those of logic; the existence of political organization of 
boundaries and barriers, of centralization, of interaction across boundaries, of 
expansion and absorption, will be quite as important for metaphysical theories of the 
discrete and the continuous as is anything derived from chemical analysis (J. Dewey, 
1925, p. 20).  
The important point is that science indicates our cognitive interaction with nature. 
The primary aim of this interaction is the acquisition of systematic knowledge and 
to take control of nature. The non-cognitive interaction on the other hand is 
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primarily not about the acquisition of knowledge. What Dewey is saying here is 
that before reflection takes place, there must have been some contacts.  
One major point against the idea that Dewey is a scientific realist is that he 
acknowledges that phenomena such as magic, myth, politics and so on, are natural 
cognitive responses to some problematic situations in human transactions within 
the world just as a biologist is interested in the outbreak of an epidemic and a 
geologist is interested in volcanic eruptions. Just because science cannot address 
questions concerning these phenomena does not mean that they are to be 
categorised as “spooky elements”. His contention that there are ontological issues 
that science cannot deal with, disqualifies him as a scientific realist. 
It seems to me that there is a promise of uniqueness in the subject matter of 
Dewey’s metaphysics. Unlike philosophers in traditional philosophy who 
concentrated on the cognitive side of experience and reality, Dewey envisaged a 
more rewarding venture by aiming at the neglected counterpart. Dewey was 
looking for, in the words of Campbell, “a philosophy that will integrate our 
practical and theoretical lives and would function as a tool of criticism or 
evaluation of our inherited life” (1995, p. 67). For Margolis, Dewey was envisaging 
a kind of metaphysics that can close the gap between science and practical 
experience (2002, p. 112). 37  If this suggestion is correct, then our previous 
suggestion that Dewey wanted a metaphysics that could complement science 
seems to need some modifications. Dewey seems to be looking for how to deal 
with issues that science is incapable of or has no interest in dealing with.38 Does 
this unique interest of Dewey’ metaphysics render him an anti-realist? Some critics 
argue that it does. I now examine some arguments presented by critics and their 
implications on Dewey’s claim to realism, empiricism and naturalism. 
                                                     
37  However, Margolis identified another reason behind the kind of metaphysics that Dewey 
envisaged. He said Dewey was looking for a kind of metaphysics that can accommodate Darwin’s 
evolutionary theory. A metaphysics that can close the gap between experience and the animal 
sources of practical success bearing on survival, well- being, and the satisfaction of our wants and 
needs (Margolis, 2002, p. 112). 
38 In Dewey’s terms, these will be those issues that do not fall into the realms of “selective emphasis” 
of science. 
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2.5.3 The possibility of Dewey as an anti-realist 
Several critics have contended that Dewey is not a realist (McGilvary, 1977; 
Santayana, 1951). For instance, on Dewey’s metaphysics, Santayana writes: 
This question, which is the crux of the whole system, may be answered, I think, in a 
single phrase: The dominance of the foreground. In nature there is no foreground or 
background, no here, no now, no moral cathedra, no centre so really central as to 
reduce all other things to mere margins and mere perspectives. A foreground is by 
definition relative to some chosen point of view, to the station assumed in the midst 
of nature by some creature tethered by fortune to a particular time and place. If such 
a foreground becomes dominant in a philosophy naturalism is abandoned (Santayana, 
1951, p. 251).  
A critique of Dewey’s claim to naturalism is the primary focus of this passage, but 
it extends to Dewey’s claim to realism when Santayana compares Dewey’s 
“specious kind of naturalism” to naturalism in works of idealists such as Emerson, 
Schelling, or any Hegelian of the left” (Santayana, 1951, p. 253).39  Santayana 
contends that Dewey’s conception of how human experience is linked with reality 
indicates a rejection of principles or ideas that can be defined as naturalism and 
realism. The reason he gave is that while a naturalist and a realist will conceive 
Nature to be independent of the whims and caprices of human beings, Dewey’s 
conception of Nature is irredeemably anthropocentric. Dewey’s conception of 
reality, is at best, for him, more or less a kind of moral exhortation or at best a 
relativist’s account of Nature. How serious is this objection? At a glance, it seems 
the disagreement between Santayana and Dewey is all about the differences in 
their conception of what a consistent naturalist should take into consideration 
when analysing what reality is. For Santayana, a consistent naturalist will 
necessarily exclude all that pertains to humans: their observations, moral 
exhortations and stories in the attempt to map out the constituents of nature. For 
Dewey, on the other hand, a conception of nature without humans and their 
activities forming an integral part is denatured. At a first glance, it seems the 
disagreement is what both of them can live with, given the fact that there are 
                                                     
39 Santayana described the “attitude” of these idealists in terms of being “romantic, transcendental, 
piously receiving as absolute the inspiration dominating moral life in their day and country” 
(Santayana, 1951, p. 253).  
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many definitions of naturalism as there are many naturalists, as we have 
established in Chapter One. 
However, Santayana presents a more specific and more fundamental 
disagreement with Dewey, which goes beyond mere disagreement over 
conceptual definitions of naturalism when he writes: 
Immediacy, which was an epistemological category, has become a physical one: 
natural events are conceived to be compounded of such qualities as appear to human 
observers, as if the character and emergence of these qualities had nothing to do with 
the existence, position, and organs of those observers…. Naturalism could not be 
more romantic: nature here is not world but a story (Santayana, 1951, p. 253). 
Santayana’s point is that Dewey treated “immediacy” as a metaphysical category 
and consequently relegates reality to what is immediate. How does treating 
“immediacy” as a metaphysical category indicate a rejection of a realist stance? 
Santayana’s point is that “immediacy” is a concept featuring in humans’ subjective 
account of nature or reality. It is an epistemological category because it emanates 
from humans’ knowing process. However, Santayana accuses Dewey of treating 
“immediacy” as “object” as transcendental, absolute, and groundless (1951, p. 
255). Consequently, for Santayana, only in an idealist ontology can a phenomenon 
that is not part of nature be regarded as such. 
The potency of this criticism was amplified by several other critics of Dewey. For 
instance, building on this objection from Santayana, McGilvary writes: 
The object as it existed before it was experienced, was not reality, but only a condition 
of reality, and the condition is not sufficient to produce reality. Only when the 
condition is supplemented by an experience which realizes the object does the object 
become real …. No thinker, no thought-object; no experience somewhere and 
somewhen, no meaningful reality anywhere and anytime. This is the truth which is 
contained in Professor Dewey’s contention (McGilvary, 1908, p. 593). 
Both critics read Dewey’s conception of existence to mean that the existence of 
reality begins from the awareness of the constituents of the nature by human 
beings, in their transactions within or with nature. Both are of opinion that this 
contention involves circular reasoning which renders inconsistent the entire 
naturalistic metaphysics that Dewey hopes to build on this theory. Santayana 
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concentrates on the use of immediate experience as a “foreground” imposed on 
nature. McGilvary, on the other hand, concentrates on the distinction between 
“objects”–before-they-are-experienced and “objects”–after-they-are-
experienced. 
How best can Dewey’s response be articulated? I want to start by discussing two 
significant concessions made by Dewey in response to criticisms from Santayana 
and McGilvary, but I will argue that these neither render Dewey’s original position 
inconsistent nor make it an anti-realist position but merely offer a much needed 
chance for Dewey to further clarify his views. After this, I will discuss Dewey’s 
response to the contention that “immediacy” is an epistemological category and 
not a metaphysical category as used by Dewey. 
 Dewey agrees that his position was rightly described by Santayana as creating a 
kind of foreground in nature: 
The significance of experience as foreground is that the foreground is of such a nature 
as to contain material which, when operationally dealt with, provides the clues that 
guide us straight into Nature’s background and into nature as background. If 
philosophical writers would and could only forget their own dominating foreground 
of mentalistic psychological interpretation of experience, the historic course of the 
experiential development of the sciences out of experiences of the sort found among 
savage peoples would suffice to prove that experience is in fact of this sort. The proof 
will be reinforced by noting what happens whenever out of experiences previously 
had there develops a new experience based upon and containing juster and deeper 
cognitive insight into the world in which we live (J. Dewey, 1939, p. 533). 
In my own interpretation of Dewey, I think the concession here is more 
epistemological than ontological.40  Dewey is only using the “foreground” as a 
heuristic device to show how experience offers much needed ways of knowing the 
generic traits in reality. The use of the word “foreground” is “operational” and is 
not about any attempt to graft anything unnatural onto nature. While Santayana 
is interested in how to link the use of “foreground” of the immediate experience 
                                                     
40  It seems to imply that admitting that the concession being discussed at this point is 
epistemological rather than ontological indicates that Dewey has a very tough nut to crack in any 
attempt to articulate a consistent epistemology as corollary to his naturalistic metaphysics. But in 
my next chapter, I will state and explore the argument that this is not the case. 
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to the human subject to create a gulf between his experiences in nature and nature 
itself, Dewey would like to attach the concept of foreground to his concept of 
“doing” and “action-going” which portrays an unbroken continuity and symbiotic 
relation between the actor, his actions on nature, as part of nature and in nature. 
With this explanation of what Dewey meant by “foreground”, Santayana’s 
criticism loses its bite. 
The second concession is that Dewey agrees with Santayana that there is a kind of 
circularity involved in his position. Dewey explains that what he meant was that 
“everything immediate emanates from something biological” (J. Dewey, 1939, pp. 
533-534). Is this circular? Yes, Dewey was sincere enough to admit that it is. This 
is because in any attempt to explain what immediate experience is, we are 
directed to biology and vice versa. However, my contention is that the circularity 
is not vicious. In the words of Nicholas Rescher, “what is involved here is not the 
vicious circularity of definitional question-begging but the virtuous circularity of 
an explanatory feedback loop” (Rescher, 2007, p. 31). It is arguable that no 
concept is left hanging, unexplained. Sticking to our terminology, it is defensible 
to say that biology provides the “epistemological foreground” for the analysis of 
what “immediate experience” is.  
However, McGilvary’s objection to Dewey’s use of the word “object” seems to be 
more fundamental than Santayana’s criticism of Dewey’s use of “foreground”. 
According to Boisvert, in McGilvary’s objection, Dewey was interpreted as using 
“objects” to mean something created through experience. It follows from this 
interpretation that the existence of beings and the world itself will depend upon 
experience (Boisvert, 1988, p. 58). Boisvert rightly noted that McGilvary was 
exploiting Dewey’s failure to make explicit his distinction between “things as 
existent” and “things as experienced” (Boisvert, 1988, p. 60). However, it is 
arguable that Dewey was cautious of being misinterpreted as subscribing to the 
traditional distinction between appearance and reality, which he keenly abhors. 
However, one reminder is useful at this point. Dewey made a distinction between 
the subject-matter of experience and the object of scientific reflection (Margolis, 
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2004, p. 141). The constituents of the world that human beings come in contact 
with when human transactions take place are the subject-matter of experience. 
The objects of scientific reflection, on the hand, are these same objects of 
experience, but in refined form. Their “refinement” is in terms of attaining new 
signification through regulated and reflective analysis. For Dewey, water attains 
new signification when conceptually presented as H₂0 but it is only conceptually 
different from water. It is important to note that Dewey used words such as 
“subject-matter”, “objects”, “mediate” and “immediate” in radically new ways 
that lead his readers (and critics) to interpret his stipulatively defined concepts in 
erroneous ways. Anyone who misses this is bound to make a parody of Dewey’s 
philosophy. Dewey made a distinction between primary and secondary experience 
and more importantly between subject-matter of primary experience and object 
of secondary experience, as awkward as it reads (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 1-36; 1939, 
p. 532), . The subject-matter of primary experience (which are realities that are 
not created), engenders qualitative experience between organism and 
environment (in which things are had, used and enjoyed). This is what Dewey 
meant by saying that “experience is the manifestation of interactions of organism 
and environment. Dewey pointed out that it is fallacious to think that because he 
claims that experience is immediate in its existence, its subject-matter must be 
immediate” (J. Dewey, 1939, p. 532).41  
Now we come to Santayana’s second contention that “immediacy” is an 
epistemological concept rather than metaphysical as supposed by Dewey. To 
understand the vehemence that Santayana put into this objection, we need to 
understand the background. The history of the distinctions between mediacy and 
immediacy in mainstream philosophy shows that it has had only one 
interpretation which is epistemological. For instance, John Locke identified 
sensations and reflections as sources of human ideas. However, he distinguished 
the ideas we get from sensations and reflections in terms of degrees of clarity. He 
                                                     
41 McGilvary’s types of objections were arguably actuated by Dewey’s “stubbornness” in using old 
words in new ways in spite of his awareness of the meanings that are tenaciously attached to them. 
I argue that Dewey’s use of non-cognitive experience (as a synonym for immediate experience) is 
less controversial. 
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described the ideas we get from sensations as providing the clearest of all forms 
of knowledge. The clarity of this form of knowledge, according to him, lies in fact 
that the mind is presently filled with the light of such ideas. By “presently”, he was 
referring to the spontaneous way the ideas are received through sense-contact 
with the world. This mode of receiving these ideas and their epistemic worthiness 
are contrasted with ideas we get as conclusion or consequences of a process 
described as systematic reasoning (Locke, 1952, p. 309). A good example is my 
direct awareness of the pain in my leg that can be contrasted with my acceptance 
of the idea that bats have physiological properties that qualify them as both 
mammalian animals and birds- the former idea is immediately known while the 
latter is mediately known. 
More recently, Laurence Bonjour made a similar distinction between direct and 
indirect awareness but in terms of factors that an epistemic agent can appeal to 
when justifying a belief. According to him, there are factors that an agent has 
exclusive and direct cognitive access to, such as thought, state of mind and 
functioning of senses (internalism) and factors that an epistemic agent has indirect 
cognitive access to that are outside, such as social norms, rules, paradigms, and so 
on. The former factors that are designated as “direct” are regarded as “internal” 
and the latter designated as “indirect” are external (Bonjour, 1994, p. 132). The 
“direct factors” are ones that we are mediately aware of in terms of spontaneity 
while the “indirect factors” are ones that we are immediately aware of because 
they involve a process of systemic reasoning. The most salient fact inherited from 
the history of philosophy about the distinction between immediacy and mediacy 
is that it is an epistemological distinction. It is based on how we come to know. 
This is the tradition that produced both Dewey and Santayana.42 
                                                     
42  How did Santayana miss the crucial point in Dewey’s use of immediacy and mediacy? His 
objection seems to rest on his mistrust of the tradition or culture from which Dewey emerged. He 
appears to be bent on attaching Dewey’s philosophy (and the “misrepresentations of reality” that 
he believes it portrays) with the tradition and mentality of the Americans which he caricatured as 
“philosophy of enterprise” or “monopoly of material activity” (Santayana, 1951, pp. 248, 252). 
Most critics (and apologists) of Dewey have attributed whatever problems they have discovered in 
Dewey to the “tension” between his Hegelian background, the influence of Darwinism and his 
adoration for scientific knowledge (T. M. Alexander, 1987, pp. 15-17, 57-118; Boisvert, 1988, pp. 
5,46; Campbell, 1995, p. 25; Margolis, 2002, p. 112). Although, this attribution appears to be more 
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I think one can conclude that it is difficult to identify Dewey’s position on reality 
with any of the standard versions of realism.43 It is also equally difficult to identify 
him as anti-realist. It is a fact that identifying him as an idealist will irreparably 
render his position inconsistent in respect of his naturalism and empiricism. 
However, Dewey’s conception of reality is not an idealist position for several 
reasons. Firstly, the descriptions of the “traits”, characters and events that 
characterised his notion of reality and more importantly his descriptions of how 
reality can be manipulated, are consistently in physical (or material) terms. 
Secondly, his description of the complementary relationship between science and 
metaphysics suggests that both are empirical disciplines. Finally, his insistence that 
only an empirical approach can guide to the discovery of the knowledge of this reality also 
suggests a position that is not idealism. Consequently, I suggest that Dewey’s position 
“transcends” realist/anti-realist dischotomies and labelling.   
2.6 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, I have explored how Dewey developed his version of metaphysics 
from his theories of experience, reality and human mind. I have identified is 
interest in a version of metaphysics that is empirical. Also, I have explored his 
attempt to establish a metaphysics that is continuous with traditional metaphysics, 
on one hand, and compatible with science, on the other hand. I have established 
that the construction of Dewey’s metaphysics was strictly based on his naturalistic 
views which include the ideas that the human species are inseparable parts of 
nature, that their experiences are transactions with nature and that reality is an 
instrument to be manipulated for the survival of the human species.  
In Section One, I explored how Dewey offered a radical conception of human 
experience, as an alternative to the traditional views. I discussed how he rejected 
the conception of human experience as essentially a mode of knowing nature in 
                                                     
historically evident and less- speculative than Santayana’s suggestion, it is arguable that Dewey’s 
position is defensible.   
43 The only way of classifying Dewey’s positions as realist is to identify him with positions such as 
idealist-realist, material-realist, and materialist-idealist. 
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traditional metaphysics and replaced it with the conception of experience as 
human transaction within nature. Exploring Dewey’s principal argument that 
nature is experienced whenever any human experience takes place, I discussed 
Dewey’s distinction between primary and secondary stages of human experience 
and their ontological connotations. I discussed Dewey’s explanation that primary 
experience marks the point when the human species has raw encounters with 
nature in terms of having, using and enjoying things in nature. The secondary 
experience marks the stage where human species manipulate nature by re-
arranging and reproducing its constituents. I also discussed how Dewey used the 
concepts of “immediacy” and “mediacy” to correspond to the primary and 
secondary stages of experience, respectively.  
Several objections to Dewey’s theory of experience were examined. Most of these 
objections alleged that his conception of experience is vague. One expression of 
this vagueness is that Dewey failed to distinguish between what a knower is 
consciously aware of (human experience) and what nature actually or objectively 
is. This objection is usually raised by critics in their contention that Dewey is better 
classified as an idealist rather than realist. One response to this objection explored 
in this section is that critics have confused the traditional conception of experience 
as a mode of knowing with Dewey’s conception of experience as an account of 
human transaction within nature, while the former is ultimately epistemological 
the second is primarily ontological. However, I noted that a critique of Dewey’s 
theory of experience cannot be performed in isolation since it is extricably 
intertwined with his theory of reality and his version of naturalism. 
In Second Two, I focused on how Dewey rejected the conception of reality as single, 
stable and static that is predominant in traditional philosophical settings and 
replaced it with a conception of reality that is dynamic and pluralistic. In this 
section, I explored Dewey’s two strongest claims for his theory of reality. The first 
claim is that human experience has shown the traits of existence to be both 
precarious and stable. The second argument is that evolutionary theories do not 
favour the kind of single, uniform and static reality propounded by traditional 
metaphysicians. However, I noted the problem inherent in the attempts to locate 
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Dewey’s notion of reality within the ontological theories provided by modern and 
contemporary philosophers. The problem is that Dewey’s position cannot be 
categorised in terms of the well-known orthodox versions of realism such as naïve 
realism, metaphysical realism or scientific realism. He is a realist in the sense that 
he admitted the existence of physical reality. He rejected all forms of theory of 
reality usually described as transcendental or beyond the physical world.  
However, in his naturalist position that the human species is part of nature, his 
realism is different from metaphysical realists who claim that a mind-independent 
world exists. Similarly, his contention that science selectively pursues subject-
matter for scientific investigations, leaving out issues that define non-cognitive 
human experience (such as emotion, esthetic feelings, magical experience, and so 
on), renders his position different from scientific realists who believe in the 
omnicompetence of science. I concluded the exploration of Dewey’s position by 
noting that it transcends the conventional dichotomies between idealism and 
realism, on one hand, and between various versions of realism, on the other hand.  
Several objections were critically examined, most of which spill over from the 
critique of his theory of experience. One of the strongest is that Dewey has 
reduced reality to what a knower experienced immediately. Santayana succinctly 
presented this objection in terms of creating a foreground for nature, whereas in 
reality, there is no “before” and “after”. The implication is that Dewey is a 
surreptitious idealist and an anti-naturalist. Another strong objection is that 
Dewey equated human experience with reality and consequently must account 
for realities that are unexperienced or in-experience-able by human beings. The 
point of this objection is that human experience is not commensurable with reality. 
Another objection is that he reduced reality to a process. 
I explored Dewey’s responses to these objections. Firstly, for Dewey, the fact that 
science (evolutionary biology) admits that nature is evolutional justifies his claim 
that nature is not static. In addition, I explored Dewey’s explanation that nature 
and (or) experience is an unbroken process or a continuum. The implication is that 
there is no need for an experiencing agent or a knower for there to be reality. 
89 
 
However, whenever or wherever there is a reality which includes human beings, 
human experiences would be about nature. Furthermore, I explored the meanings 
of “immediacy” and “mediacy”, construed in ontological terms by Dewey to 
underscore the point that his naturalistic metaphysics do not reduce reality to 
what a knower immediately and subjectively experienced. “Immediacy” for Dewey, 
is a radically new term depicting non-cognitive or pre-theoretical human 
transaction within nature.  
The argument pursued in this chapter is that there are notable unprecedented 
contributions in Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics such as his unique analysis of 
aspects of human experience such as immediacy, qualitative and non-cognitive 
aspects of experience, “problematic situations”, pluralistic facets in reality and 
many other themes. His attempts to redefine metaphysics in a way that is distinct 
as well as amenable to science, and his success in identifying science as continuous 
with ordinary human transactions with the physical world are also notable. 
However, I observed that most of his critics have argued that his subscription to a 
thoroughgoing naturalism is suspect on the ground that his overall position 
implicitly engenders idealism. On the contrary, I argued that Dewey could not have 
succeeded in connecting several themes in his overall philosophical position such 
as experience, pluralism, social and functionalist theory of human mind, and 
radical empiricism unless he subscribed to a version of naturalism and realism. 
Again, while it is evident that there are many issues in Dewey’s philosophy that 
appear to be ambiguous because of his style of language and aggravated by his 
insistence on using old concepts in radically different ways, I established the 
plausibility of how he constructed a metaphysics from his theories of experience, 
reality and the social nature of human mind. His naturalistic metaphysics concerns 
itself with human transactions within nature and comes up with questions about 
how to manipulate or restructure nature for human survival. The primacy of 
transaction (and necessity of solving the problematic situations that is entailed in 
it) makes naturalistic metaphysics the field that furnishes the subject-matter for 
science, epistemology and every other cognitive field from which solutions are 
envisaged. Consequently, naturalistic metaphysics is regarded as the foundation 
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for every human cognitive pursuit. However, this “foundational role” is not 
necessitated by the kinds of argument depicting the “supremacy of reason over 
the senses” that characterised Cartesian “first philosophy”.44 It is also different 
from the argument usually meant to present philosophy as superior to science by 
virtue of some special subject-matters that are supposed beyond the scope and 
methods of the sciences.45 However, constructing metaphysics from the naturalist 
conception of experience, Dewey hopes to develop a metaphysics that is 
continuous with traditional metaphysics, but in a naturalistic setting.46  
Given these clarifications of Dewey’s philosophical position, I argued that he offers 
a substantive and “empirical” metaphysics and that he is not merely proposing a 
new philosophical methodology. The most informative coinage in his metaphysics 
is “the traits of existence”. And he was not merely enumerating traits as his critics 
interpreted his preoccupation. According to Shook, “Dewey’s mature philosophy 
retained the term metaphysics to cover empirical inquiry into traits common 
across all experience and hence across all multifarious modes of knowing as well” 
(Shook, 2002, p. 101).  Sleeper simplifies Shook’s claim about Dewey by saying that 
“Dewey’s motive is to communicate the connection of things in experience with 
things in existence” (Sleeper, 1986, p. 116). More fundamentally, Dewey’s 
naturalist metaphysics is arguably a continuation of the “old” metaphysics in spite 
of its differences in methodological approach, re-orientations on issues and new 
non-reductive alignment with science.47 His metaphysics seems to match perfectly 
                                                     
44 Philosophers such as Penelope Maddy have contrasted naturalism with “first philosophy”. The 
approach, usually, is to contrast the differences in what both traditions regarded as the subject-
matter and methods of metaphysics in relation to other cognitive fields such as science (Maddy, 
2007). 
45 For instance, the study of being qua being in traditional metaphysics is believed to be beyond 
empirical science.   
46 For instance, it is evident in Dewey’s Experience and Nature that the traditional interest in 
metaphysical issues such as knowing the nature of reality, human nature, human mind, and 
inquiries concerning other metaphysical questions, are preserved, but the approach became 
naturalistically transformed by locating the natural problematic situations that generate inquiries 
and concerns about possibility of solutions.  
47  In this regard, his view on metaphysics is radically different from the view of mainstream 
philosophers such as Hume, Kant and the Positivists who at various times have called for the 
elimination of Metaphysics because its propositions are sophistries, impossible and nonsensical, 
respectively. His position is also different from the position of philosophers from the Pragmatist 
tradition such as Peirce (1934a, p. 282) and Quine (1994a, p. 18) who have suggested that 
metaphysical questions are best answered through observational methods of science. However, 
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Bradley’s description of what a substantive metaphysics should be, insofar as it is 
still an attempt “to comprehend the universe, not simply as piecemeal or by 
fragments, but somehow as a whole” (Bradley, 1893, p. 1). 
However, several concessions are noted in this chapter that seem to justify the 
impression that if Dewey’s metaphysics is regarded as a success, it is at the 
expense of the possibility of his having a consistent or meaningful epistemology. 
We have seen how Murphy argued that based on how Dewey conceptualised and 
used the concept of immediacy in his philosophy there is unavoidable tension 
between his type of metaphysics and any theory of knowledge that can be 
presented to correspond to it. Gale seems to be arguing that a relativist 
epistemology is all Dewey could get given his use of the notions of precariousness 
and stableness. Campbell argues that Dewey’s notion of non-cognitive experience 
is spurious as it is not possible to have a conscious experience without reflection 
and the occurrence of reflection is an indication that a process of knowledge has 
been initiated. Consequently, a Deweyan theory of knowledge that could 
correspond to his naturalistic metaphysics is necessary to make his philosophy in 
general a real success. This is what I hope to achieve in the next chapter. 
 
                                                     
two facts are noteworthy about this claim. First, while fragment 5.423 in Peirce’s volume 5 
evidently shows his preference for science over metaphysics, his discussion of “scientific 
metaphysics”, especially the categories of Firstness to Thirdness in Volume VI seems to indicate a 
reversed opinion (Peirce, 1934b, p. 25). Maybe the best thing to say about Peirce is that there is a 
type of metaphysics he favours and others that he rejects. Second, it should be noted that Quine’s 
view on metaphysics that is expressed here, is a subtle one. It may be inferred from his assessments 
that Russell’s Our Knowledge of the External World and Carnap’s Der logische Aufbau der Welt 
were monumental failures. These are classics of the genre of metaphysical discourse. 
93 
 
Chapter Three: 
 A critique of Dewey’s epistemological naturalism 
3.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I explore the version of epistemology (theory of knowledge) in 
Dewey’s naturalism. His position has been described as “epistemological 
naturalism” because of his contention that the knowing process is a natural event 
to be empirically studied like any other natural events such as rainbows, 
earthquakes, and erosion. I discuss how this view differentiates his epistemology 
from traditional epistemology and other positions such as Quine’s naturalized 
epistemology. For instance, while most traditional epistemologists are concerned 
with establishing necessary and sufficient conditions to demonstrate the 
possibility of knowledge, Dewey sees knowledge demonstrated in every successful 
human transaction within nature. Consequently, I argue that the traditional 
concern about the possibility of knowing is replaced with a concern about the 
possibility of knowledge ‘transforming reality’ as envisaged by Dewey. In addition, 
while naturalists such as Quine arguably see epistemology as dependent on 
scientific knowledge (1994a), Dewey sees all forms of knowledge (scientific 
knowledge, philosophical knowledge, technical knowledge, magical knowledge 
and so on) as complementary. I discuss how Dewey’s view is rooted in his 
contention that all human cognitive endeavours (science, epistemology, logic, fine 
arts) have their roots in problematic human transactions or symbiotic relations 
with nature.  
This chapter focuses on three broad aims. Firstly, I discuss how Dewey’s theories 
of knowledge and reality entail one another. Specifically, I discuss how his notion 
of reality provides a road-map for the conceptions of knowledge, truth, and 
justification that characterise his epistemology. I explore how this mutual 
relationship is corroborated by Dewey’s apologists (Archie, 1958; R. E. Dewey, 
1977, p. 142), . More importantly, I explore how this mutual entailment refutes 
the claim made by some critics that the nature of the metaphysics presented by 
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Dewey forecloses the possibility of establishing a consistent and substantive 
epistemology within his naturalistic philosophy (Gale, 2010a, p. 10; Murphy, 1951, 
p. 221; Santayana, 1951, pp. 251-252).  
Secondly, I explore the continuity between Dewey’s naturalistic epistemology and 
traditional epistemology in terms of how he accepts some of the preoccupations 
of traditional epistemologists as genuine but proposes naturalistic foundations for 
analysing those concerns and offers a naturalistic methodological approach for 
solving them. I focus on traditional concerns such as defending the importance of 
normativity in epistemology, identifying the attainment of truth and avoidance of 
errors as one of the goals of epistemology, the social nature of knowledge and the 
significance of doubt and sceptical challenges.  
Thirdly, I articulate how Dewey aimed to establish a general notion of knowledge 
rather than a notion within the context of epistemology (philosophy) alone. 
Although he takes scientific knowledge as a paradigm, I argue that Dewey’s 
conception of knowledge cuts across all cognitive disciplines (epistemology, 
morality, science, technology, arts, drama, politics, magic, and so on). This view 
was discussed as a consequence of his contention that all cognitive inquiries are 
inherently motivated by problematic situations and are resolved when controls 
are effected. 
This chapter has four sections. In the first section, I discuss how Dewey presents 
his naturalist metaphysics as a road-map for epistemology. This feature 
underscores his point that metaphysics is inseparable from epistemology and 
offers a challenge to philosophers (such as Hume, Kant and the positivists) who 
have argued for the rejection of metaphysics without considering a corresponding 
rejection of epistemology. In the second section, I explore Dewey’s critique of 
traditional epistemology. I discuss his contention that most of the problems of 
traditional epistemology are consequences of obsolete assumptions about the 
nature of knowledge (J. Dewey & Bentley, 1949, p. 47), the use of non-empirical 
methodologies (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 1-36) and appeals to some kinds of non-
naturalistic metaphysics. However, I discuss his acknowledgement that some of 
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the problems are genuine, if what motivated them is naturalistically approached. 
This view has been interpreted to mean that his naturalistic epistemology is 
essentially about reconstructing traditional epistemology.  
I start the third section by discussing Dewey’s critique of traditional methodologies 
such as the use of analysis, intuition, and argumentation, which he described as 
non-empirical. His contention that these non-empirical methods led to many 
pseudo-problems is examined. I discuss the alternative method he proposes which 
is the denotative empirical methodology (DEM). In addition, I examine his claim 
that the use of denotative method invariably involves the use of hypotheses and 
experimentation.  Most importantly, I explore what it meant, in Dewey’s view, for 
a method to “denote”, and how he uses this “function” to underscore the 
uniqueness of this philosophical method. The importance of this function in 
Dewey’s conception of inquiry and contention that knowledge is practical is 
discussed. In section four, I discuss Dewey’s instrumentalist and experimentalist 
conceptions of knowledge, as consequences of his rejection of the Spectator 
Theory of Knowledge. More importantly, I explore how through these conceptions 
he establishes the nature and usefulness of knowledge and how a claim to 
knowledge can be justified.  
3.1 Dewey’s conception of metaphysics as a ground-map for naturalistic 
epistemology and its consequences 
This section reviews two popular views about the connection between Dewey’s 
metaphysics and epistemology. On one hand, we have some philosophers who 
have noted that the only way to comprehend Dewey’s entire philosophy is to 
understand that his theory about reality (metaphysics) and his theory about 
knowledge and truth (epistemology) are two inseparable aspects of his naturalism 
(Archie, 1958; R. E. Dewey, 1977, p. 142; Neubert, 2009, p. 29) . On the other hand, 
for critics, such as Gale, certain ontological claims that Dewey emphasised in his 
metaphysics foreclose the possibility of a substantive and consistent epistemology 
within his naturalistic philosophy (Gale, 2010a, p. 10). For Murphy, Dewey used 
the concept “Experience” in two incompatible ways, as “the essential link between 
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man and a world which long antedates his appearance in it” and as: “the terminus 
of all knowing, in the sense that all our cognitive claims refer ultimately to what 
experience will show itself to be in a ‘resolved’ situation and to nothing else” 
(1951, p. 221). Consequently, Murphy concludes that if Dewey’s metaphysics is 
true, his epistemology must necessarily be false. For Santayana, Dewey’s 
metaphysical conception of nature is anthropocentric, so that any Deweyan 
epistemology must be either a subjectivist epistemology or a non-epistemic theory 
of knowledge (Santayana, 1951, pp. 251-252).48 The suggestion from these critics 
is that Dewey’s metaphysics and epistemology are not only clearly distinct but 
better separated. 
However, the position that I maintain throughout this section is that if these two 
components of his naturalism are separated or one is denied, the overall 
framework of his philosophy will become inconsistent and characterised by 
unresolved internal problems. Consequently, I contend that most 
misinterpretations and criticisms of Dewey’s naturalistic philosophy came about 
because of the failure of critics to understand his conception of the relationship 
between epistemology and metaphysics.  I start the discussion with Dewey’s 
contention that knowledge is a natural event and then proceed to discuss how he 
uses this claim to link his naturalistic metaphysics with his naturalistic 
epistemology, most especially in the sense in which the former provides a road-
map for the latter.  
3.1.1 Knowledge as responses to natural conditions and modes of interaction 
In Knowing and the Known, Dewey and Bentley contend that both reality and the 
process of knowing should be “given transactional observations”(J. Dewey & 
Bentley, 1949, p. 88). What does this mean? “Transaction” is Dewey’s special 
coinage for human activities purposely meant to manipulate or re-order nature. 
The practical and physical nature of these activities is expressed in Dewey’s 
reference to them in terms of “making and doing” (J. Dewey, 1930, p. 10). 
                                                     
48 By a “subjectivist” or “relativist” epistemology, I think they meant ‘something’ non-substantive 
or a parody of what epistemology should be. 
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Consequently, by describing the human-reality relationship as “transactional”, 
Dewey meant to emphasise how reality impacts human species and how, in 
return, the human beings physically alter or manipulate nature for survival.  We 
have discussed this relationship as symbiotic in chapters 1 and 2. In what sense 
can knowledge be regarded as “transactional”? 
According to Dewey, “knowledge” is doing and making “which has intelligent 
direction”. This intelligent direction is explained in terms of taking cognizance of 
condition, observing relations of sequence and executing in the light of some 
purposes (1930, p. 37). What are these purposes? How are they determined? In 
Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Dewey writes:  
Upon the biological level, organisms have to respond to conditions about them in 
ways that modify those conditions and the relations of organisms to them so as to 
restore the reciprocal adaptation that is required for the maintenance of life-
functions. Human organisms are involved in the same sort of predicament. Because 
of the effect of cultural conditions, the problems involved not only have different 
contents but are capable of statement as problems so that inquiry can enter as a 
factor in their resolution. For in a cultural environment, physical conditions are 
modified by the complex of customs, traditions, occupations, interests and purposes 
which envelops them. Modes of response are correspondingly transformed (J. Dewey, 
1991, p. 66). 
The point in this passage is that knowledge is a response to certain conditions in 
human transaction within nature. As “intelligent directives”, knowledge is the 
mode of interacting with nature. The notion of “intelligence” is in terms of certain 
human goals (such as survival and aspiring to a more comfortable life) and 
pragmatic evaluations of means of attaining them. We have discussed Dewey’s 
notion of “metaphysics” in terms of human transactions with nature in Chapter 2. 
We also identified and discussed two significant levels of interaction in that 
chapter: the level at which there are direct contacts between human species and 
nature (in which things are had, used, and enjoyed) and the level at which 
individuals and their complex relationships define a society. We concluded in that 
chapter that problems encountered in individual human transaction within nature 
(primary experience which involves minimum levels of reflection) lead to socially 
motivated and regulated systematic reflections and inquiries (which is secondary 
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cognitive experience) and that the success of inquiry is determined in terms of 
how the understanding of the objects of primary experience are enlarged and how 
the problems emanating from them are resolved. It is in this sense that Dewey 
contends that epistemological discussion depends upon “discourse” in 
metaphysics (1925, p. 117). Epistemological inquiries start when questions are 
generated within the course of human existence (transactions) and the outcomes 
of these inquiries are determined in terms of their impacts on human existence 
(1991, p. 30). 
From Dewey’s naturalist position, metaphysics provides a road map for 
epistemology in terms of how features of inquiry, knowledge and justification are 
determined. Dewey presents an empirical metaphysics in terms of how nature 
constrains humans to act in certain ways. For Dewey, the most appropriate modes 
of response (inquiry) to these constraints are empirical. From Dewey’s position 
that reality is dynamic, knowledge concerning reality also becomes dynamic. 
Differences in cultural environments and physical conditions become contextual 
parameters through which “modes of response are correspondingly transformed”. 
From this view, knowledge is practical, contextual, and dynamic. In addition, given 
Dewey’s view that problematic situations actuate inquiries, it follows that the 
justification of any claim to knowledge can only be determined in terms of how 
those problems are resolved. Consequently, practical and pragmatic 
considerations become indispensable in Dewey’s notion of justification. This is the 
basis for Dewey’s instrumentalist conception of knowledge. I now discuss how 
Dewey used his conception of the relationship between metaphysics and 
epistemology as a ground for his extensive critique of the preoccupations of 
traditional epistemologists. 
3.2 Dewey’s critique of traditional epistemology 
In this section, I discuss Dewey’s critiques of some traditional conceptions of the 
nature, scope, methodology and goals of epistemology. I explore these critiques 
as consequences of his conception of metaphysics as a road map for epistemology. 
The exploration has two dimensions. Firstly, I discuss Dewey’s rejection of the 
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impression in the works of some traditional epistemologists that epistemology can 
be done without metaphysics. Dewey targets traditional epistemologists who 
conceived the field as a priori and epistemologists such Kant, Hume, and the 
positivists, who believed that metaphysics can be rejected without any effect on 
epistemology. Secondly, I discuss how Dewey critiques the kind of metaphysics 
that some traditional epistemologists have “conceptualised” as foundation of 
epistemology.  A good example is the transcendental metaphysics endorsed by 
several traditional epistemologists. 
More substantively, I discuss Dewey’s critique of epistemology as a series of 
responses to universal scepticism, his critique of the traditional conception of 
epistemology as independent of science and the goal of epistemology in terms of 
the acquisition of knowledge for knowledge’s sake.   
3.2.1 Dewey’s critique of epistemology without metaphysics  
For Dewey, the idea that questions about knowledge can be raised and answered 
as a matter of dialectical definition implies that knowledge is a priori and thus 
epistemology can be done without any reference to what goes on in the external 
world. Noting the prominence of this presupposition in traditional epistemology, 
Dewey writes: 
Epistemology starts from the assumption that certain conditions lie back of 
knowledge. The mystery would be great enough if knowledge were constituted by 
non-natural conditions back of knowledge, but the mystery is increased by the fact 
that the conditions are defined so as to be incompatible with knowledge. Hence the 
primary problem of epistemology is: How is knowledge uberhaupt, knowledge at 
large possible? Because of the incompatibility between concrete occurrence and 
function of knowledge and the conditions back of it to which it must conform, a 
second problem arises: How is knowledge in general, knowledge uberhaupt, valid? (J. 
Dewey, 1965, pp. 97-98) . 
Dewey claims that epistemologists from the traditional to modern era have shown 
interest in questions such as: What is knowledge? How is knowledge different 
from belief? Dewey sees these questions as reasonable but argues that they 
cannot be answered independent of concrete human situations. From this point 
of view, Dewey is challenging dialectical or conceptual epistemology. In Plato’s 
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dialogues, the “Socratic tradition” of engaging one another in the art of defining 
epistemological concepts such as knowledge, belief, truth, and justification was 
established. This dialectical tradition is also noted in the modern philosophical 
works of Hegel such as Phenomenology of Spirit (PS) popularly described as his 
epistemology (Hegel, 1997). In PS, Hegel presents two opposing definitions of 
consciousness and of the objects of consciousness as a way of presenting the 
development of his philosophical view. Elsewhere, he described this engagement 
as a “speculative mode of cognition”(1991, p. 10). The fact that this type of 
engagement defines a method, a tradition, and a conception of epistemology is 
made evident by the fact that philosophical positions on issues and ideas about 
the nature, scope, methods, and goals of epistemology are made through them. 
In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke identifies linguistic and 
conceptual analysis as the major way that epistemologists can meaningfully 
contribute to the growth of scientific knowledge- as ‘under-labourers’ saddled 
with responsibilities of removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of 
knowledge (1952). In analytic philosophy, Gilbert Ryle is noted for his attempt to 
refute scepticism through conceptual analysis. Ryle’s argument is known as the 
‘polar concept argument’. It states that the sceptics must admit that the existence 
of genuine knowledge is implied in their claim that genuine knowledge is not 
possible- just as if there are no genuine coins there cannot be counterfeit coins.49 
A critical study of the interchange between Edmund Gettier, his apologists and his 
critics in the prolonged and recurring debate whether the traditional three 
conditions of knowledge (belief, truth, and justification) are sufficient for 
knowledge, seems to provide another analysis of knowledge with only 
hypothetical references to concrete human situations. More specifically, it 
provides an example in which knowledge and truth are strictly identified as logical 
properties of propositions. 50  All these instances, from Dewey’s view, seem to 
                                                     
49  See Gilbert Ryle, 1960. Dilemmas, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See also similar 
argument in Grayling, A.C. (1995). “Scepticism” in Grayling A.C. (ed.) Philosophy: A Guide through 
the Subject. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
50 For instance, in Edmund Gettier’s second counter-example, the concept of truth and knowledge 
were treated exclusively as a matter of “logical entailment” between two disjuncts in a disjunctive 
proposition; Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona (1963, pp. 121-123). 
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imply that epistemology can be done without any need to appeal to metaphysical 
theories about the world. 
What exactly is the nature of Dewey’s disagreement with this tradition? Is he 
arguing that analysing, defining, or determining the meaning of epistemological 
concepts is wrong? His argument is that we cannot separate epistemological 
issues from everyday human experience in which lies its origin and value. That 
when we define any epistemological problem or concept, it must be done “not 
simply for reflective philosophy or in terms of epistemology itself, but in terms of 
what is its meaning in the historical movement of humanity and as a part of a 
larger and more comprehensive experience” and as a problem “which social life, 
the organized practice of mankind, has to face” (J. Dewey, 1965, pp. 273-274). For 
him, when this historical context is ignored and technical or “intellectual” 
definitions are provided a priori, what will ensue is a kind of epistemology that is 
abstract and speculative- the kind that has misled traditional epistemologists into 
attributing non-natural features and conditions to knowledge (J. Dewey, 1925-36). 
Dewey rejects some popular notions about knowledge in traditional epistemology 
such as the claims that certainty is an indispensable feature of knowledge (1930) 
and that knowledge is strictly a mode for “grasping or beholding reality” (1930, p. 
188). He also rejects how traditional epistemologists regarded and the way they 
defined “objectivity” (objective knowledge) in terms of knowledge that is 
independent of the knower’s interests, feelings, and judgement, a position that in 
Dewey’s critique, renders knowers as “spectators”. He argues that there is no way 
these notions could have been derived from the natural conditions from which the 
quest for knowledge emanates. He also argues that dialectical epistemology in 
Hegel’s work can only produce new and strange conceptions of logic and God 
(1925, p. 45). 
I think Dewey’s point is that, just as a technologist can analyse and discuss the 
“blueprint” of a novel machine he wants to build in his head, philosophers thought 
that they could also discuss the nature or features of knowledge independently of 
a metaphysical theory about reality. Dewey specifically cited Kant as one of the 
examples of philosophers who “called upon philosophers to cease their discussion 
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regarding the nature of the world and the principles of existence until they have 
arrived at some conclusion regarding the nature of the knowing process” (J. 
Dewey, 1965, p. 271).51 Describing Kant’s notion of knowledge as “self-sufficing 
purveyor of reality” Dewey criticises the character of the entire Neo-Kantian 
movement as lying in the assumption that “knowledge gives birth to itself and is 
capable of affording it is own justification” (J. Dewey, 1965, pp. 297-298). 
However, Dewey contends that this approach has produced several conflicting 
notions of knowledge and truth and several controversial conditions for attaining 
them. For Dewey, the failure of this epistemology is made evident by the fact that 
it becomes reasonable to doubt the possibility of knowledge and deny any 
relationship between epistemology, common sense, and science.   
At a glance, one natural response to Dewey’s contention as stated above is to see 
it either as outright false, or as an exaggeration. It seems that metaphysical 
foundations have always served as points of reference for every traditional 
epistemological claim. The point is that it is arguable that references to concrete 
human situations are hypothetically made. For instance, the contrast between a 
knower and someone with a mere true belief in the analogy of “the road to 
Larissa” in Plato’s Meno, seems to be an acknowledgement of how changes in 
concrete human affairs can create a huge difference between a knower and a 
believer. In many other cases, metaphysical theories were actually discussed in 
relation to their epistemological theories. For instance, from Plato’s theory and 
analysis of the world of Form and Ideas, a conception of an object of knowledge 
that is certain, unchangeable, and perfect became entrenched. In addition, the 
distinction between what has the features of the Forms (knowledge) and what has 
the features of Idea (belief), became established. Similar distinctions are found 
prominently in Aristotle’s conceptions of the Universal and Substance. In this 
                                                     
51 In his Prolegomena to any future Metaphysics, Immanuel Kant made the declaration that “All 
metaphysicians are therefore solemnly and legally suspended from their occupations till they shall 
have answered in a satisfactory manner the question, ‘How are synthetic cognitions a priori 
possible?’ For the answer contains the only credentials which they must show when they have 
anything to offer in the name of pure reason. But if they do not possess these credentials, they can 
expect nothing else of reasonable people, who have been deceived so often, than to be dismissed 
without further ado”(Kant, 1996, pp. 47-48). 
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regard, one can argue that if any position in traditional epistemology implies that 
epistemology can be done without a metaphysical presupposition, it is a matter of 
“default” rather than design. In section 3.2.2, I explore Dewey’s critique of the 
metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle as “un-naturalistic”. 
However, I think Dewey is right when we consider the positions of some 
philosophers such as Hume 52 , the logical positivists53  and Quine54 , who have 
suggested the rejection of metaphysics. All these philosophers seem to see 
epistemology as distinct and distinguishable from metaphysics. More importantly, 
they seem to believe that the rejection of metaphysics cannot have any effect on 
epistemology. However, one may argue that the rejection of metaphysics by these 
philosophers does not imply the rejection of all theories of existence or reality. For 
instance, it is arguable that Hume, Quine, and the logical positivists rejected 
metaphysics based on the speculative and unempirical nature of its propositions 
which resulted in unverifiable claims. It is also arguable that Quine, for instance, 
was against the kind of indubitable and logically firm “metaphysical foundations” 
that traditional metaphysicians thought they could provide for science. According 
to Quine, the metaphysicians hoped to provide a non-scientific foundation for 
science, to avoid the problem of circularity that will ensue if one should justify 
science by science.55  
My position is that Dewey is right in a sense; that ancient Greeks did epistemology 
and metaphysics together, but they were sundered after this period. 
                                                     
52 Hume referred to metaphysics as containing nothing but sophistry and illusion in his An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding (Hume, 1748, p. 166). 
53 In Ayer’s Language, Truth, and Logic and Rudolf Carnap’s Philosophy and Logical Syntax, Hume’s 
suggestion that metaphysics should be rejected, was endorsed. The logical positivists generally 
declared metaphysical propositions as meaningless because, according to them, they cannot be 
empirically verified; both in actuality and in principle. 
54 In his project of naturalizing epistemology which involves the ‘separation’ of epistemology from 
its supposed metaphysical foundation, Quine described it as the “dislodging of epistemology from 
its old status of first philosophy” (Quine, 1994a, p. 28).   
55 W.V.O Quine rightly captures the fear of the traditional epistemologists about circular reasoning 
when he writes about their concern that “If the epistemologist’s goal is validation of empirical 
science, he defeats his purpose by using psychology or other empirical science in the validation” 
(Quine, 1985, p. 19). However, for Quine, given the fact that “science cannot be deduced from 
sense data”, he concludes that “the hopelessness of grounding natural science upon immediate 
experience in a firmly logical way was acknowledged” (Quine, 1985, p. 18). 
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Consequently, I argue that what Dewey has in mind is that post-Greek traditional 
epistemologists have shown more interest in the analysis of concepts and 
arguments we employ in epistemology than in the practical applicability of these 
concepts and arguments. Consequently, while most questions are about what 
knowledge ought to be, less attention has been paid to knowledge in terms of 
what Dewey calls “action-doing”. Put differently, and following the distinctions 
made by some philosophers between “philosophy” and “meta-philosophy” 
(Alston, 1989, pp. 1-2; Overgaard, Gilbert, & Burwood, 2013, p. 6; Ryle, 2009, p. 
331) one can reformulate Dewey’s contention to read that traditional 
epistemology has “degenerated” from preoccupation with “substantive 
epistemology” to “meta-epistemology”. By “meta-philosophy”, these 
philosophers meant the preoccupations of philosophers with questions about the 
nature and meaning of philosophical notions, raising questions about the nature 
of philosophical methods, which are believed to be different from discussing the 
applications of those notions and methods. Dewey shares Gilbert Ryle’s view that 
preoccupation with questions about epistemological concepts and methods tends 
to distract us from doing epistemology itself (Ryle, 2009, p. 331).  
Given the fact that many Greek philosophers mixed their metaphysical and 
epistemological inquiries together (which I have pointed out as a counter-
objection to Dewey’s claim that traditional epistemologists ignored metaphysics), 
I turn now and discuss Dewey’s critique of Greek metaphysics as transcendental. I 
explore what Dewey meant by “transcendentalism” in terms of non-natural 
ontological claims- claims that are incompatible with an empirical and material 
world. I discuss his argument that such metaphysics is irredeemably anti-science. 
The most important question that I explore is: In what ways, according to Dewey, 
have these supposedly transcendental metaphysical theories created the 
problems of epistemology? 
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3.2.2 Dewey’s critique of traditional epistemology built on transcendental 
metaphysics 
In Experience and Nature, Dewey acknowledges the foundations of European or 
Western philosophy in the works of Greek thinkers. However, he argues that “in 
Greek philosophy the problems of western philosophy are either formulated or 
adumbrated” (J. Dewey, 1986, p. 19). Consequently he contends that this “classical 
theory of existence” necessarily “must be reversed” (1925, p. 81) if the “problems 
of epistemology” are to be surmounted. I start by discussing his critique of Greek 
metaphysics as a metaphysics “with a practical bias toward the regular and 
repeated” (1925, p. 96), a “confused metaphysics” (1925, p. 88), that bequeathed 
a confused “ intellectual tradition” to philosophy (1925, p. 75). I then discuss the 
impacts of these problems on epistemology. 
3.2.2.1 Greek metaphysics and the influence of the concept of “eternal” 
Dewey pointed out that the foundational doctrines of Greek metaphysis are not 
arbitrary or products of idle speculations but are shaped by their culture and 
practices. He writes: 
Greek philosophy, as well as Greek art, is a memorial of the joy in what is finished, 
when it is found amid a world of unrest, struggle, and uncertainty in what, since it is 
ended, does not commit us to the uncertain hazards of what is still going on. Without 
such experiences as those of Greek art it is hardly conceivable that the craving for the 
passage of change into rest, of the contingent, mixed and wandering into the 
composed and total, would have found a model after which to design a universe like 
the cosmos of Platonic and Aristotelian tradition. Form was the first and last word of 
philosophy because it had been that of art; form is the change arrested in a 
prerogative object. It conveys a sense of the imperishable and timeless, although the 
material in which it is exemplified is subject to decay and contingency… Such was the 
conversion of Greek esthetic contemplation effected by Greek reflection (J. Dewey, 
1925, p. 77). 
Dewey’s contention is that Greek cosmology and cosmogony was adapted from 
what they observed in their artistic experience. From artistic experience, the idea 
of persistent or enduring form, the nature, stages and types of causation, and 
forces found in the classical works of philosophers such as Aristotle, were 
formulated (1925, p. 78). Following this model, it was believed that only things 
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that are immutable can be real or have real existence.56 It was also believed that 
“changing things were not capable of being known on the basis of relationship to 
one another, but on the basis of their relationship to objects beyond change, 
because marking the limit, and immediately precious” (1925, p. 80).  
In the midst of this tradition that Dewey describes as having “hypnotic influence 
exercised by the conception of the eternal” (1925, p. 26), he acknowledges the 
philosophies and metaphysics of “change” in the works of Heracleitus, Hegel, 
Spencer, and Bergson- a few philosophers  who kept alive a sense of what classic 
and orthodox philosophies have whisked out of sight. However, he argues that 
their works also indicate “the intensity of the craving for the sure and the fixed”, 
by deifying change in the sense of “making it universal, regular, and sure” (J. 
Dewey, 1925, p. 45).  
With Hegel becoming is a rational process which defines logic… and an absolute, 
although new and strange God. With Spencer, evolution is but the transitional process 
of attaining a fixed and universal equilibrium of harmonious judgement. With 
Bergson, change is the creative operation of God, or is God (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 45). 
Dewey recalls how some philosophers turned to mathematics for models of real 
existence. He cites how Plato and the Pythagoreans imported mathematical 
concepts and Descartes and Spinoza took over the presumptions of geometrical 
reasoning (1925, p. 32). While Dewey does not oppose the adoption of concepts 
and paradigms from mathematics, logic, or science, he argues that the practice of 
borrowing from other fields “to cast discredit on philosophy” is problematic (1925, 
p. 35).57 Again, while Dewey will not object to metaphysics that is modelled on 
empirical facts or after what transpires in the natural world, he was against how 
the Greeks translated facts about everyday life into abstract principles about 
existence. By “abstract” he meant “designating something which exclusively 
                                                     
56 Dewey also argues that from the model, reality and superior value are equated. True, Good, and 
Unity became the marks of Being (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 25). 
57 One of Dewey’s worries is that philosophers have tried to define the nature of experience strictly 
from the laws of logic. For instance, from the logical rule that “a part cannot be larger than the 
whole”, Dewey notes the objection raised by his critics against his claim that experience and nature 
are co-extensive, that, “it is absurd that what is only a tiny part of nature should be competent to 
incorporate vast reaches of nature within itself” (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 4). 
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occupies a realm of its own without contact with the things of ordinary 
experience” (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 9). Plato’s non-physical, incorrigible, and infinite 
Forms are good examples.  
Dewey contends that instead of the Greek metaphysics reflecting that nature is a 
mixture of elements that are both precarious and stable to foster “a conception of 
experimental inquiry and of reflection efficacious in action” (1925, p. 79), they 
opted for the hypostatization of what was observed. This is what he calls 
translating a “logic of reflection” into a cosmology or converting “mode of practice 
into intellectual formula” (1925, pp. 72, 79). Dewey describes this as selective 
emphasis. While he argues that selective emphasis can be used procedurally in 
kick-starting an inquiry or in formulating a hypothesis for experimentation, he 
argues that “deception comes when the presence and operation of choice is 
concealed, disguised, denied” (1925, p. 29) and when objects of selective 
preference are erected as “exclusive realities” (1925, p. 25).  It is in this sense that 
Dewey referred to Greek metaphysics as a “confused metaphysics” because its 
proponents “formulated a doctrine in which the esthetic and the rational are 
confused on principle” (1925, p. 75).  I now discuss some of the confusions in Greek 
metaphysics that Dewey identified. 
3.2.2.2 Dewey’s critique of Greek Metaphysics as a confusion between 
cultural idiosyncrasies and philosophical truths  
Dewey condemns the selective emphasis (and “hypostatization”) in Greek 
metaphysics as a “vice” and “intellectual arbitrariness” (1925, p. 21) because it 
was a consequence of a concealed form of elitism or class chauvinism. 
Consequently, I discuss Dewey’s exploration of the “standard view” of the Greeks 
for their “selective emphasis” and what Dewey identifies as the real cause.  
In The Quest for Certainty, Dewey presents the “standard” explanation classically 
offered by Greek philosophers for the celebration of what is “finished”, absolute 
or certain in their culture and the eventual emergence of their transcendental 
conception of reality. He writes: 
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The distinctive characteristic of practical activity, one which is so inherent that it 
cannot be eliminated, is the uncertainty which attends it. Of it we are compelled to 
say: Act, but act at your peril. Judgement and belief regarding actions to be performed 
can never attain more than a precarious probability… Practical activity deals with 
individualized and unique situations which are never exactly duplicable and about 
which, accordingly, no complete assurance is possible... The intellect, however, 
according to the traditional doctrine, may grasp universal Being, and Being which is 
universal is fixed and immutable…. Hence men have longed to find a realm in which 
there is activity which is not overt  and which has no external consequence (J. Dewey, 
1930, pp. 10-11). 
Dewey’s explanation is that Greek thinkers (such as Plato and Aristotle) have 
defended their metaphysical position by pointing out how the existence of the 
perpetually changing, imperfect, physical and heterogeneous world necessitates 
the understanding that there are Forms that are non-physical, fixed, perfect, and 
eternal and non-empirically apprehended. Dewey cites how Aristotelian “four-fold 
causation” and “natural end” are typically used in projecting a purposeful or 
designed nature- a typical explanation for how “all change, or matter, is potentially 
for finished object” (1925, p. 78). Identifying two prominent features of Greek 
metaphysics, Dewey writes: 
First, elimination from the status of natural ends of all objects that are evil and 
troublesome; secondly, the grading of objects selected to constitute natural ends into 
a fixed, unchangeable hierarchical order. Objects that possess and import qualities of 
struggle, suffering and defeat are regarded as not ends, but frustrations of ends , as 
accidental and inexplicable deviations (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 88).  
However, Dewey argues that the Greek metaphysics is a confusion of two senses 
of “ends”: in terms of the purpose of final destination of a self-regulating nature, 
and “ends” in terms of “ends-in-view, aims, things viewed after deliberation as 
worthy of attainment and as evocative of effort” (1925, p. 88).  Dewey endorses 
the latter and recalls how the scientific revolution of the 17th century rejected “the 
imputation to natural events of cosmic appetition towards ends, the notion that 
their changes were to be understood as efforts to reach a natural state of rest and 
perfection” and  regarded it “as the chief source of sterility and fantasy in 
science…”(1925, p. 80).  
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However, apart from the argument that Greek metaphysicians confused two 
senses of “ends”, Dewey argues that class chauvinism misled them. He writes: 
Their thinkers were as much dominated about the esthetic characters of experienced 
objects as modern thinkers are by their scientific and economic (or relational) traits. 
Consequently, they had no difficulty in recognizing the importance of qualities and of 
things inherently closed or final…. Unfortunately, however, these thinkers were not 
content to speak of artists, of whom they had a low opinion. Since they were thinkers, 
aiming at truth or knowledge, they put art on a lower plane than science; and the only 
enjoyment they found worth serious attention was the object of thought (J. Dewey, 
1925, p. 74). 
Dewey argues that a sharp separation of servile workers and free men of leisure 
marked the Greek community. The social dishonour in which the working class was 
held was extended to the work they do (J. Dewey, 1930, pp. 8-9). For Dewey,  work 
or practical activity is regarded as what is done “under compulsion and the 
pressure of necessity”, while “intellectual activity is associated with leisure” (1930, 
p. 8) and the blissful contemplative mind is ranked highest because of its 
“possession in thought of all forms of nature” (1925, p. 89). Dewey contends that 
there is no basis for this “artificial” or accidental class division and the “division 
between acquaintance with matters of facts and contemplative application” 
(1925, p. 79). Dewey concludes that, “in casting aspersion upon the things of 
ordinary experience, the things of action and affection and social intercourse”, the 
Greek metaphysicians “have done something worse than fail to give these affairs 
the intelligent direction they so much need” (1925, p. 35). I will now discuss other 
problems that Dewey identifies as consequences of Greek metaphysics for 
epistemology. 
3.2.3 The negative impacts of Greek metaphysics on traditional epistemology: 
Dewey contends that the metaphysics of the Greeks “found its way into all themes 
and subjects, and determines the form of current problems and conclusions 
regarding mind and knowledge” (1930, p. 12). On several occasions, Dewey 
compares the similarities between the metaphysical foundation of Greek 
epistemology and the foundation of the epistemology presented by philosophers 
such as Kant, Hume, and Russell, a foundation playing similar roles in the 
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philosophy of the 20th century. For instance, Dewey contends that Kant followed 
Aristotle’s pluralistic and hierarchically ordered forms of existence. Specifically, he 
notes that, just as Aristotle identified reality with what is fixed and regular and 
what is unreal with what is changing and hazardous, Kant also “assigns all that is 
manifold and chaotic to one realm, that of sense, and all that is uniform and 
regular to that of reason”(J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 44-45).58 Dewey also shows how 
“Platonic division into ideal archetypes and physical events” and “Aristotelian 
division into form which is actuality and matter which is potential” influenced 
Kant’s distinction between the noumena (things-in-themselves) and phenomena 
(objects as they appear to observers). He contends that these distinctions define 
contemporary positions of the absolutist idealists on reality and appearance (J. 
Dewey, 1925, p. 50). Some epistemological problems common to these 
philosophies, according to Dewey, include the dialectic problem of showing how 
the senses relate to thought, relating a thing as observed and a thing in its 
unobservable form and relating the noumenal world to the phenomenal world.  
Dewey identifies the influence of Greek metaphysics on Cartesian rationalist 
metaphysics and epistemology in which the human thought (mind), described as 
distinctively immaterial, incorrigible, and indubitable, and was contrasted with 
human body. Dewey contends that the consequence of this metaphysical view is 
“a transcendental supra-empirical self” (1925, pp. 184, 188, ). Consequently, 
Cartesian epistemology was confronted with the epistemological problem of how 
to explain the relation between human mind and body (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 206).  
We can summarise the consequences of building an epistemology on a 
transcendental metaphysics as follows. Firstly, Dewey contends that “the arbitrary 
character of the “reality” that emerges is seen in the fact that different objects are 
selected by different philosophers (1925, p. 25). Consequently, there are 
confusions because there are many objects of knowledge. In addition, from the 
(metaphysical) premise that only things that are stable are real, several 
                                                     
58 Dewey also identifies a similar craving for what is fixed and regular in Hegel’s conceptions of 
logic and God. He also identifies this factor in Spencer’s theory of evolution (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 45). 
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corresponding epistemological themes emerged, which include the ideas that 
knowledge involves certainty 59 and that only things that exhibit the attribute of 
certainty are knowable. From the conception that metaphysics is about the quest 
to know the Absolute or Universal Being, the conception of the attributes of 
knowledge became associated with immaterial and spiritual principles60 and the 
subject-matters of metaphysics and epistemology are regarded as different from 
science (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 126, 188).   
Secondly, Dewey contends that knowledge and action are conceptually separated 
based on the argument that practical activities and theories are different 
phenomena and unconnected (1930, p. 9). “Knowledge” became elevated above 
making and doing (1930, p. 10). In addition, the idea of “objective knowledge” or 
knowledge without any human input and pragmatic consideration, often 
described as “pure knowing”, became celebrated  (1930, p. 12).  One of the fall-
outs of the downgrading “practical activity” and severing it from knowledge is the 
endorsement of “thought” (and meditation) as the pathway of knowing the 
universal Being or knowledge.61 According to Dewey, “thought has been alleged 
to be a purely inner activity, intrinsic to mind alone” and consequently is 
“complete and self-sufficient in itself” (1930, p. 11).  
More generally, the influence of Greek metaphysics can be seen on the 
conceptions of the nature, scope, and subject-matter of epistemology. For 
instance, with the conceptions of reality in Greek metaphysics characteristically 
unempirical (such as Plato’s Forms), the phenomena that traditional 
epistemologists are called upon to investigate are believed to be different from 
those studied in the sciences. Consequently, the relevance or usefulness of the 
methods and resources in the sciences to philosophical inquiry becomes 
                                                     
59 Dewey succinctly described the preoccupation of the epistemologists from the Greek time to the 
contemporary period as the quest for certainty (J. Dewey, 1930). Philosophers became obsessed 
with the quest to  establish self-evident data that possess properties that put it beyond doubt (J. 
Dewey, 1925, p. 72). 
60 For instance, Plato argued that knowledge of “particular things” gained from the senses cannot 
be objective and absolute. 
61 The argument is that human organs intractably are involved in overt actions. And like every other 
instrument of practical activity, there is no predictable certainty (J. Dewey, 1930, pp. 8-9). 
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debatable. Such supposedly non-scientific phenomena include essences in nature, 
the human mind and its capacity to represent or “mirror” nature, and epistemic 
norms that are believed not to be part of nature. Consequently, philosophical 
inquiries are regarded as requiring methodologies that are quite different from 
science. The challenge to and attempted refutation of these notions constitute the 
bulk of Dewey’s naturalistic epistemology.  
I now discuss Dewey’s conception of epistemological inquiry and how its empirical 
and practical features warrant the method of investigation which he calls “the 
denotative empirical methodology” (DEM). 
3.3 Dewey’s conception of inquiry and denotative empirical methodology (DEM) 
A common view in all traditions or schools in philosophy is that the discovery and 
demonstration of the truth of a claim depends largely on their methodological 
approach. Consequently, empiricists, rationalists, intuitionists, reliabilists and 
other schools of epistemology, have been identified by the methodologies they 
subscribed to in addressing philosophical problems.  In this regard, the concern 
about the link between truth and methods or the reliability of methods is an on-
going concern among epistemologists. In most of his works, Dewey shared this 
view about the importance of method. He notes that a good method is a necessary 
precondition for having any genuine understanding (1929, p. 203). Consequently, 
the methods of doing philosophy came under his severe criticisms. At numerous 
points, he attributed the cause of the lingering problems in philosophy to the use 
of these methods which he described as non-empirical.  
In this section, I discuss Dewey’s critique of traditional methods for being “non-
empirical. I argue this critique is one of the consequences of his contention that 
epistemology is a practical and experimental inquiry. More importantly, I explore 
his argument that non-empirical methods fail to “enlarge” the objects of study. I 
then discuss his arguments for recommending the denotative empirical method 
for epistemological inquiry. I focus on questions such as:  In what ways is this new 
113 
 
method experimental? How does its use enlarge the object of study in 
epistemology? How distinct is this method from the methods of science? 
3.3.1 Dewey’s critique of the use of non-empirical methods in traditional 
epistemology 
In Experience and Nature, Dewey identifies several methods that philosophers use 
in their investigations: the use of definitions,  dialectical argumentation,  
contemplation, logical analysis, and intuitive reasoning, which he usually 
(derogatively) referred to as “reflective analysis” (1925, pp. 11, 13, 17, 18, 19, 21). 
In another work, he criticised the peculiar “methodological doubt” of Descartes as 
“pathological” (1991, p. 109). What all these methods have in common, according 
to Dewey is the absence of the use of empirical data, empirical observation, 
empirical verification, and practical experimentation. Dewey’s description of non-
practical and non-empirical philosophical theorizations as “intellectualism” 
matches what contemporary philosophers such as Kirk (2014), Kornblith (2014a), 
Papineau (2014) and Prinz (2008) describe as “arm-chair philosophy”.  
However, I argue that Dewey did not out-right condemn these unempirical 
methods as useless in theorizations. His concern is that the total dependence on 
the use of these traditional methods without empirical observation and validation 
will invariably lead to a series of erroneous traditions and paradigms. Dewey cites 
how the use of analysis led to the conception of experience that is antithetical to 
nature, which according to him implies that human beings are not part of nature 
(1925, p. 21). He also cites how absolute reliance on dialectical definition reduces 
the chair we sit on, stumble against and carry about, to “certain qualities of sense 
attending the act of vision” (1925, pp. 17-18). He describes such philosophy as 
consequences of “arbitrary intellectualism” (1925, p. 21) and “scholasticism” 
(1925, p. 25).   
However, Dewey identifies “the root-cause” of the problematic nature of non-
empirical methods- inquiry that do not start from the natural setting or 
background of the phenomena under investigation. He writes: 
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Non-empirical method starts with a reflective product as if it were primary, as if it 
were the originally “given”. To non-empirical method, therefore, object and subject, 
mind and matter (or whatever words and ideas are used) are separate and 
independent (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 11-12).    
Dewey illustrates his point through how concepts such as experience, essences 
and sense-data are discussed by traditional epistemologists in such a way that they 
are disconnected from their natural basis in human transaction within nature. For 
instance, in their discussion of essences, Dewey argues that qualities of natural 
phenomena (hot/cold, wet/dry, up/down, light/heavy) are regard as “essential 
forms and active principles of nature”. While he does not object to studying 
phenomena through their qualities, Dewey disagrees with Galileo, Descartes and 
Hobbes for arguing that “these sensory forms are things to know” (J. Dewey, 1925, 
p. 111).  His argument is that designating some aspects of a phenomenon as 
“qualities” is theoretical or what he calls “our secondary experience” and must be 
used in studying the original natural phenomenon which those qualities belong to. 
Consequently, Dewey writes: 
The charge that is brought against the non-empirical method of philosophizing is not 
that it depends on theorizing, but that it fails to use refined, secondary products as a 
path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience. The resulting 
failure is threefold. First, there is no verification, no effort even to test and check. 
What is worse, secondly, is that the things of ordinary experience do not get 
enlargement, and enrichment of meaning as they do when approached through the 
medium of scientific principles and reasonings. This lack of function reacts, in the third 
place, back upon the philosophic subject-matter in itself. Not tested by being 
employed to see what it leads to in ordinary experience and what new meanings it 
contributes, this subject-matter becomes arbitrary, aloof-what is called “abstract” …. 
But the problems to which non-empirical method gives rise in philosophy are blocks 
to inquiry, blind alleys; they are puzzles rather than problems, solved only by calling 
the original material of primary experience, “phenomenal,” mere appearance, mere 
impressions, or by some other disparaging name (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 8-9). 
Thus, what non-empirical methods lack, generally and most fundamentally is a 
background metaphysics, which Dewey describes as human transaction within 
nature. From this view, Dewey makes a strong point that “knowledge is not the 
only mode of experience that grasp things”(1925, p. 73). Dewey also makes 
another strong point that non-empirical methods take us away from objects of 
primary experience which are concrete reality, which are denied as unreal or 
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phenomenal. He argues that this method leads to the subject-matter of 
experience becoming arbitrarily abstract and renders the material world irrelevant 
in the verification of claims about it. As an example, Dewey cites the classical 
distinction between “sense data” of a table and the “sensation” of the same table 
in Russell’s Appearance and Reality and various works of the phenomenalists. 
Comparing the “experience” of a table before philosophical analysis and after 
philosophical analysis, many philosophers such as Russell and the phenomenalists 
have concluded that “the real table, if there is one, is not immediately known to 
us”. Consequently, it has been assumed that “sense data” of the table and the 
“sensation” of the same table are two distinct and separate things (B. Russell, 
1992, pp. 183-189). Consequently, there are duplications of entities such as body 
and mind, objective and subjective, and real and appearance- without any 
explanation of how the dualized entities relate to one another. Dewey’s 
submission is that the consequences of the use of non-empirical methods are 
numerous recurring pseudo-problems in epistemology. I now discuss Dewey’s 
arguments on how these problems are rectified or prevented through the 
adoption of denotative empirical method.  
3.3.2 The nature and significance of denotative empirical method (DEM) in 
Dewey’s naturalistic epistemology 
In Experience and Nature, Dewey introduces the “denotative method” as an 
“empirical method”. However, his description of this method has been challenged 
as vague by critics. As noted by several scholars such as Alexander, Dewey 
describes the denotative-empirical method (DEM) largely in negative terms, 
warning philosophers about the kinds of philosophical investigations and practices 
that the method rigidly prohibits (T. M. Alexander, 2004, p. 253). Alexander and 
Gale did not hide their disappointment that what it means for a method “to 
denote”, remains obscure, when considered from the list of what the method 
forbids and the advantages Dewey argues it has over rival methods (T. M. 
Alexander, 2004, p. 248; Gale, 2010a), .  
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I argue that we do not need to view the negative terms in which Dewey’s 
denotative method appears as problematic because regulative norms are usually 
about either what we ought to do or what we are prohibited from doing. I think a 
better way of critiquing this method is to challenge those advantages that Dewey 
claims the method has over non-empirical methods such as analysis. For instance, 
he argues that the adoption of DEM provides an account of how human 
experience is part of nature and that putting experience in its natural setting will 
facilitate the understanding of how metaphysics plays a foundational role in 
epistemological inquiry. He also argues that DEM engenders experimentation and 
prediction in epistemology. I examine these claims because doing so offers more 
information about the nature of the denotative empirical method. I start with 
Dewey’s claim that the application of DEM engenders the understanding of the 
inclusive nature of experienced phenomena. 
Dewey contends that only the denotative method can guarantee a naturalistic 
account of experienced phenomena because only it directs inquiry towards 
objects of knowing rather than the knowing mind. For instance, he argues that in 
the use of reflective analysis, human experience and nature are severed. However, 
adopting denotative empirical method enables the understanding that 
“experience” indicates a symbiotic relation between nature and human beings  (J. 
Dewey, 1925, p. 11). How does this happen? The method engenders inquiries that 
“start with no presuppositions save that what is experienced” (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 
20). Consequently, “all the phenomena of magic, myths, politics, painting and 
penitentiaries” have the right to be studied in the way they are experienced rather 
than being rejected as un-scientific, illusions or sophistries because of the 
assumptions that their subject matters cannot be strictly explained through the 
laws of physics. 
Take for instance Dewey’s account of how denotative inquiry and understanding 
can unravel the “real” or most enduring value or reason “that kept men loyal” to 
magic, tribal myths and observation of religious rites. He writes: 
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But it possible to magnify the place of magical exercise and superstitious legend. The 
primary interest lies in staging the show and enjoying the spectacle, in giving play to 
the ineradicable interests in stories which illustrate the contingencies of existence 
combined with happier endings for emergencies than surrounding conditions often 
permit. It was not conscience that kept men loyal to cults and rites, and faithful to 
tribal myths. So far as it was not the routine, it was enjoyment of the drama of life 
without the latter’s liabilities that kept piety from decay. Interest in rites as means of 
influencing the course of things, and the cognitive or explanation office of myths were 
hardly more than an embroidery, repeating in pleasant form the pattern which 
inexpugnable necessities imposed upon practice (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 68).  
Here, we have two conceptions of superstition (whether in the form of myth, 
magic, or religion). The first is that these phenomena are means of explaining and 
controlling the physical world. This view alienates these phenomena from the 
subject-matters of science because they are regarded as unscientific. However, 
Dewey proposes an “unconventional” conception, that these phenomena have 
esthetic value for which they are latently appreciated. We have discussed how 
Dewey defines phenomena or experience that are not “means to other ends” as 
“esthetic” in Chapter Two. I will not repeat the discussion here. However, I argue 
that conceptualising myths, magic, and religion in this naturalist way makes them 
amenable to scientific investigations. We may inquire if tribal myths (for instance) 
have sociological values. My primary point is that Dewey argues that only in the 
adoption of denotative method can the cognitive importance of these phenomena 
be unravelled. 
The use of DEM compels inquirers to trace the genesis of the phenomenon under 
discussion in terms of the history of how it becomes a subject of inquiry. Thus, for 
Dewey, it the only method that can show how the problems encountered in 
primary experience lead to secondary experience in which systemic and scientific 
theorizations take place. It is also the only method that can show how the results 
of these theorizations are referred back to the primary experience for validation 
(in which problems encountered in primary experience are solved). Dewey’s 
contention is that while the empirical method shows, naturalistically, that primary 
and secondary experiences are a kind of continuum, non-empirical methods such 
as reflective analysis, on the other hand, “tear the object of experience into two” 
by upholding the objects of secondary experience as the only “reality” while the 
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object of primary experience, which actuate the former are regarded as mere 
“appearance” or “phenomenal.  
Dewey argues that DEM shares characteristics which scientific methods such as 
empirical testing, the use of hypotheses, repeated experimentations and 
provisions for prediction. He argues that these characteristics make DEM more 
relevant and appropriate in inquiry about human knowledge than non-empirical 
methods.  I turn now to examine these claims. 
3.3.3 DEM and its affiliation with scientific methods 
The impression created in Experience and Nature by Dewey is that the denotative 
empirical method is modelled after scientific methods (1925, pp. 1-36). However, 
it is arguable that Dewey is not specific about the scientific methods he had in 
mind. We need to know Dewey’s choice of scientific method(s) for comparing 
these methods with Dewey’s denotative method- to see the affinity between 
them. Consequently, I will start by discussing the affinity between Dewey’s 
denotative method and some scientific methods.  
Among the methodological approaches cherished by Dewey, the use of empirical 
and practical experimentation is the most preferred, most especially in terms of 
how material hypotheses are made use of in the way that natural phenomena are 
explained and predictions are made possible. His references to the preoccupation 
of geologists, Darwin and Einstein makes this evident. According to him, a scientist 
observes natural phenomena, collates and dates his objects of study in sequential 
manner. She compares various data, explains events in the past and makes 
predictions into the future (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 3, 7). I argue that these are the 
most prominent among the features of scientific methodologies that Dewey 
incorporates into his denotative empirical method. How are these features 
incorporated in DEM? What are their advantages for epistemological inquiry? I 
start by exploring the practical feature of inquiries conducted through DEM and 
then discuss how it involves the use of hypotheses and engenders 
experimentations and predictions. 
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3.3.3.1 The practical and empirical nature of DEM 
One of the prominent features of scientific methods that Dewey identifies in DEM 
is practical inquiry. He writes: 
 … Empirical method points out when and where and how things of a designated 
description have been arrived at. It places before others a map of the road that has 
been travelled; they may accordingly, if they will, re-travel the road to inspect the 
landscape for themselves ... (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 28). 
Dewey’s point is that the use of DEM does not encourage relying on definitions, 
conceptual analysis or dialectics alone. This means that inquiry can neither begin 
nor end with reflections. The method investigates human physical transaction 
within nature (Boydston, 1981, pp. 375-376) and “elaborates and conveys 
directions that intelligently point out a course to be followed J. Dewey (1925, p. 
29). It is in this sense that the method is inextricably tied with his naturalistic and 
empirical theory of reality and knowledge by emphasising that inquiries are 
ultimately for practical purposes.  
Dewey contends that the adoption of the denotative method will guarantee 
repeatable empirical experimentations in philosophy (1925, p. 28). For him, 
experimentation becomes inevitable in epistemological inquiry because, with 
naturalist inclination, it is now concerned with “various modes in which action is 
manifested: industry, politics, the fine arts, and upon morals conceived as overt 
activity having consequences, instead of as mere inner personal attitude” (J. 
Dewey, 1930, p. 9). Purposeful manipulation of the physical world in such a way 
that it enhances human transaction within it becomes experimental because it has 
become “a mode of directed practical doing” (J. Dewey, 1930, p. 9). I elaborate the 
discussion of this experimentation in Dewey’s epistemology in section 3.5 of this 
chapter. 
One feature of DEM that also facilitates experimentation is the use of hypothesis. 
For Dewey, inquiry about knowledge is inquiry about a natural event that is 
“unfinished, incomplete and indeterminate” and consequently “possesses a 
possibility of being managed and steered that ends may become fulfilments”. 
120 
 
Thus, he argues, “suspense, doubt, hypothesis, experiments with alternatives are 
exponents of this phase of nature” (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 32). Dewey’s point is that 
the regulating the on-going and incomplete processes involves selecting 
consequences that are preferred. Again, I shed more light on this view in sections 
3.4 and 3.5.   
Dewey contends that through the use of denotative method, the proper function 
of knowledge can be understood. In solving any transactional human problem, 
two major guidelines are mandated when denotative method is adopted. First, in 
the words of Alexander, “putting knowing in a context” (2004, p. 248) and ensuring 
“that things must be studied on their own account” (2004, p. 250). By this 
suggestion, Alexander is referring to Dewey’s claim that each problematic 
situation has its history: when, how and why it happened and the roles the 
problem plays in the wider scope of human histories (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 67-101). 
By “putting knowledge in the context”, the use of denotative method ensures that 
what brings about the concern for the subject-matter of knowledge is identified 
and the most intelligent possible ways of resolving it outlined for experimental 
considerations. This simply means that the quest for knowledge cannot take place 
without a concern or a problematic situation. Dewey was interested in deeply 
human practical problems “that cover every aspect of contemporary life: 
domestic, industrial, political” rather than the intellectual “problem of knowledge” 
that philosophers have prioritized (J. Dewey, 1968, p. 7). Furthermore, subsequent 
reflections concerning the problem such as our choice of data used in reflection, 
must all be acknowledged. Consequently, noting the context of the problem that 
brings about a quest for knowledge and the consequences that are preferred, 
enables the nature and functions of knowledge to be understood. 
3.3.4 Some criticisms of DEM  
Apart from the criticism raised by Alexander and Gale that Dewey’s description of 
his DEM is vague, which I take to be general, there are other specific critiques that 
I regard as specific and more serious. I will discuss two in this section. The first is 
that if Dewey’s DEM is a scientific method, its adoption will be an unnecessary 
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multiplication of scientific methods. The second is that there is a confusion in 
Dewey’s philosophy because there is no distinction between the method he is 
recommending and the content of his metaphysics and epistemology.  
3.3.4.1 DEM and the challenge of unnecessary multiplication of methods 
One way of critiquing Dewey’s recommendation of DEM is to ask: if Dewey has 
faith in the reliability of scientific methods, why do we need denotative empirical 
method? I answer this question by exploring how Dewey differentiates DEM from 
scientific methods without betraying his faithfulness to the latter. I start by 
discussing what Dewey meant by “denotation”. 
What does “denotation” signify in Dewey’s methodology? For Dewey, some 
phenomena have ineffable presence. By this, he meant that it is very difficult to 
provide direct definitions or adequate descriptions for them even though we can 
understand what the names given to them refer to when they are mentioned. For 
instance, according to him, we cannot define “life” directly, but from the use of 
the word we know what it denotes or points to: “a function, a comprehensive 
activity, in which organism and environment are included” (1925, p. 11). According 
to Dewey, “immediate things” are like the word “life”, they may be “pointed to by 
words, but cannot be described or defined. When an attempt to describe occurs, 
it involves “a circuitous method of pointing or denoting” (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 73). 
For Dewey, although these phenomena are undefinable, they are capable of 
denotation because they have communicable meaning (1925, p. 144). This 
suggests that there is inadequacy in the use of our linguistic machinery because 
not all that exists can be formulated in language. This is also an evidence against 
the idea that ‘the real’ = ‘the rational’. Consequently, when a phenomenon 
denotes, it means it has a history which can be “deconstructed” to reveal how it 
occurs and its significance in relation to other occurrences. Consequently, to 
overcome the ineffable presence of these phenomena and make them fit properly 
into our schemes of explanations about the world, Dewey suggests the 
reconstruction of how we understood them. It is in this sense that he sees an 
empirical philosopher who adopts a denotative method as an “agency of novel 
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reconstruction of a pre-existing order (1925, p. 178) and who carries out 
“experimental reshaping of external conditions”(1925, p. 60). 
One popular interpretation given to express the denotative nature of Dewey’s 
method is that it is a method pointing to the “generical” or “genealogical” 
foundation of any phenomenon under study. For Gale, it is a method “ in which 
“an idea or doctrine is understood in terms of its genesis (Gale, 2010a, p. 62). By 
“understanding the genesis of an idea”, he meant the emergence of an idea and 
the considerations given to it in a problematic situation. For Hickman, the 
denotative method is an art of giving “experimental attention to the pushes and 
pulls of existential affairs” (2007, p. 21). This interpretation is corroborated in 
many passages in Dewey’s Experience and Nature. For instance, in chapter one of 
the book, Dewey writes, 
Given this element of knowledge in primary experience, it is not difficult to 
understand how it may develop from a subdued and subsidiary factor into a dominant 
character. Doing and Suffering, experimenting and putting ourselves in the way of 
having our sense and nervous system acted upon in ways that yield material for 
reflection, may reverse the original situation in which knowing and thinking were 
subservient to action-undergoing. And when we trace the genesis of knowledge along 
this line, we also see that knowledge has a function and office in bettering and 
enriching the subject-matter of crude experience (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 22). 
Again, in his earlier work, Dewey discusses the methodology guiding psychological 
investigation and most probably one of the methodological paradigms from which 
he adapts his denotative methodology. He writes: 
The object of the science of psychology is to take the concrete manifestations of mind, 
to analyse them and to explain them by connecting them with each other (J. Dewey, 
EW 2: 26). 
In Experience and Nature, Dewey rejects features assigned to human mind such as 
non-spatiality and non-materiality in traditional epistemology and metaphysics 
typified by the Cartesian philosophy. Rather than seeing “mental activities” in 
terms of a “mode of regulation that operates wholly from within”, Dewey 
considers mental activities (such as thinking, cognition, and consciousness) as 
reactions to natural events (1925, pp. 63-64, 141). He identifies “mind” and 
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“matter” as “different characters of natural events” (1925, pp. 63-64). For him, 
mental activities are preceded by series of events (as background) and sequential 
events (as foreground) and both can be investigated and connected with one 
another.  
Thus, to know the genesis of a phenomenon, three stages are involved. First, there 
is a need to identify its empirical properties or manifestations. Second, we need 
to empirically analyse these manifestations by tracing different phases these 
manifestations have passed through. Finally, there is the synthesis stage in which 
the analysed parts must be assembled together again, with the connections 
between the parts noted and reflected upon.  
Given the above enumerated features of Dewey’s denotative method, it becomes 
easy to see the similarity it shares with Locke’s “historical plain method” in the 
sense that Locke admonished us that for each significant aspect of human 
knowledge we should ask questions such as: Where does it come from? How 
reliable it is, and how broadly does it extend? (Locke, 1952, Essay 1; i (1-2). ). 
However, the denotative method goes deeper as it involves other themes in 
Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics such as seeing methodology as a means for 
experimental reshaping of pre-existing order. These features also distinguish 
Dewey’s denotative method from other methods such as Max Weber’s empathic 
understanding and Hempel’s deductive nomological model.62 
                                                     
62 For instance, the cause-effect analysis that features prominently in Hempel’s hypo-deductive 
model is conspicuously absent in Dewey’s denotative method, although the paradigms of the 
methodologies in science are believed to be important in the features of this denotative method. 
Also, Dewey recognises the importance and indispensability of the use of imagination in human 
interaction (J. Dewey, 1934, p. 272). Consequently, it becomes one of the features of his denotative 
empirical method.  Max Weber also emphasised the indispensability of the use of imagination in 
his proposed method of emphatic understanding in social sciences (interpretative verstehen) 
(Weber, 1949). For Weber, to understand an historical actor’s (who is being studied) point of view, 
we need to imaginatively put oneself in his position to “see” how and why he acted the way he did. 
However, while “imagination” is explicitly an experimental tool for “thought experiment” in Max 
Weber’s “emphatic understanding”, Dewey’s emphasis on empirical experimentation seems to 
make the use of imagination a heuristic method.  
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3.3.4.2 The challenge that there is no distinction between theory and 
methodology in Dewey’s metaphysics and epistemology 
Another criticism is that Dewey failed to make a distinction between the method 
and content of his metaphysics and epistemology. Critics have challenged this 
overlap as a form of weakness. For instance, Robert Dewey, who argues that 
Dewey’s view concerning the nature of experience is involved in his conception of 
the empirical method itself  (R. E. Dewey, 1977, pp. 31-39) and that his 
instrumentalist view of humanity is closely linked with his denotative 
methodology (R. E. Dewey, 1977, pp. 43-50), warns that, 
When Dewey recommends the empirical method for our guidance, he is 
recommending at the same time a definite view of not only a man’s experience but 
also a conception of man as a problem –solving animal, whose thinking is 
instrumental, whose nature is socially-produced, and whose values are open to 
empirical validation. If any of these beliefs about man are surrendered, Dewey would 
either have to modify his conception of the empirical method, or else abandon his 
recommendation of it as the only reliable method (R. E. Dewey, 1977, pp. 50-51). 
Robert Dewey’s contention is that the denotative method should be distinct and 
distinguishable from the objects of study for purposes of clarity. This concern was 
also expressed by Shook when he argued that “Dewey’s philosophical 
methodology is purely theoretical and must not be converted to a metaphysical 
thesis” (Shook, 2000, p. 89).  
However, the question is: Why is the overlap regarded as a problem and not a 
pointer to a kind of consistency in the overall framework of Dewey’s naturalism? 
Shook, for instance, noted that the coherence between Dewey’s themes such as 
his theory of meaning, truth, conception of object of knowledge (to which we can 
add his methodology), establishes Dewey’s empirical philosophy as a genuine and 
significant alternative to positivism, dualism and materialism (2000, p. 217). For 
Tuggle, the fact that there is no sharp distinction between Dewey’s 
instrumentalism and Experimentalism neither affects his notion of truth nor serves 
as a pointer to any form of inadequacy concerning his methodology (1997, p. 39). 
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I think the way Dewey’s conceptions of reality and knowledge play significant role 
in the formation of his denotative empirical method enhances the uniqueness of 
his empirical and naturalistic philosophy. In addition,  Dewey’s contention makes 
sense- that the project of experimental reshaping of pre-existing order is the point 
where “the interests of empirical and denotative method and of naturalistic 
metaphysics wholly coincide”(J. Dewey, 1925, p. 60). Finally, he identifies one 
common trait between the denotative empirical method and scientific methods - 
both recognize the importance of the continuity  between the material of the 
actual world “as it is concretely experienced” and the material of “refined” 
scientific or denotative methods (1925, p. 33). This is essential for successful 
manipulation or control of the physical world. 
I now discuss Dewey’s instrumentalist and experimentalist conceptions of 
knowledge, truth, and justification. I start the discussion by exploring how these 
conceptions are consequences of his rejection of the separation of knowledge 
from practical activity in traditional epistemology. This is a perspective which he 
calls a spectator theory of knowledge.  
3.4 Dewey’s instrumentalist theory of knowledge 
Dewey noted that despite disagreements among traditional schools of 
epistemology about how knowledge is acquired, there are some common features 
of knowledge they agree upon, as indispensable. One of these features is that 
“knowledge” must be objective. An objective knowledge is widely supposed to be 
what “mirrors” or “represent” exactly what the world is- without human 
interference. Dewey frequently referred to the traditional theories of knowledge 
that are developed based on this assumption as “spectator theories”. On how 
traditional epistemologists competed to show whose notion of knowledge is more 
“objective” than the others, Dewey writes, 
All the rivalries and the connected problems grow from a single root. They spring from 
the assumption that the true and valid object of knowledge is that which has being 
prior to and independent of the operation knowing. They spring from the doctrine 
that knowledge is a grasp or beholding of reality without anything being done to 
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modify its antecedent state-the doctrine which is the source of the separation of 
knowledge from practical activity (J. Dewey, 1930, p. 188). 
Again, he writes, 
The theory of knowing is modelled after what was supposed to take place in the act 
of vision. The object refracts light to the eye and is seen; it makes a difference to the 
eye and to the person having an optical apparatus, but none to the thing seen. The 
real object is the object so fixed in its regal aloofness that it is a king to any beholding 
mind that may gaze upon it. A spectator theory is the inevitable outcome…. (J. Dewey, 
1930, p. 26). 
This is Dewey’s critique of the conceptions of an “ideal knower” and “objective 
knowledge” in traditional epistemology. He argues that an ideal knower in the 
traditional setting is an investigator who studies the external world in a way that 
the data that form his objects of study are free from subjective interference. The 
investigator’s sole mission is to unveil what is out there in the world, delineating 
between what is known, what can be known and what is unknowable. Is Dewey’s 
description an exaggeration?  
In his agreement with Dewey that “spectator theory” typically describes the 
assumption about knowledge in traditional epistemology, Robert Dewey writes: 
Common to all these positions is the assumption that the object known is some reality 
as it exists prior to being known. There is also general agreement that knowing must 
not alter its object. If one were to admit that the object known is a product of some 
practical activity upon the part of the knower, one would thereby admit the presence 
of a distorting factor in the very process of apprehending the object (R. E. Dewey, 
1977, p. 143). 
This passage succinctly describes how traditional epistemologists became 
preoccupied with their quest for certainty and objectivity. Every epistemological 
thesis in this historical setting usually commences with the recognition of “reality” 
as an “external world” which every correct and useful theory must correspond 
with. An objective attainment of knowledge is only possible, according to this 
conception of reality, if an epistemic agent can separate his emotion, 
presumptions, and interests from the object of his study. Consequently, this rigid 
demarcation between man and Nature (which translates into the dichotomy 
between subject and object, respectively) reflects prominently in philosophers’ 
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conceptions of knowledge, truth, and justification. For instance, traditional and 
modern epistemologists are noted for making distinctions between practical 
knowledge and theoretical or propositional knowledge. More importantly, they 
are noted for their unanimous recognition of propositional knowledge as the 
subject-matter of epistemology.  
Another significant way that traditional epistemologists have modelled their 
theories on a spectator framework, according to Dewey, is found in their 
preoccupation with making their notions of justification reflect “objective criteria” 
and dispassionate investigations. For instance, epistemologists have made 
distinctions between epistemic and non-epistemic justification and shown their 
preference for the former.63 Richard Fumerton gives two examples of such non-
epistemic justification: prudential and deontological.  For him, a patient’s quick 
recovery may be facilitated by her optimism that she will get well. He calls this a 
prudential justification. He also cites the case of a husband, who, acting strictly on 
the moral obligation to be loyal to his wife, believes his wife to be faithful even in 
the face of rather powerful epistemic reasons for believing otherwise. According 
to Fumerton, these are regarded as examples of non-epistemic justification 
because the basis of the beliefs held is non-rational. According to him, both 
optimism or faith (upon which the patient’s belief in her recovery rests) and the 
moral duty to believe the faithfulness of one’s wife at all time, do not “make 
probable the truth of the propositions believed” (Fumerton, 2002, p. 205). Other 
epistemologists have made similar distinctions between epistemic and non-
epistemic justification (Alston, 1989). The point is that theories that are built on 
subjective or pragmatic variables or reasons are somewhat “derogatively” 
referred to as non-epistemic or non-rational theories of justification.  
Is this concern for “objectivity” or certainty unreasonable? I think Dewey accepts 
it as reasonable if the concern can be prevented from leading to non-naturalistic 
                                                     
63 The question is: Why should an epistemologist be interested in non-epistemic justification? My 
focus in this section will be on Dewey’s rejection of the basis upon which the distinction was made. 
For Dewey, the rejection of the practical nature of knowledge led traditional epistemologists to 
regard justification that are based on practical evaluation as non-epistemic. 
128 
 
conceptions of reality and human nature. For instance, Dewey contends that in 
the world full of dangers, the “need for assurance was the dominant emotion” 
(1930, p. 13). He admits that it is reasonable for a man who realizes that he lives 
in a world of hazards to seek means and assurances of escaping from peril. He can 
only be certain of security if the means of securing this safety is objectively 
determined (1930, pp. 7-27).  Put in a more theoretical sense, the quest for an 
independent or privileged access to reality or a conception of an absolute reality 
looks indispensable, as noted by Manicas: “if we want to avoid relativism and 
anchor our fallibilism”. There is need for an absolute reality and some privileged 
access to it “if criticism and persuasion is not to collapse into sophistry” (Manicas, 
2008, p. 121).  
However, Dewey’s point is that the conception of objectivity in traditional 
epistemology is highly “theoretical” or “intellectual” and consequently far from 
reality. It is theoretical in the sense that the idea of objectivity is only possible 
within the framework of how propositions (about reality) relate to one another 
and not in the sense in which nature puts pressure on human beings to think and 
act in certain ways. As noted by Rorty, the concept of “objectivity” in traditional 
epistemology has been defined in terms of conditions of accurate representation 
of an antecedently existing reality (1979, p. 11). The concept, in this sense, has 
become “transcendentalized”. However, for Dewey, theories are said to be 
“objective” in naturalistic terms only in relation to some specific goals in human 
transactions and specific goal-oriented manipulations of nature.  
For Dewey, the adoption of a naturalistic conception of reality shows that there is 
no “external world” as construed by traditional epistemologists- a world that is 
independent of man. Man is part of the world in which he acts as subjects and 
objects in the continued process of the dynamic world. With this new conception 
of man, there cannot be a view of the world so privileged as to exclude man. It 
equally follows that no point of view about the world can be regarded as a 
“disinterested investigation” or as a dispassionate observation” because human 
needs, desires and emotions are consequences of their symbiotic relation with 
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nature. More importantly, knowledge is an instrument for manipulating or 
transforming the world so that these human needs can be met. Dewey writes: 
[T]he instrumental nature of object of knowledge accounts for the central positions 
of laws, relations. These are the formulations of the regularities upon which 
intellectual and other regulation of things as immediate apparitions depends (J. 
Dewey, 1925, p. 121). 
Again, he writes: 
But in the practice of science, knowledge is an affair of making sure, not of grasping 
antecedently given sureties. What is already known, what is accepted as truth, is of 
immense importance; inquiry could not proceed a step without it. But it is held 
subject to use, and is at the mercy of the discoveries which it makes possible. It has 
to be adjusted to the latter and not the latter to it. When things are defined as 
instruments, their value and validity reside in what proceeds from them; 
consequences not antecedents supply meaning and verity (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 128-
129). 
Dewey’s point is that the basis for the justification of any claim about the empirical 
world lies in the events in that world, between the event that actuated the inquiry 
and the outcome of the inquiry (knowledge) that solves the problem. 
Consequently, ultimate justification is neither in any analysis of the relationship 
among propositions nor in human thought. For Dewey, the practice in science 
exhibits the acknowledgement of the instrumental nature of knowledge: 
occurrence or fear of occurrence of epidemic incites scientific inquiries and the 
discovery of antidotes that cure or prevent this threat is knowledge. His point is 
that justification of beliefs lies in some reconstructive function in nature. For him, 
“only action, interaction can change or remake objects” (1925, p. 132). 
In this sense, defining objectivism in a way that ignores these modes of transaction 
is unacceptable. Put differently, the argument is that the “ontological sense” in 
which the object and subject are defined as antithetical to one another, is rejected 
(J. Dewey, 1925, p. 196). More specifically, the ontological sense in which 
subjectivism is used to indicate a rigid contrast between individuals with the 
society, is rejected (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 201). In lieu of this absolute conceptions, 
objective or subjective is now defined by Dewey in terms of “factors in a regulated 
effort at modification of the environing world” (1925, p. 196).  
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3.4.1 Some criticisms of Dewey’s instrumentalist conception of knowledge 
Several scholars have agreed that Dewey’s rejection of the spectator theory of 
knowledge is plausible, most especially in the sense that he calls attention to the 
practical and instrumental aspects of knowledge that traditional accounts have 
neglected (R. E. Dewey, 1977, p. 167; Kadlec, 2007, p. 55; Manicas, 2008). 
However, there are some challenges.  
There are three significant objections to Dewey’s instrumentalist notion of 
knowledge. First, by challenging his idea that the quest for knowledge is rooted in 
problematic human transaction as an exaggeration. For instance, one may agree 
that there are many problems in nature that may serve (or have served) as springs 
for inquiry but claim that it is an exaggeration to say that every instance of inquiry 
emanates from problem or is meant to solve a problem. For instance, an academic 
publishing papers to enlarge the scope of human knowledge may not fit the 
description of inquiry (or knowledge) necessarily emanating from problematic 
situations. Scientific discovery of laws of nature is another example where 
curiosity to unravel the mysteries of nature have been cited. Consequently, if 
there are quests for knowledge that are not actuated by a problematic situation, 
such knowledge will be non-instrumental. Second objection is that linking 
knowledge with human problems and interests, the objection continues, renders 
it anthropocentric. This second objection is based on the argument that while 
other fields (such as biology, geography, anthropology and physics) study some 
particular aspects of knowledge, only traditional epistemology focuses on what it 
means to know and is consequently regarded as studying knowledge in its general 
form. If Dewey’s epistemology focuses on human knowledge alone, the argument 
continues, then it is different from traditional epistemology.  
I agree that the way Dewey uses the phrase “problematic situation” to cover every 
human activity can be misleading. It is used in a clumsy way such that every human 
activity meant for progress are portrayed as characterised by obvious and 
imminent dangers; similar to escaping from a lion’s den or running to safety 
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through a mine field.64  Whereas, he uses the phrase to cover seemingly non-life 
threatening activities such as planning and acting in reference to some anticipated 
future progress that are common in human life (such as an academician who is 
meticulously planning and building a career by publishing and attending 
conferences).65 However, there is other description that he offers that redresses 
the clumsiness. He describes this situation as a “disturbed relation of organism-
environment”(J. Dewey, 1991, p. 42). We can explain this “disturbance” in terms 
of existential situation that generates tension or conflict of ideas or thoughts. 
Kosnoki Jason describes this “situation” as when individuals feel “tension between 
the discordant aspects of their environment” (2010, p. 98), in a way that they are 
rendered incapable of deciding a priori which action is capable of bringing the 
desired solution. Consequently, the phrase can be interpreted as covering any 
human activity that demands making choices, provokes thought, and encourages 
creation of new ideas. The key word is “transformation”; creating new situations 
that actuate further problems and further inquiries. 
In response to the second objection, I argue that the idea of “general knowledge” 
is incompatible with Dewey’s naturalist epistemology. The reason is that the idea 
is abstract and theoretical. Dewey identifies such ideology to be idealistic and 
identifies it as one of the consequences of traditional epistemology that sees 
knowledge as non-practical. A naturalist epistemologist is interested in the kind of 
knowledge that has practical effects on human/nature symbiotic relation.  
The third objection is that Dewey conflates the “function” of knowledge with its 
identity and consequently presents a vague phenomenon. The point of the 
objection is that, while the functions of knowledge may give us general idea about 
what the phenomenon is, it won’t be a contradiction to find a phenomenon whose 
identity is impossible to glean from its function. There are two ways of answering 
                                                     
64 A similar problem can be seen in Dewey’s concession that his use of “indeterminate situation” 
and “doubtful situation” as synonymous is also vague. For him, while “indeterminate situation” 
points to a pre-inquiry existential situation, “doubting” correlates with inquiry (J. Dewey, 1968, pp. 
326-329).   
65 However one can argue that the idea of “publish or perish” in the academics can also make the 
career of an academician a good example of human activities responding to “problematic” 
situations. 
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this challenge. First, one can counter-argue that the challenge is a demand for 
definition of knowledge. Although Dewey defines knowledge in various ways, he 
warns about how dialectical definitions could be misleading.66 He also argues that 
epistemologists cannot rely on definition because some phenomena are not even 
define-able in concise ways. This is one of the reasons for his adoption of 
denotative methodology which we have discussed in section 3.3.2.  
A stronger way of responding is that “knowledge” belongs to that category of tools 
in which their functions define their identity. According to Dewey, it is a form of 
bias for a human “to think of tools solely in relation to himself”. I argue that 
determining the identity of tools strictly by the names given to them by human is 
one of these biases. Rather, Dewey argues that the identity of a tool lies in “its 
primary relationship toward other external things, as hammer to the nail, and the 
plow to the soil” (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 103). His point is that in the relation of a hammer 
alone lies its function.  
However, Fred Newman and Lois Holzman seem to disagree with Dewey’s citing 
of hammers as an example of tools whose identity is defined by their function. 
According to these scholars, hardware store tools such as hammers only become 
identified and recognized with certain function in the process they called 
reification (Newman & Holzman, 1993, p. 36). However, Dewey’s argument that a 
tool derives its identity through its functions is strongly supported in their 
description of what they called “the toolmaker’s tool”: 
While purposefully, it is not distinguishable from the result achieved by its use. 
Explicitly created for the purpose of helping to make a specific product, it has no 
reified pre-fabricated social identity independent of that activity. Indeed, empirically 
speaking, such tools are typically no more recognizable as tools than the product… It 
is the productive activity which defines both- the tool and the product (the result) 
(Newman & Holzman, 1993, p. 36). 
Another form of objection can be seen in Kadlec’s claim that Dewey abandoned 
instrumentalism for experimentalism (Kadlec, 2007, p. 19). This is an objection 
                                                     
66  For instance, in Experience and Nature, Dewey defines knowledge as “a work of art” that 
“confers upon things traits and potentialities which did not previously belong to them” (J. Dewey, 
1925, p. 309). In this sense, knowledge is being presented as an act.  
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because it suggests that Dewey dropped the former notion for the latter because 
they are incompatible or because along the line, instrumentalism became 
untenable. It can also be interpreted to mean that there are no differences 
between the two concepts. I will reject these suggestions. Consequently, the next 
discussion focuses on Dewey’s notion of experimentalism. I examine Robert 
Dewey’s claim that Dewey “somewhat arbitrarily restricts the term, “knowledge” 
to cases fitting his own theory or when he over-generalizes from experimental 
contexts of knowing to non-experimental contexts” (R. E. Dewey, 1977, p. 167). 
Consequently, my research questions include: What are the non-experimental 
contexts that are beyond Dewey’s experimental scope? To what extent are these 
non-experimental contexts to serve as constraints on Dewey’s position? In 
addition, I examine the relationship between Dewey’s instrumentalism and 
experimentalism.  
3.5 A critical examination of the nature and role of experimentalism in Dewey’s 
epistemology 
In chapter two, we discussed Dewey’s contention that a naturalistic analysis of 
experience “affords a model for a conception of experimental inquiry and of 
reflections efficacious in action”(J. Dewey, 1925, p. 79). We discussed his account 
of how experience reveals that “all reflection sets out from the problematic and 
the confused” and “aims to clarify and ascertain” and “closes in transforming the 
disordered into the orderly, the mixed-up into the distinguished or placed, the 
unclear and ambiguous into the defined and unequivocal, the disconnected into 
the systematized” (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 57-58). I will not repeat these arguments 
again. Rather, I focus on the question: How different is Dewey’s use of 
experimentation from what obtains in science? 
In Experience and Nature, Dewey describes how his naturalist conception of 
inquiry necessarily involves experimentation. He writes: 
Inquiry is the directed or controlled transformation of an indeterminate situation into 
a determinately unified one. The transition is achieved by means of operations of two 
kinds which are in functional correspondence with each other. One kind of operations 
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deals with ideational or conceptual subject-matter. This subject-matter stands for 
possible ways and ends of resolution. It anticipates a solution, and is marked off from 
fancy because, or, in so far as, it becomes operative in instigation and direction of 
new observations yielding new factual material. The other kind of operations is made 
up of activities involving the techniques and organs of observation. Since these 
operations are existential they modify the prior existential situation, bring into high 
relief conditions previously obscure, and relegate to the background other aspects 
that were at the outset conspicuous (J. Dewey, 1991, p. 121). 
Again, in The Quest for Certainty, Dewey presents what he calls “the traits of 
experimental inquiry” and how these traits are essential in formulating a theory 
of knowledge and mind in relation to nature: 
They exhibit three outstanding characteristics. The first is that all experimentation 
involves overt doing, making of definite changes in the environment or in our relation 
to it. The second is that experiment is not a random activity but is directed by ideas 
which have to meet the conditions set by the need of the problem inducing the active 
inquiry. The third and concluding feature, in which the other two receive their full 
measure of meaning, is that the outcome of the directed activity is the construction 
of a new empirical situation in which objects are differently related to one another, 
and such that the consequences of directed operations form the objects that have 
the property of being known (J. Dewey, 1930, pp. 84-85).   
Dewey’s point is that experimentation necessarily involves some existential re-
arrangement or manipulation of nature. This rules out the use of thought 
experiment as an independent method because there is no existential 
requirement in the practice of thought experiments. This existential requirement 
also further buttresses Dewey’s contention that knowledge is an existential 
phenomenon. In Experience and Nature, Dewey writes about how naturalistic 
analysis of experience affords a model for experimental inquiry and of reflections 
efficacious in action” (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 79). This is because “the conjunction of 
problematic and determinate characters in nature renders every existence as well 
as every idea and human act, an experiment in fact, even though not in design”(J. 
Dewey, 1925, p. 61). The reason is that the dynamic nature of Nature makes 
natural activities “experimental” in the sense that certain reactions always follow 
some forceful or manipulative activities elsewhere. Several new situations are 
potential consequences of the present state of affairs. However, while natural 
non-human events (such as hot magma resulting in volcanic eruptions) are 
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arguably without purposes, activities in nature that are consequences of human 
manipulations are purpose-oriented. Human acts are experimental because they 
are goal-directed or serve as means to some anticipated ends. Certain human 
activities are chosen among several options on the hypothetical basis that they 
have more potential to actuate the anticipated results than their alternatives.  
The final point is that is that experiments necessarily bring out new states of 
affairs, new problems and new forms of inquiry. Further on this point, Dewey 
writes: 
In my Logic, I have explicitly pointed out that one chief reason why the introduction 
of experimental methods meant such a great, such a revolutionary, change in natural 
science, is that they provide data which are new not only in detail but in kind. Hence 
their introduction compelled new kinds of inference to new kind of subject-matters, 
and the formation of new types of theories- in addition to providing more exact 
means of testing old theories (J. Dewey, 1968, p. 337).  
Three points are notable in Dewey’s position. The first is that Dewey’s notion of 
experimentation is a replica of experimentation in science. The second point is 
that his experimentalism concerns significantly the development and growth of 
human knowledge rather than the possibility of knowledge. The third point is that 
his notion of experimentalism renders human beings as natural problem-solving 
experimenters. As rightly noted by Robert Dewey, John Dewey conceived man as 
“first and foremost a future-oriented problem-solving animal whose 
characteristics and activities evolved from, but remain continuous with processes 
taking place on the so-called lower levels of life”(R. E. Dewey, 1977, p. 44). I will 
now discuss some criticisms of Dewey’s notion of experimentalism. 
3.5.1 Some criticisms of Dewey’s notion of experimentalism. 
Firstly, the impression in Dewey’s discussion is that his notion of experimentalism 
is modelled after scientific practice. He mentioned how his notion of 
experimentalism involves the use of hypothesis and how it could engender 
prediction.  However, he was silent on any possibility of his experimentation being 
guided by any form of laws as it is the usual case in science. I think Dewey’s 
subscription to evolutionary theories, his recognition of the biological needs of 
136 
 
human beings and their striving to satisfy them, makes all scientific laws in these 
areas relevant to his notion of experimentation. What a law needs to recognise 
and become relevant to Dewey’s position is that it is possible to have “conversion 
of undirected changes into changes directed toward an intended conclusion” (J. 
Dewey, 1930, p. 196). “The types of laws that are not acceptable to him are those 
that state that “the future and the past belong to the same completely 
determinate and fixed scheme” (J. Dewey, 1930, p. 193).  
Secondly, it seems Dewey’s use of the word “experiment” is so ambiguous that 
every problem-solving human action targeting some identifiable goal will qualify 
as “experimentation”. For instance, when a first-year student is deciding whether 
to choose a logic course in Philosophy or a course in sociology, as far as Dewey’s 
notion of “experiment” is concerned, the student is “experimenting” just like a 
chemist mixing various chemicals in the laboratory. Following Dewey’s notion of 
“experimentation”, the undergraduate student who is trying to decide which 
course to take, has an end-in-view that created the need for choice in the first 
instance: getting the best grade, getting the best exposure to knowledge, and so 
on. Consequently, evaluation of choices is determined hypothetically in relation 
to the possibility of this end-in-view. This description matches what Dewey call 
“operational facts”; “a theoretical recognition of what is involved when inquiry 
satisfies the conditions imposed by the necessity for experiment” (J. Dewey, 1991, 
pp. 116-117). In addition, the choice will herald new situations: attending a new 
class consisting of new people and creating new relationships, new challenges and 
further needs for making decisions and choices. 
However, according to Robert Dewey, these kinds of problem-solving human 
activities are better regarded as non-experimental contexts (R. E. Dewey, 1977, p. 
167). His point is that the word “experiment” is reserved for highly regulated 
activities meant for the establishment of some specific network of knowledge and 
not for actions done at random. I think Dewey reconceptualises the notion and 
procedure of experimentation by “de-technicalising” it. Consequently, the 
orthodox or technical notion should not be confused with his common-sensical 
notion. Consequently, the suggestion from Dewey’s notion of experimentation is 
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that, for all problematic cases, the same methodological approach is needed- the 
use of a hypothesis which “can instigate and direct an experiment that will disclose 
precisely those conditions which have the maximum possible force in determining 
whether the hypothesis should be accepted or rejected” (J. Dewey, 1991, pp. 115-
116). For Dewey, “experimental procedure carries with it the idea of continuous 
reconstructions of the ideas” (J. Dewey, 1968, p. 187). However, it must be noted 
that these reconstructions and modifications of ideas or hypotheses are done in 
conjunction with their material or factual implications. 
How does Dewey’s notion of instrumentalism fit into his notion of 
experimentalism? In Problems of Men, Dewey explains how his experimentalism 
opposes doctrinal absolutism and rigid conceptualism. These are two pejorative 
concepts he uses to describe the practice of making facts “conform to concepts 
that are framed independently of temporal or historical change” (J. Dewey, 1968, 
pp. 136-137). According to him, all natural events are dynamic and the perils that 
come with it, perpetually renders experience of human beings to be experimental 
and forces them to see nature as the instrument of multiple control. 
Consequently, both experimentalism and instrumentalism are consequences of 
Dewey’s naturalist conception of pluralistic and dynamic reality and human 
experience. Both concepts are indispensable in his epistemological naturalism and 
are mutually entailed.  The possibility of adapting what previously existed to 
accomplish a purpose, requires an instrument that passes through an experiment. 
3.6 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, I examined Dewey’s naturalistic epistemology. In section one, I 
explored the link between his naturalistic metaphysics and epistemology in terms 
of how the features of reality necessitate the features of every aspects of human 
knowledge and other epistemological concepts such as truth, inquiries, and 
justification. For instance, for Dewey, human knowledge is empirical, practically 
dynamic, pluralistic, and inherently experimental because nature (which is the 
object of knowledge) possesses those traits. In addition, the continuity of natural 
events determines the continuity and open-endedness of inquiries and the 
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contextual nature of knowledge. The empirical nature of reality warrants the 
appropriateness of empirical methodological approach. Justification and functions 
of knowledge are determined in terms of the possibility and extent of human 
success in the goal of manipulating and re-ordering events in the physical world 
for the realization of human purposes such as survival. 
Three significant morals are established in the section. Firstly, I articulate how 
Dewey’s position refutes some traditional epistemologists whose works suggested 
that metaphysics can be dismissed without any adverse effects on epistemology 
or who thought that epistemological investigations can be carried out without 
explicit reference to  metaphysical theories. On the contrary, for Dewey, human 
knowledge is essentially an existential affair in a peculiar sense- its understanding 
cannot be achieved without reference to other events going on in the world. This 
point underscores Dewey’s contention that naturalistic metaphysic functions as 
road-map for theories of knowledge. These ideas form the basis for describing 
Dewey’s position as epistemological naturalism. The second moral is that most 
traditional epistemological problems are avoidable if their non-naturalistic 
foundations are de-activated. I explore Dewey’s argument that some problematic 
notions about knowledge such as certainty, non-practical and dispassionate 
objectivity, are legacies from transcendental metaphysics of the Greeks. The third 
moral is that the section refutes the claims of some critics who contend that some 
features or claims in Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics foreclose the possibility of 
a substantive epistemology. 
In the second section, I explored Dewey’s presentation of the denotative method 
as a proto-type of scientific methods and concluded that the method emulates 
several practices in scientific approach to issues such as empirical 
experimentation, repeated and repeatable testing, and the use of hypothesis. 
More importantly, the section explored what Dewey meant by “denote” to 
underscore the peculiarity of the method. According to him, some phenomena are 
not explicitly definable but have communicative meaning in the sense that we can 
identify activities that denote their presence or existence. To have an adequate 
understanding of them (or metamorphous from communicative meaning to 
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cognitive meaning) Dewey suggested that those activities through which they are 
denoted must be reconstructed. Consequently, the use of denotative method is 
necessitated by the nature of certain phenomena (such as what Dewey calls 
esthetic or non-cognitive experience) that scientific methods may not be adequate 
to contend with. Its usage also provides empirical way of studying the natural 
origin of these phenomena in human transaction within nature and expose them 
to scientific understanding. This is a pointer to the uniqueness of Dewey’s 
clamouring for scientific foothold in epistemology. This is a foothold that does not 
engender reductionism or lead to scientism.  
I considered an objection that Dewey’s proposed methodology is vague because 
there is no distinction between it and the core themes in his metaphysical and 
epistemological theories such as instrumentalism and experimentalism. I 
defended Dewey’s position by arguing that the entailment between his 
methodology and other themes in his philosophy is because they are all 
consequences of his naturalism. I further argued that this entailment is a pointer 
to consistency rather than a problem. 
In the third section, I discussed Dewey’s instrumentalist conception of knowledge. 
It emphasised how the view is a consequence of Dewey’s claim that inquiry is 
actuated by problematic human transaction and that a claim to knowledge is 
warranted when this problem is solved. Consequently, the attainment of 
knowledge is demonstrated when a portion of nature or an event in nature is 
purposefully and successfully manipulated or transformed. I considered some 
objections to this view that regards knowledge as a tool. One objection is that not 
all knowledge is instrumental because some knowledge is actuated by curiosity 
and excitement for discoveries (such as scientific explorations) and consequently 
are not attached to solving any problem. I responded by arguing that Dewey’s use 
of “problematic situations” should not be read as entirely life-threatening 
occurrences but what provokes creative thinking and activities. His problematic 
situations should be read as challenges. Besides, Dewey argues that all forms of 
knowledge is instrumental because knowledge ultimately serve some specific 
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human purposes: whether it enlarges the scope of human knowledge, allays fear 
or satisfies curiosity.  
I also considered the objection that, rather than addressing the kind of general 
knowledge that traditional epistemology studies, Dewey restricted his attention 
to human or humanistic knowledge. I responded by arguing that the notion of a 
general knowledge is abstract and theoretical, and consequently unacceptable in 
a naturalist epistemology that concerns world-transforming practical knowledge. 
In the fourth section, I considered the notion and significance of Dewey’s 
experimentalism, most especially how it underscores his view that knowledge is 
practical and that a knower cannot be a spectator. Dewey’s point is that 
experimentation necessarily involves some existential re-arrangement or 
manipulation of nature. This existential requirement also further buttresses 
Dewey’s contention that knowledge is an existential phenomenon. I explored the 
cogency of his argument that “the conjunction of problematic and determinate 
characters in nature renders every existence as well as every idea and human act, 
an experiment in fact”. The dynamic nature of Nature makes natural activities 
“experimental” in the sense that certain reactions always follow some forceful or 
manipulative activities elsewhere. Several new situations are potential 
consequences of the present state of affairs. Human acts are experimental 
because they are goal-directed or serve as means to some anticipated ends. 
Certain human activities are chosen among several options on the hypothetical 
basis that they have more potential to actuate the anticipated results than their 
alternatives. Finally, I discussed his point that experiments necessarily bring out 
new states of affairs, new problems and new forms of inquiry. 
Generally, in the chapter, I explored how Dewey’s naturalistic epistemology shares 
the normative concerns of traditional epistemology by making provision for the 
avoidance of error. I argued that sharing this concern provides evidence of 
continuity between traditional epistemology and Dewey’s naturalist 
epistemology. However, while traditional epistemologists strive to prevent errors 
by establishing criteria that will provide necessary and sufficient conditions for 
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claims to knowledge and engender certainty, Dewey rejects this approach as 
theoretical. Alternatively, he aims to secure human interests (such understanding 
nature for adaptation and survival) by considering how practical and experimental 
manipulations of nature can be employed. 
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Chapter Four: 
Renaissance or decline: the problem of identifying the 
original ideas of Dewey in Rorty’s neo-pragmatism 
4.0 Introduction: 
In this chapter, I discuss the problem of identifying the original ideas characterising 
John Dewey’s work in the philosophy of Richard Rorty. There are two reasons that 
make it natural to choose to discuss Rorty here over other contemporary 
philosophy with pragmatist inclinations. First, Rorty’s philosophical position is 
usually described as neo-pragmatism because he draws inspiration from classical 
pragmatists such as Dewey, Peirce, and James. Rorty identifies himself as a 
Deweyan (2000e, p. 7). He acknowledges the impact of Dewey’s philosophy on his 
influential works such as Consequences of Pragmatism and Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature. He pointed out that the influence from Dewey was deeper than 
the inspiration he received from Wittgenstein and Heidegger (Rorty, 1979, p. 5; 
2010, p. 19).67 He identifies with positions in Dewey’s philosophy such as anti-
foundationalism (1979, p. 6), anti-representationalism (Rorty, 1982, p. xix; 1991, 
p. 5; 2000e, p. 5), and experimentalism (2010, pp. 21-22). Secondly, Rorty has been 
described as the philosopher “who single-handedly brought into being a 
renaissance for pragmatism” (Misak, 2010, p. 27). The suggestion then is that 
Rorty’s neo-pragmatism is a modern version of (Dewey’s) pragmatism and 
consequently provides a good ground for examining the continuity of Dewey’s 
original philosophical ideas. 
However, philosophers such as Hildebrand rightly notes that Rorty denies that 
there could be “an accurate” rendering of a philosophical position (Hildebrand, 
2003, p. 88). A number of scholars have described Rorty’s position as “anti-
philosophy” because of his often quoted declaration that philosophy has come to 
an end (Blum, 1990; D. E. Cooper, 1993). Consequently, Rorty’s position is 
                                                     
67 The influence of Dewey on other neo-pragmatist philosophers such as Putnam has been noted 
as well (Hildebrand, 2003, p. 87). 
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regarded as a direct opposite of the “optimism about a future for philosophy” 
often attributed to Dewey (Kitcher, 2012, p. xiv). However, Rorty distinguishes 
between “philosophy” and “Philosophy” and suggests that the latter has come to 
an end by urging the development of a post-Philosophy culture (Rorty, 1982, pp. 
xxxvii, xl). I contend that both Rorty’s two senses of philosophy and the idea of a 
post-Philosophical culture, contradict the “continuity thesis” that we have 
established in chapters one to three, as prominent in Dewey’s philosophy. 
Is Rorty a Deweyan? How can those differences be interpreted: as developments 
or as rejections of Dewey’s original positions? Three suggestions made by some 
scholars will be explored. The first is that most fundamental differences in the 
works of these two philosophers are largely consequences of their differences on 
some metaphysical issues 68  or differences “in the worlds they inhabit” 
(Shusterman, 1994, pp. 391-392). The second is that Rorty was correcting 
“Dewey’s privileging of natural sciences over literary culture” (Shusterman, 1994, 
p. 391). The third is that Rorty recasts (or misinterprets) Dewey along traditional 
philosophical lines and consequently warrants reclassification with Dewey’s past 
critics (Hildebrand, 2003, pp. 87, 89).  
While agreeing that these suggestions are useful, I contend that more is needed 
to answer the question. Further suggestions that will be articulated and explored 
are: (i) that Rorty over-stretched some interpretations of Dewey in many ways to 
suit his own (non-Deweyan or anti-Deweyan) position, such as his 
recommendation that Philosophy should be replaced with literary criticism or 
cultural politics (Rorty, 1989, p. 82; 2007), (ii) that Rorty was preoccupied with  
linking Dewey with other philosophers, such as Heidegger and Nietzsche (Rorty, 
2000a, pp. 237 - 239) and that this preoccupation created tensions in Rorty’s 
presentation of Dewey’s original position because the differences in the works of 
these philosophers overshadow the similarities that Rorty was presenting, and (iii) 
                                                     
68 Shusterman provides two instances of such disagreements. First, differences created by Rorty’s 
stating the problems between representationalism vs anti-representationalism in terms of words 
and sentences rather than Dewey’s focus on ideas and experiences. Secondly, Rorty’s refusal to 
“countenance philosophical discourse that traffics, as Dewey’s does, non-linguistic entities like 
experience and ideas” (Shusterman, 1994, p. 391). 
145 
 
that Dewey and Rorty have two radically different versions of naturalism that led 
to different notions of metaphysics, epistemology and theories of language.  
This section is not a critique of Rorty’s entire neo-pragmatist philosophy. It is 
rather a critique of Rorty’s understanding or presentation of Dewey’s philosophy 
and a critique of Rorty as a self-professed Deweyan. Most of these arguably anti-
Deweyan positions in Rorty are extensively discussed in Philosophy and Mirror of 
Nature and defended in subsequently published works such as Objectivity, 
Relativism and Truth and Consequences of Pragmatism. The consistency of Rorty 
on these seeming anti-Deweyan arguments or claims suggest that these 
incompatible issues are not mere slips of the pen. Consequently, my target is to 
articulate some of these anti-Deweyan positions in Rorty’s work and contrast 
them with Dewey’s original positions.  
This chapter has five sections. Section one discusses briefly some of the claims 
shared between classical pragmatists and neo-pragmatists. I also note the 
differences among the neo-pragmatists in terms of the levels of compatibility 
between their positions and the works of the classical pragmatists.  I did not 
attempt to define pragmatism. I agree with critics of pragmatism who have argued 
that there are as many versions of pragmatism as there are pragmatists (Lovejoy, 
1908).  
Section two discusses the rejection of foundationalism and the adoption of 
coherentism in Rorty’s work and how he thinks holding both views makes him a 
Deweyan pragmatist. Section three discusses Rorty’s rejection of 
representationalism and how this provides one of the bases for his rejection of 
metaphysics. I critique Rorty’s position by contrasting his position with Dewey’s 
position on representationalism and metaphysics. Section four compares Rorty 
and Dewey’s views on the realism versus antirealism debate, as a fall-out from 
their differences on the tenability of metaphysics. Section five discusses the 
differences and similarities between their versions of naturalism and how the 
differences out-weighed the similarities, providing the most important 
desideratum for separating Rorty’s philosophy from Dewey’s.  
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4.1 From pragmatism to neo-pragmatism 
Several philosophers have shown the futility of various attempts to define 
generally what pragmatism is (Hacking, 2007, p. 33; Misak, 2007, p. 1). 69 
Consequently, scholars have taken the tactical approach of enumerating and 
analysing some fundamental ideologies that are common among pragmatists. For 
instance, Misak discussed what she called “pillars of pragmatism” which include: 
the claims that “objectivity comes into being and evolves over time” (2007, p. 2) 
and that “knowledge has no foundation” (2007, p. 2). Hacking described this 
rejection of foundations as “fallibilism”-  the view that “all beliefs are fallible” 
(2007, p. 35). A similar approach is also commonly used in defining neo-
pragmatism. Some common views define a neo-pragmatist in relation to one or 
several classical pragmatists. For instance, for Kitcher, “central to classical 
pragmatism” is an impulse to reform, a yearning for “reconstruction of philosophy” 
(2012, p. xii). Consequently, he sees himself, Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, and 
Robert Brandom as neo-pragmatists who have been moved to “renew” 
pragmatism (Kitcher, 2012, p. xiii). 
Is “neo-pragmatism” a mere label? Ian Hacking thinks it is and claims not to care. 
He designates Rorty’s philosophy as “neo-pragmatism” to indicate a “new 
pragmatism” after noting Rorty’s admiration for Dewey but couldn’t possibly “see 
Peirce having had much sympathy for Rortyan conversation as the terminus of 
philosophy” (Hacking, 2007, p. 33). However, some scholars seem to have seen 
more than labels and consequently made distinctions between “neo-pragmatism” 
and the new breed of pragmatism usually referred as “new pragmatism”.70  
                                                     
69 Lovejoy, A. O. presented thirteen different definitions of pragmatism most of which he argued 
are contradictory to one another. (Lovejoy, 1908, Part I: Vol. 5:1, 2 January 1908, pp. 5-12 and Part 
II: Vol. 5:2, 19 January 1908, pp. 29-39). 
70 Misak, for instance, writes that, “Ian Hacking calls Rorty’s view ‘neo-pragmatism’ to distinguish 
it from classical pragmatism. I’m happy enough to put up with the infelicity and distinguish Rorty’s 
neo-pragmatism from what I am calling ‘new pragmatism’” (Misak, 2007, p. 1).  
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What is the basis for making distinctions between Rorty’s neo-pragmatism and 
“new pragmatism”? For instance, commenting on David Macarthur and Huw 
Price’s view that the “new pragmatists” “wants to dismiss or demote metaphysical 
puzzles in favour of more practical questions, about the roles and functions of the 
matters in questions in human life”, Misak writes that, 
This is indeed what lies at the heart of pragmatism and the hope is that the new 
pragmatists can connect our philosophical concepts of truth, rationality, and norms 
to the practices which are so central to human life – science, ethics, and politics 
(Misak, 2007, p. 3). 
Misak thinks this is the most important distinctions between the position of Rorty 
as a neo-pragmatist and the “new pragmatists”. But it is arguable that the neo-
pragmatists want this too. However, the irreconcilability in the positions of new 
pragmatists and neo-pragmatists becomes more glaring when one compares the 
preoccupation of the former (building on classical pragmatism) with Rorty’s claim 
that the consequence of his neo-pragmatism is that “post-Philosophical culture” 
replaces philosophy, as traditionally construed.  
If Rorty’s views reconcilable neither with the views of the classical pragmatists nor 
with the views of the new pragmatists, is designating his position as neo-
pragmatism a misnomer?  Would it be more appropriate to describe his position 
as “post-pragmatism”? To what extent can an ideology be different from classical 
pragmatism and still be regarded as a pragmatic ideology? While these questions 
are important for an extensive understanding of pragmatism and its successors, I 
did not attempt such a huge project in this chapter. Rather, I focus on a limited 
(but no less significant) aspect of the project which is examining “theoretical 
foundations” that link Rorty’s neo-pragmatism to Dewey’s philosophy to see 
whether he is a Deweyan pragmatist or not.  
4.1.1 Rorty’s critique of traditional and modern epistemology and the quest for 
the Deweyan in Rorty 
In many of his works, Rorty has repeatedly acknowledged  the influence of Dewey 
(Rorty, 1979, p. 5; 2010). He attributes his (successful) preoccupation with how to 
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put Wittgenstein and Heidegger in the context to the influence of Dewey (Rorty, 
2010, p. 19). Among these inputs from Dewey, the most prominent in Rorty’s work 
include the rejection of foundationalism, representationalism and essentialism. 
His arguments against these theories provide major premises for his position on 
the notions of truth, knowledge, his conception of pragmatism and critique of 
metaphysics.  
 In this section, I discuss Rorty’s critique of foundationalism, understood as “the 
supposition that knowledge needs foundations”(1979, pp. 168-172). While this 
critique covers his views both on traditional epistemology and metaphysics, for 
this section, I concentrate on the epistemological aspects and argue that Rorty 
rejects traditional and modern epistemology, based on his polemics against 
foundationalism to pave the way for a post-Philosophical tradition. I shall not 
attempt an assessment of whether Rorty is successful or not in his arguments for 
a post-Philosophical tradition. I focus only on whether he is successful in his 
argument that rejection of foundationalism, adoption of coherentism and 
dismissal of epistemology are all embedded in Dewey’s philosophy but in a 
confused way.  
I start the discussion with Rorty’s exposition and critique of foundationalism and 
then compare his criticisms of foundationalism with Dewey’s. I discuss two 
possible alternatives to foundationalism suggested in Rorty’s work: replacing 
foundationalism with coherentism or replacing epistemology (or Philosophy) with 
post-Philosophy culture. I discuss and critique the first by considering a sense in 
which Dewey is a foundationalist without compromising his conceptions of reality 
and knowledge as dynamic or evolving. I then explore Rorty’s suggestion about 
the necessity of a post-Philosophy culture and argue that such claim is not 
compatible with Dewey’s position. Finally, I consider whether Dewey advocates 
for the dismissal of epistemology.  
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4.1.2 Rorty’s idea of foundationalism 
Foundationalism is a traditional approach to epistemic justification. 
Foundationalists recognize that justification of beliefs cannot be endless. 71 
Consequently, they contend that justification consists in basic beliefs serving as 
ultimate ground for less basic beliefs. Foundationalists use several adjectives to 
describe the feature of “basic beliefs” that warrants their “foundational” role in 
the process of justification. These “basic beliefs” are often described as credible, 
certain, indubitable, incorrigible and infallible (Ayer, 1956, p. 19; Hamlyn, 1970, p. 
35; Lewis, 1946, p. 333; Locke, 1952, p. 309). Rene Descartes’ conception of “clear 
and distinct ideas” and how they generate indubitable beliefs (1969, pp. 144-149) 
and Plato’s theory of archetypal “Forms” and the role they play in the acquisition 
of knowledge in the physical world in Plato’s Republic, are sometimes referred to 
as examples of the “foundations” of knowledge . 
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty gives prominent attention to the 
exposition and criticisms of foundationalism. He explains his understanding of 
“foundation” and gives an account of how of foundationalism became the focus 
of epistemology. 
 [The] notion of “foundations of knowledge”-truths which are certain because of their 
causes rather than because of the arguments given for them-is the fruit of the Greek 
(and specifically Platonic) analogy between perceiving and knowing (Rorty, 1979, p. 
157).   
Again, he writes: 
[T]he desires for a theory of knowledge is a desire for constraint – desire to find “a 
foundation” to which one might cling, frameworks beyond which one must not stray, 
objects which impose themselves, representations which cannot be gainsaid…. The 
notion that there is a permanent neutral framework whose “structure” philosophy 
can display is the notion that the objects to be confronted by the mind, or the rules 
which constrain inquiry are common in all discourse… (Rorty, 1979, pp. 315-316). 
                                                     
71  An endless process of justification is usually referred to as an “infinite regress” which is 
interpreted to indicate that justification is unsuccessful. 
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In these passages, Rorty uses “foundationalism” in two important ways. Firstly, it 
is used to refer to thesis stating that justification is a special relation between ideas 
(or words) and objects (Rorty, 1979, p. 170). Objects are referred to as 
“foundations” because beliefs that are justified are regarded as “caused” by those 
objects.72 We can call this sense of foundationalism epistemological. The second 
sense covers a wider spectrum than a theory of knowledge or justification. It 
concerns the role of philosophy in terms of identifying and establishing neutral 
frameworks for “all discourse” interpreted as all human cognitive practices. We 
can call this notion of foundation the philosophical sense. The distinction between 
these senses of “foundation” is important for the understanding of how Rorty links 
his dismissal of philosophy with his rejection of foundationalism. At this point, I 
will concentrate on his view on the epistemological sense of foundation. 
Understanding Rorty’s notion of foundationalism also requires understanding the 
way he uses two important concepts: “constraint” and “confrontation”. He uses 
these concepts to describe the relationship between the knower and the known. 
He uses “constraint” in his interpretation of the contention of foundationalists 
that the process of justification cannot be complete without reference to the 
causal relationship between beliefs/propositions and their objects. For him, this 
causal relationship is regarded as guaranteeing necessary and objective truths. 
This is what he describes pejoratively as the “grip” of the object upon the knower.  
Rorty uses “confrontation” to refer to what we can describe as the obligations of 
the knower, most especially proving the ability of the human mind to engage the 
world by mirroring it. (I will discuss this view more extensively in section 4.3.) For 
Rorty, the popular acknowledgement of this “constraint” as a guide to necessary 
                                                     
72 For Rorty, the idea that only reality of which we are certain can provide “foundations” makes 
“foundationalism” a theory involving both epistemological and metaphysical claims, due to “the 
Platonic Principle” that states that “differences in certainty must correspond to differences in the 
objects known (Rorty, 1979, p. 156). While one might regard as contentious the idea that 
mathematics fits into the causal model stated above, Rorty’s point is that philosophers such as 
Plato were impressed by “the special characters of mathematical truth” which are “certainty” and 
demonstrable “necessary truths” and consequently were preoccupied with the articulation of a 
model of knowledge that can reflect such characters. 
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truths and the commitment to this “confrontation” as what defines the autonomy 
of philosophy,73 reduce traditional epistemology to foundationalism. 
4.1.3 Rorty’s critique of foundationalism 
Rorty identifies with Dewey by tracing the origin of foundationalism to the 
philosophers’ search for the immutable in Greek metaphysics, exemplified by 
Plato’s metaphysics (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 77, 79; 1930, pp. 28-49; Rorty, 1979, p. 
156). Both acknowledged how the quest for the “foundations” of knowledge was 
sustained and became one of the priorities in modern epistemology through the 
works of philosophers such as Descartes who regarded the establishment of 
indubitable foundations as one of the most important goals of epistemology (J. 
Dewey, 1925, pp. 188, 276; 1930, p. 61; Rorty, 1979, p. 6). Both philosophers 
understood that the quest for foundations by traditional and modern 
epistemologists is a consequence of the idea that knowledge involves certainty (J. 
Dewey, 1930).  
Rorty rejects foundationalism as an essential step towards embracing pragmatism 
for several reasons. First, he contends that the notion of “foundation” of 
knowledge is based on analogy with the compulsion to believe the existence of an 
object when directly perceiving it (1979, p. 162). Rorty actually got this argument 
from J. Dewey (1930, p. 26). This idea is expressed in statements describing naïve 
realism as “seeing is believing” or via the notion that only physical objects can 
provide concrete evidence.74  While Rorty commends Heidegger for tracing the 
root of this analogy (between perception (or vision) and theory of justification) to 
Plato’s notion of “objectivity”75, he argues that “the West became obsessed with 
                                                     
73 For instance, Rorty contends that “Descartes’ invention of mind-his coalescence of beliefs and 
sensations into Lockean ideas-gave philosophy a new ground to stand on” (Rorty, 1979, p. 136).  
74 A good example is in G.E. Moore’s “Common-sensism”. See, G.E. Moore, (1959) “A Defense of 
Common Sense”, in Philosophical Papers (London: George Allen and Unwin), Pp. 32-59. 
75 Rorty mentioned how Plato  identified “reality” of a thing with “its presence before us” (Rorty, 
1979, p. 162). However, a more comprehensive account of how foundationalism can be traced 
back to Plato and Aristotle. Both philosophers were said to have used “visual perception” as a 
model for talking about knowledge in the sense that when perception takes place, we have the 
idea of “something outside that is realized inside”. This led to the idea of “inner” and “outer” 
distinctions, “mental representations”, “Cartesian theatre with ideas”, and so on (Palmer, 2005). 
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the notion of our primary relation to objects as analogous to visual perception” 
through the Aristotle-Locke analogy of knowledge as perception (1979, pp. 162-
163). Rorty rejects the idea of Plato’s objectivity and the analogy between visual 
perception and knowledge. He contends that the idea of “foundation of 
knowledge” is a product of the choice of perceptual metaphor- “the mirror of 
nature”, which there is no compelling reason to adopt (1979, p. 159).  
The second argument Rorty raised against “foundationalism” is that there was a 
confusion between empirical knowledge (and its objects), on one hand, and 
mathematical knowledge (and its objects), on the other hand (1979, p. 158). For 
him, while the “necessity” of the truth of geometrical axioms (as an example of 
necessary truths) are supposed to have no need of justification, of argument, of 
discussion because they are un-discussable, the truth of empirical claims need 
justification. A simple way of expressing what Rorty meant is that mathematical 
truths are self-justifying. For Rorty, if there is any doubt about the truth of 
mathematics, it would be on the part of human reasoning or applications and not 
about the corrigibility of mathematical theorems or formulae. 76  With the 
objection raised against requiring necessary truths in empirical matters, Rorty 
rejects the Platonic idea of “foundations of knowledge”. Consequently, Rorty 
claims to follow a non-foundationalist path like Dewey by denying that there are 
beliefs that provide absolute foundations for our knowledge of the external world. 
This is the kind of foundation that Descartes believes can be used in  refuting the 
epistemological sceptic who denies the possibility of knowledge (1979, p. 6) .77  
                                                     
76 This argument against foundationalism derives support from some philosophers whose works 
are regarded as classics in the history of philosophy. This claim was more succinctly expressed in 
Hume’s distinctions between matters of facts/existence and relations of ideas. For Hume, while 
the denial of any truth concerning relations of ideas invariably leads to self-contradiction, the 
“contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it can never imply a contradiction” (Hume, 
1973, p. 129). The idea is also expressed in the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths 
which arguably is an artifact of Leibnizian and Kantian philosophy. 
77 However, it is arguable that the distinction between mathematical truths and empirical 
knowledge that Rorty wanted to use to reject foundationalism will lose considerable strength if it 
is proven that mathematic truths are invented by human beings rather than being discovered. 
Consequently, it would be interesting to explore Plato’s argument that mathematical truths are 
discovered in contrast with Dewey’s argument that mathematics, logic and science are 
“instruments” created by human beings to control nature. However, this pursuit is beyond the 
scope of this work. 
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Rorty argues that if the purpose of the “foundation” metaphor is to avoid the 
problem of infinite regress in our process of justification or to guard against the 
scepticism about reality that can be inferred from perceptual errors (such as 
illusion and mirage), “we can think of knowledge as a relation to propositions and 
thus justification as a relation between the propositions in question and other 
propositions from which the former may be inferred”. More importantly, we can 
hold a proposition as justified when “everyone, or the majority, or the wise, are 
satisfied” (Rorty, 1979, p. 159). In this regard, we can talk about “knowledge” and 
“justification” without mentioning any “foundation”. What is being suggested 
here is that, analysing knowledge in terms of relations among propositions is more 
viable than foundationalism as a theory of justification. From this suggestion, two 
important characterizations emerged concerning Rorty’s anti-foundationalist 
stance. The first of these is coherentism. The second characterization is that Rorty 
envisages a post-Philosophy culture in which conversation replaces philosophical 
theories. I briefly discuss these two characterizations before determining their 
compatibility with Deweyan philosophy. 
4.1.3.1 The idea of coherentism in Rorty’s anti-foundationalism  
Some arguments in Rorty’s work suggest that he sees the adoption of 
“coherentism” as an inevitable consequence of his rejection of foundationalism 
and representationalism. In Truth and Progress, Rorty writes: 
… We deny that the search for objective truth is a search for correspondence to reality 
and urge that it be seen instead as a search for the widest possible intersubjective 
agreement (Rorty, 1998, p. 63). 
 
Again, he writes: 
We pragmatists, who have been impressed by Peirce’s criticisms of Descartes, think 
that both skeptics and foundationalists are led astray by the picture of beliefs as 
attempts to represent reality, and by the associated idea that truth is a matter of 
correspondence to reality. So we become coherentists (Rorty, 2000e, p. 5).  
Rorty’s main target is to set up a version of coherentism that refutes the traditional 
correspondence theory of truth.  However, he tries to differentiate his version of 
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coherentism from traditional versions by claiming that it does not imply a 
coherence theory of truth. While in the traditional versions of coherentism, the 
notion of a coherence relation among beliefs (which provides warrant for their 
truth) is determined either by consistency between beliefs or entailment among 
beliefs, Rorty’s notion of coherence is determined by agreement among language 
users or community of inquirers at the end of an inquiry.78  
What does his version of coherentism offer? Michael Williams thinks that Rorty 
did not take coherentism as a credible alternative to foundationalism. For instance, 
he observes that, while traditional and modern epistemologists usually consider 
coherentism as one of the alternatives to foundationalism as theories of 
justification, “in Rorty’s eyes, coherentist epistemology is not really epistemology”. 
The reason is that Rorty thinks that holistic constraints on belief-revision are only 
loosely constraining, they do not offer “a set of rules which will tell us how rational 
agreement can be reached on what would settle the issue on every point where 
statements seem to conflict” (Rorty, 1979, p. 316; Williams, 2000, pp. 209-210). 
The suggestion is that coherentism is irrelevant in Rorty’s envisaged post-
Philosophy culture.79   
However, Barry Allen provides an illuminating way of describing Rorty’s 
coherentism and its importance in his (Rorty’s) envisaged post-Philosophy culture: 
Rorty “goes all the way” from presence and representation to an entirely linguistic 
and anti-representational view of knowledge. Knowledge does not require that a Real 
Something transcend belief and measure the cognitive quality of our conversations. 
Knowledge revolves entirely within discourse. It is entirely a matter of sentences 
people believe true, the statements they make, the interlocutors who receive and 
criticize such statements, the standards they go by. In the eighteenth century, it was 
said that nothing but an idea can be like an idea. Rorty transcribes this insight in the 
                                                     
78Rescher provides a good example of the traditional version of coherentism and coherence theory 
of truth. According to this theory, the truth of a belief is determined in terms of its “systematization” 
with other beliefs. A belief is said to be “systematized” if adding it to the existing webs of accepted 
beliefs, consistency will be maintained (Rescher, 1974). What Rorty wanted to maintain in his 
version is that the truth of a belief is not “automatic” or a matter of systematization. (Rorty, 2000e, 
p. 5), especially footnote 13.  
79 What I think worries William is that he thinks Rorty cannot dismiss traditional epistemology and 
simultaneously hold coherentism credible without contradicting himself. 
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register of language: Nothing but a sentence can justify a sentence (Allen, 2000, p. 
223). 
 
Three aspects are prominent in Rorty’s version of coherentism. First, the concept 
of “justification” is defined in terms of successful interlocutions or conversations.  
According to Rorty, “there is no such thing as a justified belief which is non-
propositional” (1979, p. 183). The suggestion is that knowledge concerns 
propositions within our language rather than assumptions concerning some extra-
linguistic objects. Consequently, the cognitive quality of our conversations is 
determined by the relationship between the structure of a language and the 
consistency of the language users (Rorty, 1979, p. 154). Consequently, a 
coherentist of this type need not worry about any relation (theoretically) to reality 
in any attempts to justify a belief. In addition, if one consider Rorty’s argument, 
that we can “give up the notion of an epistemic relation to something in the world,” 
and just rely on “the ordinary causal relations which bind utterances together with 
utterers’ environments” (Rorty, 2000e, p. 18), it follows that epistemological 
theories are also not necessary. A competent language user presents (or defends) 
a claim to other competent language users in an epistemic community by using 
her language proficiency. This is how to “get agreement from other members of a 
competent audience about what is to be done (Rorty, 2000e, p. 9). The question 
whether one holds a realist or a non-realist view is inconsequential, since 
philosophical theorizations in which appeals are made to theories about reality 
and concepts like truth and knowledge cannot engender “successful 
interlocutions”. 
The second feature is that a Rortyan coherentist need not bother about which 
belief is fundamental or foundational because (Rorty quoting Sellars) ‘’all our 
beliefs are up for grabs, though not all at once” (Rorty, 2000e, p. 5). The 
foundationalists needed some “privileged” position to start building knowledge of 
the external world. The foundationalist needed to demonstrate a linkage with a 
“Real” something that transcends human beliefs and perceptions about the world 
to refute sceptics who are denying the possibility of such relationship. Whereas, 
Rorty’s coherentist only needs to be situated within a community of language 
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users and inquirers to learn the rules for interlocutions and abide by the linguistic 
practice.  
The third point in Rorty’s coherentism is that we are to give up an idea of “truth” 
that is disconnected from the interests or needs of certain people or certain social 
contexts, since “truth” is nothing over and above whatever we can arrive at 
through inter-subjective agreement. Rorty thinks there is nothing significant left to 
be said about truth “once one has explicated the distinction between justification 
and truth by the contrast between present and future justifiability” (2000e, p. 5). 
For him, “x is true” is reducible to “x is justified” based on the argument that the 
concept of truth has become redundant in our explication of justification. In 
agreement with Sellars, Rorty contends that “justification is matter of social 
practice, and that everything which is not social practice is no help in 
understanding the justification of human knowledge” (1979, p. 186). He concludes 
that the social practice of conversation is the ultimate context within which 
knowledge and justification are to be understood (1979, pp. 389-394). 
Barry Allen argues that attempts to understand Rorty’s coherentism must go 
deeper than his critique of foundationalism and representationalism. They extend 
to his critique of realism (2000, p. 223). He argues that Rorty’s contention that 
“there is no such thing as a justified belief which is non-propositional” (Rorty, 1979, 
p. 183) is a pointer to this fact. This simply means that, for Rorty, knowledge is all 
about propositions rather than objects (Rorty, 1979, p. 154). Allen asks how Rorty 
can hope to make use of an “ordinary causal relation that binds utterances with 
utterers” in the formulation of his notions of the “justification” or 
“commensurability” without having anything to do with something extra-linguistic? 
I discuss Rorty’s answer to this kind of question in section 4.3 where Rorty’s 
critique of metaphysics will be explored. 
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4.1.3.2 Rorty’s “conversationalism” and the dismissal of traditional 
epistemology and Philosophy  
Rorty’s anti-foundationalism is more popularly associated with the idea that 
philosophy must give way to a post-Philosophical culture than the suggestion that 
coherentism should be adopted. This post-Philosophical culture is described as a 
context where knowledge will become a matter of conversation and social practice 
(1979, pp. 170-171). What is the connection between anti-foundationalism and 
post-Philosophical culture in Rorty’s neo-pragmatism? Two facts are important for 
understanding Rorty’s conversationalism. First, Rorty’s identification of 
foundationalism as the basis for modern epistemology. Second, his distinction 
between “philosophy” and “Philosophy” and his identification of epistemology as 
the foundation of Philosophy. Most critics attacked Rorty’s conversationalism 
without reckoning with the distinctions he made concerning his two notions of 
philosophy and arguably missed the basis of Rorty’s contention. For clarity, I 
discuss his rejection of epistemology and Philosophy separately. 
4.1.3.2.1 Rorty’s rejection of epistemology 
Michael Williams contends that Rorty equates “the demise of foundational 
epistemology” with the demise of epistemology tout court” (2000, p. 209). Barry 
Allen identifies some ideas meant to portray foundationalism as the bedrock of 
traditional epistemology that Rorty criticizes. Two ideas are identified as most 
prominent: the definition of knowledge that Rorty attributed to traditional 
epistemology and the task he identified as having priority among the 
preoccupations of traditional epistemologists. Rorty defines knowledge (the 
subject-matter of epistemology) as “accurate representation, made possible by 
some special mental processes, and intelligible through a general theory of 
representation” (Allen, 2000, p. 221; Rorty, 1979, p. 6). Consequently, armed with 
a theory of knowledge, traditional epistemologists think philosophy can define a 
“permanent neutral matrix” for the adjudication of any claim to know (Allen, 2000, 
p. 221; Rorty, 1979, p. 211).  
158 
 
Allen contends that Rorty’s choice of definition of knowledge is a bias. He argues 
that there are different definitions of knowledge in traditional epistemology and 
that Rorty provides inconclusive argument why the definition he chooses is the 
generally accepted definition (2000, pp. 221-223).80 I think Allen has a good point 
in here. His point corroborates our earlier contention that Rorty has the habit of 
criticizing traditional epistemology from selected definitions and theories. 
What about Rorty’s identification of epistemology with the task of defining a 
“permanent matrix” for the adjudication of any claim to know”? It is arguable that 
Allen did not address how Rorty uses this idea in his equating foundationalism with 
epistemology. What does this idea mean? I contend that Rorty uses this idea to 
describe the normative conception of epistemology. 81  According to this idea, 
Rorty was using “foundationalism” (metaphorically) to depict the centrality of the 
notion (in traditional epistemology) that epistemology is essentially about 
establishing norms (or necessary and sufficient conditions) for the discovery of 
knowledge. Rorty describes this task as a metapractice which will be the critique 
of all possible forms of social practice (1979, p. 171).  John McDowell and 
Bouveresse shed more light on how the scope of this “permanent matrix” cuts 
across all human cognitive pursuits and more importantly how Philosophy derives 
its authority over other disciplines from it through the notion that philosophical 
mediation is indispensable in its application. For McDowell: 
                                                     
80Allen discusses Rorty’s bias in two senses. The first are the biases in the way Rorty chooses to 
present traditional epistemology. The second are the biases that Rorty shares with traditional 
epistemology in his pragmatism. He mentioned propositional bias, belief-plus, discursive bias and 
the misplaced good of knowledge (Allen, 2000, pp. 228-230).  Allen also suspects that that Rorty’s 
subscription to anti-realism is at the root of his attempt to replace epistemology (in terms of 
making others see how a belief is justified) with a non-theoretical “social practice of 
conversation”(Allen, 2000, p. 226). Allen’s contention is that making references to concrete objects 
and justifying claims about them are indispensable in human conversations and that this fact 
renders Rorty’s anti-realism and anti-epistemology suspect. My contention is that this objection 
about Rorty’s position on realism concerns Rorty’s critique of representationalism (metaphysics) 
more than his identification of foundationalism as the bedrock of epistemology. Consequently, I 
will consider Rorty’s response to this kind of objection in section 4.3. 
81 One prominent link between foundationalism and the idea epistemology is essentially normative, 
lies in the conception of the role that basic beliefs are expected to play in the justification of beliefs. 
Foundationalists have argued that justification can neither be endless nor circular. Any evidence 
presented for a belief in either of these two ways is regarded as untenable. Thus, for 
foundationalists, the establishment of self-justifying basic beliefs is the most important 
preoccupation of epistemologists. 
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What Rorty takes to parallel authoritarian religion is the very idea that in everyday 
and scientific investigation we submit to standards constituted by the things 
themselves, the reality that is supposed to be the topic of the investigation. Accepting 
that idea, Rorty suggests, is casting the world in the role of the non-human Other 
before which we are to humble ourselves (McDowell, 2000, pp. 109-110). 
For McDowell,  Rorty thinks that philosophy derives authority from the idea that 
answerability to the world is central to the discourse about objectivity and inquiry 
(McDowell, 2000, p. 110).   
Is Rorty’s description of traditional epistemology fair? I think it is. Foundationalists 
(Chisholm, 1980; Hamlyn, 1970), coherentists (Lehrer, 1974; Rescher, 1974), and 
contextualists (Annis, 1978; Henderson, 1994), have defended the conception of 
epistemology as essentially normative. Contemporary epistemologists such as 
Stroud (1985), Goldman (1993b), Kim (1994) and Kornblith (1994b) all contended 
that the normative task of epistemology is indispensable. In addition, these 
philosophers shared Rorty’s view that normative task of epistemology is 
necessitated by the need to refute epistemological scepticism (Rorty, 1979, pp. 6, 
46). Consequently, Rorty’s equating the replacement of “confrontation” with 
“conversation” with the rejection of epistemology is a consequence of his 
rejection of “foundationalism”. 
4.1.3.2.2 Rorty’s two versions of philosophy 
Two versions of philosophy are usually contrasted in Rorty’s philosophy: 
Philosophy and philosophy. He uses different phrases to explain what Philosophy 
stands for: as a means for solving problems (Rorty, 2010, p. 18), a metapractice 
“which will be the critique of all possible forms of social practice” (1979, p. 171). 
The second version is vaguely described as “academic philosophy” that tries to 
“make peace with the literary culture” rather than to “ape the natural sciences”. 
He explains further that this philosophy is built on the notion that “philosophy is 
not so much a matter of solving problems as of telling a story about the relation 
between the human past and possible human futures”(Rorty, 2010, pp. 17-18). 
Rorty’s point is that philosophy in this sense is neither concerned with the task of 
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confronting or refuting sceptics nor with establishing a canon that can provide “a 
springboard for quasi-scientific research programs” (2010, p. 17).82  
 Rorty’s critique focuses on Philosophy that is construed as metapractice and 
problem-solving. He dates its emergence from Cartesian epistemology that makes 
justification of beliefs and refutation of sceptical doubts the centre of philosophy. 
Michael Williams agrees with Rorty that epistemology became the foundation of 
philosophy in two ways. First, because the subject determines the “foundation of 
knowledge”, epistemology became the most basic division of philosophy because 
other divisions depend on its results. William describes Rorty’s other reason as 
richer. For him, Rorty is right that after Kant, the subject we came to know as 
“epistemology” represents “a new theoretical configuration, without any exact 
counterpart in antiquity”. Consequently, epistemology “only really comes into its 
own when promoted to the rank of first philosophy” (Williams, 2000, p. 207).  
Several critics have challenged Rorty’s dichotomies between the two versions of 
philosophy. Susan Haack, for instance, contends that Rorty’s two versions of 
philosophy lead to an untenable dualism. Haack criticises this view as based on a 
false dichotomy, most especially how Rorty employs the distinction to categorise 
Peirce (Haack, 1993b). However, I will not explore these critiques. What I need to 
establish is that his distinction between Philosophy and philosophy and his 
argument that epistemology is the foundation of philosophy are not 
misrepresentations of Rorty’s position. The significance of these claims will be 
demonstrated when Rorty’s philosophy is compared with Dewey’s. 
After outlining several senses in which Rorty’s anti-foundationalism can be 
interpreted and their possible consequences, in the next sub-section I will discuss 
three important points that suggest that Dewey is not an anti-foundationalist in 
the Rortyan sense. Firstly, I consider the argument of Rorty’s critics such as Susan 
Haack, who argue that Dewey is a foundationalist in a sense that is not 
                                                     
82 In one of his responses to his critics, Rorty mentioned two sorts of philosophy professors; those 
who will like to nudge philosophy over to the side of poetry and those who will like to nudge it over 
to the side of science (Rorty, 2000c, p. 146). 
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contradictory with Rorty’s identification with Dewey as a non-foundationalist. The 
last two points concern the consequences Rorty draws out from his rejection of 
foundationalism which are the adoption of coherentism and the dismissal of 
traditional epistemology and Philosophy. Consequently, I consider Dewey as a 
coherentist in the Rortyan sense and how anti-foundationalism in terms of 
dismissing traditional epistemology and Philosophy is compatible with Dewey’s 
philosophy. 
4.1.4 A Critical appraisal of Dewey as an anti-foundationalist; in the Rortyan 
sense 
Susan Haack has made an important contribution to the debate on whether 
Dewey is a foundationalist. Haack’s argument commences from the observation 
that there are several senses in which the notion “foundationalism” has been used 
in philosophy. Three senses of “foundationalism” were offered. The first involves 
theories of epistemic justification: the idea of some “foundational or basic beliefs 
that are self-justifying and grounding or justifying other non-basic beliefs”. This is 
arguably the most popular version of foundationalism in traditional epistemology. 
However, given Dewey’s contention that new knowledge (or warranted truth) are 
determined at the end of each inquiry (a notion that implies the possibility of 
dynamic changes) and given that the notion of “self-justifying beliefs” implies a 
kind of conceptually fixed notion (before inquiries), Haack was right in saying that 
Dewey was anti-foundationalist in this sense. 83  The second sense of 
“foundationalism” involves the idea that philosophy provides extra-scientific 
footing for science. It is arguable that Dewey is also anti-foundationalist in this 
sense because he sees both science and philosophy as a continuous cognitive 
enterprise which complement one another. Finally, the third sense of 
foundationalism is described as some terminal points within specific inquiries. This 
is because inquiries cannot go on endlessly. However, these terminal points are 
not absolute and are appropriately described as “contextual foundations” (Haack, 
                                                     
83 It is important to note that, for Dewey, previously established knowledge is a resource for 
subsequent inquiry. However, for new knowledge to become a resource, it requires new inquiry. 
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2006, pp. 55-56). Haack’s argument is that the fact that Dewey implicitly 
subscribed to the third sense of foundationalism renders Rorty’s depiction of 
Dewey as an anti-foundationalist incorrect. 
However, there is another sense of foundationalism that is not covered in Haack’s 
enumeration. Tom Rockmore called this version “ontological foundationalism” 
and described it as a strategy for metaphysical realism. In his articulation of this 
version, epistemological foundationalism (“foundation” in respect of justifying or 
grounding our beliefs or knowledge claims) is contrasted with ontological 
foundationalism (“foundation” in respect of how structure of reality determines 
our theories about reality) (Rockmore, 2004). We have established this view as the 
most prominent in Dewey’s philosophy in chapter two and three, most especially 
in our contention that Dewey presents metaphysics as the ground-map for 
epistemology. 
We have seen in chapter two how in Experience and Nature and The Quest for 
Certainty Dewey traced the origin of “foundationalism” to Greek philosophy 
exemplified by Plato and Aristotle’s metaphysics, against which he offers a 
trenchant criticism. One significant point concerning Dewey’s critique is that he 
was not arguing for the abolition of “foundations” but rather rejecting 
“foundations” that are incompatible with the dynamic tenet of evolutionary 
theory. Consequently, Dewey usually contrasted two notions of “foundations” in 
his work: the notion of foundationalism that is arrived at through non-empirical 
methods and the version that is based on empirical or naturalist methodology. A 
vivid example is found in Dewey’s description of reality as “both precarious and 
stable”. I will not repeat the whole argument here. However, I will reiterate his 
argument portraying existence as “event”. 
So the traditional view of the static points to something fixed, rigid, incapable of 
change, and therefore also outside the course of things and consequently non-
empirical. Empirically, however, there is a history which is a succession of histories, 
and in which any event is at once both beginning of one course and close of another; 
is both transitive and static (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 85).  
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The word “events” was used in an unprecedented sense; to describe the content 
of the physical world: mountains, valleys, plants, animals, rivers, and so on. These 
contents of the physical world are all “events” in the sense that they are dynamic 
or changing. Since all “events” are characterised by episodes, the components of 
the physical world such as mountains, valleys and landscapes have histories of how 
they appear and disappear in successive order. However, some events are more 
stable or more enduring than others. Without these degrees of “stability” made 
manifest in objects such as mountains, oceans, valleys, the idea of “precariousness” 
or “episodic events” made manifest by phenomena such as climate, rainbows, and 
human psychological dispositions such as joy and happiness, will be meaningless 
and unfathomable. Without the concept and examples of objects that are stable 
(to some extent), there won’t be any way to differentiate what is precarious from 
what is stable. Without some aspects in human transitory states that are more 
enduring, there won’t be any way to mark where one episode ends and another 
begins. It is in this sense of limited or temporary stability that some aspects of 
nature enjoy over others that we can describe them as “foundational”. For Dewey, 
the metaphor “foundation” describes certain transiting epochs in the history of 
events. This suggests that he admits some version of “foundation”, in the sense 
that not everything in the world is completely chaotic or in a state of complete 
flux. But it must be noted that the periods when these aspects of the world “are” 
foundational are temporary or contextual.  
Three points about these metaphors of “foundation” and “events” are important 
to prevent confusion. First, they primarily concern existence. The way the 
metaphor “foundation” was just used is different from the first sense of 
“foundationalism” mentioned by Haack, which is in respect of our (non-tangible) 
beliefs. Secondly, this metaphoric use of “foundation” was frequently used in 
Experience and Nature in a specific way to contrast non-naturalist (traditional) 
metaphysics with a naturalist metaphysics. Thirdly, Dewey rejected “non-
naturalist metaphysics because the metaphysicians assumed that there were 
some entities such as Platonic “Forms” or “Being” or Spinoza’s “Monads” that are 
described as having features that are permanent or incorrigible. These adjectives 
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(permanence, incorrigibility) are primarily about the “structures” of some reality 
and not about the cognizers of the structures.  
It is arguable that Dewey’s contention is that there are only contextually stable or 
“foundational” entities.  Dewey’s critique of “ontological” foundationalism is 
based on the idea that our understanding of the structure or nature of the objects 
of our knowledge goes a long way towards determining the truth of our 
epistemological theories about them. More importantly, it is arguable that Dewey 
was replacing the traditional version of ontological foundationalism (with its 
permanent notion of foundation) with another version involving contextual 
foundations. This point corroborates Haack’s argument that Dewey subscribed to 
the “contextual” sense of foundationalism. The only difference is that while the 
version that Haack attributed to Dewey is epistemological, my version is 
ontological. 
In Consequences of Pragmatism, Rorty seems to notice Dewey’s subscription to 
this version of episodic “ontological foundationalism”. He claims Dewey was 
preoccupied with the attempt to present “primary experience” or raw contacts 
with nature as “the causal antecedents of knowledge”. This is made evident by his 
preoccupation with attempts to establish “continuities” between the nervous 
system and people, and between “experience” and “nature” (Rorty, 1982, p. 81). 
Given that this line of reasoning leads towards commitment to some version of 
realism, Rorty critiques Dewey’s conception of “primary, non-reflective 
experience” or more specifically the “role” that he assumed Dewey assigned to it- 
serving as a foundation or providing justification for “secondary experience”.  
Rorty argues that what Dewey intended to do was not to establish knowledge or 
erect a “foundation” for knowledge but instead to accept that “we can eliminate 
epistemological problems by eliminating the assumption that justification must 
repose on something other than social practices and human needs”. He thought 
that Dewey inadvertently “ran into this problem” (embracing foundationalism) 
because he was “side-tracked into doing “metaphysics”” (Rorty, 1982, pp. 81-82). 
Two questions are pertinent: (i) Did Rorty think Dewey’s “side-tracking” into 
foundationalism was a genuine mistake or confusion?  (ii) Was he suspicious of 
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Dewey as a surreptitious foundationalist? I think he was only second-guessing 
Dewey. Dewey’s preoccupation with the metaphysics of experience as a strategy 
to establish an empirical “ontological foundation” for his naturalist epistemology, 
arguably, is too glaring to be a misrepresentation. 
 Dewey argues that “primary experience” provides evidential support for 
“secondary experience”. For instance, Dewey says that “the subject-matter of 
primary experience sets the problems and furnishes the first data of the reflection 
which constructs the secondary objects is evident. It is obvious that test and 
verification of the latter is secured by return to things of crude and macroscopic 
experience…”  (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 7). In respect of this non-reflective, primary 
experience prompting or leading to secondary experience, an ontological 
“foundation” is implied. And in the “use of things in primary experience” to verify 
or validate the things in secondary experience, both ontological foundationalism 
and epistemological foundationalism are embraced.84 
At this point, it is arguable that Rorty’s interpretation of Dewey in terms of 
unreserved or “radical” subscription to anti-foundationalism is suspect. The 
argument that Dewey used primary experience as ground or foundation for 
secondary experience seems plausible.85 There is one more point that needs to be 
made in the light of our contention that Dewey is not a radical anti-foundationalist 
as suggested by Rorty. Rorty sees his own subscription to anti-foundationalism as 
a premise to his critique and rejection of metaphysics and his reading of 
                                                     
84 We have discussed the “foundational” roles of primary experience for secondary experience in 
chapters 1 and 2. A problematic human encounter with nature prompts inquiries and the findings 
of the inquiries are referred to the encounter to determine its validation. 
85  However, Richard Shusterman argues that Dewey did not present “primary experience” as 
playing the role of grounding or justifying “secondary experience”. He argues that “Dewey 
effectively denies this by asserting that primitive non-cognitive experience is simply had but not 
known. And since not even known as “had”, it is unavailable for use as evidence to support specific 
knowledge claims” (Shusterman, 1999, p. 197). While Shusterman was right in his observation, it 
is arguable that Dewey’s emphasis on the grounding role of primary experience is more 
pronounced. However, Shusterman explored a different motivation for Dewey’s “primary 
experience” that is different from the quest for epistemological foundations as implied in Rorty’s 
critique. Shusterman explored this motivation in terms of an attempt to develop “aesthetic and 
practical uses of such experience”. His general goal in that article is to explore the possibility of 
“stripping off” the “foundationalist function” ascribed to Dewey’s notion of “immediate experience” 
without losing its point (Shusterman, 1999, pp. 193-219). But the examination of this proposal is 
not part of the goal of this section.  
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philosophy (in general) as therapeutic; a mission to which he emphatically 
asserted that Dewey (and all pragmatists) were disposed.  
The ramifications of this problem can be seen in two dimensions. First, If Dewey 
and Rorty have different notions of foundationalism, it may serve as a pointer to 
the fact that Rorty does not subscribe to Dewey’s version of pragmatism. Secondly, 
if Rorty’s understanding and application of “foundationalism” is radically different 
from what obtains from any of the classical pragmatists, then, one can argue that 
Rorty’s “neo-pragmatism” is better seen as “post-pragmatism”. The foregoing 
supports Shusterman’s contention that post-foundationalist philosophy for 
Dewey, was neither mere Wittgensteinian therapy to relieve linguistic “cramps 
and itches”, nor a Heideggerian attempt to recapture a pre-Socratic experience of 
Being but “rather to transfer and apply philosophy’s critical acumen and 
imaginative energy to the resolution of concrete socio-cultural problems” 
(Shusterman, 1999, p. 193).  
4.1.5 An examination of Dewey as a coherentist in the Rortyan sense 
Rorty is correct that Dewey emphatically rejected the reading of certainty or fixity 
into the concept of knowledge. However, it is very hard to think of Dewey as a 
coherentist in the sense described by Rorty. The reason is that seeing the 
“structure of our knowledge” as completely “foundation-less”, like Neurath’s 
analogy of “a raft floating on the sea”, is not compatible with Dewey’s theories of 
nature and knowledge. For instance, from Dewey’s claim that “reality” is both 
stable and precarious, it follows that he acknowledged “foundations”, although 
not eternal, unchangeable, pure and indubitable in either Platonic or Cartesian 
senses. In Neville’s words, “these narrowly stable structures allow us to say 
metaphysically what change and other obvious characteristics of our world might 
consist in” (2010, p. 141).  
As rightly noted by Manicas, the existence and the acknowledgement of a physical 
or concrete world is important for the meaningfulness of Dewey’s naturalism 
(2008, p. xiv). Dewey would agree with Rorty that philosophy is all about 
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conversations and interlocutions, with agreement among language-users playing 
an important role in inquiries. However, in Dewey’s naturalist project, human 
beings are presented as having a symbiotic relation with nature. There is an 
apparent cause-effect relationship between reality and our language and beliefs. 
In this relation, language or conversation is a mere tool and consequently a means 
to an end. Consequently, there is need for a theory concerning an extra-linguistic 
world with which propositions, human agreements and conversations are 
concerned.  
Consequently, a theory about how the physical world offers a series of continuous 
constraints on human beings: prompting inquiries, adaptations, and changes in 
methodological approach to nature, is a central theme in Dewey. His contention 
that reality is inherently made up of interchange between precarious and stable 
events led him to reject the idea of absolute truth. Manicas was right in seeing 
Rorty’s contention that there are “no constraints on inquiry save conversational 
ones” as un-Deweyan. He identifies this un-Deweyan trend in Rorty as one of the 
consequences of his (Rorty’s) rejection of metaphysics (Manicas, 2008, p. xiv). As 
noted by Michael Williams, Rorty’s denial of any extra-linguistic constraints on 
inquiry was due to his equating the rejection of foundationalism and 
representationalism to the end of traditional epistemology on the one hand, and 
equating the end of traditional epistemology with the end of philosophy on the 
other hand (Williams, 2000). 
With this idea of changeable or corrigible foundations, it is more appropriate to 
see Dewey’s position as similar or closer to D.B Annis’ version of contextualism or 
Susan Haack’s version of “found-herentism” 86 , rather than the traditional 
coherentist theory. Contextualists do acknowledge some foundations that are 
limited or relative to time, cultures or social contexts. A found-herentist holds that 
there are foundations that are changeable.87 The most important point is that 
                                                     
86 Susan Haack combined the “foundation” in foundationalist theories of justification and the 
notion of “coherence of beliefs” in her book (Haack, 1993a). 
87  For instance, Haack compares the structure of evidence with the crossword puzzle. The 
difference between her position and mainstream coherentism is that in relating truth, knowledge 
or justification to the mutual dependence among our beliefs, we have the empirical world to which 
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Dewey’s ontological thesis about reality is incompatible with a coherentist theory 
of knowledge. More discussion about the differences between Dewey and Rorty 
with respect to their theory of reality will be carried out in the later part of this 
chapter. I turn now to examine the claim that Rorty equates the rejection of 
foundationalism with the rejection of traditional epistemology, and thus 
Philosophy. 
4.2 Dewey and Rorty’s idea of a post-Philosophy culture 
How would a Deweyan respond to Rorty’s dismissal of epistemology? I think 
Rorty’s bases for this dismissal are unacceptable. In chapter 3, I discussed Dewey’s 
naturalist epistemology and how it is continuous with traditional epistemology but 
in a clarified way. A vivid example of this continuity is provided by the necessity of 
admitting some notions of “contextual truths” in Dewey’s epistemology. Although 
Dewey (like Rorty) rejected traditional conceptions of “transcendental” or 
“absolute truth”, he still endorsed a notion of truth (“Truth or falsity” for Dewey, 
“depends on what men find when they warily perform the experiment of 
observing reflective events” (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 29)).  In chapter three, we have 
shown how Dewey’s instrumentalism provides a fallibilist theory of justification. 
According to this view, knowledge is a tool and its effectiveness is determined by 
how its application enhances the re-ordering of the physical world. This point 
supports the idea that Dewey recognizes the importance of the normative task in 
epistemology.88 
                                                     
to appeal; just as crossword puzzles are solved by  a player appealing to different aspects of her 
experiential evidence (Haack, 1993a). This simply means absence of holistic constraint on relations 
among beliefs. 
88 Rorty agrees with Dewey’s notions of instrumentalism and experimentalism in several ways. He 
recommends Dewey’s experimentalism at the expense of Plato’s attaching human rationality with 
the ability to “trace our justification back to unquestionable first principles- to “absolutes”(Rorty, 
2010, p. 21). He endorses Dewey’s practical conception of knowledge rather than theoretical 
(Rorty, 2000d, p. 217) and Dewey’s persuasion concerning abandoning “problems that no longer 
have practical importance”(Rorty, 2010, p. 22). He agrees with Dewey that languages are “adaptive 
tools” for reshaping and coping with natural environment (Rorty, 1982, p. xix); one of the most 
important theses upon which Dewey built his instrumentalist conception of knowledge. Although 
Rorty warns that we must be careful not to phrase the  language/tool analogy in way that could 
suggest dualism between language and its users (Rorty, 1982, pp. xviii-xix). 
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Secondly, Rorty envisages a post-Philosophical culture based on his contention 
that epistemology (which is the foundation of modern philosophy) is untenable. 
My contention is that his argument that epistemology is the foundation of 
philosophy renders his position significantly un-Deweyan. In chapter 3, I discussed 
how metaphysics serves as the foundation for Dewey’s epistemology. This renders 
Rorty’s distinction between “philosophy” and “Philosophy” and his presentation 
of normative epistemology as “first philosophy” suspect.   
Finally, I find it very difficult to assimilate Rorty’s conception of post-Philosophical 
culture (in terms of philosophy abandoning the role of arbiter of truth for all 
human cognitive pursuits or serving as metapractice for all culture) into Dewey’s 
philosophy. Furthermore, the acknowledgement of the importance of this 
normative task is also reflected in Dewey’s conception of the nature of “scepticism” 
in epistemology. I will reiterate some important points for present purposes. 
Dewey rejects Cartesian practices of “methodic doubt” on the ground they are 
“doubts that are not evoked by and are not relative to some existential situation”. 
For this reason he regards them as pathological or idle (J. Dewey, 1968, p. 349; 
1991, p. 109). For Dewey,  genuine doubts and scepticism can only occur either in 
respect of questions concerning the “adequacy of the operation used in achieving 
the issue which transforms a problematic situation into a settled or resolved one” 
(J. Dewey, 1930, p. 185) or questions relating to the “value of purposes and policies 
of life” (J. Dewey, 1930, p. 186) . Thus, “real” sceptical attitudes and doubts occur 
in human life when a methodology fails in actuating some desired results, 
prompting the necessity of being more cautious or careful in subsequent attempts. 
In The Quest for Certainty, Dewey describes how knowledge is inherently 
normative and how this normativity confers on epistemology a regulatory role: 
What is the bearing of our existential knowledge at any time, the most dependable 
knowledge afforded by inquiry, upon our judgements and beliefs about the ends and 
means which are to direct our conduct? What does knowledge indicate about the 
authoritative guidance of our desires and affections, our plans and policies? Unless 
knowledge gives some regulation, the only alternative is to fall back upon custom, 
external pressure and free play of impulse (J. Dewey, 1930, p. 67).   
170 
 
Is Dewey recommending an authoritative or meta-epistemological practice that 
can lead to the kind of Philosophy that Rorty repudiates? I think he is not. Dewey 
distinguishes the authoritative or regulatory role proffered for epistemology 
(because of the normative nature of knowledge) from the kind of Philosophy Rorty 
hopes to replace when he writes: 
When I say “authority” I do not mean a fixed set of doctrines by which we settle 
mechanically problems as they arise. Such authority is dogmatic, not intellectual. I 
mean methods congruous with those used in scientific inquiry and adopting their 
conclusions; methods to be used in directing criticism and in forming the ends and 
purposes that are acted upon (J. Dewey, 1930, p. 70).  
Two points are notable from our discussion. First, Dewey’s conception of 
epistemology as essentially normative points to the continuity between traditional 
epistemology and Dewey’s naturalist epistemology. This confirms that Rorty’s 
neo-pragmatism is different from Dewey’s naturalist epistemology. Second, 
Dewey’s explanation of how epistemology assumes a regulatory role without 
developing into “a fixed set of doctrines” by which we can settle all problems, 
points to the fact that before Rorty’s post-Philosophical culture can take off, it 
must refute Dewey’s version of epistemology. I now discuss how Dewey’s 
naturalist metaphysics poses further challenge to Rorty’s position. 
4.3 Rorty’s critique of representationalism and his anti-metaphysical position 
In this section, I discuss Rorty’s rejection of representationalism in traditional and 
modern philosophy. Like his critique of foundationalism, Rorty’s critique of 
representationalism involves both metaphysical theories about the nature of 
existence and epistemological concerns about theories and methods of knowing. 
The most important focus, however, is to examine his claim that holding an anti-
representationalist position is a necessary condition for pragmatism; a Deweyan 
version of pragmatism. I argue that Dewey neither shares Rorty’s metaphysical 
stance nor adopts what appears to be an anti-realist stance in Rorty’s work, even 
when they both reject representationalism as presented by traditional 
philosophers.   
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In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty was essentially preoccupied with 
criticizing traditional conceptions of phenomena such as human mind and 
language as “mirrors” of nature. The belief that the human mind or language has 
the “ability” to represent or characteristics that reflect exactly how nature is, is 
what Rorty pejoratively described as representationalism. I will start the 
discussion by offering a general sketch concerning some basic ideas on 
representationalism as presented in traditional philosophy. This sketch is meant 
to draw attention to the point that while a traditional epistemologist, arguably, 
will depict the question whether human mind or language can represent nature 
as a problem of perception, Rorty sees representationalism as an ontological 
theory that defines the entire history of traditional philosophy.89 What then is 
representationalism? How prominent is the theory in traditional philosophy? 
Laurence Bonjour attributes the prominence of representationalism to 
philosophers’ preoccupation with solving problems of perception such as illusion, 
hallucination, mirage, and so on. Its fundamental suggestion is that we are not 
directly aware of objects we perceive (2013). Given these supposed errors in 
perception, the central question that representationalists are trying to address is 
“what is it that we are immediately or directly aware of in sensory or perceptual 
experience? Is it public physical objects, private sensory entities of some sort, or 
perhaps some still further sort of entity (or state)?” Consequently, 
representationalism has been defined as the view “that our immediately 
experienced sense-data, together with the further beliefs that we arrived at on 
the basis of them, constitute a representation or depiction of an independent 
realm of material objects” (Bonjour, 2013). Thus, representationalism involves 
questions in respect of our perceptual awareness of what exists, the nature of 
beliefs we formed based on these awareness and how to establish their 
correspondence (truth) with the external world. 
                                                     
89 I will not focus on the views concerning how language can represent nature and Rorty’s critique 
of them because of lack of space. A chronicle of how traditional, modern, and postmodern 
philosophers have engaged in what has been described as the “linguistic turn” of 
representationalism can be found in the work of Dachun and Zengbo (2008, p. 596). 
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Two phenomena often cited as possible media for representations are human 
mind and language. The question of how these two approaches fit together has 
been challenged by critics of representationalism. However, I will focus on Rorty’s 
view about the theory. 
Three points are important in Rorty’s analysis and critique of 
“representationalism”. The first concerns how he linked “representationalism” 
with “foundationalism”. According to Rorty, “thinking of “rational certainty” as a 
matter of relation to an object known” makes it reasonable to look toward some 
“cognitive faculties” for the explanation of the phenomenon (1979, pp. 156-157). 
The need for a “link” between the “knower” and the “known” will become 
necessary for the “cognitive relationship” to be possible and comprehensible. It is 
in this regard that representationalism is theoretically regarded as an offshoot of 
foundationalism.   
The second point concerns how Rorty made a distinction between two trends in 
the history of the theory of representationalism: the conceptualization of (i) the 
human mind and (ii) language as a mirror reality. According to him, in the 
conceptualization of the human mind as a “mirror”, the discussion was on the 
questions whether “material reality is “mind-dependent” or not”. However, in the 
conceptualization of language as a mirror, the focus shifted to “questions about 
which sorts of true statements if any, stand in representational relations to non-
linguistic items” (Rorty, 1991, p. 2).  
A further significant point concerns how Rorty contrasts “representationalism” 
with “anti-representationalism”. On this distinction, he writes: 
Representationalists typically think that controversies between idealists and realists 
were, and controversies between skeptics and anti-skeptics are, fruitful and 
interesting. Anti-representationalists typically think both sets of controversies 
pointless. They diagnose both as the results of being held captive by a picture, a 
picture from which we should by now have wriggled free (Rorty, 1991, pp. 2-3). 
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From this distinction, Rorty sees realists, anti-realists, sceptics and  anti-sceptics 
all as “representationalists”, because they do not subscribe to “the “therapeutic 
conception of philosophy familiar from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations”, and to “such earlier books as James’ Pragmatism and Dewey’s 
Reconstruction in Philosophy” (1991, p. 3). Consequently, instead of seeing 
“traditional problems of epistemology” (such as refuting sceptics who claim that 
knowledge is not possible, preoccupation with defining notions of knowledge, 
truth, objectivity and so on), as pseudo-problems to be dismissed, 
“representationalists are preoccupied with “systematic” attempts to solve these 
problems, seeing them as genuine and defining the essence of philosophy (Rorty, 
1991, pp. 3-4). It is arguable that this last sense of “representationalism” goes 
beyond the idea of human mind or human language containing representations or 
mirroring nature that we have earlier highlighted, to hold that a large percentage 
of mainstream epistemologists fall under the second category of 
“representationalists”. From the fore-going, it is arguable that there are two 
senses of “representationalism” being used interchangeably by Rorty across many 
of his works and correspondingly two separate objections may be offered. 
 As an anti-representationalist in the first sense, Rorty argues that we cannot “pick 
or choose among the contents of our minds or our language and say that this or 
that item “correspond to” or “represents” the environment in a way that some 
other item does not” (1991, p. 5). It is in this sense that he rejected the idea that 
the human mind has the capacity to “mirror” nature. Instead of seeing beliefs or 
language as representing reality (Rorty, 2000e, p. 5), Rorty sees pragmatists (such 
as Dewey) as seeing beliefs or language as adaptive tools for re-shaping and coping 
with natural and social environments (1982, p. xix). One point to be noted about 
this objection is that the supposed cognitive capacity of the human mind to mirror 
the world and the supposed semantic structures in language that engenders 
linguistic representation are both denied. As an anti-representationalist in the 
second sense, Rorty sees himself (and others he identified as subscribers to this 
view) as holding a therapeutic stance that the supposed traditional problems of 
philosophy are pseudo-problems and consequently should be dismissed.  
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How do we assess these two objections? Brandom interprets Rorty’s objection to 
the first sense of representationalism in a way that illuminates Rorty’s strategy 
and intention. He concentrates on Rorty’s “analysis” of the supposed features of 
mind such as “incorrigibility” upon which representationalists frequently reacted. 
Brandom writes: 
Rorty construed incorrigibility in normative terms as a structure of authority, as 
according some representations a distinctive sort of epistemic privilege. And he went 
on to understand this special sort of normative status in social terms: we treat sincere 
first-person claims about the contemporaneous contents of consciousness as 
incorrigible by agreeing to count nothing as overriding them, that is, as providing 
decisive evidence against them. … If, as Rorty further argued, it is coherent to 
conceive of circumstances in which we alter our vocabulary to allow sincere first-
person reports of mental happenings to be overruled, say by the deliverances of 
cerebroscopes, then by doing so we are conceiving of circumstances in which we 
would have come not to have minds in the specifically Cartesian sense. Since this 
process need not affect our capacity to deploy the vocabulary of psychological states 
about which no-one these days takes us to be incorrigible- beliefs, desires, intentions, 
and so on – to envisage the loss of mind in this sense need not have impact on our 
sense of ourselves as intelligent or rational, that is as sapient (Brandom, 2000, pp. 
157-158). 
According to Brandom, Rorty’s target “is the philosophical invocations of 
representations supposed to be epistemically privileged solely by their relations 
to certain kinds of things- perceptible facts and meanings- apart from the role 
those things played in practices of acknowledging them as authoritative” (2000, p. 
159). However, he objected to this strategy because it addresses only one of the 
two issues that are involved in the representationalist account of mind. Rorty 
argues against “epistemically privileged access” often attributed to the human 
mind and ignores the role of the mind in the determination of what access is 
privileged.90  
Another argument that I will be exploring later in this chapter concerns the 
distinctiveness of these two senses of representationalism which arguably, Rorty 
conflates with one another. More importantly, following Brandon’s contention 
that epistemic descriptions of the human mind are different from ontological 
                                                     
90 It is more of social determination for Brandom(Brandom, 2000).  
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descriptions, I will argue that commitment to the first sense of Rorty’s 
representationalism does not imply any commitment to the second sense. While 
the first sense is arguably the standard or traditional version of 
representationalism, it is arguable that the second version became the central 
focus of Rorty’s neo-pragmatism. He frequently presents it as one of the 
consequences of pragmatism. However, it is arguable that Rorty keeps on 
changing the borderlines between these two ideas of representationalism. This 
unclear distinction becomes worrisome most especially when it serves as the basis 
for his other closely-related distinctions such as between systematic philosophers 
and edifying philosophers on one hand and between normal philosophers and 
revolutionary philosophers, on the other hand (Rorty, 1979, pp. 365-379).91 
I summarise what Rorty regarded as consequences of holding anti-
foundationalism and anti-representationalism: (i) denial of truth that is 
independent of or transcends the human condition (ii) denial that that knowledge 
represents reality and that certainty is one of the hall-marks of knowledge (iii) 
denial of the notion of objectivity, as traditionally conceived to mean human-
independent perspective and the denial that “reality” is monolithic with one 
perspective or one privileged access. 
4.3.1 A Critical appraisal of Dewey as an anti-representationalist in Rorty’s sense 
Rorty seems to be correct in grouping Dewey as an anti-representationalist in the 
first sense. The way in which Dewey rejected Kant’s conception of the cognitive 
capacity or functions of human mind together with his (Dewey’s) conception of 
                                                     
91  Rorty thought he could carve out “a tradition” from philosophers who subscribed to the 
“therapeutic stance” and contrast them with mainstream philosophers. In his “Intellectual 
Autobiography”, he admitted the futility of this mission when he writes that “I wrote the distinction 
when “I was just beginning to get acquainted with the line of thought that leads from Hegel through 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to Heidegger and Derrida. In his “Response to Michael Williams”, he 
made similar admittance of failure in the attempt to dissolve “certain very particular problems 
which were being discussed by analytic philosophers in the 1970’s (Rorty, 2000d). In the 
subsequent section of this chapter, I shall argue in the subsequent section that philosophers such 
as Dewey take the “therapeutic stance” only on a limited number of problematic issues and 
consequently cannot be described as totally dismissive of Philosophy.       
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language as “adaptive tools” seem to corroborate Rorty’s claim.92 For instance, 
Dewey rejected Kant’s statement that “we have in our mind” schema of things 
that are “monogram of a priori pure imagination through which alone images are 
formed” (Kant, 1963, pp. 118-119) on the ground that it explains the cognitive 
capacities of human mind as a phenomenon with magical powers (J. Dewey, 1925, 
pp. 64, 133). Alternatively, Dewey argues that “mind” is existentially an adverb 
and not a noun. He explains the adverbial nature of “mind” in terms of “disposition 
to activity” (1925, p. 132). For him, “thought”, “reason” and “intelligence” are the 
generic traits of human mind without which the nature of human mind cannot be 
known (1925, p. 172).  He writes: 
Natural events are so complex and varied that there is nothing surprising in their 
possession of different characterizations, characters so different that they can be 
easily treated as opposites… That to which both mind and matter belong is the 
complex of events that constitute nature. This becomes a mysterious tertium quid, 
incapable of designation, only when mind and matter are taken to be static structures 
instead of functional characters (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 64). 
The suggestion from this passage is that Dewey’s conception of knowledge (and 
reality) as dynamic is incompatible with the notion of mind having power to mirror 
nature for two reasons. For human mind to mirror nature, it requires permanence 
and one-to-one correspondence in the relationship between the two phenomena. 
In his analysis of the human mind, the traditional conception of mind that is 
contrasted with the human body is rejected. The idea that human mind can mirror 
nature is rejected in Dewey’s instrumental conception of the human mind. 
However, one point to note is that the quest to know or account for how the 
human mind works is evident in the alternative account provided by Dewey. 93  
                                                     
92 Again, I will not go deeper into Dewey’s theory of language. I will only make references to it in 
passing. 
93 In addition, Dewey’s analysis of language in terms of “tool of tools”, arguably forecloses any 
attempt to see language as having any representative capacity. According to him, “Language is 
always a form of action and in its instrumental use is always a means of concerted action for an 
end, while at the same time it finds in itself all the goods of its possible consequences” (J. Dewey, 
1925, p. 152). Dewey’s point is that language is our means of converting thinking into a social 
medium. It is a way of sharing our world with other people. In addition, language is an instrument 
for concerted social actions. Language is a tool of tools. This conception of language is a rejection 
of the “representative” approach to language perhaps most profoundly expressed in the early 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus according to him, “A proposition presents the existence and non-
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As rightly noted by Haack (2006, p. 55) and Shusterman (1999, p. 195), Dewey’s 
conception of mind is a consequence of his critique of mind/body dualism and its 
attendant Spectator Theory.94 The Spectator Theory depicts mind as having the 
cognitive ability to represent (or “mirror” the world in Rorty’s term) the world 
independently of the material body in an objective way; free from sensory errors. 
Dewey rejects both dualism and the Spectator Theory because they alienate 
human beings from nature. Shusterman puts Dewey’s conception of mind 
succinctly as “mind is not an outside observer of the natural world but an 
emergent part of it (1999, p. 195). The rejection of this theory of mind and 
language in Dewey’s philosophy matches the first sense of Rorty’s anti-
representationalism highlighted above.  
What about the second sense of representationalism in which Rorty arguably 
equates anti-representationalism with holding a “therapeutical stance”? Once 
again, Haack provides a good guide. Her argument is that to understand the 
differences between Rorty and Dewey on “representationalism”, one needs to 
identify the different motives behind their rejection of the theory. For Haack, 
Dewey’s critique of mind/body dualism, the Spectator Theory and his attempt to 
“get away from the representative theory of perception” was to “improve on the 
idea of truth as correspondence or copying”, by acknowledging that “we are not 
passive receivers but active inquirers” (Haack, 2006, p. 55). Dewey’s target, 
according to Haack, was to demonstrate how “purposive success, might replace 
accuracy of representation as the criterion of well-conducted inquiry”. In this 
sense, Haack’s contention is that in those instances where Dewey appeared to be 
holding a therapeutical stance (for instance on mind/body problem, consciousness, 
and natural ends), he was only rejecting the ways the problems were traditionally 
formulated and the solutions proffered to them.  
                                                     
existence of atomic facts” and “The totality of true propositions is the total natural science (or the 
totality of the natural sciences)” (Wittgenstein, 1922, pp. 4.I, 4.II).   
94 Dewey describes the Spectator Theory as the belief that “what is known it antecedent to the 
mental act of observation an inquiry, and is totally unaffected by these acts”(J. Dewey, 1988, p. 
19). We have discussed his presentation and critique of this view in chapter 3. 
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Haack argues that for every such engagement where Dewey challenged previous 
positions or theories, he always provided radical new theories in lieu of the 
rejected ones. Dewey developed a naturalist theorist of mind, ends, and 
consciousness. In addition, Haack contrasts Rorty’s attempt to repudiate 
epistemology itself as a discipline with Dewey’s critique of the Spectator Theory 
or representationalism and concludes that Dewey cannot be described as 
repudiating epistemology nor offering a therapeutic stance (Haack, 2006, p. 55). I 
now explore Rorty’s view concerning Dewey’s metaphysics, specifically, his claim 
that understanding Dewey in a therapeutical sense shows why nobody needs a 
metaphysics (Rorty, 1982). 
4.3.2 Anti- metaphysical arguments in Rorty’s neo-pragmatism and their 
incompatibility with Dewey’s philosophy 
In this section, I explore the argument that Rorty’s denial of metaphysics is at the 
root of his anti-representationalist stance. More importantly, I discuss how Rorty 
thinks that rejecting metaphysics is necessary for “pragmatism” and “naturalism” 
(Rorty, 2000e). However, the most important focus in this section is to examine 
Rorty’ claim that his position is like Dewey’s; that the idea of being a pragmatist 
and a naturalist without needing a metaphysics, is implicitly contained in Dewey’s 
work. I start the discussion by sketching Rorty’s idea of a metaphysics. I then 
discuss two approaches to metaphysics that he identifies in his work: the 
constructivist and the therapeutical stances. I then discuss his argument that, 
although Dewey wavers between the two stances, he is better read as holding a 
therapeutical stance. I challenge this claim by arguing that a therapeutical stance 
cannot be used to describe the entire framework of Dewey’s metaphysics.  
What is a metaphysics, according to Rorty? Again, no straightforward definition 
can be provided. However, there is no doubt that he sees metaphysics as 
invariably involving questions about nature, which is indicated in his reference to 
some works as paradigms of metaphysics: the central books of Aristotle’s 
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Metaphysics and Spinoza’s Ethics (Rorty, 1982, p. 72).95 For present purposes, I 
concentrate mainly on two significant aspects of his notion of metaphysics: (i) how 
Rorty presents the traditional conception of metaphysics as a rival to science 
(Rorty, 1982, pp. 37, 77) or as a branch of philosophy that needs to justify its 
existence before the sciences (Rorty, 1982, pp. 38-39) and (ii) how he makes 
distinctions between what he calls therapeutical and “constructivist” approaches 
to metaphysical questions or problems. 
 According to Rorty, the early works of philosophers such as Wittgenstein, 
Heidegger, and Dewey were “constructive”. By this, he meant that they were 
initially preoccupied with attempts to construct one theory or the other based on 
the conviction that philosophical problems were genuine. He argued that they all 
abandoned this “constructivist” stance in their mature works when they realised 
the futility of their efforts. For Rorty, these philosophers moved from 
“constructive” preoccupations to “therapeutic” when they “broke free of the 
Kantian conception of philosophy as foundational” (1979, p. 5). Rorty believed that 
their endorsement of a therapeutical stance was conditioned by failure to achieve 
anything that is theoretically substantive. However, he contends that even though 
in Dewey’s mature works, he still wavers between the traditional stance and the 
therapeutical stance, he is better read as a subscriber to the latter (Rorty, 1991, p. 
3).96 Rorty noted that Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey “are in agreement that 
the notion of knowledge as accurate representation, made possible by special 
mental processes, and intelligible through a general theory of representation, 
needs to be abandoned” (1979, p. 6). However, Rorty seems to see this quest to 
abandon tradition as pervading the entire preoccupations of these three 
philosophers when he writes: 
                                                     
95 However, we can go deeper by pointing to references concerning idealist metaphysics, empiricist 
or materialist metaphysics (Rorty, 1982, p. 42) and Christian metaphysics in his numerous works; 
to indicate his acknowledgement of the distinctions between transcendental and non-
transcendental metaphysics in traditional metaphysics. 
96  In Truth and Progress, Rorty argued that although Dewey was preoccupied with telling 
philosophers “what problems not to discuss”, the fact that he still asked some questions that were 
formulated in earlier times, makes him to waver in his therapeutic stance (Rorty, 1998, pp. 5-6). 
180 
 
They set aside epistemology and metaphysics as possible disciplines. I say “set aside” 
rather than “argue against” because their attitude toward the traditional problematic 
is like the attitude of the seventeenth-century philosophers toward the scholastic 
problem. They do not devote themselves to discovering false propositions or bad 
arguments in the works of their predecessors (though they occasionally do that too). 
Rather, they glimpse the possibility of a form of intellectual life in which the 
vocabulary of philosophical reflection inherited from the seventeenth-century would 
seem as pointless as the thirteen-century philosophical vocabulary had seemed to the 
Enlightenment (Rorty, 1979, p. 6). 
What makes the positions of these philosophers therapeutical is that they set 
aside traditional theories in epistemology and metaphysics without offering 
alternative theories (Rorty, 1979, p. 6). A subscriber to the therapeutical stance, 
like Wittgenstein, will be preoccupied with attempts to convince fellow 
philosophers that they are engaging with pseudo problems that cannot be solved 
because misuse of language creates them. Consequently, Rorty reads Dewey as 
suggesting that traditional concerns such as attempting to refute the sceptics, 
differentiating between a believer and a knower or between truth and error, 
between objectivity and subjectivity, should be abandoned. Rorty’s reading of 
Dewey on these positions as “therapeutical” is correct. 
Moreover, there are arguably many arguments in Dewey’s work that justify Rorty’s 
reading of his position as therapeutical. In Experience and Nature, for instance, 
Dewey recommended that some classical Aristotelian metaphysical theories such 
as his “theory of natural ends” be treated as “the Jonah of science” and be “thrown 
bodily overboard”. His reason for dismissing this form of inquiry is that it 
contradicts some principles in astronomy and physics (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 112). 
Dewey also rejected any form of metaphysics that is presented as “a rival instead 
of a complement to the sciences” (J. Dewey, 1929, p. 309). Dewey was typically 
against any form of metaphysics that employs non-empirical methodologies 
because it “denatures” natural phenomena. Dewey usually referred to this kind of 
metaphysics as non-natural or transcendental philosophy (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 1-
36). However, Rorty seems to be pushing Dewey from a position we can describe 
as a “selective therapeutical stance” to a radical or total therapeutical stance. 
More importantly, he seems to move from interpreting Dewey as having a 
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therapeutical stance to interpreting his position as generally indicating an anti-
metaphysical stance, rather than seeing Dewey as being against a version of 
metaphysics. But Dewey is not against the kind of metaphysics that employs 
empirical methodology and more importantly that embraces his version of 
naturalism. 
Take for instance one passage in Dewey’s work that Rorty interpreted as 
containing a recommendation for a “general” therapeutical approach to 
philosophical problems (Rorty, 1982, p. 73). Dewey writes: 
This is the extent and method of my “metaphysics”:- the large and constant features 
of human sufferings, enjoyments, trials, failures and success together with the 
institutions of art, science, technology, politics, and religion which mark them, 
communicate genuine features of the world within which man lives. The method 
differs no whit from that of any investigator who, by making certain observations and 
experiments, and by utilizing the existing body of ideas available for calculation and 
interpretation, concludes that he really succeeds in finding out something about 
some limited aspects of nature (J. Dewey, 1927, p. 59). 
Interpreting this passage, Rorty writes: 
In this passage, Dewey wants to say simultaneously “I am just clearing away the dead 
wood of the philosophical tradition” and “I am using my own powerful invention-the 
application of scientific and empirical method in philosophy-to do so” (Rorty, 1982, p. 
73).    
While Rorty argued that this passage from Dewey points to an instance where 
Dewey wanted traditional questions of metaphysics to be abandoned, it is 
arguable that he was wrong.  Dewey’s passage claims that there is a “world” in 
which human being is an integral part. Human beings are part of the world because 
their “traits of existence”: sufferings, enjoyment, and the institutions emanating 
from them “communicate genuine features of the world within which man lives” 
This is one of the most fundamental claims that defines Dewey’s naturalism. In 
addition, the importance of empirical investigations, experimentation, and the 
employment of scientific paradigms in inquiries are acknowledged. It follows 
therefore that any metaphysics that embraces these features is a naturalist 
metaphysics that Dewey endorsed. Consequently, he defines his version of 
metaphysics as “the nature of the existential world in which we live”  (J. Dewey, 
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1925, p. 41) and the “cognizance of the generic traits of existence” (J. Dewey, 1925, 
p. 46) .  
Dewey was very particular about the empirical methodology he was 
recommending, which he called “denotative methodology”. For him, while the 
subject matters of the naturalist metaphysics are not novel but continuous with 
traditional metaphysics in a transformed way, the methodology is new. For 
instance, like traditional metaphysicians, the naturalist metaphysician is keenly 
interested in knowing subject-matters of metaphysics such as the nature of mind 
and body and the relationship between them. However, while the former treated 
the two phenomena as distinct and separate and ended up with the idea of “mind” 
as a disembodied existence, the naturalist metaphysician rejects this “dualistic 
metaphysics” and its corresponding “idealistic ontologies” and treats “mind”, 
“thought”, and “reflection” as “adjectives” for describing some “natural events 
occurring within nature”. The recognition of “mind” as substance is replaced with 
the idea that “reflections” are responses to natural events and are associated with 
empirically observable traits (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 59). Scientists and metaphysicians 
have similar interests but different methodological approaches. This means some 
of the questions previously engaged with are still regarded as relevant and worth 
pursuing.  In addition, given that scientists and that the naturalist metaphysicians 
have nature or “experienced material” as their subject-matter, there is no rivalry 
between the ontological account of a naturalist metaphysician and a scientist (J. 
Dewey, 1925, pp. 2,7,123).  
Dewey argues that the consistent use of empirical methodology in a naturalist 
metaphysics differentiates it from traditional metaphysics in which the use of non-
empirical methods (such as conceptual analysis and the use of intuition) are 
indispensable. The thrust of his contention is that the “transformation” of the 
subject-matters of the traditional metaphysics depends on diligent application of 
this novel empirical method. This method shares several features with the 
methods common among the natural sciences: empirical investigation, repeated 
and repeatable tests, and the use of laboratory instruments. However, there is one 
element about Dewey’s method that is unique. It requires that “things must be 
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studied as they are experienced” (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 4). It follows that those issues 
such as questions about morality, esthetics, arts, and magic, must be studied as 
they are experienced. The target of this method is to “discover some of the general 
features of experienced things and to interpret their significance for a 
philosophical theory of the universe in which we live” (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 5). 
 Three points are notable about this methodology: (i) it is closely linked with 
Dewey’s naturalism (ii) it engenders a complementarity between naturalist 
metaphysics and science, and most importantly (iii) its application renders issues 
usually regarded as “unscientific” legitimate scientific issues. While Rorty argues 
that Dewey was using the “new method” to “clear away the dead wood of 
philosophical tradition” (Rorty, 1982, p. 73), it is arguable that Dewey was 
explaining how his approach engenders a naturalistic but not scientistic 
metaphysics. This is how the method allows him to continue metaphysics, expand 
its scope, and connect it with science without replacing it with science. 97 
It is apparent that Dewey’s claim that understanding that experience is of as well 
as in nature, is indispensable in the formation of a theory of nature (J. Dewey, 1925, 
pp. 2, 4), is one of the most fundamental points that define his naturalism and 
metaphysics. Philosophers such as Boisvert see the importance of Dewey’s 
naturalism as lying in the project of “situating humans within a natural context” 
(Boisvert, 2010, p. 562). However, I have explored in chapter three the point that 
his claims on the subject-matter of experience draw exclusively from his discussion 
of “generic traits of existence”. The point that needs to be emphasised is that both 
issues are metaphysical issues. Neville was right when he argued that a pragmatic 
metaphysics emerged from Dewey’s preoccupation with “generic traits of 
existence” (2010, pp. 140-144). Both Boisvert and Neville contend that Rorty failed 
to acknowledge the “metaphysical nature” of these issues and consequently 
missed their significance within Dewey’s naturalism.  
                                                     
97 Sleeper succinctly put this point when he writes: “For though there is a sense in which Dewey is 
always considering what science can tell us, he is not trying to put scientific method in the place 
once occupied by classical metaphysics and epistemology. He is not trying to overcome tradition, 
but rather to transform it” (Sleeper, 1986, p. 7). 
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In the next section, I discuss the distinction between realism and anti-realism in 
Rorty’s neo-pragmatism and argue that this discussion shed further light on the 
differences between Dewey and Rorty’s position on metaphysics.  
4.4 Ontological commitment in Rorty’s neo-pragmatism and its implications for 
understanding Dewey’s philosophy 
In this section, I consider some ontological commitments that are either directly 
declared by Rorty or are often attributed to him by his critics and allies; as 
consequences or implications of his contentions. While these attempts to pin 
Rorty down to either a realist or an antirealist position may be contentious, it is a 
task that is important for making his perspectives clear, most especially the 
Deweyan in him. This task is guided by the thought that some form of commitment 
to an empirical ontology is unavoidable in any Deweyan theory of knowledge. 
One of the controversies often associated with Rorty’s neo-pragmatism is that 
some of his views really espouse anti-realism. What seems to make Rorty’s 
supposed denial of reality very interesting is how he associated it with the denial 
of positions such as foundationalism and representationalism, and how he 
associates the position with pragmatism. But did Rorty subscribe to anti-realism? 
Perhaps the strongest evidence that Rorty is an anti-realist is found in one of his 
characterizations of pragmatism:  
Let me sum up by offering a third and final characterization of pragmatism: it is the 
doctrine that there are no constraints on inquiry save conversational ones - no 
wholesale constraints derived from the nature of the objects, or the mind, or of 
language, but only those retail constraints provided by the remarks of our fellow-
inquirers... The pragmatist tells us that it is useless to hope that objects will constrain 
us to believe the truth about them, only if they are approached with an unclouded 
mental eye, or a rigorous method, or a perspicuous language (Rorty, 1982, p. 165).  
Again, he writes, 
As I see it, the whole point of pragmatism is to insist that we human beings are 
answerable only to one another. We are answerable only to those who answer to us 
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– only to conversation partners. We are not responsible either to the atoms or to God, 
at least not until they start conversing with us.98   
The impression created in holding these views is that, if there is reality out there, 
they do not affect us and consequently need not be referred to in our 
metaphysical theories. Rorty’s major premise for his claim that there are no non-
linguistic constraints on inquiry and our theories is that pragmatists believe that 
there is nothing inherent in objects (nature) that could determine the truth 
regarding the state of affairs in nature or there is nothing in nature that could 
actuate our theorizing or serve as a guide or set a limit to our conversation about 
nature. This will be a strong premise for denying metaphysics.  
Putnam, for instance, noted Rorty’s admission that science is to be seen “as a set 
of working diagrams for coping with nature” and that “using vocables” (the words 
and sentences of ‘our language’) “is as direct as contact with reality can get” are 
reassurances that he is not denying that there is a world. However, Putnam’s 
challenge is that these reassurances are  inadequate (2000, p. 81). 
Putnam argues that Rorty’s account of reality can be compared with the positivists’ 
phenomenalist “construction of the world” and consequently faces the same 
problems. According to Putnam, the positivists believed that everything we refer 
to as “real” is a “logical construction out of sense-data” but they are faced with 
questions concerning how to explain the apparent dissimilarities between “sense 
data” (for instance, a spouse’s “empirical” and phenomenalist’ account of her 
partner) that have “only contingent relations with the person performing the 
phenomenalist construction of the world” and “entities” (for instance, the 
husband or partner of the spouse) in our ordinary language that arguably have 
more enduring characteristics (Putnam, 2000, pp. 81-82). Putnam argues that 
Rorty faces the same problem about how to account for the “relation” between 
what he called “vocables” (our utterances) and what the “vocables” are all about 
(reality). Analysing Rorty’s explanation of this “relation” Putnam writes: 
                                                     
98 This quotation credited to Rorty was cited by Stout Jeffrey (2007, p. 9).  
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On Rorty’s view, we have a variety of language games; the use of words in a language 
game is determined by what Rorty sometimes refers to as “algorithms” or “programs”. 
The inputs to these programs are themselves, Rorty says, always “tailored to the 
needs of a particular input-output function, a particular convention of 
representation”, and the output are ways of coping (kicking back), ranging from 
technological strategies to emotional, aesthetic, even spiritual attitudes. Insofar as I 
do something that can be called “describing reality” at all, the description is the whole 
system of vocables I produce. But no word in that system of vocable is has a 
determinate correspondence to a particular set of “discrete hunks of reality… 
(Putnam, 2000, p. 83).    
Putnam’s point is that the feature common to both positivist and Rorty’s accounts 
of reality is that there are certain realistic sounding statements in ordinary 
language that are being treated as trivial. Putnam thinks that while Rorty is 
claiming to be an anti-realist, his choice of words in describing the use of language 
such as “ways of coping” or “kicking back” betrays an implicit notion of a 
relationship between the use of “language-game” (or vocables) and an extra-
linguistic “reality”. The fact that Rorty needs “to cope” with “something” is a 
pointer to an extra-linguistic reality that is capable of constraining inquiries and 
conversations. Rorty responded that he was not presenting an account of 
language meant to acknowledge or preserve references to extra-linguistic 
phenomena in our ordinary language (common sense realism). He argues further 
that “common sense realism” usually leads to metaphysical realism; the view that 
there is reality that exists independently of human thought, conceptions and 
language  (Rorty, 2000b, pp. 88-89)99.  
However, Brandom cautioned that seeing Rorty’s denial of “non-linguistic 
constraints on conversations” as a pointer to an anti-realist position could amount 
to a straw man argument. His point is that Rorty’s statements should not be taken 
as they appeared and that Rorty was not overemphasizing plasticity. Brandom 
                                                     
99 The thrust of Rorty’s response to Putnam’s challenge is that his account (of language) was given 
“for philosophy-of-language purposes, just as the sense-data account was once given for 
epistemological purposes” (Rorty, 2000b, pp. 88-89). It is arguable that this suggests a kind of 
theory of language that is cut off from ordinary common-sensical use of language. Rorty’s further 
argument that we can co-switch between different contexts of language users (the learned and 
the ordinary) seems to strengthen further this elitist theory of language. However, it is arguable 
that Rorty evaded Putnam’s question about how to account for the apparent references to extra-
linguistic phenomena in our ordinary language. 
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compares Rorty’s strategy in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature with the strategy 
Kant used against his predecessors, making a distinction between causal 
considerations and justificatory considerations:  
Rorty appeals to this Kantian distinction to enforce a strict separation between the 
foreign and domestic affairs of vocabularies. Under the banner “Only a belief can 
justify another belief”  - epitomizing a view he shares with Sellars and Davidson- Rorty 
insists that inferential or justificatory relations obtain only between items within a 
vocabulary (that is, between different applications of a vocabulary). The relations 
between applications of a vocabulary and the environing world of things that are not 
applications of a vocabulary must be understood exclusively in nonnormative causal 
terms. The application of any empirical vocabulary is indeed constrained by the world 
in which it occurs, but that constraint should be understood as a kind of causal 
constraint, not a kind of normative constraint [Brandom, 2000, p. 160]. 
From this reappraisal of Rorty’s position, it appears that the contention that Rorty 
denies reality significantly loses its bite. It offers a strong argument for the claim 
that the contention arose because of a category mistake: confusing causal 
considerations with justificatory considerations.  It is a category mistake to hold 
claims as standing in normative relations to facts, because “normative relations 
are exclusively intravocabulary” while “extravocabulary relations are exclusively 
causal”. Rather than interpreting Rorty as arguing that only vocabularies exist, 
Brandom argues further that, “to talk of facts is to talk of something that is 
conceptually structured, propositionally contentful” and this is a consequence of 
his (Rorty’s) anti-idealist commitments to the world of causally interacting things 
that causally constrains our applications of vocabulary not having a conceptual 
structure [Brandom, 2000, p. 161].    
How do we appraise this argument? Firstly, Brandom expects Rorty’s allies and 
critics to understand his (Rorty’s) denial of extra-linguistic constraints on inquiry, 
exclusively from the purview of his (Rorty’s) rejection of traditional theory of 
justification. This is specifically the rejection of justification in terms of subjects (as 
a claimant) standing in certain relations to objects or claims being justified in terms 
of a correspondence relation with facts. This is a theory of justification that Rorty 
identifies as embedded in the interwoven theses of foundationalism and 
representationalism. For him, “facts” cannot justify our beliefs because facts are 
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not to be regarded as concrete reality in the manner the traditionalists have 
construed it but rather are our conceptualizations about reality. Consequently, the 
idea of seeing concrete realities in terms of facts, capable of determining the 
correctness or incorrectness of our claims, is a subscription to idealism. On this 
point, as noted by Brandom, Rorty’s argument is valid. 
However, the way we relate with objects in the world is not only in terms of the 
need to justify our claims. For instance, we describe them as they appear to us: 
shapes, colours, weight and other descriptions that philosophers have categorised 
either as primary or secondary qualities. More importantly, in Dewey’s terms, they 
are things had before cognised or theorised. Again, as noted by Dewey, this “non-
cognitive” relationship with the world is what makes one form of ontological 
commitment or the other imperative for us. Rorty’s critics can go along with his 
contention that we don’t need to be a realist (or an anti-realist) when we need to 
determine, for instance, what it means when we are confronted with a signboard 
stating either that “This road is closed” or “This bathroom is under construction”. 
Merely seeing these inscriptions is enough for us to modify our actions. But his 
critics are not ready to extend this agreement to the claim that references to 
reality are not needed when the truths about the structures, locations, and 
conditions of certain “bathrooms” and “roads” referred to in those inscriptions are 
to be determined. Any form of answer to this question seems to put a demand on 
Rorty to be a realist or otherwise.100  
 Are we being unfair to Rorty? In chapter one, we arrived at a conclusion that 
Dewey’s position on ontology is neither realist nor anti-realist because it renders 
obsolete the traditional lines usually drawn between the two theories. This is 
because his position contextually contained some aspects of both theories. If 
Rorty’s position matches this characteristic, won’t it point towards Rorty being a 
Deweyan rather than being a problem? 
                                                     
100 This claim at first glance seems to be a false dilemma because Rorty may opt for quietism. Yet, 
Jeffry Stout notes Rorty’s rejection of a “wholesale quietistic impulse” (Stout, 2007, p. 12). I will 
not go into this debate in this work. 
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 For Dewey, our conversation or theories about nature can neither start in a 
vacuum nor progress (nor terminate) without decisive constraints arising from 
human environment-organism transaction. Man-nature transaction, according to 
him, is a symbiotic relation. From his fundamental ontological position that reality 
is inherently both precarious and stable, Dewey arguably developed a position 
that rightly can be described as pluralist but realist. He is a pluralist because he 
argues that both the precarious and stable aspects of reality are legitimately real 
and are to be treated as they are, without the precarious aspects being denied 
based on the stability of the other aspects (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 37-66). He regarded 
any attempt to convert the precarious aspect of reality into what is stable or 
attempt to relegate “the unstable, and unfinished to an invidious state of unreal 
being”  while “the assured and complete” is exalted to the rank of “true Being” as 
the philosophic fallacy (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 47). 
 Dewey’s broader argument is that these traits of precariousness and stability 
permeate every form of existence. He is a realist because he contends that the 
precarious and stable aspects of reality provide an indivisible objective reality (J. 
Dewey, 1925, p. 43). More importantly, he emphatically argued that nature 
determines or actuates our deliberations about nature. Challenges from nature, 
according to him, actuate our desire to know more about nature in order to cope 
with nature. Consequently, Dewey has an ontological account showing how the 
constituents of the world interact with one another. The account of these 
symbiotic interactions marks the starting point of his naturalistic epistemology 
where human beings, by the conditions of their transactional relations with the 
world, must keep on adapting to changing situations and reconstructing parts of 
the world to enable their survival. This is what Dewey called a “Reality”- a 
phenomenon which is presumed to be “more comprehensive, fundamental, and 
ultimate than the knowledge which can be provided by the organs and methods 
at the disposal of the “special” sciences” (J. Dewey, 1968, p. 5).  
However, Dewey has been regarded as an anti-realist by some scholars. 
Reichenbach, for instance, regarded Dewey as an antirealist because he thought 
that Dewey’s reference to objects of science as instruments, constructions or 
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relations of “qualitative” objects indicated the denial of their objective reality 
(1939, p. 164). Generally, Dewey’s conception of reality as an unfinished and 
evolving process has being regarded by some scholars as an anti-realist point of 
view because reality should not be regarded as dependent on human creativity. In 
chapters 2 and 3, I have explored these two positions in Dewey’s naturalist 
philosophy: (i) that Dewey’s claim that “scientific objects” are instruments 
arguably appears to be a constructivist or an anti-realist stance and (ii) that 
Dewey’s admission that reality is both stable and precarious is a realist stance. I 
have also explored two possible ways of defending Dewey against anti-realist 
charges: (i) that the appearance of both realist and anti-realist stances in Dewey’s 
philosophy is a pointer to the fact that the realism/antirealism distinctions do not 
apply to Dewey. Sleeper gives a good account of this argument. For him, to 
understand the apparent subscriptions to both realist and antirealist tenets in 
Dewey’s philosophy, one needs to note that he was engaging in the 
“reconstruction of realism as he had previously been in the reconstruction of 
idealism” (Sleeper, 1986, p. 7)101 and (ii) that Dewey is better understood as being 
a realist in his metaphysical theory and an anti-realist in his epistemological theory. 
He is an anti-realist (epistemologically) because he denies one-on-one 
correspondence between human knowledge and reality. It is in this sense that 
Dewey’s philosophy contains both realism and anti-realism without involving 
contradiction. 
However, Rorty seems to be making no attempt to deny being an anti-realist. Rorty 
argues that “pragmatists do not employ expressions like “ontological status” 
(Rorty & Engel, 2005, p. 32). Dewey on the other hand, as rightly noted by Sleeper, 
“approaches metaphysics through ontology- that is, by means of existences as 
qualitatively individual” (Sleeper, 1986, p. 132). This significant difference provides 
                                                     
101 Sleeper argued that one needs to understand “the process of growth” from Dewey’s early work 
to the “mature work” (1986, pp. 62-63) and the corresponding transformation from idealism to 
radical (empiricist) ontology (Sleeper, 1986, p. 63) and radical realism (Sleeper, 1986, pp. 3,13, 63). 
Buttressing this point, Sleeper contrasts two versions of realism that were identified in Dewey’s 
work; the “functional realism” which in his argument is an extreme realist position that Randal and 
Woodbridge ascribed to Dewey and “structural realism” which he argues to be a modest and more 
appropriate Deweyan position (Sleeper, 1986, p. 132). Exploring these versions of realism in Dewey 
is beyond the scope of this section. 
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strong evidence for the claim that Rorty’s neo-pragmatism is significantly different 
from Dewey’s philosophy. One notable point about Rorty’s anti-realism is that he 
rejected common sense realism in our ordinary language as a way of preventing 
philosophers from “succumbing to the urge of metaphysical realism”. 
Consequently, his anti-realism (and theories of justification and language) 
depends on his view about metaphysics. I now turn to examine the differences in 
Dewey’s and Rorty’s views on metaphysics through their subscriptions to 
naturalism. 
4.5 Rorty’s critique of naturalism: Deweyan and non-Deweyan versions   
I start the discussion by noting the difficulty concerning any attempt to identify 
Rorty with any of the versions of naturalism such as metaphysical, ontological, and 
methodological versions considered in chapter one. Consequently, I did not 
attempt to state, categorically, Rorty’s definition of naturalism. Rather, I articulate 
his position on naturalism by discussing some versions or some aspects of some 
versions of naturalism that Rorty seems to endorse  
Although a critical examination of Rorty’s critique of naturalism should contrast 
his views with all possible versions of naturalism, I did not attempt that here. 
However, instances where Rorty commended and critiqued Dewey’s naturalism 
will be regarded as providing the best source for articulating Rorty’s naturalism.  
Consequently,  I discuss some aspects of Dewey’s and Rorty’s philosophy that 
suggests that the two share similar naturalist views such as conceptions of human 
beings in Darwinian terms, language as tool of tools, which Rorty describes as a 
“naturalistic, behaviouristic attitude toward language” (Rorty, 1982, p. xxi) and 
rejection of dualistic theses, transcendental conceptions of truth and objectivity, 
which Rorty regards as portraying the right attitudes towards naturalism. I also 
discuss Rorty’s criticism of some core issues in Dewey’s naturalist project such as 
his reconceptualization of human experience, naturalist ontology, and 
experimentalist theory of knowledge.  
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I conclude the section by exploring the argument that Rorty’s critique of Dewey’s 
naturalism, like his rejection of metaphysics and epistemology, is part of his 
project to herald a post-philosophical tradition which makes him, sometimes, 
choose to interpret Dewey in certain compromising ways, such as projecting a 
therapeutical stance on Dewey’s work. I argue that this makes Rorty an unfaithful 
Deweyan. I contend that seeing Rorty as holding a version of naturalism entirely 
different from Dewey’s would have done more justice to the scholarship of both 
philosophers. I start the discussion by sketching Rorty as a naturalist. 
4.5.1 Articulating Rorty’s naturalism: the apparent endorsement of Dewey’s 
naturalism 
One of the important points about Rorty’s claims on naturalism is that they are 
mostly negative theses: no human nature, no pre-scientific or extra scientific point 
of view, no dualism between mind/body or spirit/non-spirit, no absolute truth or 
no “patterns of justification within normal discourse that is hooked on to 
something extra-linguistic we can call Reality, Truth, Objectivity, Reason” (1979, 
pp. 385, 388),  no general synoptic way of analysing the functions knowledge has 
in universal contexts of practical life (1979, p. 381), no permanent framework for 
inquiry (1979, p. 380), and no nature’s criteria for inquiry (1979, p. 299).102 Two 
further important points are notable. First, Rorty believes that all these positions 
he rejected are crucial to essentialism. Second, he usually contrasts essentialism 
with naturalism. For instance, he thinks his rejection of representationalism and 
foundationalism provides a good ground for subscribing to naturalism. 
The impression that pervades Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is that 
he treats some versions of “naturalism” as suspect based on their explicit or 
implicit subscription to essentialism. For instance, he argues that “the standard 
philosophical strategy of most naturalism is to find some way of showing that our 
                                                     
102 In addition, he warns about the “dangers of philosophy becoming too naturalistic” (Rorty, 1979, 
p. 168). He offers two examples: (i) a philosophy that “reduces norms to fact and (ii) when a 
philosophy is reduced to or draws excessively from psychology (he called this psychologism) (Rorty, 
1979, pp. 166-168). Rorty believes that his rejection of “representationalism” provides a good 
ground for the rejection of any essentialist version of naturalism. 
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culture has indeed got hold of the essence of man” through which “a firm 
philosophical basis” can be established for the explanation and justification of our 
philosophical theories (1979, pp. 36, 362). One of his favourite examples of an 
“essentialist tradition” is the Cartesian conception of mind. For him, Cartesianism 
is an essentialist tradition because it identifies human mind as an essence. 
Generally, an essence is thought of as a property or set of properties (an attribute 
or set of attributes) that necessarily defines a phenomenon. The Cartesian 
tradition presents human mind (or soul) as what differentiates human species 
from other living things- having “representative powers” and capacity to “mirror” 
the world.103 Rorty acknowledges that Dewey is an exception to this essentialist 
tradition which he described as Dewey’s “peculiar achievement”. I start the 
articulation of Rorty’s naturalism from this commendation. 
In Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, Rorty acknowledged that, (concerning 
Dewey’s anti-foundationalism and anti-representationalism) Dewey “takes off 
from Darwin rather than from Descartes: from beliefs as adaptations to the 
environment rather than as quasi-pictures” (Rorty, 1991, p. 10). According to him, 
Dewey is a good naturalist for two reasons: (i) he did “not think of natural science 
as having an inside track on essences of things” and (ii) he thought of human 
beings in Darwinian terms (Rorty, 1979, p. 362). He counted it as “a great virtue” 
in Dewey’s pragmatism in the sense that “it points the way toward, and partially 
exemplifies, a non-epistemological sort of philosophy, and thus one which gives 
up any hope of the transcendental” (Rorty, 1979, p. 381). Rorty defines a “non-
epistemological philosophy” in terms of theses such as: (i) a non-transcendental” 
and “non-epistemological” philosophy states that there is no inevitable subjective 
condition which both make a theory possible and place limits on it, (ii) it rejects 
the notion of one-on-one correspondence between truth and reality (Rorty, 1979, 
pp. 381-382) and rejects seeing the task of epistemology in terms of what Rorty 
describes as metapractice: offering the critique of all possible forms of social 
                                                     
103 Another example from Rorty is that the naturalists think that if we assume we possess any “non-
physical inner state” it can be used to explain our understanding of “raw feels” which in turn might 
help us understand our moral responsibilities” (Rorty, 1979, p. 36). 
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practice (Rorty, 1979, p. 171).  In addition, a de-transcendentalized epistemology 
gets “rid of spirit-nature distinction, conceived as a division between human 
beings and other things, or between two parts of human beings corresponding to 
the distinction between hermeneutics and epistemology (Rorty, 1979, p. 379). 
The impression Rorty created from this acknowledgement of “aspects” of Dewey’s 
naturalism or pragmatism is that he is comfortable with these aspects of Dewey’s 
“naturalism”. Towards the end of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty 
summarises his position on naturalism when he writes: 
The wholehearted behaviourism, naturalism, and physicalism I have been 
commending in earlier chapters help us avoid the self-deception of thinking that we 
possess a deep, hidden, metaphysically significant nature which makes us “irreducibly” 
different from inkwells or atoms (Rorty, 1979, p. 373). 
The connections between Rorty’s naturalism and his other supposed inter-linked 
theories (behaviourism and physicalism) have been challenged by his critics on the 
ground that holding a substantive (or positive) theory of reality is essential for any 
meaningful subscription to such metaphysical theories (Allen, 2000; Brandom, 
2000; Williams, 2000). I will not repeat the argument here. Rather, I want to 
concentrate on the peculiarities of his version of naturalism and critically examine 
it in light of Dewey’s version, which I take to be more robust and significantly 
different. More importantly, I argue that it is only by understanding the 
peculiarities of Rorty’s notion of naturalism that one can understand his 
commitment to the argument that the quest to abandon metaphysics is a 
consequence of pragmatism. The “naturalism” and “pragmatism” in question are 
his versions and not Dewey’s. The question I want to explore is what are the 
similarities in the versions of pragmatism and naturalism in the philosophies of 
Dewey and Rorty that warrant Rorty’s claim to be a Deweyan? Are the differences 
in these two philosophies so significant that it is inevitable that Rorty ended up as 
an anti-metaphysician and Dewey with a naturalist metaphysics?  I now consider 
the possibility of seeing Rorty as a non-Deweyan naturalist.  
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4.5.2 Articulating Rorty’s naturalism: the anti-Deweyan version 
The central argument that runs through chapter one to chapter three of this thesis 
is that Dewey’s metaphysics and epistemology rest on his version of naturalism. 
His claims that human beings and their experiences are part of nature and that 
human beings (as knowers) are not spectators but rather are active forces using 
knowledge experimentally and instrumentally to re-order and manipulate the 
world are instances of Dewey’s naturalist theses we have considered. If Dewey’s 
naturalism leads to substantive theories in epistemology and metaphysics, how 
can Rorty be justified in interpreting Dewey’s philosophy as therapeutic? Is Rorty 
contradicting himself?  
I contend that Rorty is not contradicting himself and that he has a conception of 
who a naturalist is, that he is consistently and implicitly sticking to. The explanation 
is that Rorty commends Dewey only in those instances he was explicitly rejecting 
traditional positions on philosophical issues. He commends Dewey for rejecting 
positions such as mind/body dualism and Spectator Theory of Knowledge. On 
these occasions where Dewey is therapeutical; preoccupied with consistent 
repudiation of traditions, he is a naturalist. However, when Dewey is preoccupied 
with replacing these repudiated old traditions with new ones or re-framing 
problematic old questions in some enlightening new ways that answers could be 
easily attained, Rorty brands him as a derailed naturalist. Consequently, being a 
naturalist, in Rortyan sense, is synonymous with consistently holding a therapeutic 
stance. I contend that this point becomes clearer after considering some of the 
arguments that Rorty raised against some of the theses we have identified as 
crucial in Dewey’s version of naturalism. For present purposes, I discuss two: his 
rejection of Dewey’s naturalist conceptions of human nature and epistemology as 
problem-solving. 
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4.5.2.1 Rorty’s rejection of Dewey’s naturalist conception of human nature as 
pre-scientific.  
I start this section by arguing that Rorty did not wholeheartedly subscribe to the 
idea of human nature that is evident in Dewey’s naturalist philosophy. This 
disagreement appears in several forms. Firstly,  for Rorty, “the question of 
whether there are any beliefs or desires common to all human beings is of little 
interest apart from the vision of a utopian and inclusivist” (2000e, p. 1). By 
“utopian” he meant someone who has hopes for or embarks on a project even in 
the face of contravening evidence.104 An “inclusivist” would be a person who is 
ambitious and is preoccupied with breaking cultural hegemonies. Secondly, Rorty 
contends that there is “no such thing as “human nature” or “man’s true place in 
the universe’ to be discovered once and for all- and hence no need for a 
foundational discipline such as theology or metaphysics” (2010, p. 20). 105  With 
this premise rejected, for Rorty, “there is no point thinking that “philosophy must 
centre on the discovery of a permanent framework for inquiry” or engage with the 
quest for “a general synoptic way of “analysing” the functions knowledge has in 
universal contexts of practical life”. He argues that “cultural anthropology (in a 
large sense which includes intellectual history) is all we need” (Rorty, 1979, pp. 
380-381).106  
What “human nature” (outside the scope of science) is Rorty denying? If by his 
denial of “human nature” he meant the denial of some supposed cognitive 
endowments in human species (such as having a mind that is inherently equipped 
to play the foundational role of cognitive architectures or a “mind” capable of 
                                                     
104 At this point, one can ask if Rorty is also seeing “pessimism” as one of the consequences of 
pragmatism. 
105 Rorty compares Dewey’s pre-scientific description of or theory of human being with theory of 
beings in the philosophy of of Habermas and Husserl’s notion such of “phenomenology of the life-
world” (1982, p. 382) and attributed the quest for a non-scientific foundation as the motive. This 
is one of numerous occasions where Rorty attempts to lump Dewey with other philosophers with 
different and often incompatible ideological orientations. However, in this work, I will not address 
the question whether Rorty has the right to lump these philosophers together or not.  
106 Rorty’s stronger argument is that there is nothing like universal truth because there is no basis 
for such universality. This appears to be a point in which Rorty is torn between Dewey’s 
pragmatism and the nihilist position of philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche and Soren 
Kierkegaard. These are two other influential philosophers on his work.  
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mirroring nature) as found prominently in Descartes and Locke (Rorty, 1979, p. 
213) then, he is still in line with Dewey’s rejection of Kant’s conception of the 
cognitive abilities of the human mind. In chapter three, we discussed how Dewey 
rejected Kant’s conception of human mind because it was presented as if it is 
inherently endowed with “magical” cognitive powers. Alternatively, Dewey 
contends that the human mind functions as a “social device”; with thought and 
reflections explained in terms of responses to nature. We also discussed Dewey’s 
conception of human nature in terms of how human happiness, desires, sorrow 
(which Dewey meticulously described as “esthetic experience”), have bearings on 
their actions. These are the examples of “practical life” that Dewey was linking 
with the foundation and functions of knowledge in Experience and Nature. If Rorty 
sees no point in philosophers engaging with this kind of preoccupations, then, his 
version of naturalism and Dewey’s might not have anything fundamental in 
common. 
However, what I take to be the most irreconcilable disagreement between Rorty’s 
and Dewey’s naturalism is this: Dewey sees human nature, such as being active 
experimentalists, inquirers, thinkers, and so on, as primarily natural propensities 
and only secondarily social or cultural. These propensities, for Dewey, are “generic 
traits” to be discovered. However, the natural and the social are not merely 
“symbiotic” but they are co-constitutive, integrated dynamically into ongoing 
situations.  It is only afterwards, in an inquiry’s analysis that they can be pulled 
apart and labelled. However, it seems Rorty’s point is that all these supposed 
features of “human nature” are inherently social in their origin and consequently 
there is no basis for referring to them as “human nature” that can be conceived as 
universal or discoverable through philosophical theories.]    
However, for Dewey, the recognition of human beings as part of nature as well as 
the recognition of human activities as responses to nature is the cornerstone of 
his naturalistic metaphysics and epistemology. As rightly noted by James Allard:  
Dewey attributed the major problem in traditional and modern epistemology to the 
separation of man from nature, which raises the problem of how subjective human 
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mind can represent nature or how subjective human experience can beget objective 
knowledge (Allard, 2010, p. 53).  
The solution is found in Darwin’s evolutionary theory, as Dewey “naturalized” “the 
knowing subject by revealing it to be a living being adjusting to its world” (Allard, 
2010, pp. 53, 58). Thus, Dewey’s recognition of the symbiotic relation between 
man and nature is meant to be highly illuminating with respect to human nature. 
Rorty agreed with Dewey that “the distinctive office, problems and subject-matter 
of philosophy grow out of stresses and strains in the community life in which a 
given form of philosophy arises” (Rorty, 1998, p. 5). But apparently, Rorty 
interpreted what Dewey meant in a way that is incompatible with the core thesis 
of Dewey’s philosophy. 
For Rorty, “the stresses and strains Dewey has in mind are those that arise from 
attempts to understand new ideas using outdated sets of concepts or organising 
principles (Rorty, 1998, p. 5). This simply means, for Rorty, the problematic 
situations one confronts when one is trying to run both therapeutical and 
constructivist stances together. However, by “stresses and strains”, Dewey meant 
the problematic in human transactions with nature in which the raw encounter 
with nature (which he usually referred to as non-reflective, primary experience (J. 
Dewey, 1925, pp. 1-36) paves the  way to theories of knowledge (which he usually 
referred to as secondary or reflective experience). Dewey identified these 
“stresses and strains” with “practical problems of men” (for instance, practical 
concerns about survival) which he differentiated from “the more technical 
concerns of professional philosophy (for instance, theoretical inquiries about the 
relation between mind and body) (J. Dewey, 1968, p. 18). More importantly, he 
identifies the function of knowledge strictly in terms of how to find solution to 
recalcitrant or problematic human situations.  
 Dewey identifies some factors (human nature; traits) that are similar in every 
social context and can be used in formulating theories and ascertaining a basis for 
a general notion of truth. For instance, the symbiotic relation between man and 
nature that naturally prompts human beings to adapt, to modify and transform 
their environments, arguably actuates similar experience across cultures. The 
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approach may vary across contexts and time but the modalities are similar. As 
rightly noted by Michael Peters:  
One cannot step outside of the social, or beyond socialization. Nevertheless, it is 
important to understand the dynamic relation between the social and the biological, 
otherwise one is left with the untenable notion that human beings exist as some kind 
of tabula rasa (Peters, 2001, p. 150).  
For Peters, given that human will and desires are still biosocially intertwined, 
Rorty’s postulation of a false antimony between social and human nature is 
unacceptable. Rorty’s commitment to anti-essentialism forecloses the possibility 
of a platform by which both social and non-social human nature can run together. 
Does Rorty’s “commendation of Dewey’s naturalism” apply to Dewey’s theory of 
“generic traits”? I think the “commendation” breaks down when one considers 
Rorty’s more damaging critique of Dewey’s notions of naturalism and experience. 
Rorty argues that there are several tensions in Dewey’s work that support his 
reading of Dewey’s philosophy as therapeutic.  He writes; 
Consider Dewey’s devastating remark about the tradition: “Philosophy has assumed 
for its function a knowledge of reality. This fact makes it a rival instead of a 
complement to the sciences.” To pursue this line of thought, one must renounce the 
notion of an “empirical metaphysics” as wholeheartedly as one has already 
renounced a “transcendental account of the possibility of experience.” I see no way 
to reconcile such passages as this, which I think represent Dewey at his best, with his 
answer to Santayana-his talk of “generic traits”. Sympathetic expositors of Dewey-as-
metaphysician-such as Hofstadter, who describes “the aim of metaphysics, as a 
general theory of existence” as discovery of the basic types of involvements and their 
relationships” – cannot, I think, explain why we need a discipline at that level of 
generality, nor how the results of such “discoveries” can be anything but trivial  (Rorty, 
1982, p. 77). 
Rorty thinks that Dewey got derailed into an anti-naturalist or essentialist 
programme by looking for some generic traits of existence.  This passage raises 
Rorty’s strongest objection against the substantiveness of Dewey’s naturalism or 
“empirical metaphysics”. He thinks Dewey’s own view of the nature and function 
of philosophy precludes such an “empirical metaphysics”, or the investigation of a 
subject-matter (such as generic traits of all existence): with a level of generality 
outside science. He also argues further that all attempts to analyse categorically 
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the nature of these “generic traits” and identify the method that can be employed 
in producing them; in a way that is different from what laboratory scientists are 
dealing with, have failed  (Rorty, 1982, p. 73). From this denial he argued that there 
is nothing in Dewey’s work that can be called a “metaphysics of Experience” (Rorty, 
1982, p. 77). He contends that Dewey has the habit of “announcing a bold new 
positive program when all he offers, and all he needs to offer, is criticism of the 
tradition” (Rorty, 1982, p. 78). 
However, Rorty’s attribution of the view about “the nature and function” of 
metaphysics that rivals science, to Dewey, misrepresents Dewey’s passage. Dewey, 
in the passage quoted by Rorty was pejoratively describing the traditional idealistic 
metaphysics he was rejecting. The passage that Rorty quoted reads thus, 
A final word about philosophy is then in place. Like religion it has come into conflict 
with the natural sciences… since the seventeenth century. The chief cause of the split 
is that philosophy has assumed for its function a knowledge of reality. This fact makes 
it a rival instead of a complement to the sciences … In consequence, it has, at least in 
its more systematic forms, felt obliged to revise the conclusions of science to prove 
that they do not mean what they say, or that, in any case, they apply to a world of 
appearances instead of to the superior reality to which philosophy directs itself. 
Idealistic philosophies have attempted to prove from an examination of the 
conditions of knowledge that mind is the only reality (J. Dewey, 1930, p. 294).  
Dewey’s metaphysics is a rejection of the appearance/reality distinction and the 
view that the human mind has an existence independent from the body. His 
metaphysics is a rejection of idealistic metaphysics. Rorty’s failure to distinguish 
between Dewey’s position and the position he was rejecting, shows Rorty’s 
“unfaithfulness” to Dewey. Dewey explains how problematic human transactions 
with nature create the condition for a naturalist metaphysics. According to him, a 
philosophy that emerges under such conditions “is a liaison officer between the 
conclusions of science and the modes of social and personal actions through which 
attainable possibilities are projected and striven for” (J. Dewey, 1930, p. 295). The 
tension that Rorty claimed to exist between Dewey’s definition of philosophy and 
the subject-matter of his naturalist metaphysics, on one hand, and the rivalry he 
anticipates between this version of metaphysics and science, on the other, does 
not exist. 
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Rorty seems to be comfortable with his idea that experimentations are meant to 
alter human conditions. Declarations such as “the direction of inquiries is steered 
by human interests”, that philosophers should not care about “problems that no 
longer have practical importance”  (2010, pp. 21-22), and that the distinction 
between knowledge and opinion “is a practical rather than a theoretical matter” 
(2000d, p. 217), are pointers to his endorsement of Dewey’s experimentalism and 
instrumentalist conception of knowledge and language. However, he pejoratively 
compares Dewey’s experimentalism with “literary experimentalism” in which a 
fiction writer experimentalizes with new literary forms. Rorty’s point is that 
whatever Dewey hoped to achieve with his notions of experimentalism and 
naturalism, it cannot go beyond the use of conversations in language. I argue that 
the only version of “literary experimentalism” that Rorty can claim will be “thought 
experiments”; which we have argued to be incompatible with the essential 
practical nature of Dewey’s experimentalism that we have discussed in Chapter 
3. 107  Rorty’s pejorative comparison of Dewey’s naturalism with Wordsworth’s 
poetic description of nature, betrays his sceptical attitude towards the idea that a 
metaphysics could be derived from Dewey’s notion of naturalism or that there 
could a metaphysics that is empirical and experimental. This contention amplifies 
his bewilderment that anyone could imagine the idea of Dewey having a 
metaphysics that can be assimilated to the genre which includes the central books 
of Aristotle’s Metaphysics or Spinoza’s Ethics, and so on (Rorty, 1982, p. 72). This 
fact makes it evident that Rorty is not being “faithful” to Dewey, as a self-professed 
Deweyan. I now discuss how Rorty’s critique of Dewey’s conception of 
epistemology as problem-solving further amplifies our contention that Rorty’s 
naturalism is anti-Deweyan. 
                                                     
107 However, this contention does not rule out the plausibility of Rorty’s naturalism best described 
as linguistic naturalism and considered a rival to Dewey’s version. 
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4.5.2.2 Rorty’s critique of Dewey’s conception of epistemology as problem-
solving 
In chapters 1 to 3, we discussed Dewey’s conception of experience and its 
importance in his versions of naturalist metaphysics and epistemology. 108 
Consequently, for Dewey, knowledge is an instrument for manipulating and re-
ordering nature. A claim to knowledge is justified by virtue of how holding it will 
warrant or be sufficient enough for stabilizing a recalcitrant or precarious situation. 
In his explanation of how this problem-solving conception of epistemology 
dominates modern thought, Dewey writes: 
The problem of restoring integration and cooperation between man’s beliefs about 
the world in which he lives and his beliefs about values and purposes that should 
direct his conduct is the deepest problem of any philosophy that is not isolated from 
life (J. Dewey, 1939, p. 523). 
It is in this sense that Dewey’s conception of epistemology as problem-solving 
becomes an important thesis in his version of naturalism.109 The conception also 
marks Dewey’s project of reconstructing philosophy. 
In Consequences of Pragmatism, Rorty offers a radical critique of Dewey’s 
naturalism, specifically directed at Dewey’s conception of epistemology as 
essentially problem-solving. According   to Rorty, determining the nature of 
knowledge or justification of our claims to knowledge by relying on its causal 
antecedents is unacceptable. 
But this return to a Lockean mode of thought, under the aegis of Darwin, betrayed 
precisely the insight which Dewey owed Green: that nothing is to be gained for an 
understanding of human knowledge by running together the vocabularies in which 
we describe the causal antecedents of knowledge with those in which we offer 
                                                     
108 In The Quest for Certainty, Dewey contends that the most urgent of all practical problems is 
how to decide how our most authentic and dependable cognitive beliefs be used to regulate our 
practical beliefs and how the latter can serve in organizing and integrating our intellectual beliefs(J. 
Dewey, 1930, p. 21). In The Problem of Men he differentiates between the “technical problems” of 
the Academic or Professional philosophers and the “practical problems of men” and argues that 
the latter problems constitute the “original” problems of philosophy (J. Dewey, 1968).  
109Given this focus on “human problems” and values, various scholars have described Dewey’s 
version of naturalism as humanistic naturalism or humanistic pragmatism (Bupp, 2001), (Selznick, 
2008). 
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justification of our claims to knowledge… To say, as Dewey wants to, that to gain 
knowledge is to solve problems, one does not need to find “continuities” between 
nervous system and people, or between “experience” and “nature.” One does not 
need to justify our claim to know that, say, a given action was the best we could take 
by noting that the brain is an “organ of action-undergoing,” any more than by pointing 
out that the particles which make up the brain are undergoing some actions 
themselves. Dewey, in short, confuses two ways of revolting against philosophical 
dualism…(Rorty, 1982, pp. 81-82).     
By “Lockean mode of thought”, Rorty runs two explanations together. There is a 
Lockean historical method that acknowledges the importance of the causal 
antecedent of the process of knowing. A Deweyan would have no objection to this 
requirement for an empirical epistemology; as a naturalistic requirement. 
However, there is another explanation of the “Lockean method” that Rorty offers; 
assimilating psychological issues to conceptual issues. For Rorty, this 
methodological approach enables Locke, although unacceptably, to “assimilate all 
mental acts to raw feels” (1982, p. 82).   I will not attempt a defence of Locke’s 
epistemology here. But what is relevant, for present purposes, is that forging a 
demarcation between the psychological and conceptual aspects of human 
knowledge is typically an anti-Deweyan position and consequently, the 
reconciliation of the two aspects cannot be part of Dewey’s philosophical goals 
since he never separated the two in the first place.  One must wonder why Rorty 
is comparing Locke’s reductionist or assimilationist program with Dewey’s 
arguably non-reductionist philosophy. 
How can “running together” the account of our causal experience with our 
theories of justification constitute a non-naturalistic stance? Dewey’s treatment 
of the biological, psychological, environmental, and socio-cultural factors 
concerning knowledge as the matrix for a human-nature symbiotic relation is to 
prove that these factors are not mutually exclusive on a naturalist program. The 
lesson from Dewey’s understanding of generic traits of existence is that the history 
of human species is just one continuum. Seeing some aspects of it as biological, 
neurological, sociological, or cultural is as a matter of conceptual sophistication or 
theoretical convenience. Is the disagreement between Rorty and Dewey a 
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dismissible conceptual disagreement? I think it goes beyond conceptual 
misunderstanding. I will offer two explanations for this view. 
The first problem Rorty has with Dewey’s position concerns the question: Why did 
Dewey follow in the footsteps of Locke by asking questions about the link between 
psychological and conceptual aspects of our knowledge? Locke followed this path 
to establish the foundation of our knowledge of external world. In this sense, he 
is a constructivist in Rortyan terms. For Rorty, a therapeutic approach is all that 
Dewey needed to be a naturalist. Consequently, Rorty declares the Lockean 
approach as pointless. 
4.6 Chapter summary: 
In this chapter, I explored how and to what extent fundamental issues in Dewey’s 
philosophy are preserved, modified, or rejected in Rorty’s neo-pragmatism. The 
choice of Rorty was informed by his declaration of himself a Deweyan and the 
unequivocal remarks often credited to him such as his announcement of “the end 
of philosophy”; a remark which in my argument is a pointer to Rorty’s 
unfaithfulness to Dewey.  
In section 1, I articulated some distinctions between contemporary pragmatists by 
differentiating those whose philosophical views are closer to the classical 
pragmatists (neo-classical pragmatism) from others whose works are arguably 
incompatible (post-pragmatism). This was to set a framework for exploring 
whether self-professed Deweyans such as Rorty are really neo-pragmatists or 
post-pragmatists, based on how and to what extent Dewey’s original ideas are 
preserved in their works. 
In section 2, I established Rorty as a Deweyan on the basis that he maintained 
Dewey’s rejection of foundationalism- in the sense of a theory of epistemic 
justification that attaches absoluteness or transcendentalism to the concept of 
truth and certainty or incorrigibility to the concept of knowledge. However, 
following Haack’s articulation of versions of foundationalism and Rockmore’s 
articulation of “ontological foundationalism”, I established that Dewey need not 
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be an anti-foundationalist, exclusively, in the Rortyan sense. I argued that Dewey’s 
philosophy is comprised of anti-foundationalism (in Rortyan sense) and 
ontological foundationalism (in anti-Rortyan sense), and that the two theories are 
not mutually exclusive.  
In addition, I rejected Rorty’s claim that adopting coherentism is one of the 
consequences of rejecting foundationalism because it created a false dilemma, 
given that other various versions of foundationalism (such as weak 
foundationalism and Haack’s found-herentism) and non-foundationalist theory 
(such as contextualism) are recognized alternatives to radical foundationalist 
theory of justification that he rejected.  I considered the prospects for a 
contextualist theory of justification in Dewey’s epistemology to be more relevant 
because of his conception of nature as dynamic and the role plays by 
environmental or evolutionary changes in his theory of knowledge.   
I also rejected Rorty’s argument that the rejection of foundationalism necessarily 
heralds the dismissal of Philosophy.  I compared Dewey’s philosophy with the 
description of “Philosophy” that Rorty rejected and found them significantly 
different. Exploring Rorty’s description of “Philosophy” in terms of normative 
epistemology playing the role of “First philosophy”, I argued that the notion of 
normativity in Dewey’s epistemology is not restricted to philosophical knowledge 
but extends to all forms of human knowledge. Consequently, the concept of an 
over-bearing or authoritarian Philosophy, the kind Rorty had in mind, does not 
arise. I reiterated Dewey’s position that metaphysics provides the road-map for 
epistemology in terms of how problematic situations in human transaction within 
nature engenders the quest to know (such as how to subdue nature). I argued that 
the importance that both Rorty and Dewey attached to the “foundation” they 
have identified for philosophy, established the incompatibility of their positions. 
Furthermore, I explored the argument that the continuity between Dewey’s 
epistemology and traditional epistemology is a refutation of Rorty’s claim. On the 
continuity between Dewey’s naturalist epistemology and traditional epistemology, 
I reiterated Dewey’s view on scepticism and identified the epistemic goal of 
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discovering truth and avoiding error that characterises it with traditional 
epistemology. I argued that this fact points to continuity between traditional 
epistemology and Dewey’s naturalist epistemology. I concluded the section by 
arguing that Rorty has not been able to establish his anti-foundationalist and 
coherentist positons within the framework of Dewey’s epistemology.  
In section 3, I discussed Rorty’s critique of representationalism from two 
perspectives: in terms of the human mind and languages having capacity to mirror 
nature and the idea that there must be a cognitive faculty or a phenomenon to 
serve as a link between the knower and the known. I agreed with Rorty that Dewey 
is an anti-representationalist in this sense because Dewey replaced the traditional 
conception of the human mind with an empirical and social conception and 
defined language as tool of tools. In both preoccupations, language and the human 
mind do not have the capacity to mirror nature. 
However, I identified a more prominent perspective of being an anti-
representationalist in Rorty’s work- holding a therapeutical stance. This stance 
dismisses all traditional problems of philosophy as pseudo-problems. I explored 
how Rorty classified the realists, the anti-realists, sceptics, and the anti-sceptics as 
“representationalists” because they regarded the traditional problems of 
philosophy, such as the problems resulting from the quest for truth, objectivity 
and foundational knowledge, as genuine problems. I considered Dewey as an anti-
representationalist in this therapeutical sense and found Rorty’s claim to be 
unacceptable. I agreed with Rorty that in Dewey’s later work, there are 
suggestions about abandoning conceptions such as dualism between mind/body, 
objectivity/subjectivity, experience/nature, and knower/known because they are 
untenable. I cited Dewey’s recommendation that a classical “theory of natural 
ends” must be rejected because it contradicts some principles in astronomy and 
physics. I discussed how he generally rejected any version of metaphysics that is 
presented either as “a rival instead of a complement to the science” or that 
employs non-empirical methodologies because it “denatures” natural phenomena. 
This is the kind of metaphysics he usually tagged as non-natural or transcendental 
philosophy.  
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However, I argued that Rorty overstretched Dewey from a position we can 
describe as a “selective therapeutical stance” to a radical or total therapeutical 
stance. I argued that Dewey has a metaphysics that employs empirical 
methodology. He developed theories of human mind, human nature, knowledge, 
and truth, in lieu of the traditional accounts or notions he rejected. I concluded 
that Rorty conflated his two senses of “anti-representationalism” in his 
interpretation of Dewey and ended up being a critic of Dewey rather than a 
Deweyan. On what could be responsible for Rorty’s conflating therapeutical and 
constructivist stances in Dewey’s position, I disagreed with Boisvert and Neville in 
their contention that Rorty failed to acknowledge the “metaphysical nature” of 
Dewey’s preoccupation with issues such as human-nature symbiotic relations, 
traits of existence, human experience, and their significance in Dewey’s naturalism. 
I argued that the problem lies in the differences between their attitudes toward 
metaphysics and conceptions of naturalism. These are the differences Rorty 
wanted to mitigate. 
In section 4, I considered the possibility of explaining the differences between 
Rorty and Dewey by contrasting the former as an-anti-realist. I discussed Rorty’s 
critics, such as Putnam, who have taken up Rorty’s claim that “there are no 
constraint on inquiry apart from conversational ones”, as a pointer to an anti-
realist position. According to Putnam, Rorty denied reality but continued using 
words and phrases that point to a subscription to realism. He compared Rorty’s 
position with the positivists’ phenomenalist “construction of the world” and that 
it consequently faces the same problems.  
I agreed with Brandon’s view that it could be erroneous to classify Rorty as an anti-
realist based on the contention that his (Rorty’s) position is only making a 
distinction between causal considerations and justification considerations in 
respect of use of languages rather than stating that only languages exist. With the 
use of language cast in a justificatory role, the moral lesson is that there is no need 
to be either a realist or an anti-realist. Rather, what is needed is an audience of 
competent language users who are demonstrating their competency in making 
meaningful conversations. I compared this neither-realist-nor anti-realist position 
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with Dewey’s position and found them incompatible. I reiterated our conclusion 
in chapter 1 that those labels (realism, anti-realism) do not apply to Dewey 
because he has a theory of reality that entails the narratives of both realism and 
anti-realism. It is on this point that Rorty’s departure from Dewey became more 
glaring. For Rorty, for instance, we can localise (or normalise) our conversation by 
not appealing to any ontological theory. We can sit on a chair, sip coffee or take a 
stroll without needing the question: What is real? However, for Dewey, human 
transactions are interwoven with each other and consequently too complex for 
such attitude or approach. I concluded that while a Rortyan may not necessarily 
be committed to either realism or anti-realism, a Deweyan necessarily needs a 
theory of reality.  
In section 5, I identified some theses of naturalism with which Rorty agreed and 
contrasted them with those he rejected rather than trying to identify naturalism 
in terms of metaphysical, ontological, or methodological versions. One notable 
feature of these theses is that they are negative, in the sense of stating what 
naturalism is not about. Rorty rejected naturalism that entails “essentialist 
tradition”. By this tradition, he meant any attempts towards finding “a firm 
philosophical basis” in phenomena (such as human mind, language) for the 
explanation and justification of our philosophical theories. He believes that his 
rejection of representationalism and foundationalism provides a good ground for 
refuting any version of naturalism that entails such tradition. He also rejected the 
kind of naturalism in which philosophers attempt to reduce norms to facts or 
reduce philosophy to or draw excessively from psychology.  
I discussed Rorty’s appraisal of some aspects of Dewey’s naturalism. I cited how 
he praised Dewey for providing a good example of naturalism that rejects 
essentialism, not thinking of science as having inside track on the essence of things, 
thinking of human beings in Darwinian terms, breaking down the spirit/nature 
barrier and rejecting transcendentalist and absolutist approach to truth, 
knowledge, and objectivity. However, a deeper articulation of Rorty’s critique of 
some aspects in Dewey’s naturalism shows that Rorty was inconsistent. For 
instance, Rorty rejected Dewey’s conception of man as pre-scientific, his pre-
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occupation with traits of existence as essentialistic and described his version of 
metaphysics “as a good example why no one needs a metaphysics”.  
In my explanation of the differences between Rorty and Dewey’s positions, I 
considered the possibility of Rorty misinterpreting Dewey in different 
incompatible ways. I also considered the possibility that Rorty started as a 
Deweyan with some significant tolerance towards Dewey’s naturalism at the initial 
stages of his neo-pragmatism (most especially in PMN) but turned radically away 
from him in his post-PMN work. I considered both explanations too speculative.  
Alternatively, I considered the argument that Rorty only accepted Dewey as a 
naturalist in the sense in which his (Dewey’s) work is interpreted as therapeutic. 
In those instances, where Dewey emphatically rejected essentialism, 
foundationalism, the conceptions of human mind and language as mirrors of 
nature, mind-body dualism, transcendentalized truth and objectivity, and so on, 
Rorty considered him a naturalist.  He described Dewey’s preoccupation, in this 
direction, approvingly, as “a non-epistemological sort of philosophy”. However, he 
regarded Dewey as un-naturalistic in those instances where he believed Dewey 
got distracted or derailed into metaphysics or epistemology in terms of doing what 
Rorty called constructivist engagements with traditional problems of philosophy: 
asking and answering questions that are meant to present some traditional 
problems of philosophy as genuine.  I argued that this explanation is a pointer to 
the fact that Rorty has a conception of naturalism that is radically different from 
Dewey’s and that this is responsible for the differences in their conceptions of 
epistemology and metaphysics.  
I agreed with Haack and Shusterman who have noted some problematic 
tendencies in Rorty’s interpretation and presentation of Dewey’s philosophy. 
These tendencies include (i) mistakenly treating some philosophical concepts and 
positions as having monolithic meaning or being non-controversial (ii) selecting 
some portions of Dewey’s work and articulating it as if it represents the 
philosopher’s entire position or philosophy, and making over-generalized claims 
such as saying “we pragmatists”- as if pragmatists have a uniform position on all 
issues. Many of these critics have argued that these “defects” were responsible 
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for Rorty’s misrepresentation or misconstrual of Dewey’s position. Some have 
argued that Rorty’s anti-philosophical” motive led to his apparent misconstrual of 
Dewey’s position, to suit his new and radical perspective on philosophy. I have 
explored this tendency in Rorty’s construal of Dewey as holding a therapeutic 
stance rather than as a philosopher who is interested in transforming philosophy. 
I explored some of these contentions that Rorty misconstrued Dewey at several 
points and found them plausible. 
I also agreed with Haack, Shusterman and Manicas that the motives behind Dewey 
and Rorty’s engagements with philosophical issues are very important with 
respect to understanding, interpreting, or even attempting any kind of 
modifications on their works. I noted Rorty’s motive for establishing similarities 
between the works of philosophers such as the American pragmatists like Dewey 
and Wittgenstein, Derrida, and Heidegger, to break the “historical hegemonies” 
between the American, Anglo-Saxon, and Continental philosophies. I have noted 
that this brings about confusion in Rorty’s presentations of Dewey’s original ideas.  
As rightly noted by Haack, Rorty’s motive to establish a post-philosophical 
tradition is responsible for the interpretations he chose for philosophical theories 
he was rejecting and equally defines his tactics for looking for other philosophers 
such as Dewey as potential “allies”. Contrary to Rorty’s “motive”, any proper 
understanding of Dewey, as noted by Manicas, “requires that we acknowledge 
how radical his effort to reconstruct philosophy was” [Manicas, 2008, 283].  
I concluded that the real problem is that both philosophers have different versions 
of pragmatism or better still, naturalism. I disagreed with some critics (Boisvert, 
2010) who argue that Rorty missed Dewey’s naturalism on the ground that Rorty 
actually wanted to impose his version of naturalism on Dewey’s. I also disagreed 
with critics who argue that Rorty should be regarded as a critic of naturalism 
(Wagner & Warner, 1993, pp. 4-5) on the ground that Rorty has his own version 
of naturalism, although incompatible with Dewey’s version. While at the centre of 
Dewey’s version of naturalism, as rightly noted by Shusterman, is the need to 
reconceptualise human experience (Shusterman, 1999, p. 194), Rorty’s naturalism 
needs merely a simple form of pragmatism that emphasises “practical significance” 
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and guarantees continuity of debates (Rorty & Engel, 2005, p. 34). This is a 
naturalism that is defined in terms of “real” language-users who are continuously 
engaged with one another in literary and cultural criticism without any need for 
what Shusterman describes as philosophical “back up” (Shusterman, 1994, p. 393). 
As rightly noted by Manicas, Rorty should be regarded as one of the critics of 
Dewey (Manicas, 2008, p. xiii) rather than as a Deweyan. I now discuss the 
relevance of John Dewey in contemporary philosophy. I start by considering how 
his naturalist views are important to the debates on the nature, scope, and goals 
of social epistemology. 
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Chapter Five: 
The relevance of Dewey’s naturalist epistemology to 
contemporary social epistemology 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter establishes further the relevance of John Dewey in contemporary 
philosophy by engaging his epistemology with some contemporary social 
epistemologists in a debate concerning the nature, methods and goals of social 
epistemology. The aim is to argue that taking a Deweyan approach would advance 
the debate rather than argue that the protagonists in the debate are directly 
influenced by Dewey’s work.  
The chapter begins by outlining the key tenets of contemporary social 
epistemology. This will be guided by two questions. The first question is, is “social 
epistemology” continuous with “traditional” epistemology, or a new field? This 
question is based on the premise that there is a branch of philosophy known as 
epistemology which is concerned with the nature, scope, and methods of 
acquiring knowledge in general but with specific focus on human knowledge. The 
nature of this “philosophical approach” to knowledge is believed, in some 
significant ways, to be different from approaches used in other fields such as 
physics, chemistry, or economics. The second question is, if social epistemology is 
not continuous with traditional epistemology, in what ways can it contribute to 
philosophical attempts to understand knowledge? Consequently, I start by 
identifying two rival positions on social epistemology: one claiming that social 
epistemology is a new field and the other denying the claim. The first position, 
exemplified by scholars such as Fuller and Kitcher, I label radical social 
epistemology. The second position, exemplified by Kornblith and Goldman, I label 
a moderate positon. 
This chapter has three sections. In the first section, I recall some of the important 
features of traditional epistemology that we have discussed in chapter three. 
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However, my focus is on how epistemology has been differentiated from closely 
related disciplines in social sciences such as sociology and psychology. 
 In section two, I explore the debate about the nature, focus, methodology and 
goals of social epistemology. I compare the positions of the radical and moderate 
social epistemologists by exploring three disagreements between them. The first 
disagreement concerns the nature of social epistemology. For instance, Fuller 
argues that traditional epistemology and social epistemology are different. The 
former, he contends, treats knowledge acquisition as a prerogative of individuals, 
in the sense that it is possessed by individuals and verified by individuals. By 
contrast, he contends that the latter treats knowledge as ultimately a social 
phenomenon because it depends on shared language, shared practices of inquiry, 
and social institutions that endorse knowledge. His conclusion is that the methods 
and goals of social epistemology are peculiar to social sciences rather than 
philosophy (Fuller, 1988, p. 24). 
Moderate social epistemologists such as Kornblith and Goldman admit that 
traditional epistemology has been dominated largely by concentration on 
individual inquirers or knowers but contend that this preoccupation has a plausible 
rationale- knowers are individuals using their brains, senses and inferential 
mechanisms to establish knowledge. They also admit that mechanisms for 
knowledge production is inadequate if they exclude factors in the natural and 
social environment in which they live. However, they contend that traditional 
epistemology does not treat individual and social factors of knowledge as mutually 
exclusive. Besides, they contend that social epistemology is continuous with 
traditional epistemology because both offer theories about knowledge.  
While articulating and evaluating the contentions of these protagonists, I focus on 
some problems confronting both sides of the debate. Specifically, I explore the 
argument that both positions involve reductionism. The radical position attempts 
to reduce individual factors to social factors and the moderate position attempts 
to reduce social factors to individual factors. I consider the effects of these 
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reductionist stances on both parties’ attempts to explain the nature of social 
epistemology. 
The second disagreement concerns whether social epistemology is a descriptive 
or normative discipline. Fuller’s work suggests that social epistemology is both 
descriptive and normative. However, I explore how his account of a normative 
social epistemology provides arguably the strongest argument for identifying 
social epistemology with social sciences rather than philosophy and consequently 
draws stronger criticism from moderate social epistemologists. Fuller challenges 
the traditional conception of normativity because it was formulated mainly to 
evaluate the beliefs of individuals. He contends that normativity in social 
epistemology arises solely from “shared social practices” and is specifically meant 
to direct and change the actions of people towards the realization of their shared 
interests. He argues that social epistemology offers a “realistic and informative” 
conception of normativity that takes into consideration “the interest that informs 
the epistemological investigation” (Fuller, 1988, p. 275).  
However, moderate social epistemologists contend that the normative concerns 
in traditional epistemology invariably continue in social epistemology because the 
same goals guide all epistemological investigations such as explaining the 
phenomenon of knowledge, establishing normative criteria for knowledge 
attainment, and refuting scepticism. Specifically, I discuss Kornblith’s contention 
that “the suggestion that normative standards that apply to knowledge claims 
arise only out of shared social practices is not clearly true”. For him, while 
normative commitments such as the necessity of asking for and giving reasons 
may be closely tied with some social practices, there are normative demands that 
are independent of those social practices. The natural human curiosity to know 
and be disposed towards the attainment of truth and avoidance of errors need not 
be dependent on social practices (Kornblith, 2002, pp. 92-93). In addition, I discuss 
his contention that the social dimensions of knowledge must be evaluated exactly 
the way that individual factors are evaluated- with the attainment of truth and 
avoidance of errors as the goal.  
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In my assessment of this disagreement, I discuss how Fuller’s radical position is 
confronted with the problem of relativism based on his arguments that social 
interests must be factored into the conceptualization of “normativity”. This is 
because each society has different social interests or what Wittgenstein rightly 
referred to as different “forms of life” that members will defend as correct. I also 
discuss Sandra Harding’s challenge to both moderate and radical positions on the 
ground that concentration on both the individual and social factors (to formulate 
the concept of normativity) do not constitute the proper focus of social 
epistemology. Rather, she contends that only a “standpoint epistemology” can 
provide a road map for epistemology (2005, p. 219). 
The third disagreement concerns how both sides play out over the issue of 
whether social epistemology should be viewed as part of the a priori discipline of 
philosophy, or a more empirical study which belongs with sociology, anthropology, 
or psychology. I discuss how Fuller wavers between two ideas: (i) that social 
epistemology is essentially a descriptive enterprise characterised by the empirical 
study of how knowledge is produced and utilized in society and (ii) that it is a 
normative enterprise that derives its normativity from science. Having outlined 
these considerations, I argue that both views are unsuccessful. Moderate social 
epistemologists such as Kornblith arguably want to defend the autonomy of 
philosophy and present epistemological investigations as essentially characterised 
by a first-person approach. Having outlined this view, I will critique it in the light 
of contemporary cognitive practice that favours an interdisciplinary approach to 
issues.  
In section three, I turn to Dewey and articulate how his naturalist explanation of 
the development of human knowledge from the level of individual (primary 
experience) to the collective or communal level (secondary experience), offers an 
account of how the individual and the social play equally important roles in the 
generation of human knowledge, and that neither is reducible to the other. I 
articulate how his conceptions of inquiry (as a collaborative social activity) and 
“community of inquirers”, further emphasize the indispensability of these two 
factors. Moreover, I discuss how he uses the scientific theory of evolution to 
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explain that there are general human problems and interests (such as the need to 
cope with changing environment) and that attempts to solve these general 
problems led to inquiries about knowledge. I discuss how he emphasised two 
points; (i) that inquiries are socially regulated activities and (ii) that knowledge is 
a social instrument. 
Furthermore, I explain how Dewey’s presentation of the processes of belief 
formation and retention, as a single continuum, erases the traditional boundaries 
between philosophy and cognitive fields such as psychology, sociology, biology 
and consequently opens up philosophical discussions about human knowledge to 
an interdisciplinary approach while its philosophical background is preserved. 
Secondly and more importantly, I discuss how Dewey’s position, (the identification 
of some “general human problems or interests”, the recognition that inquiry is a 
collaborative approach towards solving these problems and that whatever is 
“instrumental” in solving these problems is knowledge), offers an account of 
normativity that arguably is not relative to specific social contexts.  
I end the chapter by noting the way in which Dewey’s social and empirical 
conception of human mind, his ‘esthetic’ approach to human problem-solving and 
his naturalist position on culture (cultural naturalism) broaden out the traditional 
purview and concerns of epistemology in a valuable way. 
5.1 The nature of traditional epistemology: an over-view 
In this section, I recall some of the most important features of “traditional 
epistemology” that we have elaborated in chapter 3. Traditional epistemologists 
have shown a keen interest in the phenomenon of knowledge in a way that is 
described as epistemic- a way that purports to reflect objectively how the world 
is. For instance, if I make a claim that “there is a beautiful golden table in my 
room”, this claim is a belief that can be established as either true or false. Making 
a claim or holding a belief, is regarded as the first step towards the establishment 
of knowledge. For my claim “there is a table in my room” to be established as true, 
there must be a world where there is a table, a room, where there is an object 
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called “gold” from which the concept of golden is derived, and so on, which the 
claimant can know. The world is the object of knowledge. Consequently, for a 
belief to become established as knowledge, it must reflect exactly what obtains in 
the world (must be true) and the believer must have evidence (justification) that 
the belief is true or be in the appropriate causal relation with the world. It is in this 
regard that “knowledge” in traditional epistemology has been described as 
justified true belief. 
Traditional epistemologists have noted that our mechanisms for the formation of 
beliefs (such as the senses) and the mechanisms for justification of beliefs (such 
as human inferential skills, arguments, and sources of evidence such as memory 
and testimony), are often inaccurate. They have also noted that if there is no way 
of differentiating our accurate claims about the world from the inaccurate ones, 
the sceptical claim that the attainment of knowledge is not possible will become 
justified. Consequently, they are particularly interested in establishing a notion of 
justification that can enhance the realization of the goals of epistemology. These 
goals include establishing a practice that can guarantee the attainment of truth 
and avoidance of error.  
In addition, traditional epistemologists are conscious of the fact that human (self) 
interests may influence the process of justification. Consequently, they have made 
a distinction between “epistemic” (or objective justification) and non-epistemic 
justification. By epistemic or objective justification, they usually have in mind the 
practice of establishing propositions that reflect some state of affairs in the world. 
“Objectivity” in this sense, is defined in terms of preventing the interests or biases 
of the claimant or the interests of the community in which she resides from 
influencing the processes and outcomes of justification. 110  Consequently, it is 
believed that when a piece of evidence for a claim is insulated from the influence 
of personal interests, it enhances objective and epistemic justification. On the 
                                                     
110 This sense of ‘objectivity’ relates to questions about propositions, reality and truth and is one 
of the most fundamental issues in traditional epistemology. There are others. For instance, the 
concept of objectivity in ethics is usually considered to be wider in meaning and applications. 
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other hand, interest-based justifications are often regarded as subjective and 
consequently non-epistemic. 
Moreover, in traditional epistemology, philosophical theories of knowledge are 
regarded as distinct from discussions about knowledge in closely related fields 
such as psychology and sociology or anthropology. Epistemological investigations 
can and do begin with formation of beliefs, a concern that epistemologists share 
with either empirical or behavioural psychology. However, the primary focus of 
epistemology is the validation of beliefs. It is in this sense that it is regarded 
essentially as a normative enterprise. This is regarded as the factor differentiating 
it from sociology, anthropology and natural sciences that are regarded as 
descriptive enterprises.  
More generally, traditional epistemologists admit that in many fields, people are 
interested in acquiring knowledge. But only epistemologists are interested in what 
it is for something to count as knowledge. Consequently, these general questions 
about knowledge that epistemologists are keenly interested in, are regarded as 
more fundamental than specific questions that are raised in fields. This general 
approach to knowledge is to be pursued (at best), the argument goes, through 
methodologies such as analysis, intuitive reasoning, and dialectical argument. 
These are the methodologies that are supposed to transcend the methodologies 
of the specific disciplines.  
Having briefly outlined the “basics” of traditional epistemology, I will now turn to 
examine scholars’ views about what “social epistemology” is. The focus will be on 
whether the latter offers a new dimension or an expansion of the former, or an 
entirely new field. 
5.2 The nature of social epistemology 
In this section, I discuss in detail the differences between the radical and moderate 
positions. I start by discussing what these protagonists mean by the term “social”. 
I then move deeper to explore differences that I take to be more fundamental: 
differences in their positions on the nature of knowledge, justification, 
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normativity, objectivity, scepticism, and the relationship between epistemology 
and other fields such as sociology and anthropology. Several questions will provide 
a road-map for this exploration. Is social epistemology contrasted with or 
continuous with “traditional epistemology”? If it is continuous, why a different 
name? Are a priori philosophical methods appropriate for social epistemology or 
only empirical methods? Are there differences between the goals of traditional 
epistemology and the goals of social epistemology? I will start the discussion with 
the radical social epistemologists. 
5.2.1 Articulating the radical conception of the “social” nature of social 
epistemology 
Social epistemology is often described as a discipline that sees knowledge as a 
social phenomenon. By social phenomenon, it is usually meant that knowledge, 
like language and games, cannot be privatised. In his critique of (traditional) 
epistemology and philosophy of science which he regards as the two branches of 
philosophy devoted to the nature of knowledge, Fuller writes, 
… Philosophers treat the various knowledge states and processes as properties of 
individuals operating in a social vacuum. They often seem to think that any correct 
account of individual knowledge can be, ipso facto, generalized as the correct account 
of social knowledge. For example, the assertibility conditions for a scientific claim are 
typically defined in terms of the evidential relation that the knower stands to the 
known, without taking into account the epistemic states of other knowers whose 
relations to one another and the known would greatly influence the assertibility of 
the scientific claim (Fuller, 1988, p. xii). 
Again, he writes, 
… Epistemologists… assume that the best explanation for why a cognitive community 
officially treats a given claim as knowledge is that most of the community’s members 
believe the claim. However, both inferences greatly underestimate the influence 
exercised by each member’s expectations about what is appropriate to assert in his 
cognitive community, as well as each member’s willingness to discount his own 
personal beliefs and conform to these canonical expectations –if only as a means of 
maintaining his good standing in the cognitive community. In short, then, in my own 
view epistemic judgement has much of the character of identifying and anticipating 
trends in the stock market (Fuller, 1988, p. xiii). 
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There are two ways one can explain Fuller’s definition of the “social” nature of 
epistemology: at the level of belief formation and at the level of justification or 
belief retention. At the level of belief-formation, Fuller admits that there are 
processes that involve some mechanisms that individuals are endowed with, such 
as the senses, brain and other psychological endowments. These mechanisms play 
important roles both in generating beliefs and providing evidence for their 
validation. However, he contends that those individual factors cannot be utilised 
without social mechanisms such as the use of language and concepts which are 
generated and passed from generation to generation through social interactions. 
Fuller’s contention was succinctly presented by Kitcher when he writes, 
Both in our abstract thinking and in our perceptual experience, the conclusions we 
draw depend on the conceptual repertoire that we employ and on the habits for 
reaching or inhibiting belief in which we have been trained. Early absorption of the 
lore of our societies affects us even at those points at which we appear most able to 
take our epistemic lives into our own hands  (Kitcher, 1994, p. 112). 
Kitcher’s point is that our perception and even some of our experiences that are 
usually acknowledged as “private” such as our thoughts, are dependent on social 
factors, for instance, language, concepts and symbols. For instance, when I see 
two objects running and I identified them as a tiger and a goat, perceiving them 
and reporting what they were doing, depend on what society has conceptually 
established as “tiger”, “goat”, “running”, “walking” and so on.  
The second way of explaining Fuller’s notion of “social” is at the level of validation 
or verification of knowledge-claims, Fuller sees these processes also as ultimately 
social. Again, language is indispensable- the concepts of true, false, belief, justified 
and so on, are “social legacies” bestowed on individuals. In addition, there are 
rules that are socially established to guide knowledge production. There are social 
organizations set up in social contexts to monitor the applications of these rules 
and determine the acceptability of claims before they can become knowledge. The 
indispensability of institutions such as peer-review panels (among academics, 
bodies or professional groups for physicists, medical practitioners and so on) in 
the validation and acceptance of knowledge arguably gives support to Fuller’s 
stance. All claims endorsed as knowledge by these institutions are added to the 
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body of community or collective knowledge. These institutions have powers to 
review or revoke previously endorsed claims. 
Perhaps Fuller’s most radical claim is that, about a claim that a community 
endorses as knowledge, most of its members need not accept the claim. This claim 
seems to be corroborated if we consider the ratio of scientists in a community 
(and the authority they wield) with many non-scientific members, most of which 
are not aware or do not understand most of what the scientists are saying but still 
accept and abide by their scientific claims. Consequently, Fuller contends that an 
epistemology cannot be regarded as “social” on the basis that we can put together 
all correct accounts of individual knowledge and generalize them as the correct 
account of social knowledge. How strong is this claim? 
Dave Elder-Vass agrees with Fuller that socially produced knowledge need not be 
accepted by all members of the community (as the example of the scientists and 
non-scientists members of the community has shown). However, he argues about 
the indispensability of the role of non-scientific members in the community in 
terms of disseminating the opinion of the experts widely “to become effective” 
(Elder-Vass, 2012, p. 227). While one may agree with Elder-Vass that in some cases 
such as the outbreak of epidemics such as cholera, prompt and accurate 
dissemination of information and instructions from the health experts by 
individuals, government agencies and organizations is vitally important in curbing 
the health hazard, there is no role for non-experts in the production of scientific 
knowledge. Elder-Vass clearly misses Fuller’s point. 
However, he challenges Fuller’s position again by arguing that within a broad 
cognitive community, there are “clusters of epistemic circles”. For instance, within 
a broad association of medical practitioners, there are circles of doctors, 
radiologists, nurses, dentists, optometrists and so on, working within different 
paradigms which often result in paradigm conflicts (Elder-Vass, 2012, p. 227). 
What is more relevant to our present purposes is the need for an overall 
coherence of knowledge produced by the cognitive community that cannot be 
realised unless objections raised at the individual or specific paradigm level are 
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responded to. Consequently, Elder-Vass rejects Fuller’s claim that knowledge can 
be socially produced independently of individual account of knowledge.  
From Fuller’s and Kitcher’s explanation of the “social”, it is notable that their 
emphasis is on the presentation of social epistemology as a contrast to traditional 
epistemology. For them, traditional epistemology is an individualistic 
epistemology on the ground that it concentrates only on individuals’ perceptual 
experience, ability to reason or make inferences (Kitcher, 1994, p. 111). In his 
emphasis on the indispensability of social interaction in knowledge attainment 
and rejection of any epistemology that fails to acknowledge this fact, Fuller 
pejoratively identifies the methodological approach of traditional epistemology 
with the Cartesian gesture of “withdrawing from all social intercourse as a means 
of getting into the right frame of mind for posing foundational questions about the 
nature of knowledge” (Fuller, 1988, p. 3). I now turn to explain how radical social 
epistemologists believe that social epistemology can focus solely on social factors.  
5.2.1.1 Social factors as constituting the sole focus of social epistemology 
There is agreement among all social epistemologists that a theory of knowledge 
that investigates only the mechanisms of belief production and retention which 
are located entirely within individuals cannot be adequate. What is the major 
point of disagreement between social epistemologists? It is arguable that the 
position of social epistemologists such as Fuller and Kitcher is stronger than merely 
advocating for the inclusion of social factors in the theories about knowledge. 
Their contention is that social epistemologists can concentrate solely on social 
factors and still arrive at their goals. There is arguably a radical shift from the 
traditional conception of epistemology in this position.  
In explaining this shift, I take a conception of knowledge that Schmitt describes as 
the “strong programme” in sociology of knowledge as providing helpful insights.  
According to this view, some works on the social dimensions of knowledge in 
sociology have offered arguments that are strong enough to prompt 
epistemologists “to take seriously the idea that knowledge is a matter of 
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consensus or accordance with a multiplicity of perspectives.111 What is suggested 
is that, rather than seeing knowledge as emerging from individuals (from their 
rational thoughts, imagination, and curiosity that lead to believing and eventually 
knowing states), epistemologists should focus mainly on social factors and 
conditions such as economic, social and political interests that cause knowledge. 
Equally important is the methodological reliance on shared paradigms. 
It is arguable that Fuller also subscribes to this “strong programme” in his 
argument against traditional epistemology. According to him, traditional 
epistemologists focused on individual factors based on the wrong assumption that 
“a feature of the knowledge enterprise that appears primarily at the level of social 
interaction is, ipso facto, reproduced (by some means or other) as a feature of the 
minds of the individuals engaged in the interaction” (Fuller, 1988, p. xiii). He claims 
the feature of knowledge that appears after social interactions is different from 
what obtains at the level of individuals. A socially produced knowledge, according 
to him, will reflect community-wide interests rather than the interest of 
individuals.   
Kitcher also subscribes to this “strong programme” when he writes that, 
The processes that underlie the formation of the beliefs are types approved as 
knowledge-generating within the community (Kitcher, 1994, p. 117). 
In Kitcher’s conception of social epistemology, the classical picture of an individual 
epistemic agent who is subjecting every belief to rigorous epistemic doubt to 
arrive at an indubitable foundation upon which other structures of knowledge can 
be built, seems to have been rejected. Rather, knowledge production is a 
communal or collective affair.  
The plausibility of the recommendation from this “strong programme” depends 
on the credibility of the conception of what society is. Subscribers to the strong 
                                                     
111 Schmitt cites the works of Barnes and Harding on how “social interests interfere with methods 
directed toward truth or empirical adequacy” and which warrant the proposal that knowledge 
should be conceived not as belief with methods that aim at truth but instead “as belief in 
accordance with social interests”  (Schmitt, 1994, pp. 3-4).  
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programme usually argue that society is not a simple outgrowth of individual 
experience. Fuller, for instance, argues that although books, artworks and other 
textually and symbolically coded items emanate from distinct human cognitive 
efforts, they have a peculiar ontological status of their own.112  Similarly, concepts 
or “social facts” such as “collective representation”, “institutionalised beliefs”, 
“community ideologies”, “group testimony” and “group mind” are “emergent” 
entities, but are distinct and distinguishable from the individual experiences from 
which they emerged.  
Take for instance, Fuller’s idea of “collective representation”, which he regards as 
a development of Durkheim’s notion of the concept. For him,  
Such an entity arises not when everyone has the same beliefs, nor even 
when everyone believes that a belief has been accepted by the group; 
rather, it arises when everyone tacitly agrees to express whatever they 
may happen to believe in terms of specific linguistic and other symbolic 
practices (Fuller, 1988, p. 54). 
Hummon defends this conceptualization of society when conducting research on 
community ideology among some American communities. He argues that the 
research offers evidence “to conceive a community perspective as part of a shared 
tradition rather than a simple “outgrowth” of individual experience” (1990, p. 
196). For him, community background shapes community preferences through 
socialization and that these processes usually result into some kind of “community 
imagery”. Such imageries include expressions of collectivity such as “group mind” 
and “communal beliefs”.113  
                                                     
112 In Social Epistemology, Fuller explores the possibility of strengthening the thought experiment 
on World Three presented in Popper’s Epistemology without a Knowing Subject. This is an 
experiment that considers the possibility of reconstructing the human world without human beings. 
It considers the possibility of aliens (Martians) reconstructing human culture “by developing a 
linguistic competence in a way that does not involve actually interacting with humans”. Fuller sees 
this project as laudable; carving out a metaphysical space for objective knowledge. However, he 
considers making this experiment more successful by “reconstructing” Bloor’s sociological 
construal of World Three (Fuller, 1988, pp. 51-61). 
113 I will attend to this argument in the latter part of this chapter and discuss how it involves the 
debate between the summativists and the anti-summativists. 
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Consequently, one can say that subscribers to the strong programme offer top-
down analyses of society. For Fuller, social epistemology should embrace the 
strong programme in sociology to realize its established goals. We now turn to the 
conception of these goals. 
5.2.1.2 The radical position and the goal(s) of social epistemology 
For Fuller, “epistemology is inherently a sociological activity” (1988, p. 9). He 
explains this claim in two ways that he argues are connected. The first is that social 
epistemologists focus on social activities (social factors) that are concerned with 
the production of knowledge. We have discussed this point at length in the 
previous sub-section. The second explanation is that the field is sociological in the 
sense that it is characterised by certain “cognitive pursuits” that are meant to 
improve societies. Rather than knowledge being regarded as an abstract or 
theoretical phenomenon, it is practical. For him, traditional epistemologists 
missed this because they treated cognitive pursuits and their social organization 
as if they were two independent entities (1988, p. 9). It is in this sense that he 
contends that the goal of epistemology is the social organization of knowledge 
(1988, p. 5). 
He further states, 
[T]he social epistemologist would like to be able to show how the products of our 
cognitive pursuits are affected by changing the social relations in which the 
knowledge producers stand to one another. As a result, the social epistemologist is a 
policy maker (Fuller, 1988, p. 3). 
Fuller’s point is that social epistemology is social engineering. According to this 
view, knowledge is, in Dewey’s coinage, “an instrument” for public policy. The 
practical impacts of knowledge in society define the adequacy of knowledge by 
contrast to traditional epistemology exemplified by Descartes who tied the 
adequacy of knowing to clarity and certainty of thinking (Fuller, 1988, p. 3). For 
Fuller, social epistemology is meant to be “a radical critique and replacement of 
the epistemological enterprise, especially of its classical task of laying down 
interest-invariant foundations for knowledge” (1988, p. 10). 
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 From Fuller’s explanation of social epistemology as a “sociological activity” both 
in terms of focus on social organization and social cognitive pursuits, two further 
characterizations of social epistemology are identifiable: descriptive and 
normative. I discuss these two descriptions and argue that he struggles to define 
and deal with the implications of a notion of normativity that poses a radical 
challenge to the traditional notions of normativity.   
5.2.1.3 The radical social epistemology and the (new) conception of 
normativity 
On the issue of normativity, Fuller pursues two approaches. In the first, he 
challenges the notion that philosophy has monopoly over the determination of 
what criteria constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge 
acquisition. According to him, 
Sociologists have long suspected that philosophical talk about how knowledge “ought” 
to be produced is motivated by a desire to speak with an authority that lies beyond 
the check of the empirical disciplines (Fuller, 1988, p. 17). 
He contends that philosophers’ presumed prerogative over norms about 
knowledge and the idea that epistemology is a special discipline that concerns 
itself with knowledge independently of science, were significantly refuted by 
Quine and Rorty. For him, Quine’s project of naturalizing epistemology succeeded 
in showing that epistemology belongs to some aspects of behavioural psychology 
and neurophysiology that are concerned with the causal origin of human 
responses to stimuli. In addition, he contends that Rorty admitted that the 
business of legitimizing knowledge claims belongs to humanistic disciplines that 
are traditionally devoted to cultural criticism. 114  On both accounts, “the 
epistemologist ends his normative ways and thereby dissolves the boundaries that 
currently exist between his work and that of historian, psychologist, and 
                                                     
114 While “cultural criticism” rightly may be thought of as normative, there is an interpretation of 
Rorty’s position (as seeing epistemology coming to an end) to contend with. Whether this 
interpretation is true or not, one problem with taking Rorty’s path is that while Rorty arguably rejects 
the view of the traditional epistemologists that through some objective normative criteria, we can 
establish links between propositions, truth and reality, traditional epistemologists on the other hand 
reject Rorty’s idea of cultural criticism as normative and his contention that epistemology should be 
replaced with cultural or literary criticism. This debate is beyond the scope of this section. 
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sociologist” (Fuller, 1988, pp. 17-18). Fuller argues that by dividing the labor of 
justification in this manner, “the need for a special discipline of epistemology is 
eliminated” and “the deepest epistemological problem is conquered” (1988, p. 
18). On this view, the question whether social epistemology should be descriptive 
or normative is irrelevant.  
The second approach in Fuller’s work is towards the reconceptualization of the 
concept of “normativity” without its philosophical presumptions. According to 
him, 
Epistemologists have presumed an excessively restricted understanding of 
“normative” which manages to include the decisions that individual scientists ought 
to make for regulating their own research practices in idealized settings, yet exclude 
the decisions that policymakers ought to make for regulating research practices of 
the scientific community as a whole in a more realistic setting (Fuller, 1988, p. 275). 
 Fuller’s point is that the concept of normativity in traditional epistemology may 
be considered appropriate (as a form of “house-cleaning”) for an individualistic 
epistemology but not for a social epistemology that has a wider purview in terms 
of holistic or collaborative interdisciplinary investigations. This is a further 
development from his proposal previously considered concerning the need to 
erase the “artificially” erected boundaries between epistemology (philosophy) 
and other cognitive fields that deal with knowledge. 
Furthermore, he argues that the traditional conception of normativity is built 
around two factors that render the concept unrealistic and uninteresting. First is 
the idea that there could be an ideal epistemic agent who is completely stripped 
of biases and personal interests in her pursuit of knowledge. He sees this as a myth 
or an “idealization”, a description that has a pejorative meaning comparable to 
Dewey’s description of a “spectator investigator”. Like feminist theorists such as 
Harding (1998) and Haraway (1991), he describes the traditional conception of 
“objective justification” as “a view from nowhere”. According to him, the 
conception of this sense of “normative” in classical epistemology can be attributed 
to an idealist bias according to which there is agreement that knowledge is 
propositional but refusal to “take the material instantiation of a proposition” 
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(Fuller, 1988, p. 275). What he meant by “material instantiation of a proposition” 
is that for a proposition to be true, there must be practical or material implications. 
Thus, for him, for a conception of justification and objectivity to be realistic and 
informative, the interest that informs the epistemological investigation must be 
factored into it. For him, “much of what ordinarily passes as signs of objectivity 
(such as absence of individual biases in theorization or justification), may be 
understood as the product of normatively constrained social action” (Fuller, 1988, 
p. 51). 
The second factor upon which the traditional conception of normativity is built, 
according to Fuller, is a belief-theory of knowledge. Given that holding a belief is 
regarded as necessary condition for knowledge, the conceptualization of 
normativity in traditional epistemology is meant solely for evaluating individual 
beliefs. However, Fuller contends that this conception of “individual belief” 
excludes a wide range of collective human actions and other important 
institutionalized activities such as governmental policies which are not explicitly 
covered by the term “individual beliefs”. Alternatively, Fuller proposes a sense of 
epistemological “normativity judgements” that is based on the purpose of 
directing people’s actions rather than merely evaluating their beliefs. His point is 
that changing the course of people’s actions is normative, in the sense that there 
are goals and norms to guide towards their attainment. It is in this sense that he 
sees a social epistemologist as a policy maker or a social engineer. 
In articulating this new conception of normativity, Fuller argues that ethics 
provides two standpoints from which normative judgements can be made: Firstly, 
before someone acts so as to direct his action. Secondly, after someone acts, so 
as to evaluate his action (Fuller, 1988, p. 24). Social epistemology, according to 
Fuller, adopts the first standpoint. By choosing a model of normativity where the 
focus is essentially on moral actions rather than beliefs, Fuller hopes to circumvent 
the traditional belief-theory of knowledge. By locating the preoccupation of social 
epistemologists in the first standpoint of normativity provided by ethics (where 
the focus is more on prescription rather than evaluation of actions), Fuller hopes 
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to identify with Karl Marx on his maxim that “changing the world” is a greater task 
for philosophers than interpreting it (Fuller, 1988, p. 24).  
The similarity between Fuller’s position and Dewey’s naturalist epistemology is 
notable in the sense that both advocate for “practical epistemology” or 
“instrumental” conception of knowledge. Dewey presents knowledge in terms of 
practical activities or what he calls “action-doing”. He also rejects the traditional 
notion of justification in terms of preference for arguments that are more logical 
than their rivals and replaces the approach with the conception of justification in 
terms of choosing between hypothesis that are most likely to be instrumental in 
turning around a recalcitrant or precarious situation. 
We can summarise the uniqueness in Fuller’s conception of normativity in two 
ways. He contends that the concept of normativity that is developed around 
prescriptions on human actions is not only as legitimate as the conception of 
normativity built on evaluation of beliefs, it is more realistic. It is more realistic 
because it involves human overt actions and human interests and based on the 
argument that the quest for knowledge by the humans always presupposes some 
human interests and purposes. The realization of these purposes makes validation 
more real and easily discernible than what obtains in the traditional conception of 
normativity that is conceptualized around the notions of ideal rational knower and 
ideal investigations.  
For Fuller, the only way to give philosophers’ propensity for idealization some 
sociological credibility is to treat “idealization as an  elliptical form of social 
engineering” (1988, p. 24).115 Thus, for Fuller,  
when philosophers speak of the ideal rational knower, they too may be suggesting 
that our judgements of knowledge production should be taken in a more restricted 
social setting, with the philosopher’s preferred Method functioning as partial 
instructions for creating that setting (Fuller, 1988, p. 25).  
The suggestion here is that philosophers’ ideal rational knower can be interpreted 
as a kind of strategy or practice meant to establish certain facts about knowledge 
                                                     
115 Fuller acknowledges Francis Bacon as the ultimate source of this strategy (1988, p. 24). 
231 
 
in ideal or ‘sampled’ situations from which generalizations can be made. 
Interpreted in this way, normativity (in terms of idealizations) is regulatory in 
terms of directing epistemologists on how to conduct their research, have their 
findings endorsed as knowledge and so on.  However, for Fuller, interpreting the 
traditional conception of normativity in this way is still problematic since factoring 
the purpose of the norms into the concept of normativity, the “philosophers’ 
idealizations” will only provide “partial instructions” for social engineering.116  
Another important point of contrast is contained in Fuller’s argument that social 
epistemology derives its concept of normativity from what obtains in science. 
According to this view, in actual scientific practice, norms are derived or selected 
from the social organization of science. He calls this the “norm of coordination” 
and argues that it reflects the interdependent nature of scientific research (Fuller, 
1988, p. 269). For example, there is an increasing role that deference to expert 
opinion plays in science. He explains how this is actuated by the growing 
specialization that “expands the region of incompetence for any given individual”. 
Consequently, an individual ends up being able to test fewer of the claims on 
which his own decisions are forced to rely (Fuller, 1988, p. 269). He compares this 
“social” selection of norms in science with normative activities in philosophy 
where logical structures of arguments are inspected and experiments of one’s 
colleagues are replicated. (Fuller, 1988, p. 268). For Fuller, while normativity in 
science (and consequently in social epistemology) is systemic, normativity in 
traditional epistemology is characterised by what he pejoratively calls “the free 
pursuit of knowledge” (Fuller, 1988, p. 270). He thinks that the absence of a 
universal or systemic approach to normativity in philosophy renders the concept 
problematic. On the systemic nature of normativity in science, Fuller writes:  
                                                     
116 However, Fuller cites other problems that may contribute to the inadequacy of philosophers’  
idealizations playing the proper role of social engineering. One such problem he debates at length 
is the tendency of philosophers to regard their “methodology” as “self-certifying”. This is a problem 
that he sees as militating against attempts to reach optimal knowledge production (1988, pp. 25-
26). 
232 
 
For if what makes a norm “normative” is its possibility to be enforced”, then a 
necessary ingredient in the rational selection of a scientific norm is that the scientific 
community has the resources for enforcing the norm (Fuller, 1988, p.268).  
According to this view, social factors play decisive roles in belief formation and 
retention processes. Social interests also determine the choice of method and 
direction of investigation. One of the advantages of Fuller’s new conception of 
normativity  noted by Thomas Nickles, is that social epistemologists can 
legitimately raise  questions about how and to what extent the methodological 
proposals of philosophers are socially and psychologically possible (Nickles, 1988, 
p. ix).  
5.2.1.4 The Radical position and the conception of social epistemology as a 
sociological field 
In his Social Epistemology, I argue that Fuller wavers between presenting social 
epistemology as a thorough-going non-normative or descriptive sociological field 
and an enterprise with a revised notion of normativity. However, his tactical 
approaches such as redefining the concepts of knowledge and normativity, 
replacing the methods of traditional epistemology with empirical approaches 
peculiar to social sciences and recommending social factors as the sole focus of 
social epistemology, are meant to render social epistemology ultimately an 
extension of sociological investigation. He defines this tactical approach as 
“sociologizing traditional epistemology” (Fuller, 1988, p. 269). At this point, I 
briefly outline this “nonnormative” version. 
Fuller writes: 
[T]he key issues for me concern a fairly literal sense of “knowledge production” which 
includes how certain linguistic artifacts (“texts”) become certified as knowledge; the 
possible circulation patterns of these artifacts (especially how these “artifacts” are 
used to produce other such artifacts, as well as artifacts that have political and 
cultural consequences): and the production of certain attitudes on the part of the 
producers about the nature of the entire knowledge enterprise (such as the belief 
that it “progresses”) (Fuller, 1988, pp. xi-xii). 
From this view, Fuller compares the process of knowledge production and 
justification with the production of artifacts such as tools and appliances. Just as 
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the worthiness of a tool lies in its usefulness, the justification of a knowledge claim 
is determined by the consequences of holding it as justified. In this sense, Fuller’s 
nonnormative social epistemology contrasts with traditional epistemology in 
several ways. Firstly, the idea that epistemologists are preoccupied with a kind of 
general knowledge abstracted from all the notions of knowledge studied by 
specific disciplines, is rejected. For Fuller, there is no significant difference 
between knowledge that an epistemologist is discussing and what a policy maker 
or a biologist is dealing with. In both cases, knowledge is any rationally organized 
information that commands the consideration of members of some relevant 
cognitive community. Fuller’s point is that the production of knowledge is not 
different from the way other material commodities are produced, distributed and 
utilized in society and consequently the methodological approach in this version 
of epistemology is not different from empirical investigations that characterise 
disciplines such as political economy or technology- where what is produced is 
based on what is needed.   
Another peculiarity of Fuller’s nonnormative sociologized epistemology is that 
traditional epistemological worries about “whether our beliefs in an external 
world are veridical or justified” are now irrelevant (Fuller, 1988, p. xi). What is 
important is, from Fuller’s view, is what science tells us about our beliefs and their 
connection with the physical world. This is because social epistemology as a 
subfield in science, derives its foundation from the practice, norms and paradigms 
within science.  
In summary, Fuller and Kitcher present social epistemology as a new field that is 
closer to sociology than philosophy. This position is called “radical” because it 
argues that social factors are ultimate in belief-formulation and retention. More 
important, the position rejects some of the goals of traditional epistemology such 
as refuting scepticism that contends that the attainment of knowledge is 
impossible and providing a foundation for scientific knowledge in a way that 
amplifies the autonomy of epistemology. Most importantly, the focus on attitudes 
toward propositions is replaced with a focus on human actions. The question is, is 
the radical position successful? I now critique the radical position. 
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5.2.1.5 Critique of radical social epistemology 
The critique of the radical position is in two phases. Firstly, I discuss how the radical 
position defended by Fuller and Kitcher invites the problem of relativism. I see this 
problem as the most serious problem confronting this position. In the second 
phase, I turn to the moderate position and explore how it offers further critique 
of the radical position. I focus on how moderate social epistemologists have 
argued that scholars such as Fuller and Kitcher have exaggerated the importance 
or role of social factors in epistemology. I also examine the objections they have 
raised against Fuller’s conception of normativity and the notion that social 
epistemology is ultimately a sociological enterprise. I start with the problem of 
relativism. 
5.2.1.5.1 Radical social epistemology and the problem of relativism 
One objection against the presentation of social epistemology by Fuller and 
Kitcher is that if social factors or interests become the primary focus of social 
epistemology (or epistemology generally), this will unavoidably introduce 
different and incompatible social contexts into considerations about knowledge. 
Each social context will be characterised by different practices and parameters and 
this will actuate different notions of knowledge and theories of justification. The 
outcome will be different societies and other groups (e.g. disciplines) having their 
own independent versions of truth, knowledge, and justification. 
Fuller noted this challenge of relativism in a position he credited to both Larry 
Laudan and Karl Mannheim. Laudan and Mannheim admitted that “sociological 
accounts of our cognitive pursuits are appropriate only when those pursuits fail by 
universally acceptable standards of reality” (Fuller, 1988, p. 4). Laudan’s 
assumption is that philosophy is committed to defining a single, all-encompassing 
set of rational standards- the goal of philosophical research. In this sense, a 
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sociological account of knowledge, with its relativised standard of rationality, is a 
poor man’s epistemology.117  
Kitcher also admits the possibility of relativism in this version of social 
epistemology when he writes that, 
One route that social epistemology can take at this juncture is to adopt a full-blooded 
relativism, averring that the types of entities that can count as items of knowledge 
are as diverse as the “forms of life” in which they are embedded, and that the 
standards of knowledge are simply those of social acceptance. It is enough that an 
instrument, diagram, or text is “reproduced and circulated,” or that it forms “part of 
an enduring network” within a society-under such conditions it counts as an item of 
knowledge within that society. There are apparent losses in settling for relativism-
most obviously, the possibility of drawing a distinction between what is current in a 
society and what is genuine knowledge (Kitcher, 1994, pp. 117-118). 
Why should Fuller care about this problem of relativism? How serious is it? For 
instance, if social epistemology is a new field with its own goals, notion of 
normativity and methodologies different from traditional epistemology, then, 
can’t Fuller argue that the problem of relativism is only relevant to a traditional 
epistemologist who is interested in conceptualizations such as absolute truth or 
universal knowledge? Is this response strong enough to establish that the charge 
of relativism begs the question against Fuller? I don’t think so. 
I think traditional epistemologists are interested in defining and understanding 
some basic notions such as knowledge and truth. This is the most fundamental 
among the goals of traditional epistemology. Other goals, such as proving that 
knowledge is attainable or that the sceptics can be refuted, are meaningful only 
after we have successfully defined and understood these concepts.118 I believe 
that if ‘social epistemology’ is to count as “epistemology”, it must start from these 
                                                     
117 There are two routes to this argument. First, we can consider theories such as Utilitarianism and 
Kant’s categorical imperatives as defining a single, all-encompassing set of rational standards and 
contend with the challenge about their all-encompassing nature. Alternatively, we can consider 
the conception of objectivity (as traditionally construed) as defining rational standards and 
contend with challenges such as offered by feminist philosophers that such senses of objectivity 
are themselves biased. The exploration of both routes is beyond the scope of this section. 
118  The moral from Meno (the dialogue between Socrates and Meno) is that defining what 
knowledge is, is different from citing examples of knowledge. Fuller seems to have fallen into this 
trap by presenting the effectives of public policies as a proof that the attainment of knowledge 
circumvents the need to refute the sceptics who contend that knowledge attainment is impossible. 
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basic questions, or Fuller’s argument that knowledge is important for social 
engineering will not make sense. The reason is that, defining or analysing basic 
concepts is a preliminary step expected in any analytical discourse. If social 
epistemologists such as Fuller and Kitcher take on these basic questions, it will be 
problematic to define knowledge and truth (for instance) as whatever each society 
regards as knowledge or truth.  
As Kitcher rightly noted, one of the losses of relativism is that whatever is called 
knowledge, truth or justified, will be valid only relatively to a specific society or 
culture. Consequently, the concepts of context-independent truth, objectivity or 
validity will just disappear. If Fuller is right that the interests of a society determine 
what is regarded as “knowledge”, “normative” and justified, we can envisage a 
more worrisome relativism in societies where there are significant differences 
among the interests of the comprising groups, ethnic or tribal affiliations and more 
importantly where one group is politically more powerful than the others. 
A vivid picture of relativism based on inherent social differences is provided by 
Wittgenstein in his discussion of his language -game analogy and how it involves 
“forms of life” that are different from one culture to another. In his analogy of two 
cultures: in which members of one culture use propositions of physics in guiding 
their actions and members of the other culture use an oracle, Wittgenstein writes, 
609. Supposing we met people who do not regard that as a telling reason. Now, how 
do we imagine this? Instead of the physicist, they consult an oracle. (And for that we 
consider them primitive.) Is it wrong for them to consult an oracle and be guided by 
it? - If we call this ‘wrong’ aren’t we using our language-game as a base from which 
to combat theirs?   
611. Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one 
another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic. 
612. I said I would ‘combat’ the other man, - but wouldn’t I give him reasons? 
Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion 
(Wittgenstein, 1969, pp. 609-616). 
The lesson from Wittgenstein is that when we have two incompatible positions 
coming from two different forms of life, or practices from two different cultures, 
there is no rational or objective basis (independent of language-game in each 
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forms of life) for saying one is wrong and the other is correct. For him, to judge 
one form of life as better or superior, we must use the criteria in one form of life 
to judge the other and this for him is sheer prejudice. The question is, what is left 
for epistemology? Wittgenstein’s reply is that understanding the differences 
inherent in different forms of life often in fact does go a long way in resolving 
conflicts. Two questions that are pertinent are: (i) could understanding of 
differences inherent in different cultures lead to the dissolution of cultural or 
social relativism? (ii) Is understanding the goal of epistemology?   
However, one can object to Wittgenstein’s position by arguing that although 
“understanding” our cultural differences is a kind of knowledge, it is not part of 
the primary objectives of epistemology. If it were understanding, it is arguable that 
the business of epistemology would have terminated at the level where different 
forms of beliefs are described or asserted. The primary goal is defining and 
understanding knowledge. This goal prompts the need to make a distinction 
between knowledge and belief on one hand and the conceptualizations of truth 
and justification, on the other hand.  
However, the history of traditional epistemology has shown consistent interest in 
and preoccupation with the kind of truth that Wittgenstein called “unconditional”- 
a truth that is not relative to any individual, culture or social context. As rightly 
noted by Wilson, philosophers tend to suppose that “only one of the candidate 
paradigms treating a given phenomenon is correct… Hume did not just offer his 
account of causation as a logically or metaphysically possible alternative – he 
thought that it was the only viable such account…” (Wilson, 2014, p. 147). 
Philosophers such Stroud, Kim, Kornblith and Goldman have argued extensively 
that if the concept of normativity is taken out of epistemology, it loses its essential 
nature (Goldman, 1993b; Kim, 1994; Kornblith, 1994b; Stroud, 1985).  
Radical social epistemologists are challenging the notion of unconditional or 
absolute truth that dominates traditional epistemology. Dewey also rejects this 
notion of truth. However, while radical social epistemologists are confronted with 
question how can social epistemology be regarded as a normative enterprise 
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when there is no non-contextualised rational basis for making a distinction 
between what is regarded as true and what a society regarded as accepted, 
Dewey’s position identifies some fundamental bases, such as the need to solve 
some natural challenges that are similar in all social contexts. Again, while radical 
social epistemologists are confronted with the question on what basis can social 
epistemology be regarded as an epistemology when both are substantively 
dissimilar, Dewey’s position identifies the differences between traditional 
epistemology and social epistemology, as well as some basis for seeing the latter 
as continuous with the former. This is what makes Dewey’s theory of knowledge 
invaluable. I turn to discuss moderate social epistemology. 
5.2.2 Articulating moderate social epistemology. 
In this section I start the discussion by stating the concession of epistemologists 
such as Kornblith and Goldman, that traditional epistemology has been largely 
dominated by the focus on individuals and their attempts to use their cognitive 
endowments and abilities to establish the possibility of knowledge. I then discuss 
their accounts of the role of social factors in philosophical theories about 
knowledge. I argue that, while for Goldman, social factors necessarily must be 
included to widen the purview of traditional epistemology and make it adequate, 
for Kornblith, consideration of social factors has always been there. For him, 
traditional epistemologists only regard individual factors as primary while social 
factors are secondary. I discuss what he meant by these terms and link this with 
the point that both epistemologists hold social epistemology as continuous with 
traditional epistemology. This is a point that makes it reasonable to describe their 
position on social epistemology as moderate. I explore the argument that while 
both epistemologists favour interdisciplinary approaches to knowledge, a radical 
social epistemology (as presented by Fuller) is unacceptable to them. Put 
differently, I explore their continuation of a relatively distinct philosophical 
approach to knowledge within the framework of an interdisciplinary approach. 
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5.2.2.1 The role of social and individual factors in an “expanded” traditional 
epistemology  
Kornblith and Goldman agree with the radical social epistemologist that traditional 
epistemology has paid more attention to individuals in their account of knowledge 
than social factors. Kornblith admits this when he writes that the focus of 
traditional epistemology 
[H]as resulted primarily in an examination of perceptual and inferential mechanisms- 
ones which are located entirely within individuals, and ones which are typically 
investigated in ways which abstract away from their social setting. But the 
mechanisms of belief production and retention extend far beyond perceptual and 
inferential equipment located in individual heads, and include social structures and 
institutions which are equally appropriate objects of investigation…. And just as we 
need to examine our perceptual and inferential equipment against the background of 
the natural environment in which they operate, we also need to investigate these 
mechanisms against the background of the social environment in which they operate. 
Such investigations are straightforward extensions of the naturalistic project in 
epistemology (Kornblith, 1994a, p. 97). 
Goldman also has this to say about the necessity of widening the scope of 
epistemology: 
Epistemology has historically been preoccupied with individual knowers and their 
minds. This preoccupation has a plausible rationale. Knowers are individuals, and 
knowledge is generated by mental processes and lodged in the mind-brain…. But 
concentration on the individual to the exclusion of the social is inappropriate. The 
bulk of an adult’s world view is deeply indebted to her social world. It can largely be 
traced to social interactions, to influence exerted by other knowers, primarily through 
the vehicle of language. It is imperative, then, for epistemology to have a social 
dimension (Goldman, 1992, p. 179). 
Goldman and Kornblith contend that, although traditional epistemology has been 
individualistic in its approach, it can develop a social dimension. For Kornblith, 
epistemologists should acknowledge the impacts of social mechanisms such as 
language, social structures, rules, and interactions of people on the formulation of 
their theories of knowledge. Specifically, these impacts are in two dimensions: 
how beliefs are formed and how they are retained. Consequently, these social 
factors and mechanisms such as the brain, the senses, and other psychological 
endowments which are peculiar to individuals, will now constitute the focus of 
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epistemology. Language is a social phenomenon in the sense of being a product of 
social interaction. Also, in the process of justifying beliefs, which Kornblith rightly 
describes as characterised by the practice of “giving and asking for reasons”, a 
community of inquirers with some socially established rule of engagements will 
also be acknowledged as indispensable (2002, p. 97).  
Goldman gives a more detailed account of how traditional epistemology can 
qualify as social. For him, there are three types of social epistemology. Firstly, 
there is a type of social epistemology in terms of a “refurbished” traditional 
epistemology. Traditional epistemology becomes social when epistemologists re-
introduce its long-neglected evidential source, namely: testimony, or the 
statements one hears (or read) from other persons. According to Goldman, “if 
another person testifies to the truth of P, a hearer acquires a new source of prima 
facie evidence for P” (2011, p. 13). He contends that the importance of testimony 
as an evidential source has gained ground in recent time. Goldman’s main point is 
that in recognizing testimony of others as a source of evidence (like other sources 
of evidence such as perception and reasoning), traditional epistemology will 
become social because it will involve interactions among a collection of people 
who influence one another in the processes of belief formation and retention. 
Secondly, there is a type of social epistemology, according to Goldman, that “takes 
group agents as its subject matter, collective entities that make doxastic choices 
or decisions”. Thirdly, there is a type of social epistemology that “takes epistemic 
systems” as its subject matter. An epistemic system “is a social system that houses 
a variety of procedures, institutions, and patterns of interpersonal influences that 
affect the epistemic outcomes of its members” (Goldman, 2011, p. 13). For the 
present purposes, I will focus on the first version of Goldman’s social 
epistemology. 
The claim of Kornblith and Goldman appears to be a modest position when we 
compare it with Fuller’s. These epistemologists are drawing attention to the 
indispensability or equal importance of both individual-based factors and social 
factors. Their position challenges the radical position because it implies that 
epistemology is social all the way down. They argue that no matter how great the 
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influence of social phenomena on the process of belief formation, the existence 
of naturally (and non-socially) endowed native psychological equipment: the 
brain, the senses and other natural endowments that are used in the production 
of beliefs, will remain indispensable. These mechanisms are not reducible to social 
factors. More important, the reliability or otherwise of the non-social factors are 
equally indispensable in  every attempt to evaluate or justify a claim to knowledge 
(Kornblith, 1994a, p. 101). Kornblith’s point is that we can appeal to social and 
cultural differences when we are explaining the differences between how people 
observe rules of etiquette like greetings, table manners, nature of hospitality to 
strangers and so on, but differences in perceptual beliefs cannot be explained 
completely by social factors (1994a, p. 102). We have to appeal to differences in 
the functioning of individuals’ perceptual apparatuses.  
My take on this debate is that both Goldman and Kornblith disagree with Fuller’s 
idea that social epistemology is a new field in social science. Both see social 
epistemology as an expansion of traditional epistemology. Kornblith’s argument 
on the indispensability of the individual physiological equipment in belief 
formation is meant to preserve the focus of traditional epistemology. Goldman’s 
quest to add the testimonies of others to the sources of beliefs is also to preserve 
this focus. The radical social epistemologists cannot do so without forfeiting their 
position. On the other hand, what I think moderate epistemologists need to prove 
wrong is Fuller’s argument that, in respect of validation of knowledge, social 
factors are the only factors to be acknowledged. Consequently, we have a mutual 
disagreement concerning the nature of social epistemology. I now explore how 
disagreement between radical and moderate social epistemologists on the nature 
of normativity further complicates the understanding of the nature of social 
epistemology. 
 5.2.2.2 The moderate position and the critique of the conception of 
normativity in radical social epistemology 
In our articulation of Fuller’s position, it is noted how he wavers on whether social 
epistemology should be regarded strictly as a social and descriptive enterprise and 
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consequently needs no account of normativity or should be regarded as a 
normative enterprise with a different notion of normativity. In this section, I 
concentrate on his conception of social epistemology with a notion of normativity 
that is radically different from what obtains in traditional epistemology. This is 
because this reading of Fuller is more nuanced than his consideration of social 
epistemology as a purely descriptive enterprise. 
Kornblith objects to Fuller’s idea that the nature of normativity in social 
epistemology is different. He challenges Fuller’s contention that the processes 
involved in the retention of beliefs are solely social. He buttresses his point by 
making a distinction between reflecting on one’s beliefs (which he called individual 
metacognition) and reflecting on one’s beliefs through engagement in the social 
practice of giving and asking for reasons (which he called social metacognition) 
(Kornblith, 2002, p. 70).Thus for Kornblith: 
The suggestion that the normative standards that apply to knowledge claims arise 
only out of shared social practices, however, is not clearly true. While social practices 
may give rise to normative commitments that would not have existed without them, 
they may also simply reflect normative demands that exist independently of those 
practices…The institutions and practices reflect a social recognition of a pre-existing 
normative demand; they do not bring it into existence (Kornblith, 2002, pp. 92-93). 
 
For Kornblith, we can locate some kind of normative appraisal at the level of 
individuals who are engaging the world with natural endowments such as the 
ability to perceive, think and make inferences. What we need to establish, his 
contention goes, is that our ability to think and make inferences is not ultimately 
dependent on social interactions. He seems to be challenging his opponents to 
imagine pre-social individuals who naturally were not capable of perceiving, 
thinking and making inferences; the level of crudeness and dangers of inaccuracy 
notwithstanding. Inferences are judgements and judgements are inseparable from 
some level of normativity. Consequently, for Kornblith, every epistemic judgement 
is dependent on individuals who are perceiving, thinking, and making inferences 
from these experiences.  
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Kornblith and Goldman contend that epistemological problems (such as 
perceptual relativity and infinite regress in the justification of beliefs) that 
motivate traditional epistemologists to investigate the reliability of individual 
factors (perceptual mechanisms, the human brain) that are involved in the 
formation and retention of beliefs, also motivate investigations into social factors 
or social dimensions of knowledge. One of these considerations is the attainment 
of truth and avoidance of errors in the process of knowledge acquisition which 
epistemologists hope to secure by examining all causal factors involved and 
thereby strengthen the established conditions that are necessary and sufficient 
for the attainment of knowledge. In any attempt to identify or weigh the epistemic 
worth of social factors in a theory of knowledge, Kornblith suggests two important 
questions that he thinks should provide a necessary guide: 
First, one may ask whether the role which the identified social factor plays is 
conducive to the production of true belief. Second, assuming that the first question 
has been answered in the affirmative, one may ask whether the presence of the social 
factor itself has any special connection with the production of true belief. These are 
important questions for epistemologists to be asking, and they point in the direction 
of an important class of social explanations (Kornblith, 1994a, p. 103). 
Kornblith’s point is that the inclusion of social factors in the process of belief 
justification does not alter the evaluative processes that are established in 
traditional epistemology. The question how to justify our beliefs in an objective 
and impartial way is still the main concern. According to Kornblith, social 
epistemology shares this attribute with naturalized epistemology- both of them 
investigate both mechanisms for belief production and retention (1994a). 
In his support of Kornblith’s claim that the inclusion of social factors in 
epistemology does not alter the concern of epistemology in terms of avoidance of 
error, Goldman notes the “much-discussed problems of social evidence” in terms 
of “peer disagreements” (2011, p. 15). He sees this problem as a pointer to the 
fact that inconsistency and even irrationality arises in collective attitudes as much 
as in individual attitudes (Goldman, 2011, p. 17). Besides, Goldman contends that 
people (individuals) make epistemological and scientific breakthroughs even amid 
stiff opposition from their peers and social authorities. He cites Galileo’s exploits 
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in natural science to underscore the point that successful individual epistemic 
investigators are the cornerstone upon which community knowledge is built 
(2011, pp. 31-32). This point seems to corroborate Laudan’s view that social 
factors such as norms are generically traceable to contributions from some 
individuals that have become idealized over some time.  
How adequate is Kornblith’s and Goldman’s response to Fuller’s contention that 
evaluation of knowledge is solely social? Fuller argues that the conceptualization 
of norms that guide social epistemology is determined by social interests and its 
guidelines are administered by established social institutions. The use of public 
language in the expression of beliefs and in the practice of asking and giving 
reasons for holding beliefs also corroborates Fuller’s claim. Kornblith and 
Goldman’s objection is that the norms for determining how beliefs are retained, 
the rules about how language is used and the interests of the society are not self-
generating- they cannot be formed or meaningfully understood without reference 
to individuals. From this point, their objection is that the argument that the 
processes for ratifying beliefs are solely social, is too strong. Their moderate claim 
seems to be fair enough; that the role of individuals in the formation and 
maintenance of norms for retention of beliefs is indispensable and irreducible. 
This claim rests on the ontological claim that individuals and their activities make 
up the community, the “social” and “social factors”.     
On this moderate claim, Kornblith’s description of the importance and 
irreducibility of the role of individual epistemic agents in terms of “epistemic 
responsibilism” is notable. He writes:    
 
Although it is clearly true that beliefs are not freely chosen, the actions which an agent 
freely chose to perform may well affect the processes by which his beliefs are arrived 
at, and thus the beliefs themselves. It is thus that we may assess an agent, or an 
agent’s character, by examining the process responsible for the presence of his beliefs 
just as we may evaluate an agent, or his character by examining the etiology of his 
actions (Kornblith, 1985, p. 121). 
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Kornblith’s strategy lies in seeing the long processes of knowledge (from formation 
to retention of beliefs, starting from individuals and ending in the ratification by 
social institutions) as a continuum where a mistake or any epistemically 
“irresponsible act” of an individual can affect the entire processes. An error from 
some faulty perceptual mechanisms of an individual or some wrong calculations, 
may generate a false belief that goes unnoticed and is accepted as knowledge by 
ratifying institutions. Also, an individual epistemic agent may falsify his research 
and get away with it. All these instances point to the importance of individuals in 
the process of knowledge formation. 
Lorraine Code corroborates Kornblith’s claim when she contrasts the concept of 
“epistemic responsibilism” with “mechanical” epistemic reliabilism to emphasise 
the active nature of individual knowers: 
The concept of ‘responsibility’ can allow emphasis on the active nature of the 
knower/believer that the concept of ‘reliability’ cannot. In my view, a 
knower/believer has an important degree of choice with regard to modes of cognitive 
structuring and is accountable for these choices. A ‘reliable’ knower could simply be 
an accurate, but relatively passive, recorder of experience… A person can be judged 
responsible or irresponsible only if she/he is clearly to be regarded as an agent (in this 
case a cognitive agent) in the circumstances in question (Code, 1985, pp. 39-40). 
 
Here, Lorraine Code agrees with Kornblith that it is contributions from individuals 
that establish and expand the horizon of knowledge. According to this view, there 
are decisions, methodological approaches, and practices that may be peculiar to 
individual knowers and which in the course of their successful applications 
become conventional models or standards which Code describes as “idealized 
settings”. 119  Rorty acknowledges these idealized settings and paradigms but 
argues that they are not static. His statement that “we shall not know where the 
real limits are unless we keep on hurling ourselves against apparent limits” (Rorty, 
                                                     
119  Lorraine Code often describes the laboratory and a priori conditions (usually regarded as 
necessary for objective knowledge in traditional epistemology) as idealized settings and contrasts 
them with diverse, contextualized and concrete engagements she often describes as “standpoints” 
or a “situated” approach (Code, 1985, 2006). Other feminists have emphasized this point of view, 
for instance, Sandra Harding (2005).  
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2010, p.527), arguably refers to individuals who are not taking what society 
presents as ideal for granted.120  
This argument, shared by Kornblith and Code, was noticed in Laudan’s work by 
Fuller. According to Fuller, “Laudan thinks the main challenge to the sociology of 
knowledge is that the reasoning of the scientific community may be closer to an 
idealized standard of rationality than the sociologists are willing to admit” (Fuller, 
1988, p. 268). In other words, social norms and normative institutions that 
sociologists are tagging as “solely social factors” independent of individuals, at one 
time are “ideals” of individuals that later became generally accepted as social 
norms and paradigms.  
In his dismissal of Laudan’s contention, Fuller argues that the formation, 
application and maintenance of norms in science is systemic. By this, he means 
that norms in science developed as institutions. In this sense, the idea of norms 
developing from individuals (which he sees as peculiar to philosophy) does not 
apply in science. He further distinguishes normativity in science from what obtains 
in philosophy by stating that what makes norms normative in science lies in the 
ability and the resources at the disposal of the scientific community to enforce 
them (Fuller, 1988, pp. 268-269). 
How plausible is Fuller’s response? I think he is right that there is no reason why 
some norms cannot develop as institutions, but he will be overstretching his point 
by making it a rule for all norms. Merton (1973, pp. 270-278) provides four 
principal norms in science: the norm that anybody can contribute to science 
without racial prejudices (universalism) and the norm in respect of common 
ownership of intellectual goods or property in science for the purpose of collective 
collaboration (communalism) are indisputably institutionally developed. However, 
the norms in respect of the necessity of critical scrutiny (organised scepticism) and 
the idea that science is not for personal gain (disinterestedness), need not develop 
                                                     
120The cases of Galileo (who refused the limitations set up by the society of his time) and Edmund 
Gettier (who challenged the popular definition of knowledge as justified true belief) provide good 
examples.   
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as an institution, might be practiced by individuals in isolation. Besides, Fuller’s 
intention to distinguish normativity in science (social epistemology) and 
normativity in traditional epistemology arguably suffers a setback because the last 
two norms are common in philosophy. 
One major objection to Fuller is that he misses an important aspect of the position 
shared by Laudan, Kornblith and Code. For these scholars, some individual ideals 
become norms in the society after they are established as true, truth-conductive 
or proven to be pragmatically useful, in scientific, philosophical, moral or social 
considerations. Fuller’s explanation that norms are normative by virtue of being 
enforceable is controversial. Scholars have objected that people follow norms 
because they seem right. For Philip Pettit, “neither compliance nor enforcement 
need have any element of the normative”. Rather, he argues that “retaliation 
against offenders and other forms of punishment provide strong explanation for 
why people hold norms to be normative” (2010). 121  This argument arguably 
strengthens the position of moderate social epistemologists that the concept of 
normativity is not solely social. 
However, feminists such as Sandra Harding reject concentration on both the 
individual and social factors discussed above as constituting the proper focus of a 
social epistemology. For her, both positions are regarded as “conventionalist” or 
“Universalist” accounts of knowledge and reality. According to her, the conception 
of “socially situated knowledge” from the “conventional accounts” involves a 
contradiction in the sense that “in order to achieve the status of knowledge, 
beliefs are supposed to break free of – to transcend – their original ties to local, 
historical interests, values, and agendas” (Harding, 2005, pp. 218-219). In lieu of 
these positions, Harding’s suggestion is that the adoption of the two claims of 
“standpoint epistemology” will provide a fundamental road map for epistemology: 
how to get an account of the “real world” and how to arrive at a kind of “strong 
objectivity” that social epistemology cannot do without. The two claims are: (i) 
                                                     
121 Quine gives a similar account of why people obey moral rules- in terms of considerations based 
on reward-penalty (pleasure-pain). See, (1981b, p. 55). 
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start thought from marginalised lives and (ii) take everyday life as problematic 
(Harding, 2005, p. 219). With the first claim, it is arguable that Harding is 
suggesting a kind of social factor that can be called a “group factor”. This “group 
factor” has specific focus on the experience of women and other marginalised 
groups. In the second claim, we have a basis for the conceptualization of 
normativity in the study of the social dimension of knowledge- a problem-solving 
basis. This approach can be compared with Fuller’s “interest-based” approach.122 
One advantage in Harding’s position is that it provides a way of merging both 
moderate and radical positions on social epistemology. There is an emphasis on 
the need to attend to concrete human problems as a subject-matter of social 
epistemology. There is also a suggestion about institutional approach towards 
theorizing and solving these problems. However, one problem with Harding’s 
position is that focusing on the experience of marginalised groups in society will 
foster a narrow kind of social epistemology with its particularistic scope.123 For 
instance, one can ask how this account applies to, for example, physics. It becomes 
necessary at this point to consider how taking a Deweyan approach would advance 
the debate. 
5.3 Dewey as a social epistemologist 
Dewey’s name is rarely associated with social epistemology in the manner that 
Wittgenstein’s name is usually associated with the conception of knowledge as a 
social phenomenon through his language-game-knowledge analogy. The purpose 
of this section is to argue that Dewey’s naturalistic epistemology offers original 
and rich views on social epistemology that can put it on firmer ground.  
I start this discussion by articulating how Dewey explains individual and social 
dimensions of knowledge in his naturalist epistemology. In doing so, I note some 
                                                     
122 I dwell further on the advantages that the “problematic approach” has over Fuller’s “interest 
approach” in the subsequent section on Dewey’s social epistemology. 
123 One may disagree by arguing that “the marginalised” have privileged access to knowledge about 
social relations and that standpoint is earned through collective struggle that provides insights. 
However, I argue that by the concept of “marginalization”, a sub-group within a wider group is 
implied. 
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significant similarities in Dewey’s and Fuller’s critique of traditional epistemology 
and how this critique provides insights into their conceptions of the social 
dimension of knowledge. Specifically, I note similarities such as the rejection of 
abstract conceptions of knowledge, and the idea that community or human 
interests play significant roles in the quest for knowledge. I then discuss how some 
notable differences in Dewey’s position rescue it from problems that confront 
Fuller’s account, such as relativism, reductionism, and scientism. I also explore 
how Dewey, like the moderate social epistemologists, is disposed to the idea of an 
interdisciplinary approach to questions about knowledge, without a philosophical 
approach (epistemology) being reduced to other cognitive fields. 
Finally, I turn to some unique positions in Dewey’s epistemology that can broaden 
the purview of contemporary social epistemology. Such unique positions include 
his social conception of the community of inquirers, his position on cultural 
naturalism and his social theory of the human mind. I argue that addressing these 
issues will shed light on the question whether social epistemic factors are 
reducible to individual epistemic factors. I conclude by arguing that Dewey’s 
naturalist approach offers a resourceful account of the social dimension of 
knowledge. I start by discussing how Dewey’s naturalist account of knowledge 
explains the role of the individual and the collective in the formation and retention 
of beliefs. I also note how these activities take place in socially regulated inquiries. 
I start with the roles of individuals and the collective in Dewey’s naturalist 
epistemology. 
5.3.1 The individual and the collective in Dewey’s naturalist epistemology 
In Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Dewey writes, 
The environment in which human beings live, act and inquire, is not simply physical. 
It is cultural as well. Problems which induce inquiry grow out of the relations of fellow 
beings to one another, and the organs for dealing with these relations are not only 
the eye and the ear, but meanings which have developed in the course of living, 
together with the ways of forming and transmitting culture with all its constituents of 
tools, arts, institutions, traditions and customary beliefs (J. Dewey, 1991, p. 48). 
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Dewey’s major point is that both individual and social factors are important in the 
study of knowledge. Human sense organs are used in gathering information that 
is indispensable in the process of forming beliefs, and language is used in 
processing this information into ideas and for transmitting them to others. We can 
identify Dewey’s position with that of moderate social epistemologists such as 
Kornblith and Goldman. However, it is arguable that he presents an account of 
how both factors are important or indispensable in inquiries about knowledge as 
natural human activity. The impression created by Kornblith and Goldman is that 
the need to acknowledge social factors becomes imperative when it dawns on 
epistemologists that relying alone on individual factors is inadequate. This is 
Dewey’s naturalism. We have discussed his version of naturalism at length in 
chapter 1 and its metaphysical and epistemological dimensions in chapters 2 and 
3, respectively. Consequently, I will not repeat the discussion here. Rather, for 
present purposes, I recall some aspects of his explanation for the claim that 
problems which induce inquiry grow out of the relations of fellow beings to one 
another and briefly reflect on how it points to what I label social naturalism. I also 
recall how his distinction between “self-action” and “interaction” serves as a 
critique of moderate social epistemologists. 
Dewey’s account of the development from the primary stage of experience to the 
secondary indicates a natural and unbroken expansion or development of human 
knowledge. Dewey describes the direct physical contacts made with nature by 
humans as crude because they are generally isolated and consequently less social 
and less-reflective.124 The implication of the absence of collaborative reflection is 
that there is no knowledge and where there is no (socially) regulated inquiry, there 
is no knowledge (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 6-7). This is a strong point that supports the 
position of radical social epistemologists. However, it is notable that Dewey 
attaches much importance to the purpose to which an epistemological inquiry is 
                                                     
124 We noted in chapter three that it does not make sense to argue that when things are “had, used 
and enjoyed” (primary experience) there is no reflection. Rather, Dewey’s position should be read 
as stating that in primary experience, there is absence of collaborative reflections. Sometimes, 
Dewey contrasts the two stages of experience by saying that “The distinction is one between what 
is experienced as the result of a minimum of incidental reflection and what is experienced in 
consequence of continued and regulated reflected inquiry”(J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 6-7). 
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committed- the problem that initiates an inquiry or quest for knowledge. Without 
this problem, inquiry cannot even commence meaningfully or have a direction. For 
Dewey, problems that do trigger off inquiries ultimately have their roots in the 
individualistic, less-reflective, crude human experience. More importantly, the 
success of inquiry is determined by the extent to which this crude primary 
experience is “enlarged” or rendered “sophisticated”. This is a strong point that 
favours the position of moderate social epistemologists. 
In addition, we can also recall how in Dewey’s work, the concept of “interaction” 
is often used synonymously with “transaction” and “experience” in terms of a 
symbiotic relation between human organism and environment (J. Dewey, 1925, 
pp. 212, 230-237, 351). We described this version “organism-environment” 
interaction. However, we remarked on how he also uses the concept to denote 
purpose-oriented social relationships within the human species (J. Dewey & 
Bentley, 1949, p. 108). We called this “social interaction”. Social actions, such as a 
traffic policeman regulating the movements of motor cars, are only meaningful 
from the purview of common goals such as orderliness and public safety. These 
actions are made necessary with the help of rules and sanctions (J. Dewey, 1925, 
pp. 155-156). Dewey contrasted this social dimension of “interaction” with “self-
action” by defining the latter in terms of individual members of the human species 
acting in some ways independently of others (J. Dewey & Bentley, 1949, pp. 72, 
108).  
What is the significance of this distinction between “interaction” and “self-action”? 
It is arguable that Dewey used “self-action” pejoratively to refer to some theories 
in traditional metaphysics in which “souls”, “minds”, “selves”, “powers” or “forces” 
are taken as activating events (J. Dewey & Bentley, 1949, p. 72). To this version of 
metaphysics his naturalist metaphysics offers a comprehensive critique. It is also 
arguable that he extends this pejorative description (and his critique) to the 
practice in traditional epistemology where the meditation, speculation and 
thinking of individuals are recognized as knowledge-generating. However, “self-
action” in a non-pejorative sense, for Dewey, will include human activities or 
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doings which he called esthetic experience. 125  More importantly, it will cover 
those activities of individual members of the community that initiate inquiries:  
To a very large extent the ways in which human beings respond even to physical 
conditions are influenced by their cultural environment. Light and fire are physical 
facts. But the occasions in which a human being responds to things as merely physical 
in purely physical ways are comparatively rare. Such occasions are act of jumping 
when a sudden noise is heard, withdrawing the hand when something hot is touched, 
blinking in the presence of a sudden increased light, animal-like basking in the 
sunshine, etc. Such reactions are on the biological plane. But the typical cases of 
human behaviour are not represented by these examples… Man, as Aristotle 
remarked, is a social animal. The fact introduces him into situations and originates 
problems and ways of solving them that have no precedent upon the biological level 
(J. Dewey, 1991, pp. 48-49). 
My contention is that Dewey recognizes “self-actions” as predominant in the stage 
of raw and less-reflective human transaction within nature otherwise known as 
“primary experience”. Given that secondary experience has its origin in primary 
experience, the self-actions, arguably, are raw transactions with nature that 
trigger a quest for knowledge. The sensation of eating an apple or stepping on hot 
metal are unique to individuals and generate different and subjective awareness, 
assessments and reports, which in standard forms, are beliefs. The incompatibility 
of these beliefs among individuals creates problematic or indeterminate situations 
which kick-start inquiries at the individual level leading to a wider community of 
inquirers. From this interpretation, it seems that Dewey subscribes to the 
argument of social epistemologists such as Kornblith stressing the importance of 
individual factors in belief-formation processes.  
However, Dewey’s point on the social nature of inquiry is important. For him, 
inquiries are characterised by rule-following and common goal-oriented activities. 
More pointedly, by placing the terminus of the processes of inquiry and 
justification in the secondary stage of experience, there is a suggestion that Dewey 
subscribed to the view that the process of epistemic justification is ultimately 
social. However, his contention that “there is no breach of continuity between the 
operation of inquiry and biological operations and physical operations” (J. Dewey, 
                                                     
125 I will shed more light on the social nature of esthetic experience in section 5.10.2. 
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1991, p. 26), suggests that he is not committed to the separation of social facts 
from individual facts as emphasized in the position of radical social epistemologists 
such as Fuller. 
From the trend of our discussion, it is evident that both positions maintained by 
the protagonists in the contemporary debate about the nature of social 
epistemology are equally prominent in Dewey’s naturalist philosophy but in a 
clarified manner. I contend that Dewey’s position does not end in a mere truce. I 
believe that he was able to defuse the tension generated by the question of 
primacy between individual and social factors by offering an empirical, un-broken 
and non-dualistic naturalist account of human interactions. An instructive 
explanation of how individual experiences transform into collective experience is 
provided. The significance of Dewey’s conception of social institutions lies in its 
dependence on the interaction of individual. 
In the remaining parts of this chapter, I further articulate how Dewey offers a non-
reductive empirical and practical account of social epistemology by exploring his 
conception of the methodology for epistemology. I use this exploration to defend 
Dewey’s unique contributions to the debate on the nature of social epistemology. 
5.3.2 Articulating an empirical social epistemology from Dewey’s denotative 
methodology 
I have discussed Dewey’s denotative empirical method in the previous chapters 
but for present purposes, I will reiterate how its experimental and collaborative 
nature is important for a social epistemology. 
…But empirical method points out when and where and how things of a designated 
description have been arrived at. It places before others a map of the road that has 
been travelled; they may accordingly, if they will, re-travel the road to inspect the 
landscape for themselves….The scientific investigator convinces others not by the 
plausibility of his definitions and cogency of his dialectic, but by placing before them 
the specified course of searchings, doings and arrivals, in consequence of which 
certain things have been found… (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 28). 
Two points are important here for our understanding of what makes an 
epistemology social. The first is that inquiry is a continuous activity with all its 
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phases connected with human natural conditions. A phase in an inquiry may 
commence with the efforts of an individual or a collective. However, the full 
process of inquiry is a cooperative exercise extending to past and future. The 
process of verification is essentially a public affair. Agreement on what is the truth 
of the matter is a matter of agreement over the long run. Abstract thinking and 
perceptual awareness may be private but knowledge is not. This position provides 
good support for the contention that social epistemology is normative and 
continuous with traditional epistemology. 
The second point is Dewey’s emphasis on the need for an empirical and 
experimental approach in every epistemological investigation. Arguably, this will 
provide road-maps for preventing theories and debates in social epistemology 
from degenerating into perennial “idealistic” metaphysical problems such as the 
question whether social factors are independent of individual factors that has 
polarised contemporary social epistemology. However, there are other 
advantages in adopting this method. 
A question can be raised against Dewey’s position: If verification is by agreement 
over the long run, agreement by whom? If agreement on knowledge is attributed 
to some epistemic investigators in some specific social contexts, this will open him 
up to the charge of relativism (as we have discussed against Fuller’s position). 
Dewey’s answer is that consensus in science are not relative to any region of the 
world. This consensus is engendered by the cooperative tendencies in scientific 
methodologies- a feature which denotative empirical methodology is modelled to 
embrace. Dewey’s larger claim is that a social epistemology grounded in an 
empirical and naturalistic metaphysics will have equal empirical and experimental 
footing with science. For instance, Dewey’s epistemology recommends seeing 
“knowledge” as an instrument for manipulating nature and “social factors” as an 
empirical phenomenon characterized by interactive human activities carried out 
for some common goal.  
Another peculiar feature of Dewey’s denotative empirical methodology that we 
have discussed in chapter three is that it encourages phenomena to be studied 
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specifically and historically. For Dewey, an empirical and historical study of societal 
factors will reveal individuals interacting with one another in pursuit of some 
common goals.126 It is arguable that Dewey offers an empirical and experimental 
analysis of social factors that is lacking in Fuller’s account. 
The analysis of Dewey’s recommended methodology provides insights into 
Dewey’s conception of community that is essential for social epistemology. I 
briefly discuss this conception to show Dewey’s emphasis on the importance of 
interactions among members of the community and how this focus enhances a 
non-reductive social dimension of knowledge.  
5.3.3 Dewey’s conceptions of community and community of Inquirers 
In his attempt to explore aspects of Dewey’s conception of community, James 
Campbell cites some remarks from Dewey’s works. One of these is that “Shared 
experience is the greatest of human goods [LW1:157]” (Campbell, 1998, p. 34). 
Another is that “Everything that exists in as far as it is known and knowable is in 
interaction with other things [LW1:138]” (Campbell, 1998, p. 33). Campbell used 
these remarks to articulate Dewey’s conception of community from notions of 
association or interaction in human natural existence. Dewey’s conception of 
community sheds further light on the indispensability of both individual and 
collective factors in social epistemology. More importantly, a naturalist account of 
how the “community” emerges from social interactions of the individuals is 
provided. For instance, Campbell emphasised Dewey’s rejection of the belief that 
a community should display “homogenized and monochromatic sameness”. 
[Dewey] recognises that no community can be a community without some high 
degree of sharing. However, this communality should also imply a richness or 
complexity of possible perspectives that can be entered into, not the simplicity of 
identity. The advancement of community does not require, Dewey believes, “a 
sacrifice of individuality; it would be a poor kind of society whose members were 
personally undeveloped” [LW7:345] (Campbell, 1998, pp. 32-33). 
                                                     
126 We noted the relevance of the debate between individualists and holists in chapter three.  
However, the exploration of the debate will not be part of the present purposes. 
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The key terms for understanding Dewey’s conception of community of inquiry are: 
(i) social interactions (or shared experience) and (ii) human purposeful 
manipulation of nature. These terms manifest across activities that characterize 
both primary and secondary experience. Human transaction within nature leads 
to communication and inquiry and finally to the establishment of common goals 
or interests. The realization of these common goals marks the attainment of 
knowledge. It is in this sense that Dewey described knowledge “as a mode of 
interaction” (Dewey, 1925, p. 352) and regarded participation and sharing as the 
fruit of communication (Dewey, 1925, p.138). On communication, he writes: 
When communication occurs, all natural events are subject to reconsideration and 
revision; they are re-adapted to meet the requirements of the conversation, whether 
it is public discourse or that preliminary discourse termed thinking… Brute efficiencies 
and inarticulate consummations as soon as they can be spoken of are liberated from 
local and accidental contexts, and are eager for naturalization in any non-insulated, 
communicating, part of the world (Dewey, 1925, p.138).   
Dewey’s point is that communication marks the transition from primary 
experience (where things are had, used and enjoyed) to the secondary experience 
(where socially coordinated discussion of experience and inquiries are 
continuously carried out). Through communication, individual experiences (or 
beliefs) are expressed or communicated to others who react either by 
corroborating or disagreeing. Dewey sees this as the point at which inquiries 
begin. Dewey’s emphasis is on the impact of communication, (as a social 
phenomenon with socially coordinated rules and practices) on inquiries and 
processes of validating claims, rendering them essentially social activities. 
Consequently, a community of inquirers, for Dewey, will be any group of 
individuals who are involved in some coordinated and regulated processes of 
inquiry for the purpose of solving some problematic or indeterminate situations. 
The goal is fundamentally about the survival of the human species.  
In his articulation of how “fitness” is used by Dewey to designate any activity that 
is instrumental to human survival, Hickman writes: 
The conditions with respect to which the term “fit” must now be used include the 
existing social structure with all the habit, demands, and ideals which are found in it. 
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If so, we have reason to conclude that the “fittest” with respect to the whole of the 
conditions is the best … The unfit is practically the anti-social [EW5:89] (Hickman, 
1990, p. 182).  
Here, a social structure is defined in terms of its actual or intended contributions 
towards human collective survival. In this sense, factors regarded as peculiarly 
“individual” or “social” among contemporary social epistemologists will both be 
described as mechanisms for human “fitness” and survival. For Dewey, 
“individual” does not denote “non-social, much less anti-social”. “Communal”, on 
the other hand, is not anti-individual but rather “it is to enable an individual to 
reach a fuller manifestation of his own power…” (J. Dewey, 1968, pp. 374-375).  
 The instrumental nature of individual and social factors in Dewey’s epistemology 
can also be gleaned from Savage’s understanding of Dewey’s conception of 
culture. 
Dewey believed that social, political, and economic institutions and norms could be 
evaluated on the basis of their ability to adapt individual quests for the good life, that 
is, self-development, to the objective environmental conditions in which the 
individual exists… A culture should provide the social environment in which a 
continual cooperative inquiry into the most beneficial institutions and norms can be 
conducted (Savage, 2002, p. 3). 
The point from Savage’s understanding of Dewey’s notion of “culture” is that it is 
an instrument. The formation of communities or cultures and norms are parts of 
the organism-environmental transactions. They are part of the human strategies 
for survival. For Dewey, these are products of secondary reflective experience and 
are not to be treated as a kind of absolute because they are contingent upon 
primary experience. They are not isolated and self-sufficient (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 
13).  They are means of enlarging the understanding of the non-cognitive aspects 
of human transactions. 
From the foregoing, it is notable that Dewey’s position, characteristically, is not 
compatible with any sense of “individual” and the “social” that is too radical in the 
sense that ontological or conceptual dualism is implied. Consequently, it is 
reasonable to conclude that both social and individual factors are equally 
important in his account of social epistemology. However, the contention in this 
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work is that, with Dewey’s naturalist position, an empirical explanation is offered 
for the “individual” and “social factors”. Arguably, this conceptual clarification 
enhances the prospects for social epistemology. I turn to discuss instrumentalism 
in Dewey’s naturalist epistemology and show how it is devoid of the problem of 
relativism that Fuller’s position faces. I argue that this advantage makes Dewey’s 
position more tenable. 
5.3.4 Dewey’s Instrumentalist Epistemology and the rejection of epistemological 
relativism 
One important claim found prominently in Dewey’s naturalist metaphysics is that 
there are numerous problematic or indeterminate situations resulting from 
human transactions with nature that are global in scope. There are challenges 
from evolutionary changes such as climate change and other natural disasters that 
predate them such as famine, and drought. There are threats from highly 
contagious epidemics and there are wars and other social problems that defy 
international boundaries. These are precarious aspects of nature that are 
universal to humans (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 38-39, 97 ). The existence of these global 
problems, for Dewey, indicates the existence of some inquiries that demand global 
participation and direction by global interests.   
Using Dewey’s claim that the human quest for knowledge begins from the quest 
to resolve “indeterminate” situations” so that knowledge inherently functions as 
a “problem-solving phenomenon”, it is possible to construct a scene where several 
cultures with different and seeming incompatible forms of life must adopt a 
unanimous or an amalgamated form of life as a matter of necessity. Imagine a 
man from the culture similar to the oracle-consulting people described by 
Wittgenstein, sailing in a boat on a high sea with fellow travellers from different 
cultures. Suppose this man cannot swim but he has earlier received a message 
from an oracle that he cannot be drowned in any circumstances. Now the man 
starts to dig a hole under his own seat in the boat. The other travellers try to 
convince him that in the middle of the sea where nobody can hope to swim ashore, 
it is suicidal to test such an oracular prediction.  
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From this scenario, we can derive these propositions that capture Dewey’s 
position: 
(i) Where problematic situations are not confined to a given context, they 
can condition the amalgamation of cultures or different forms of life. 
(ii) Where cultures and forms of life are amalgamated, there can be unified 
or non-contextual inquiries or collaborative inquiries and consequently 
the possibility of conception and attainment of objective (non-
contextual) knowledge and truths. 
(iii) Where problems are shared across cultures, rational arguments are 
possible and applicable. 
 
It is arguable that the hypothetical situation described above matches the current 
concern about the danger of climate change and the responses it generated from 
countries around the world. Climate change is a general world problem that forces 
collaborative inquiries toward one goal- to save the world from extinction. The 
fact that the world is “increasingly unanimous” on the fact of the danger posed by 
climate change arguably points to a non-relative truth. The generality of the threat 
indicates a non-contextual subject-matter. The unified decision to adjust their 
“forms of life” to engender a solution points toward what we can call a universal 
knowledge in this situation. Dewey’s contention that “common” problematic 
situation can necessitate a larger scale of interactions and common inquiry is 
justified in the countries of the world coming together in France to compel China 
and India (the two greatest world polluters) to reduce their emissions of 
greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere. More importantly, there are proposed 
solutions (for instance bringing the rise in temperature of the world under 2 
degree Celsius), a parameter for marking when a solution to this problem is 
reached. This solution, for Dewey, is knowledge and it is attained when a 
problematic or indeterminate situation is brought under control.  
One point that needs to be noted is that the possibility of resisting epistemological 
relativism in Dewey’s philosophy is largely due to the peculiarity of his conception 
of metaphysics and epistemology and the relationship between them. For 
instance, his metaphysics can be described as a “social and empirical metaphysics” 
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that is meant for “social engineering”. He rejects transcendental or absolute 
metaphysics because it tries to account for existence that goes beyond human 
experience. For Dewey, metaphysics is all about human transactions with nature. 
However, as noted by Gouinlock, Dewey’s naturalist metaphysics goes beyond 
offering an empirical description of human experience. It offers criticism of values 
as well. 
A naturalistic metaphysics provides a “ground map” for criticism in the obvious sense 
that it makes clear the continuities and intermixtures of the traits of nature and it 
displays their function in various kinds of experience. Thus, it makes criticism of values 
both intelligible and efficacious. If only implicitly, any coherent and effective theory 
of criticism must presuppose a metaphysics that characterizes nature at least as 
thoroughly and faithfully as that of Dewey (Gouinlock, 1972, p. 41).  
It is in this sense that Dewey’s problem-solving analysis of knowledge is 
explanatorily superior to Fuller’s interest-based analysis of knowledge, even 
though both positions arguably endorse an “instrumental” analysis of knowledge. 
While Fuller’s analysis highlights how knowledge is instrumental towards the 
“satisfaction” of interests of specific societies, making relativism inevitable, Dewey 
enlarges or “generalises” the scope of these interests by locating their roots in 
problematic natural conditions shared by all societies. In the climate change 
scenario we discussed above, it is possible to have a solution that will serve only 
the interests of the developed countries and consequently solve the problem 
relatively and superficially. However, Dewey will want to address the root cause 
of the problem by examining “forms of life” that are responsible for the threat and 
thus give ‘justice’ to the voice-less and under-developed countries whose interests 
may not be represented in the compromise-interest-satisfying approach 
recommended by Fuller.127 
                                                     
127 However, Thomas Alexander raises a point concerning how Dewey used the terms “denotation” 
and “pointing” ambiguously. According to him, “Dewey recognised that any act of pointing 
required a defining context of shared life activity”. From this view, Alexander states that “Dewey 
does not believe that we can begin with a neutral, interpretation-free method of denotation” (T. 
M. Alexander, 1987, pp. 88-89). Alexander hopes to resolve this “paradox” by arguing that, from 
Dewey’s perspective, “the world is more than what it is during our moments of inquiry and 
reflection” (T. M. Alexander, 1987, p. 89). I think a bolder way to respond is to argue that 
contextualism is different from relativism. A number of scholars have done this (Annis, 1978; 
DeRose, 1999; Pynn, 2015; Schiffer, 1996). 
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Consequently, Dewey arguably succeeds in establishing a metaphysics that can 
provide a foundation for social theory. Dewey’s epistemology is more empirical 
and practical than traditional epistemology. However, there is a continuity 
between Dewey’s account and traditional epistemology by virtue of the 
metaphysical theory underlining his epistemology. Tracing the “causal links” 
between knowledge and Nature, on one hand, and between nature and goals of 
human existence, on the hand, arguably will preserve the philosophical approach 
to knowledge. The preservation of this distinctive “philosophical approach” is 
further highlighted in Dewey’s conception of normativity in epistemology. 
5.3.5 The concept of normativity in Dewey’s epistemology 
We have discussed the importance of social interaction and collaboration in 
Dewey’s conceptions of inquiry, and how these factors underscore his account of 
the social dimension of knowledge. We will now explore the importance of social 
interaction in Dewey’s conception of normativity. 
In chapter 3, we have discussed how Dewey insists that his naturalist or 
experimental epistemology, like traditional epistemology, is a normative 
discipline. It is normative in the sense that naturalist epistemologists are still 
interested in establishing principles or methodologies that can be used in 
differentiating knowledge-claims that are justified from those that are not. This 
implies that the concept of truth remains equally important as in traditional 
epistemology.  
However, for present purposes, I focus on two aspects of Dewey’s view of the 
validation of knowledge-claims. The first is his practical notion of justification. The 
second is his analysis of justification in terms of consensus among communities of 
inquirers. Dewey’s conception of justification, like Fuller’s, offers a radical 
challenge to the traditional conception of justification by seeing justification in 
terms of practical considerations rather than in terms of rationally acceptable a 
priori argument or empirical (but non-practical) arguments. Dewey explains 
justification in terms of choosing a hypothesis (among several) that experimental 
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inquiries can show as offering a possible solution to a problematic or recalcitrant 
situation. In his explanation of this “warrant”, rational choice plays a decisive role 
just as traditional epistemologists intended in their theory of justification. 
However, unlike the “rational choice” in traditional epistemology that is 
determined by the logical structure of arguments (coherence, consistency, validity 
and so on), Dewey’s rational choice is ultimately based on the consequences of 
choosing to act in a certain way. For him, it is practical experimentation that makes 
his notion of justification more rational or less arbitrary.128  
With Dewey’s focus on action rather than propositional attitudes, his analysis of 
justification is like Fuller’s reconceptualization of normativity from belief-based to 
action-based. In addition, both scholars contend that the justification of a 
knowledge-claim must have some material implications (actual or potential) in the 
physical world. Both reject a notion of justification in terms of absolute knowledge 
attained by some ideal rational knower. Both scholars hold some kind of 
“consequentialist” approach to justification, Dewey’s notion is in terms of 
problem-solving and Fuller’s notion is in terms of interest-satisfaction. However, 
what is equally important to our discussion is Dewey’s explanation of how this 
“rational choice” is made. For him, the choice is a matter of consensus among the 
community of inquirers only after sufficient inquiry has taken place. 
One of the most remarkable aspects of Dewey’s social conception of justification 
is that despite challenging the traditional conception of the notion as non-
naturalistic or “realistic” (about its incompatibility with what evolutionary theory 
offers in that respect), there is a sense in which there is continuity between his 
naturalist and social epistemology and traditional epistemology. Firstly, while the 
absolute conception of truth in traditional epistemology is rejected, Dewey is still 
interested in notions of truth, justification and knowledge that reflect both the 
dynamic or interplay of stability and precariousness in nature. The relation 
                                                     
128 Dewey contends that a choice “loses arbitrary character when its quality and consequences are 
such as to commend themselves to the reflection of others after they have betaken themselves to 
the situations indicated; it becomes significant when reason for the choice is found to be weighty 
and its consequences momentous” (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 29). 
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between truth, justification and knowledge on one hand, and dynamic nature, on 
the other, is objective in this non-absolute sense. Furthermore, unlike Fuller, he 
does identify social epistemology with sociology of knowledge as we have seen 
implied by Fuller’s seeing social epistemology as descriptive or sociological. He did 
not see the need to replace the philosophical sense of normativity with the 
scientific sense of normativity as we have seen Fuller did in his reconceptualization 
of the traditional conception of normativity. However, it is noteworthy that Dewey 
recommends a multi-disciplinary approach to social epistemological investigations 
in such a way that the philosophical approach to knowledge is not rendered 
irrelevant or obscure. I now discuss three epistemological issues opened up in this 
manner. 
5.3.6 Dewey’s continuity thesis; the enlargement of the scope of epistemology 
I have discussed earlier in this chapter how social epistemologists must answer the 
question what differentiates social epistemology from traditional epistemology, 
on one hand, and sociology of knowledge, on the other hand. I have also suggested 
that identifying some specific subject-matters as marking the scope of social 
epistemology will be more informative and convincing than offering definitions. In 
this section, I discuss three aspects of Dewey’s epistemology that arguably can 
enrich discourses in contemporary social epistemology. I discuss Dewey’s social 
conception of the human mind and his conception of “esthetic” or lived 
experience. I discuss how these issues, which are supposed to be “strongholds” 
for non-social or private experience, are opened up to empirical and social theory 
through Dewey’s naturalist account of them. The third aspect of Dewey’s work 
that I also discuss is cultural naturalism.  
5.3.6.1 Dewey’s Social Conception of the Human Mind 
In the previous sections, we have discussed the argument of the moderate social 
epistemologists (such as Kornblith) that in the formation of beliefs, individual 
endowments such as the brain and the senses are indispensable. We also 
considered his argument that these individual factors are irreducible to social 
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factors. In addition, we considered a rejoinder that as much as these beliefs are 
expressed through a language, the social influence must be acknowledged. The 
same arguments about indispensability and irreducibility can be extended to the 
nature and cognitive functions of the human mind in respect of the roles of 
thought, reasoning, and imagination in the formation and retention of beliefs. 
However, theories of human mind in traditional epistemology (such as Cartesian 
theory), arguably indicate that the human mind is subjective in the sense of being 
private and not subject to direct empirical investigations. 
In acknowledgement of the challenge posed by the idea of a subjective human 
mind, several contemporary social epistemologists such as Goldman (2014), Bird 
(2014) and Pettit (2011) have shown keen interest in whether or not there are 
“group minds”- a shared mind among several bodies or entities. This consideration 
extends to other collective epistemic terms such as collective or group belief, 
group action, group intention, collective justifiedness and institutional persons. As 
rightly noted by Goldman and Bird, a subscriber to the term “group mind” must 
answer several questions that embrace ontology, psychology, and epistemology, 
respectively. Do group entities exist at all? Do group entities have psychological 
properties, specifically propositional attitudes? How can the relationship between 
a group mind and the minds of its members be explained? (Bird, 2014, p. 42; 
Goldman, 2014, pp. 12-15). Take for instance some of the attempts made to 
explain the relation between the collective and the individual in reference to 
group attitude. Goldman considers the suggestion that collective subjects have a 
qualified supervenience relation to their members as “a reasonable metaphysical 
position” but prefers to explain the relation by stating that “the propositional 
attitudes of collective subjects are grounded in propositional attitudes of their 
members plus the group’s organizational structures.129 List and Pettit contend that 
“the things a group agent does are clearly determined by the things its members 
do” (2011, p. 64).  
                                                     
129 Goldman (2014, p. 12) credits this suggestion to List, P and Pettit, P. (2005, 2011).  
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In her presentation of the debate, Jennifer Lackey juxtaposes “summativist” and 
“anti-summativist” positions. For the summativists, Lackey cites Quinton’s remark 
that “groups are said to have beliefs, emotion, attitudes and to take decisions and 
make promises”, but that this way of speaking is metaphorical because it is an 
indirect way of ascribing such predicates to members (2014a, p. 64). Lackey 
describes this position as a reductionist position. She presents the anti-
summativist position as a view stating that collective terms such as group 
testimony is irreducible to that of all or some of its members, so an anti-
summativist position is a non-reductionist position.130 
 For present purposes, I will neither spell out in detail any theory of group mind 
nor attempt any deeper evaluation of the debate on whether there are group 
minds. However, I contend that the debate is not significantly different from our 
previous debate on whether social factors are reducible to individual factors. 
Concepts such as group mind and group belief are controversial. Consequently, 
introducing them does not help to explicate the nature of social epistemology nor 
its advantages over traditional epistemology. Here, turning to Dewey’s analysis of 
the human mind becomes important as an alternative to the traditional 
conception of human mind.  
In Chapters One to Four, we made reference to how Dewey’s rejection of dualism 
between mind and body is an important thesis in his version of naturalism. For 
present purposes, I will reiterate three descriptions of the human mind in the 
traditional epistemology that he rejects. Firstly, he rejects the ontological thesis 
that depicts the human mind as immaterial phenomenon, distinct and separable 
from human body. Secondly, he rejects the thesis stating that because the mind is 
immaterial, it cannot be studied empirically (directly) but only by introspection. 
                                                     
130 Lackey contends that the following case supports the non-reductionist position of the anti-
summativists: “A jury deliberating about whether the defendant in a murder trial is innocent or 
guilty. Each member of the jury is privy to evidence that the defendant was seen fleeing the scene 
of the crime with blood spatter on his clothes, but it is grounded in hearsay that, though reliable, 
was ruled as inadmissible by the judge. Given the admissible evidence, the jury as a group 
justifiedly believes that the defendant is innocent, but not a single juror justifiedly believes this 
proposition because it is defeated for each of them as individuals by the relevant reliable hearsay 
evidence” (Lackey, 2014b, pp. 2-3).   
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Thirdly, he rejects the view that the human mind has the capacity to process and 
apply concepts to sensory inputs. How relevant is this critique to the debate 
concerning the identity of social epistemology? The point is that social 
epistemologists cannot avoid the question about the role of the human mind in 
the formation and retention of beliefs. Any social epistemologist who appeals to 
the nature and cognitive functioning of the human mind as traditionally construed, 
will implicitly or explicitly embrace an individualistic, non-empirical, subjective 
foundation of knowledge. This will constitute a challenge to the prospects of social 
epistemology that aims to present knowledge as a social, empirical and science-
inclined phenomenon. 
However, Dewey argues that “mind” is “existentially an adverb “and not a noun. 
He explains the adverbial nature of “mind” in terms of “disposition of activity” (J. 
Dewey, 1925, p. 132). His argument is that “thought”, “reason” and “intelligence” 
are the generic traits of human mind without which its nature cannot be known (J. 
Dewey, 1925, p. 172). With the human mind defined as disposition to act in certain 
ways, the notion of a “private belief” becomes a misnomer. This is because the 
function of the culture or society in which the human mind resides, is to educate, 
assimilate and incorporate individuals. For him, customs and traditions are more 
than mere overt ways of acting- “Custom is Nomos, lord and king of all, of 
emotions, beliefs, opinions, thoughts as well as deeds” (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 173).  
The human mind, according to Dewey, is “the ordered system of all the characters 
which constituted kinds, differing among men, differing according to differences 
of organic constitutions” (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 172).  
More importantly, Dewey provides an empirical account of the link between 
human thought and action when he writes: 
Empirically, all reflection sets out from the problematic and the confused. Its aim is 
to clarify and ascertain. When thinking is successful, its career closes in transforming 
the disordered into the orderly, the mixed-up into the distinguished or placed, the 
unclear and ambiguous into the defined and unequivocal, the disconnected into the 
systematized. It is empirically assured that the goal of thinking does not remain a 
mere ideal, but is attained often enough so as to render reasonable additional efforts 
to attain it (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 57). 
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Again, linking the functioning of the human mind to causal factors in natural 
events, Dewey writes: 
A naturalistic metaphysics is bound to consider reflection as itself a natural event 
occurring within nature because of the traits of the latter. It is bound to inference 
from the empirical traits of thinking in precisely the same way as the sciences make 
inferences from the happenings of the suns, radio-activity, thunderstorms or any 
other natural event. Traits of reflection are as truly indicative of the traits of other 
things as are as are the traits of these events (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 59-60). 
As rightly noted by Sleeper, Dewey held that “mind is not a substance located in 
the brain, but simply the power of the individual organism to manipulate signs and 
symbols in its quest for survival” (Sleeper, 1986, p. 126). In his comment on 
Dewey’s view that thinking also qualifies as a kind of hypothesis or experiment in 
which the worth of thought is tested, Boisvert noted that “it is not haphazard. It is 
guided by ideas understood as hypothetical anticipations of desired results” (1998, 
p. 41). All these views corroborate Dewey’s argument that thinking is a substantive 
natural event. The explanation of the cognitive functioning of human mind in 
terms of a spiritual or “self-regulating” mechanism capable of mirroring nature is 
rejected. 
The significance of this social and empirical theory of the human mind in social 
epistemology is twofold. The first importance is that the theory reinforces the 
argument that the influence of the social or collective extends to both processes 
for belief formation and retention. The second is that the theory succeeds in 
erasing the traditional boundaries between epistemology, philosophy of mind, 
psychology and sociology in respect of the study of the nature and cognitive 
functions of human mind. Such an interdisciplinary approach could greatly enrich 
discourses in contemporary social epistemology. 
5.3.6.2 Social epistemology and esthetic or lived human experience  
Other Dewey’s unique contributions to social epistemology can be articulated 
from his enlargement of its scope or subject-matter. Chapter 2 discussed 
extensively how Dewey contends that all traits of experience are the subject-
matter of his naturalist metaphysics. By “traits of experience”, he usually meant a 
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general description of all the activities or events that occur in human/nature 
symbiotic “transactions”- how the nature affects the histories of humans and 
humans manipulate nature to cope with it. Thus, “intellectual and moral 
endeavours”, as attempts to understand and cope with nature, are traits of 
experience.  
However, Dewey argues that, although “intellectual and moral endeavours” have 
dominated the preoccupation of philosophers, other traits deserve equal 
attention. One such trait he calls “esthetic experience”: 
Human experience in the large, in its coarse and conspicuous features, has for one of 
its most striking features preoccupation with direct enjoyment: feasting, festivities, 
ornamentation, dance, song, dramatic pantomime, enacting stories, telling yarns and 
enacting stories. In comparison with intellectual and moral endeavour, this trait of 
experience has hardly received the attention from philosophers that it demands (J. 
Dewey, 1925, p. 67).  
Dewey describes these activities as “lived experience” because they are integral 
aspects of human transaction within nature. They are coping strategies- 
consummatory in degrees in which they exuberantly enhance escape from the 
pressure of natural surroundings (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 70). He describes these 
activities as “esthetic” because they relate to “direct enjoyment”: 
Esthetic, fine art, appreciation, drama have an eulogistic flavour. We hesitate to call 
a penny-dreadful of fiction artistic, so we call it debased fiction or a travesty on 
art…Thus we miss the point. A passion of anger, a dream, relaxation of the limbs after 
effort, swapping of jokes, horse-play, beating the drums, blowing the tin whistles, 
explosion of firecrackers and walking on stilts, have the same quality of immediate 
and absorbing finality that is possessed by things and acts dignified by the title of 
esthetic (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 68-69).   
Dewey’s contention is that all lived or esthetic human experiences are inherent 
parts of the subject-matter of his naturalist epistemology (and, by extension, the 
subject-matter of science). What makes these esthetic activities knowledge? Apart 
from their importance as “instruments” in humans’ attempt to cope with nature, 
Dewey argues that there is a more compelling reason why traditional 
epistemologists should have shown keen interest in these traits of experience:  
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It would be difficult to find a fact more significant of the traits of nature, more 
instructive for a naturalistic metaphysics of existence, than this cleavage of the things 
of human experience into actual but hard objects, and enjoyed but imagined objects. 
One might think that philosophers in their search for some datum that possesses 
properties that put it beyond doubt, might have directed their attention to this direct 
phase of experience, in which objects are not a matter of sensations, ideas, beliefs or 
knowledge, but are something had and enjoyed… In comparison, the “self-evident” 
things of philosophers are recondite and technical (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 71-72).  
His point is that esthetic experiences offer rich and “natural” materials for 
philosophical discussion about human knowledge. Because they are “phenomena 
of social life”, they reflect the social dimension of knowledge. Comparing the 
importance of studying the phenomena of social life with values derived from our 
preoccupation with science, he writes: 
The features of objects reached by scientific or reflective experiencing are important, 
but so are all the phenomena of magic, myth, politics, painting, and penitentiaries. 
The phenomena of social life are as relevant to the problem of the relation of 
individual and universal as are those of logic… (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 20).  
Dewey’s point is that a naturalistic understanding of esthetic experiences is as 
important to human survival as our scientific attempt to understand and conquer 
nature for human survival. Put differently, he seems to be suggesting that the 
distinction between science and non-science cognitive pursuits become irrelevant 
when “lived human experience’ becomes recognised as the focus of a naturalistic 
and social epistemology. In Thomas Alexander’s strong word, Dewey was trying to 
create a new “science of nature” which seems to depict a unification of all human 
cognitive pursuits.  
[Dewey] attempted to create a new science or, rather, radically to transform and 
reground the science of psychology. Dewey’s “new psychology” would start with lived 
experience and attempt to understand it in terms of organic movement and 
wholeness (T. M. Alexander, 1987, p. 19).  
It follows from this view that restricting epistemological discourse to issues that 
traditionally have been defined as constituting “intellectual and moral endeavour” 
will impoverish epistemology. Also, attaching more importance to scientific values 
at the expense of values we can derive from studying esthetic experience will 
impoverish human knowledge. Dewey’s suggestion is that we can examine, 
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theorize and experiment on human experiences such as festivals, happiness, 
sorrow, music, hobbies and so on, to see the connection between human 
experience and knowledge. With these esthetic experiences analysed in terms of 
instruments for the survival of a social or collective entity, they become an 
important subject-matter for social epistemology. It is arguable that the subject-
matter of social epistemology that reflects a more detailed social life of humans 
can be articulated from this wider spectrum.  
5.3.6.3 Social Epistemology and Dewey’s cultural naturalism 
Our final discussion of Dewey’s enlargement of the scope of social epistemology 
is on the articulation of what he calls cultural naturalism (J. Dewey, 1991, p. 28). 
What does this mean? I start my discussion by stating briefly that in contemporary 
discussions about the relationship between nature and culture, the traditional 
dualistic or antithetical conception of the two phenomena has been challenged. I 
compare the grounds for the rejection of this traditional view with Dewey’s 
rejection of such dualism. I also discuss some new insights from neurobiologists, 
philosophers and psychologists such as Fabrice Clement and Kaufmann Lawrence 
(2007) on culture in terms of reductionist approaches and naturalistic 
explanations. I critique these new insights by contrasting them with Dewey’s’ 
position. I then show that while these scholars’ explanation of the relationship 
between individuals and culture rekindles the tension between protagonists in the 
debate over individual and social factors, Dewey’s explanation does not.  
Recent work by Fabrice Clement and Kaufmann Lawrence notes that in recent 
discussions about culture, the traditional conception of culture as antithetical to 
nature has become unacceptable. 
Recently, new insights into this everlasting opposition have been given by some 
neurobiologists, philosophers and psychologists. To them, pitting nature against 
culture as two opposite forces between which human species are tossed back and 
forth, escaping from biology to be better enslaved by culture and conversely, is 
pointless (Fabrice & Kaufmann, 2007, p. 7).   
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These scholars note some attempts made to resolve this.131 The attempt which 
they favour is a naturalistic approach based on the idea that “the study of culture 
cannot ignore the fact that nature plays an important role in the development of 
culture” (Fabrice & Kaufmann, 2007, p. 8). These scholars considered cognitive 
science and its multi-disciplinary approach, “the approach that encompass all the 
processes, such as categorization, memory, and attention, through which society 
and/or shared culture enter the mind”. This is the “study of the cognitive 
equipment that enables agents to sustain social and cultural facts” (Fabrice & 
Kaufmann, 2007, p. 9). How can naturalism cash out this bridging role? 
 The authors see the strength of this approach in the fact that it nether entails 
ontological reductionism (the idea that only physical particles and forces exist) nor 
epistemological reductionism (the idea that only the models of justification and 
explanation in science are acceptable) (Fabrice & Kaufmann, 2007, p. 9). However, 
it is arguable that in this approach, the authors implicitly choose the bottom-up 
explanation (“mind-shapes-culture”) and reject top-down explanation (“culture-
shapes-mind”), a choice that arguably rekindles the tension in the debates over 
the priority between individual and social factors. It is on this note that we turn to 
Dewey’s naturalist position on culture. 
In Dewey’s Experience and Nature and Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, he offers a 
naturalist approach to both “experience” and “culture” for the purpose of 
redeeming them from dialectical definitions (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 1, 47-49) and 
“sectarian” and “provincial” contents (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 37). For present 
purposes, my aim is to articulate the social dimension of this Deweyan project. 
Instead of attempting to define culture, I start the discussion by highlighting 
Dewey’s comparison of experience with culture in terms of complexity (or what 
Dewey calls “double barrel-ness”) and in terms of action-doings that are 
continuous with nature. I take this comparative analysis to be more informative 
                                                     
131 These scholars cited some works in which the conception of antithesis is replaced with the idea 
that human mind “is pre-wired for cultural learning and knowledge acquisition that will allow it to 
escape from strict genetic determinism” (Fabrice & Kaufmann, 2007, p. 7). 
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and rewarding. I then discuss Dewey’s conception of the experimental nature and 
instrumental usefulness of both phenomena. 
In Chapter Two, we have discussed Dewey’s rejection of the standard or popular 
view that polarises experience and nature. We also discussed his claim that 
“experience” is not just a word depicting “awareness” or “mode of knowing” but 
“a double-barrel” word that covers the entire complex of human activities. 
However, it seems that Dewey regards “experience” as synonymous with 
“culture”.132  For instance, he contends that “experience has its equivalents in such 
affairs as history, life, culture” (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 37). He compares the complexity 
or diversity of experience with anthropologists’ conception of culture as “that 
complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, morals, custom, and any other 
capabilities acquired by a man as a member of society” (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 37). It 
is arguable that both experience and culture indicate human transactions with 
nature. Consequently, one can argue that culture is a kind of phenomenon that is 
developed out of reflective human acts and collaborative inquiries and became an 
instrument for coping with and adjusting between the precarious and stable 
manifestations of nature. 
However, Dewey’s idea of how cultures are formed seems to imply that a culture 
(like the “symbolic” Dewey’s secondary experience) is a product of human 
cognitive inquiry. This suggests that Dewey subscribed to the bottom-up 
explanation of culture (“mind-shapes-culture) that we have previously attributed 
to Fabrice and Kaufmann and described as increasing the tension between radical 
and moderate social epistemologists. Is this impression untenable? Thomas 
Alexander seems to corroborate this impression when he was discussing the 
connection between Dewey’s notion of generic traits of existence and culture: 
We do not begin our inquiries, especially metaphysical ones, except under certain 
defining situations. Unless one has lived and interacted with others, learned a 
language and participated in a culture with its stories and traditions, one cannot even 
                                                     
132 Dewey actually said that “experience” is the subject-matter for both science and the philosophy 
because it is “synonymous” with “nature (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 1-36). However, this suggestion is 
confirmed in Dewey’s remark that he ought to have written the title of his book as “Culture and 
Nature” instead of using the title “Experience and Nature”. 
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begin to ask questions. Questions which concern the general nature of things only 
arise after a culture has provided a rich, symbolic, cultural matrix and has come to a 
point where, as with the Greeks, the idea of inquiry itself has being discovered (T. M. 
Alexander, 1987, p. 89). 
Is Dewey inconsistent? I don’t think so. I offer two answers to this question. First, 
Dewey’s notion of human mind is different from notions that depict human mind 
as separable either from the human body or nature. Consequently, the bottom-up 
analysis of culture does not fit into Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics. Second, it is 
arguable that any interpretation of Dewey’s naturalism that puts the reflective or 
cognitive stage of human experience (described as secondary experience) before 
the discovery of inquiry will be a mis-interpretation of Dewey. One possible 
explanation is that the kind of cultures that Alexander Thomas was referring to in 
the passage quoted above are modern and complex cultures while Dewey 
arguably was interested in the formation of traditional or folk culture.  
What can contemporary social epistemologists learn from Dewey’s naturalist 
account of culture? Firstly, dualism between nature and culture becomes 
untenable and like “experience”, “culture” depicts human natural transactions 
with nature. Secondly, a natural, empirical, and social account of the generic 
foundation and social function of culture is provided. For instance, unlike some 
anthropologists who claim that “culture begins at the point at which humans 
surpass whatever is simply given in their natural inheritance” (Edgar & Sedgwick, 
1999, p. 102) which arguably indicates a culture/nature divide, Dewey argues that 
culture embodies the human/nature symbiotic relation. In addition, unlike some 
anthropologists who claim that “culture is social in so far it affirms a civilising 
mission” (Swingewood, 1998, p. xi), Dewey attributes a more fundamental social 
function to culture in terms of being a cohesive force, action-undergoing and an 
instrument for the survival of human species. It is arguable that Dewey’s 
conception of culture as human transactions with nature goes deeper than what 
anthropologists such as Nick Shaheed describe as “the product of symbolic forms 
and conventions, negotiated over time and imbued with conventional meanings” 
(Shaheed, 2011, p. 2).This is a new approach to culture that social epistemologists 
can develop further.  
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Consequently, contemporary social epistemologists can learn from Dewey’s 
naturalist account of culture is in his provision for a natural explanation of the 
content and development of culture. This explanation is meant to serve two 
purposes- to redeem the content of culture from cultural biases and to provide 
some non-relative bases for human culture. He contends that, 
Every type of culture has experienced resistance and frustration. These events are 
interpreted according to the bias dominating a particular type of culture. To the 
modern European mind they have been interpreted as results of the opposed 
existence of subject and object as independent forms of Being ... But the East Indian 
has envisaged the same phenomena as evidence of the contrast of an illusory world 
to which corresponds domination by desires and a real world due to emancipation 
from desires, attained through ascetic discipline and meditation. The Greeks 
interpreted the same experience on the basis of the cosmic discrepancy of being and 
becoming, form and matter, as the reluctance of existence to become a complete and 
transparent medium of meaning (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 195-196). 
Dewey’s point is that culture is part of human experience and consequently is part 
of human transaction within nature. He rejects the explanation (or attribution) of 
human differences (as resistance and frustration) that are exhibited within culture 
in terms of forces outside human empirical transactions with nature as non-
naturalist or idealist explanations. According to him, human differences exhibited 
within cultures are as integral and as important to the understanding of human 
transactions with nature as the understanding of the precarious and stable nature 
of nature is to the understanding of human/nature symbiotic relationship. For 
Dewey, these features exhibited by culture offer evidence for its continuity with 
nature. Nature is characterised by the mixture of precarious and stable events. 
This is Dewey’s naturalistic explanation of the formation and development of 
cultures in terms of coordinated or collective responses to nature. For him, 
culture, with all its complexity, is an instrument for coping with nature. The nature 
and functions of culture are contingent upon these responses to natural 
challenges. Human species are social animals that need society to realise their full 
potential and the community relies on the differences among individuals to 
function. Finally, for Dewey, culture is not a tradition handed down from one 
generation to another but a dynamic, lived experience, or as Handler and Linnekin 
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rightly put it - a phenomenon that is “symbolically reinvented in an ongoing 
present”(Handler & Linnekin, 1984). 
5.4 Chapter summary: 
In this chapter, I examined social epistemology. I started with what various 
scholars meant by the qualification “social”. The differences in conceptions of the 
“social” were explored and shown to involve differences in conceptions of the 
nature, scope, methods, and goals of epistemology, on one hand, and the 
relationship between epistemology and other disciplines such as psychology and 
sociology, on the other hand. Consequently, what became the fundamental 
question that every social epistemologist must answer is whether social 
epistemology is a continuation of (but expanded) traditional epistemology or a 
new field that is closer to the social sciences than philosophy in methodology, 
paradigms and norms.  
I identified two positions in the contemporary debate on social epistemology. 
Fuller and Kitcher were noted as defending the position that social epistemology 
is different from traditional epistemology. For instance, they have presented social 
epistemology as a new field that concentrates on social factors such as 
institutionalized bodies and institutions socially established for the establishment 
and applications of knowledge in societies. They have presented this point as one 
of the major factors differentiating this new field from traditional epistemology 
that is individualistic- concentrating on individuals and their cognitive activities. 
They also offered new definitions for concepts such as knowledge and normativity. 
 On the issue of normativity, for instance, I identified two approaches articulated 
by Fuller. The first approach is a rejection of normativity in social epistemology as 
it is considered as a descriptive sociological enterprise, a sub-field in social science. 
I rejected this approach because Fuller failed to show why social epistemology 
(construed in this sense) is not a mere duplication of sociology of knowledge in 
social sciences. I concentrated on the second approach in which Fuller attempted 
a reconceptualization of the concept of normativity in social epistemology. In this 
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second approach, which I regarded as more nuanced, normativity is regarded as 
systematic in the sense that a conception of normativity is believed to run 
throughout all sciences. What this implied is the rejection of the concept of 
normativity that is peculiar to traditional epistemology. Based on these 
contentions from Fuller and Kitcher which are meant to show that social 
epistemology is radically different from traditional epistemology, I argued that 
their position is radical. 
Kornblith and Goldman were identified as defending the position that social 
epistemology is not a new field but continuous with traditional epistemology, with 
the primary purpose of establishing norms for distinguishing knowledge from 
mere beliefs, establishing the reliability of human cognitive apparatuses and 
refuting scepticism. This position establishes that social epistemology 
concentrates on both social factors and individual factors such as the activities of 
individual epistemic agents and the operations of their irreducible cognitive and 
psychological endowments. However, this position takes individual factors as 
primary because individuals are initiators of belief-formation processes as well as 
processes for belief-retention. Given the fact that both Kornblith and Goldman 
only admitted the need to expand the scope of traditional epistemology (to show 
more interest in social factors) while keeping the “basics” of the practices and 
preoccupations of the traditional epistemology (normativity, truth-tracking, 
refuting scepticism and so on), I argued that their position is moderate. 
 I also discussed some problems that confront protagonists on both sides of the 
debate. I articulated how a radical social epistemologist who concentrates on 
social factors (defined as independent of or supervening on individuals) and 
defines concepts such as normativity and knowledge in terms of the interests of 
specific societies will inevitably face a problem of relativism. This is because each 
social context with their different forms of life will defend whatever is endorsed in 
their society as knowledge even if it is incompatible with what is endorsed 
elsewhere as knowledge, whereas traditional epistemologists usually see 
epistemic norms as akin to logical rules in terms of universal application.  
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I also articulated the importance and indispensability of an interdisciplinary 
approach to issues in contemporary cognitive discourse and how this will affect a 
social epistemology that concentrates primarily on individual cognitive activities 
and their psychological endowments because they are irreducible or non-social. 
Consequently, I argued that both sides of the debate are reductionist positions, 
because they attempted to reduce social factors to individual factors and vice 
versa. Generally, I contended that the debate is better appraised as a stalemate 
and that this implied that both sides have not succeeded in showing either how 
social epistemology is different from sociology of knowledge or how it is 
continuous with traditional epistemology.  
I have also shown how solutions to these problems can be found in the works of 
Dewey. I articulated the strategies used by Dewey in accomplishing this feat. 
Firstly, Dewey’s naturalism enables him to account for all human activities either 
as direct transactions with nature (primary experience) or social purpose-oriented 
interactions among individuals (secondary experience). In this account, individual 
experiences gain enlargement, meaning and verification when they are 
considered in the light of wider or collective experience. From this narrative, the 
development of human experience and cognitive activities of individuals from 
private to public are empirically and experimentally accounted for in terms of 
social interactions actuated by common interest.  I have also shown how Dewey’s 
theories of inquiry, his conception of a community of inquirers and the denotative 
empirical methodology he recommended for epistemology further buttressed his 
account of the social dimension of knowledge. The point that runs through all 
these conceptions is that the human species are social animals who realise their 
full potentials in community and that the community relies on individual 
differences to function.  
I explored several advantages of this naturalistic explanation. Firstly, the 
coherence, the simplicity, and the science-inclined nature of the naturalist 
ontological account of human existence in an environment that is challenging, 
prompting human species to embark on some manipulations of nature to survive, 
is appealing. The tension created by the disagreement among contemporary social 
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epistemologists on the primacy of social and individual factors, is abated. The 
empirical and naturalistic nature of the explanation makes social epistemology 
amenable to science. Also, the presentation of the history of human species as a 
single continuum (from irradiation of the senses to belief formation, knowledge 
evaluation and application) erases the boundaries between cognitive fields such 
as philosophy, psychology, biology, sociology and so on. An interdisciplinary 
approach to cognition and human action is encouraged. 
I also articulated how Dewey’s naturalist and instrumentalist account of 
knowledge provides a framework for a theory of knowledge that is not restricted 
to any specific social context. His instrumentalist account of knowledge states that 
knowledge is an instrument for manipulating the world for the survival of human 
species. Given his contention that at least some human natural transactions are 
universal, and his contention that some problematic situations do arise from these 
transactions that are global in scope, whatever secures solutions to these global 
problems is an instrument of knowledge. 
Finally, I examined Dewey’s contention that the human mind is a social and 
empirical phenomenon and how this claim opens up the aspect of humans most 
revered as private.  I also examined his contention that in adopting his version of 
naturalism, all lived or esthetic human experience such as music, festivals, 
religions, magic and so on, are legitimate subject-matter of epistemology and 
science. I also articulated Dewey’s cultural naturalism. This is a position through 
which his naturalist analyses of experience are extended to the conception of 
culture and makes it a subject for discussion among social epistemology rather 
than being the prerogative of social science. I contended that the enlargement of 
the subject-matter of epistemology and science to include these social activities 
hitherto labelled as non-philosophical or non-scientific is essentially important for 
social epistemology. I argued that these issues establish the uniqueness of Dewey 
as a social epistemologist. 
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Chapter Six: 
 Dewey and the contemporary debate on knowledge  
as a natural kind term 
 
6.0 Introduction: From the metaphysics of natural kinds to the debate on 
knowledge as a “natural kind” 
The debate among philosophers on the possibility of establishing knowledge as a 
natural kind is another important philosophical investigation to which Dewey’s 
instrumentalist and naturalist conception of knowledge can usefully contribute. 
While debates on the nature, types and importance of natural kinds have 
dominated the attention of metaphysicians and philosophers of science for a very 
long time,133 the extension of this debate to the question of whether knowledge 
is a natural kind is relatively recent. Consequently, engaging Dewey with these 
contemporary epistemologists will provide a further way of demonstrating his 
continued relevance.  
Many metaphysicians and philosophers of science have agreed that nature can be 
observed as having kinds. This simply means that there are entities we can observe 
as belonging to some definite groups in terms of properties they naturally have in 
common; properties they cannot lose without losing their common identity. The 
traditional view is that natural kinds can be differentiated from kinds that are 
artificially or purposefully grouped together by human beings. For Plato, we can 
“cut up each kind according to its species along its natural joints” (Plato, 1995, p. 
265e). Philosophers such as Wilkerson have taken Plato’s metaphor of “carving” 
as suggesting that our best theories are those which carve nature at its joints  
                                                     
133 For instance, Wilkerson has traced the long history of the concept of natural kinds to some 
doctrines in the work of Aristotle, revived by Locke and Leibniz (1995, p. 30). In addition, he sees 
Locke’s distinction between “substances” and modes”, objects capable of ‘subsisting by 
themselves’ and objects that are merely ‘dependencies on, or affections’ of others, respectively, 
as a “revival” of Aristotle’s distinction between independently existing substances and 
dependently existing non-substances (Wilkerson, 1995, p. 47). 
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(1995, p. 30). For Molino, we can think of a natural kind as a family of entities 
possessing properties bound by natural laws (2000, p. 168). 
Philosophers who have agreed that there are natural kinds have identified 
paradigmatic examples in natural sciences such as biology, chemistry, and physics. 
In reference to botanical and biological sciences, there are two views on how 
natural kinds can be explained. There is a view that  natural kinds can be 
understood in terms of taxonomy of plants and species of animals in which 
biologists generally place organisms into taxa on the basis of their “shared history” 
(Laporte, 2004, p. 64). The second view understands taxonomy on the basis of 
internal structure or “chromosome structures” (Kripke, 1980, pp. 120-121; 
Putnam, 1975, p. 240). In chemistry, “water” is regarded as a “chemical kind” 
sharing the “microstructural composition” known as H₂0 (on earth) (Laporte, 2004, 
pp. 92-93) while Gold is regarded as the element with the atomic number 79 
(Laporte, 2004, p. 95; Wilkerson, 1995, p. 31). In physics, physical properties such 
as quarks are regarded as constituting a natural kind. 134  These paradigmatic 
examples point to the fact that questions about natural kinds are ultimately 
ontological questions. 
Philosophers have dominated the debate about the nature of natural kinds. Some 
have analysed the concept of “natural kinds” in terms of “real essence” or “as 
properties or set of properties”. However,  while some philosophers contend that 
a natural kind (such as water) is determined in terms of a definite number of 
properties that are necessary and sufficient (oxygen and hydrogen) (Devitt, 2008; 
Elis, 2001; Wilkerson, 1995, p. 30) others have argued that not all kinds can be 
identified in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. An alternative way of 
identifying kinds in terms of “clusters of properties” has become popular. This 
simply means that identifying membership of a kind is a matter of some significant 
properties they have in common that can mark family resemblance (N. Boyd, 
                                                     
134  Quarks are regarded as particles because they lack any known internal structures and 
consequently are different from 3-dimensional objects (Cottingham & Greenwood, 2007). 
However, the combination of these particles to form composite objects are regarded as natural 
kinds.  
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1999a, 1999b). For instance, rather than classifying whales with fishes because 
they live inside water, they are classified as mammals because they give birth to 
and breastfeed their young ones, breathe lungs and are warm-blooded. 
 In contemporary philosophy of language and epistemology, there are two 
dimensions of discussion on natural kinds. In philosophy of language, there are 
debates about natural kind terms often associated with the works of Kripke and 
Putnam (Kripke, 1980; Putnam, 1975). In these debates, Kripke and Putnam 
challenge the descriptivist semantics often associated with Mill and Frege 
regarding how natural kind terms refer to natural kinds. For instance, in Naming 
and Necessity, Kripke describes natural kind terms as “rigid designators”. This 
simply means that, just as a proper name rigidly designates some particulars, 
natural kind terms rigidly specify the essence of a kind (Kripke, 1980, pp. 134 - 144). 
Secondly, there are debates on whether knowledge is a natural kind; an argument 
arguably pioneered by Hilary Kornblith. In this chapter, my focus will be on the 
second debate. 
A good number of epistemologists have shown keen interest in the argument that 
knowledge can be established as a natural kind. By this they mean that knowledge 
can be recognised as part of the fabric of the world in the same way oxygen, water, 
stones, atoms, and hills are (Kornblith, 2002; Kumar, 2014; Millikan, 1993; 
Williamson, 2000). Consequently, knowledge can be described in the same sort of 
spirit which science described tuberculosis, acid or genes (Millikan, 1993, p. 242).  
 However, there are as many disagreements among scientists and philosophers of 
science on how to define or categorise natural kinds as there are disagreements 
among epistemologists on whether knowledge can be regarded as a natural kind. 
As noted by Laporte, some critics have challenged the tendency to see the 
classification of living things into biological species as paradigmatic natural kinds 
on the ground that “species” are “individuals” rather than “natural kinds”(Laporte, 
2004).  Wilkerson has also noted that critics have claimed that “the supposed 
biological kinds and even chemical kinds are not natural kinds because they are 
not really natural” (1995, pp. 8-9). In addition, Wilkerson noted that the supposed 
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rigid demarcations between kinds (and consequently the meaningfulness of the 
concept of natural kinds) might break down “if a natural kind is merely a kind with 
a real essence, and if a real essence is a mere property or set of properties 
necessary and sufficient for members of the kind, then there will be an enormous 
number of natural kinds”. For him, a table (for instance) will fall into some 
categories of natural kinds as much as we are able (in principle) to state the 
conditions necessary and sufficient for being a table (Wilkerson, 1995, p. 31).135 
More importantly, some epistemologists have also argued that knowledge cannot 
be regarded as part of the fabric of the world like atoms, oxygen and water on the 
ground that “knowledge” is an evaluative term and consequently is a human 
creation (Hernandez, 2015).  
However, despite the many controversies among scientists, philosophers of 
science and metaphysicians concerning the nature and classifications of natural 
kinds, I will take it for granted that science has established that there are natural 
kinds. Consequently, rather than going deep into the controversies about the 
“reality” of natural kinds, in this chapter, I examine how epistemologists have tried 
to establish that knowledge has those characteristics often associated with natural 
kinds in the sciences. Such characteristics of natural kinds include; (i) a kind of 
classification imposed by nature and not by human beings (Markman, 1994, pp. 
77-78), (ii) identification of kinds in terms of classes and their cognate members 
(Quine, 1994b, p. 61) 136 , (iii) natural kinds as strictly products of empirical 
discovery (Kornblith, 2002, p. 12) and (iv) natural kinds as class of entities about 
which many inductive generalizations can be formulated (Machery, 2005, p. 445) 
or which characteristically lend themselves to scientific investigation (Wilkerson, 
1995, p. 31).  
                                                     
135 Wilkerson has now introduced some measures “to stiffen” the account of natural kinds. One is 
that “natural kinds must lend themselves to scientific investigations”. I will discuss these measures 
in the next section. 
136 Although Quine cannot be regarded as one of the protagonists in the contemporary debate 
about the nature of knowledge as a natural kind, his contribution to the debate, arguably, is 
influential, especially as an early attempt to establish natural kinds in terms of classes and cognate 
members. 
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I use two strategies in engaging Dewey’s naturalist metaphysics and epistemology 
in the project of defending knowledge as a natural kind. First, I present one of the 
positions that offer a strong and comprehensible analysis for the claim that 
knowledge is a natural kind and explore how Dewey’s views on natural kinds can 
be used to strengthen and critique it. A good number of philosophers have 
exploited different angles from which knowledge can be presented as a natural 
kind. However, it is notable that making references to facts about human 
evolution and adaptation is their common ground. Among these attempts, I 
concentrate mostly on Kornblith’s account because his focus is more 
fundamentally on epistemological concepts such as belief, truth, and justification 
and how they are related to human traits, behaviour and actions.  Other 
philosophers, Kripke (1980); Kumar (2014); Putnam (1975); Soames (2014); Ziff 
(1960) have followed a semantic or linguistic path in bringing this issue to bear on 
the question of knowledge.  
Consequently, I articulate Kornblith’s argument that defining features of natural 
kinds in science are identifiable in the concept and nature of knowledge. In 
addition, given that the position of Kornblith on knowledge as a natural kind will 
be my central focus, I compare the feasibility of Kornblith’s position with Dewey’s 
position in terms of how to identify and articulate those characteristics. The focus 
is on how Kornblith’s position can be strengthened or weakened by Dewey’s 
theses such as his “traits of existence” and “genetic classifications”. Consequently, 
on the positive side, I articulate how Dewey’s position can better address three 
objections often raised against Kornblith’s position. The first objection is from 
Goldman who argues that because knowledge involves context-sensitive 
dimensions,  while natural kinds are universal, knowledge cannot be a natural kind 
(2007, p. 17). The second objection is that knowledge is not a natural kind because 
it involves application of concepts (Machery, 2005). The third is that knowledge is 
not a natural kind because it is an evaluative term (Hernandez, 2015). However, 
on the negative side, I consider some objections that can be raised against 
Kornblith’s position from Dewey’s views about natural kinds. 
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In the second strategy, I argue that Dewey’s focus is on “knowledge as natural 
transactions”. This is an approach that is arguably different from Kornblith’s 
contention that “knowledge is a natural kind”. A way of engaging these 
philosophers with each other is to articulate the goals behind Kornblith’s 
endeavour to establish knowledge as a natural kind and evaluate both positions in 
terms of how well they do in achieving these goals.  I argue that Kornblith’s aim is 
to establish a scientific epistemology. With this formulation, the target is to 
present Dewey’s claim as an alternative and a more viable way of achieving 
Kornblith’s purpose.  
Consequently, this chapter has four sections. In the first, I briefly discuss natural 
kinds in the natural sciences. I focus on the examples of natural kinds that are 
regarded as paradigmatic and the advantages of having knowledge of natural 
kinds. In the second section, I discuss Kornblith’s position on knowledge as natural 
kind. This is a position that I defend as being more detailed. The third section 
focuses articulating arguments in Dewey’s work that can be used to defend the 
claim that knowledge is a natural kind. The fourth section focuses on articulating 
Dewey’s contention that “knowledge is human transaction within nature” as a 
more viable way of establishing a science-inclined epistemology compared to 
Kornblith’s contention that knowledge is a natural kind.  
I conclude the chapter by contending that the most important reason 
epistemologists such as Kornblith were interested in establishing knowledge as a 
natural kind is to promote an epistemology that does what the sciences are doing; 
the establishment of scientific knowledge. Consequently, showing that Dewey’s 
naturalist metaphysics and epistemology offer a more promising prospect for a 
normative scientific epistemology demonstrates that engaging Dewey with 
current issues in epistemology offers a good way to bring Dewey to life in 
contemporary philosophy. I start the discussion by exploring the notions of natural 
kinds in natural and social sciences. 
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6.1 Paradigmatic natural kinds in natural and social sciences. 
The debates on the nature and types of natural kinds are deeply rooted in the 
works of metaphysicians and philosophers of science who often refer to the 
classical works of Plato and Aristotle on issues such as the nature of Universals, 
Particulars and Essences. Questions are raised about whether we can identify 
natural kinds in terms of having essences, properties (Devitt, 2008; Ellis, 2001). 
Characteristics of natural kinds are often compared with the attributes of 
Universals and Particulars such as being self-generating or reducible to other 
entities (Armstrong, 1978; Lowe, 1998). These debates are also  popularised by 
philosophers preoccupied with theories of meaning and reference (Kripke, 1980; 
Putnam, 1975; Ziff, 1960).  
However, I do not go deeply into these debates. Rather, for present purposes I 
focus on how in these debates, classifications into kinds in the natural sciences 
(such as biology and chemistry) are taken as offering paradigmatic cases of natural 
kinds. For instance, in Chemistry, H₂0 is an example of a natural chemical 
compound. It is a natural kind in the sense that its classification is a molecular 
formula. It is also different from man-made stuff such as the artificially synthesized 
ascorbic acid (vitamin c) (B. Alexander, 2008). In biology, biological species have 
been regarded as paradigmatic natural kinds. The traditional view concerning the 
classification of natural kinds in these natural sciences has been that there are 
intrinsic natural properties that are individually and jointly sufficient for a 
particular to be a member of a kind (B. Alexander, 2008; R. N. Boyd, 1988, p. 196).  
Consequently, we have H₂0 (combination of hydrogen and oxygen) indicating the 
necessary and jointly intrinsic natural properties of water in chemistry. In biology, 
mammals are believed to have certain biological properties (such as neocortex in 
the brain) that necessitate the grouping of human beings and apes together with 
bats and whales as mammals even when in human description, there are more 
inclinations to classify whales as fish and bats as birds.   
However, there are some facts that I think one should note concerning historical 
development in the study of natural kinds en route to our consideration of 
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knowledge. First, there are several fundamental differences between what I call 
the “traditional view” and the “contemporary view” concerning what is required 
of a natural kind. A typical example is found in Boyd’s conception of some natural 
kinds which he argued are best described as having “homeostatic property-cluster” 
definitions. According to him, these natural kinds are “open-textured” in the sense 
that “there is some indeterminacy in extension legitimately associated with 
property-cluster or criterial attribute definitions. Consequently, “properties in the 
cluster are differently weighted” and membership of a kind are determined by 
“the possession of an adequate number of these properties [that] is sufficient for 
falling within the extension of the term  (R. N. Boyd, 1988, p. 196).137   
I take this position to be a radical challenge to the traditional view that for a 
particular to be a member of a kind, it must possess some intrinsic natural 
properties that are both necessary and sufficient for its kinds. Another view that I 
will present as a “contemporary view” is found in the developing field of writers 
who are challenging the impression of “physical properties” that is usually created 
when natural kinds such as “water” (H₂0), “gold” (malleability) or “species of 
mammal” (biological properties such as genes, reproductive characteristics) are 
classified. Writers have started discussing the possibility of non-physical 
properties or non-physical psychological or mental systems serving as natural 
kinds (R. Cooper, 2006, 2008; Groff, 2008; Mitchell, 2009). 
For instance, Mitchell argues that the adoption of the methods of cognitive science 
has assisted social psychologists in the discovery of previously unsuspected 
correspondence among many important phenomena at the core of the field; that 
“a common functional anatomy, centred on the medial prefrontal cortex”, forms 
a natural group of domains for approaching interpersonal understanding such as 
emotion, attitudes, and the self (Mitchell, 2009, p. 246). These are domains that 
                                                     
137 Boyd cited the example of biological species as the reason for modifying the classification of 
natural kinds in terms of possession of necessary and sufficient properties. According to him, 
“properties which determine the conditions for falling under t may vary over time (space), while t 
continues to have the same definition. To fall under t is to participate in the (current temporal and 
spatial stage of) the relevant property clustering” (R. N. Boyd, 1988, pp. 217-218). 
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are often thought of as having little in common. These findings, for Mitchell, 
“suggest a view of social psychology as a unique branch of cognitive science, 
specialized for examining a distinct and natural grouping of approximate, shifting, 
and internally-generated- in other words, ‘fuzzy’- cognitive operations” (2009, p. 
246). He concludes that social psychology is a natural kind. Cooper makes similar 
claims about the existence of psychological kinds (2008). Similarly, Engelskirchen 
contends that there are social kinds. He argues that social structures, as causal 
mechanisms, exhibit emergent dispositional properties that legitimately are social 
kinds (Engelskirchen, 2008). For Panksepp, emotions are natural kinds. For him, 
emotions arise from “coherent brain operating systems” and these systems 
“orchestrate and coordinate a large number of output systems in response to 
specific inputs (Panksepp, 1994, pp. 23-24). For him, “these systems constitute the 
core processes for the “natural kinds” of emotion” (Panksepp, 2000, p. 143). What 
is common among these positions is that there are some psychological systems or 
social structures that render some psychological phenomena and some 
dispositional properties natural kinds, respectively, by virtue of creating or 
providing natural convergence points for studying and grouping them. 
While acknowledging that these positions are far from uncontroversial, I will not 
discuss them in detail.138  For present purposes, I only need to state scholars’ 
contentions that there are psychological and social kinds that can be contrasted 
with paradigmatic examples of natural kinds in natural science. There are four 
important points to be noted concerning these natural kinds in social sciences: (i) 
There are psychological and social kinds (ii) Some psychological systems and social 
structures provide distinct and natural ways for grouping or linking certain 
psychological and social phenomena together (iii) The “membership” of these 
kinds (for instance, cognitive phenomena such as self-referential, attitudinal, 
affective and other social phenomena, converging in common functional 
neuroanatomy, centered on the media prefrontal cortex)  are internally generated 
                                                     
138 For instance, Barret argues that some empirical evidences that are meant to support the view 
that there are kinds of emotion with boundaries that are carved in nature, are inconsistent. 
Consequently, he considered the plausibility and what advantages, “moving beyond a natural-kind 
view” might engender for the scientific understanding of emotion (Barret, 2006).  
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cognitive operations and consequently are not conceived in terms of physical 
properties, (iv) These psychological and social kinds are emergent (non-physical) 
properties; dispositional, approximate groupings and consequently fuzzy. In other 
words, in a way similar to Boyd’s definition of kinds in terms of clustered mutually 
re-enforcing properties, they are mutually entailing psychological and social 
domains. 
Another important fact to note about discourses on natural kinds is what has been 
conceived as the purpose of studying them. For instance, the knowledge of natural 
kinds has been regarded as indispensable in our process of inferential (inductive) 
justification (Markman, 1994, p. 82; Quine, 1994b, p. 57). Consequently, it is 
envisaged that the establishment of natural kinds will engender the formulation 
of more reliable inductive generalizations (Machery, 2005, p. 445). For 
philosophers such as Quine, the identification of natural kinds is an essential 
preoccupation of science (Quine, 1994b). For him, science aims at discovering the 
structures that underlie superficial observable properties. Besides, he believes 
that every successful identification of these underlying structures are pointers to 
progress in science (Quine, 1994b, p. 72). I turn to Kornblith’s approach in 
presenting knowledge as a natural kind, and consider whether his position is 
successful in rendering epistemology a scientific discipline.  
6.2 Kornblith’s paradigmatic conception of knowledge as a natural kind 
In this section, l discuss two strategies that Kornblith concentrates on in his 
presentation of knowledge as a natural kind and then consider their success. 
Firstly, he draws an analogy between human knowledge and the knowledge of 
lower animals, which is the subject-matter of cognitive ethology. The motive is to 
present animal knowledge (both human and non-human) as an empirical 
phenomenon and a subject-matter within the framework of scientific 
investigation. Secondly, he uses cause-effect analysis in presenting knowledge as 
a natural kind. He contends that animals’ knowledge of their environment is 
instrumental in producing certain behaviour necessary for survival. However, I 
contend that some clarifications are needed to make Kornblith’s position more 
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comprehensive. For instance, I contend that Kornblith needs to explain the role of 
rational choice (in contrast to what nature imposes on human cognitive behaviour) 
in the process of justifying our beliefs before they become knowledge. 
 I also discuss some objections raised against Kornblith’s position. For instance, I 
discuss Goldman’s argument that knowledge has a context-sensitive dimension 
and consequently cannot be a natural kind (Goldman, 2007). Machery also rejects 
the idea of knowledge as a natural kind on the ground that it concerns the 
application of concepts (2005). Consequently, I explore whether Kornblith is 
presenting knowledge as a natural kind in terms of a physical entity with 
properties, or else a kind of non-physical property or non-physical psychological 
or mental system, as argued by Mitchell (2009), R. Cooper (2006) and Groff (2008). 
6.2.1 The analogy of human knowledge and the subject-matter of cognitive 
ethology  
In Knowledge and Its Place in Nature, Kornblith sets out to argue that knowledge 
is a natural kind. He employs an analogy between the preoccupations of cognitive 
ethologists who study lower animal knowledge and naturalized epistemologists 
who study human knowledge, in order to advance three significant claims: (i) all 
animal knowledge (whether higher or lower) is an instance of a single kind, (ii) 
there is a legitimate scientific category of animal knowledge, (iii) this scientific 
category is of philosophical interest (Kornblith, 2002, p. 29). 
In his attempt to show the preoccupation of cognitive ethologists with animal 
behaviour as constituting a proper “epistemological investigation”, Kornblith 
writes: 
Cognitive ethologists use a rich vocabulary of intentional idioms in describing animal 
behaviour. One standard textbook, John Alcock’s Animal Behaviour, has section 
headings referring to ‘hiding from’, ‘spotting’, ‘evading’ and ‘repelling’ predators. 
Wolves are described as chasing a herd of caribou or a number of solitary moose 
‘before finally selecting a vulnerable individual to attack’. Hunting dogs are described 
as having an ‘intended victim’. Rats, Alcock comments, ‘avidly explore areas around 
their burrows to learn the salient features of their habitat, information that will be of 
more than passing interest to them if pursued by a predator’ (Kornblith, 2002, p. 30).  
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What Kornblith is pointing to is purpose-oriented activities in animal behaviour. 
This is a radical challenge to philosophers (such as Rene Descartes and T. H. Huxley) 
who have argued that animal behaviours are automatic. Kornblith buttresses his 
point by making a distinction between animal behaviours that are categorised as 
“bodily motions” (e.g. moving of the beaks, wing-flapping) and those that are 
categorised as “signifying intentional states” (e.g. planning against impeding 
attack from predators). Kornblith points out that it is possible to describe all animal 
activities or behaviours in terms of “bodily motions” or in non-intentional terms. 
Viewed in this way, all these behaviours will look entirely heterogeneous. However, 
he contends: 
It is only when construed intentionally that otherwise heterogeneous bits of 
behaviour may be seen as instances of a single kind. Our recognition that ravens work 
co-operatively with one another to distract other birds and steal their food allows us 
to explain and predict subsequent behaviour, thereby providing us with explanations 
and predictions that we would not have were we to limit our descriptions of the 
behaviours to non-intentional terms. The non-intentional descriptions fail to capture 
what it is that the various behaviours have in common. We lose our ability to 
recognize subsequent repetitions of the same behaviour if we insist on characterizing 
it as bits of bodily motion (Kornblith, 2002, pp. 33-34). 
Kornblith suggests that cognitive ethologists are able to articulate “animal 
knowledge” by doing two things: (i) separating those behaviours of animals that 
fit into the patterns of non-intentional descriptions and those that fit into the 
patterns of intentional descriptions, (ii) recognising that the behaviours so 
described in intentional terms involve “information-processing tasks” which 
require the possession of some “internal states with informational content” 
(Kornblith, 2002, p. 36).  
How does the study of “animal knowledge” provide a template for arguing that 
human knowledge is a natural kind? For Kornblith, the answer lies in the fact that 
the distinctions between “bodily actions” and “intentional actions” in the life of 
“lower animals” applies to “higher animals”. For him, the objection that one form 
of life is higher or more social than the other, or that the study of human 
knowledge is philosophically more interesting than the other, do not alter certain 
fundamentally similar patterns between the two (Kornblith, 2002, p. 29). His focus 
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is on those basic and raw needs that human beings naturally share with animals 
(need for food, need to escape dangers or survival and so on) and not “theoretical 
sophistications” that mark humans’ transition from mere information-bearing 
states to full-fledged belief formation (formation of theories, seeking error-free 
knowledge, and so on).  
For him, animals’ knowledge of their environment is instrumental in producing 
certain behaviour necessary for survival: 
The environment places certain informational demands on an animal. If it is to satisfy 
its biologically given needs, it will need to recognize certain features of its 
environment and the evolutionary process must thereby assure that an animal has 
cognitive capacities that allow it to deal effectively with that environment ….Once we 
recognize the existence of internally represented animal needs together with 
representations of features of the environment, we have the beginnings of a belief-
desire psychology (Kornblith, 2002, pp. 37-38). 
He concludes that: 
[A]nd it is thus that the category of beliefs that manifest such attunement -cases of 
knowledge-are rightly seen as a natural category, a natural kind  (Kornblith, 2002, pp. 
62-63).  
The argument stated above understands animal knowledge as an empirical affair, 
and “human knowledge” as inherently based on biological and environmental 
necessities. Consequently, resources in biological, ecological sciences and natural 
history are indispensable in any attempt to understand it. The strength of this 
position lies in locating animal knowledge within evolutionary theory. This aspect 
of animal life (including human) is arguably universal. Several advantages of this 
position seem obvious. Firstly, as rightly noted by Kumar, if knowledge is identified 
with a kind of mental state, then it is legitimate to talk about “its constitutive 
psychological properties” (2014, pp. 441-442). Secondly, it presents knowledge as 
an empirical fact that concerns human activities meant for common goals such as 
survival of the human species. These goal-oriented activities provide a platform 
from which some reasonable inductive generalizations about general human 
knowledge can be made. With nature identified as the “cause” of certain natural 
processes that bring about certain animal mental states with certain constitutive 
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psychological properties, it is arguable that generalizations can be made on those 
processes and those mental states in a way that scientists generalize and predict 
concerning natural kinds. I now discuss some objections to Kornblith’s position 
and to what extent his responses shed light on his position. 
6.2.2 Some objections to Kornblith’s conception of knowledge as natural kind 
Edouard Machery raises two objections against the idea that knowledge is a 
natural kind. First, he contends that knowledge is about applications of 
concepts. 139  Given that concepts are created by humans, it follows that they 
cannot be regarded as part of nature. For him, concepts such as knowledge and 
population are kinds in terms of their formation and application but are non-
natural kinds. Secondly, he contends that application of concepts do not constitute 
a homogeneous kind. For him, “the bodies of knowledge that are used by default 
in our higher cognitive processes do not constitute a homogenous kind about 
which many inductive generalizations can be formulated” (Machery, 2005, pp. 44-
45).  
Kornblith’s response to Machery’s first objection is that the preoccupation of 
epistemologists does not end with how the concept of knowledge is applied but 
extends to how it is formed; as a consequence of natural occurrences (such as 
evolution).  It is in this sense of how nature necessitates human cognition that 
philosophy ultimately is continuous with the sciences. In the epistemological 
segment of this continuum, the impact from nature is contrasted with the 
influence of society in the formation of concepts. However, for Kornblith, focusing 
on concepts, independently of other factors, will create a theory of knowledge 
that may be “importantly incomplete or importantly mistaken or both” (Kornblith, 
2002, p. 163).140 
                                                     
139 For Machery, “Concepts are the bodies of knowledge that are stored in long-term memory and 
are used by default in the higher cognitive processes (categorization, inductive and deductive 
reasoning, analogy making, language understanding, etc.)” (2005, pp. 44-45). 
140 Kornblith challenges those who favour a view of philosophy as conceptual analysis on the 
ground that if their goal is to preserve the autonomy of philosophy, the purpose is defeated 
because they have to explain how philosophy differs from cognitive anthropology (2002, pp. 162-
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In response to Machery’s second objection, Kornblith argues that inductive 
generalizations can be formulated from three important aspects of animal 
knowledge. First, we can generalise from informational demands that the 
environment makes on its inhabitants. These are “demands that nature makes on 
animals if they are to function in their natural environment”. Second, we can 
generalise from cognitive capacities of animals; as means by which evolution 
responds to these demands. Third, we can generalise from how these responses 
give rise to the category of knowledge (Kornblith, 2002, p. 164). 
Goldman raises several arguments against Kornblith’s idea that knowledge is a 
natural kind. First, he argues that “knowledge has context-sensitive dimensions”. 
He cites the example of how “the exact standard for knowledge varies from 
context to context” and points out that “it seems unlikely that natural kinds have 
contextually variable dimensions” (2007, p. 17). He concludes that “this renders it 
dubious that any natural kind corresponds to one of our ordinary concepts of 
knowledge” (2007, p. 17).  Kornblith’s response is that neither the social 
dimension of knowledge nor its context sensitivity rule out its place in nature. For 
him, knowledge as a natural kind “enters our theoretical picture at the level of 
understanding of the species”, rather than the individual (Kornblith, 2002, p. 57) 
or social conceptualizations (Kornblith, 2002, p. 165). His argument is that if the 
nature of human knowledge rests upon characteristics of the human species or is 
determined by the mechanisms responsible for evolutionary changes in human 
environment, then Goldman’s argument loses its bite.  Moreover, Goldman admits 
being sympathetic to Kornblith’s rejection of the notion that belief possession 
requires the social practice of giving and asking for reasons, and the notion that 
knowledge requires induction into a linguistic community (Goldman, 2005, p. 48). 
These two agreements suggest that their major disagreement is not on the social 
nature or context sensitivity of knowledge.  
                                                     
163). In spite of Goldman’s disagreement with Kornblith’s idea of knowledge as a natural kind, both 
ultimately agree that although conceptual analysis (as an a priori inquiry) constitutes an 
indispensable segment of the field of epistemology, it does not exhaust it (Goldman, 2005, pp. 407-
408).  
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What exactly is Goldman’s worry about Kornblith’s position? It is arguable that he 
is not challenging the latter’s account of mechanisms for belief production, 
because both scholars agree on the importance of reliable mechanisms or 
processes there. Both subscribe to reliabilist epistemology (Goldman, 1992; 2005, 
p. 408; 2014; Kornblith, 2002, pp. 63-69). In addition, he is not challenging 
Kornblith’s account of the impacts of evolution on these mechanisms because 
both invoke the relevance of evolutionary theories on numerous epistemological 
issues (Goldman, 1986). Does the worry concern the idea of seeing human 
knowledge from the perspective of cognitive ethology? I think the major issue is 
Goldman’s critique of how Kornblith links the concept of knowledge in cognitive 
ethology with the philosophical account of human knowledge. This is the point I 
will explore. For Goldman, 
Kornblith argues carefully for the thesis that belief is a natural kind instantiated by 
animals. So perhaps knowledge is just belief; it is that natural kind. How is cognitive 
ethology supposed to adjudicate this issue? How is it supposed to decide that, no, 
knowledge is a different natural kind, inclusive of belief but more? ... Where does the 
assertion that knowledge is "more than just true belief come from? What licenses it? 
Surely it doesn't come from cognitive ethology. It would have to come, one supposes, 
from a semantico-conceptual account of the term 'knowledge’ (Goldman, 2005, p. 
407). 
Goldman’s objection is that before Kornblith’s argument that knowledge is a 
natural kind can make sense, it must first present a theory of knowledge that is 
defensible. However Kornblith’s position fails to differentiate between knowledge 
and belief. If what humans and lower animals naturally have in common are beliefs, 
then Kornblith’s position does not meet the traditional definition of knowledge as 
transcending mere belief. Put differently, Goldman’s argument is that Kornblith 
plays down the usual distinction between human rationality or reflective 
capacities and those of other animals and the rating of their knowledge as higher 
and lower level, respectively. According to this view, humans engage not only in 
self-crticism but also engage one another in the practice of asking for and giving 
reasons, which leads to the establishment of standards of justification among 
members of a community of inquirers. This practice, Goldman insists, is 
conspicuously absent among lower animals. The human system of language, 
295 
 
characterised by well developed semantics, symbols and concepts, is regarded as 
responsible for this difference. The consequence is that Kornblith’s analogy 
between human and animal knowledge breaks down.141  
In response, Kornblith rejects the idea that humanity’s ability to reflect 
differentiates their knowledge from the knowledge of lower animals. 
…while it is true that humans are capable of intellectual activities which other animals 
are not, I argue here that human knowledge and the knowledge of non-human 
animals is not different in kind, and that human knowledge requires no sort of 
reflection at all (Kornblith, 2002, p. 106). 
What exactly is Kornblith denying? There are three suggestions. Firstly, he seems 
to be denying that human reflective capacities play any substantive role that could 
warrant the distinction between animal and human knowledge. In lieu of seeing 
knowledge as reflective, we can see “philosophy as a thoroughly empirical 
discipline” (Kornblith, 2002, p. 170).  It is arguable that Kornblith cannot be 
defending this view because it is obviously false.  
Secondly, he seems to be suggesting that the ability to form beliefs is not the 
prerogative of humans. From this suggestion, the fact that lower animals do not 
have a semantico-conceptual framework nor are they social in terms of engaging 
in the practice of giving and asking for reasons, does not render them incapable of 
reflection. The point is that the formation of beliefs is fundamentally rational or 
reflective; whether formed by humans or animals. For instance, Kornblith writes: 
Just as a proper description of the psychology of animals requires that we see them 
as creatures having beliefs, a proper understanding of the cognitive capacities of 
animals requires that we see them as a means by which evolution responds to the 
informational demands that the environment makes on its inhabitants, and this in 
turn gives rise to the category of knowledge. The standards that a belief must answer 
to if it is to count as knowledge are not some sort of social construct; the standards 
for knowledge arise from the demands that nature makes on animals if they are to 
function in their environment (Kornblith, 2002, p. 164).  
                                                     
141 The charge that Kornblith equivocates between these two notions of knowledge was also 
raised by other critics such as Pernu (Pernu, 2009, p. 374).  
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The point here is that the formation of beliefs is a natural phenomenon caused by 
forces such as evolution and environmental demands from which all animals 
develop certain habits and behaviours and carry out activities guided by them. 
Consequently, what makes a belief “reflective” or “rational” is not necessarily 
being formed socially but the specific purposes it was formed for, and the modality 
that is employed in using it as means to ends. Consequently, the seasonal 
migration of birds and animals, numerous activities meant to guarantee their 
safety against predators, their selective mating for healthy procreation, and other 
activities for survival, are legitimately to be regarded as belief-based. In addition, 
they are rational beliefs as far their purposes are concerned. The problem with 
this suggestion is that Kornblith seems to have presented an account of how 
beliefs formed by animals can be argued to be true and not how these true beliefs 
amount to knowledge. Kornblith seems to have introduced a notion of belief that 
does not need to meet the third condition of knowledge which is known as the 
justification condition in traditional epistemology. I discuss this point in section 
6.2.3. 
Thirdly, Kornblith seems to be suggesting that it is wrong to start our investigation 
of human knowledge from reflective capacities or activities of human beings, that 
there are stages in the development of human knowledge that precede the use of 
human reflective activities. That these stages shared by all animals, constitute 
more natural and fundamental grounds for understanding animal knowledge (in 
general).  Thus, Kornblith sees nature/animal symbiotic relations as preceding 
human higher order reflective activities. It is arguable that this is the Deweyan side 
of him. There are several passages that show Kornblith’s commitment to this 
suggestion. For instance, according to Kornblith, 
Cognitive ethologists are interested in animal knowledge precisely because it defines 
such a well-behaved category, a category that features prominently in causal 
explanations, and thus in successful inductive predictions. If we wish to explain why 
it is that members of a species have survived, we need to appeal to the causal role of 
animals’ knowledge of their environment in producing behaviour which allows them 
to succeed in fulfilling their biological needs. Such explanations provide the basis for 
accurate inductive inference (Kornblith, 2002, pp. 62-63). 
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Kornblith’s point is we need to understand: (i) how external factors influence these 
mechanisms (stimulation of the senses, need to adapt to environmental changes, 
and so on), (ii) the internal structures and functioning of the organs or mechanisms 
involved in nature - human interactions (the brain, senses) and (iii) the reactions 
or responses of animals (the patterns of behaviour, habits, or choice). Kornblith 
derives three points from this perspective. First, we have an explanation for animal 
behaviours that is based on cause-effect analysis, predictable and arguably 
rational. Second, epistemology or whatever discipline studies animal knowledge is 
unavoidably in collaboration with other sciences that study how animal cognitive 
endowments and capacities are naturally formed and developed (such as cognitive 
science, evolutionary psychology, and neuroscience). Third, we have a general 
basis for discussing animal reflective capacities or rationality although these do 
not erase the differences between higher or lower order levels of rationality or 
reflective capacities among animals.  
Although it is arguable that Kornblith provides a general basis for animal reflection 
or rationality in such a way that makes Goldman’s challenge about the relevance 
of cognitive ethology to human knowledge lose its bite, in section 6.3, I compare 
Kornblith and Dewey’s account of the advent and role of human reflection in the 
development of human knowledge and argue that the latter poses a challenge to 
the former in terms of its indispensably social nature. This social nature will be 
explained in terms of the collaborative nature of reflective inquiry. This is a factor 
that arguably separates human knowledge from animal knowledge. However, 
before considering that, more objections to Kornblith’s position will be considered.  
Critics such as Goldman argue that Kornblith’s notion of knowledge as a natural 
category is not clear. Critics will agree with Kornblith that evolution plays active 
role in the (re)formation of human cognitive mechanisms and formation of beliefs 
but still contend that evolutionary impacts are not the same in all contexts and 
beliefs are sometimes formed differently. While natural kinds in science are 
arguably stable (in terms of continuity of identifying features), knowledge is 
relative and dynamic. The question is how are the kinds of knowledge determined? 
If Kumar’s suggestion is correct that Kornblith sees knowledge as “a mental state 
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with concrete psychological causes and effects” (Kumar, 2014, p. 40), that “can be 
reduced to its constitutive psychological properties” (Kumar, 2014, pp. 241-242), 
it is a arguable that psychological properties or mechanisms that produce 
knowledge are not knowledge. Besides, it is arguable that human knowledge is not 
naturally produced in the manner that some new species are produced or the 
features of some species modified by natural selection - without human agency. 
It should be noted that the objection from these critics is not about knowledge 
being an intangible or non-concrete phenomenon while other paradigmatic 
natural kinds have concrete properties. For instance, Mitchell rejects the 
conception of properties of natural kinds as essentially physical or material in her 
argument for the existence of psychological kinds. She argues that there are 
psychological systems that provide natural domains for seemingly disparate 
psychological phenomena such as self-referential, attitudinal, affective and other 
social phenomena; making them members of a kind (Mitchell, 2009, p. 246). 
Consequently, one can say that the objection of these critics concerns some kind 
of explanatory gap between Kornblith’s conceptions of ‘belief’, ‘knowledge’ and 
‘kinds’.  
In Kornblith’s account of knowledge as a natural kind, Boyd’s view of natural kinds 
is evident. Kornblith writes: 
I take natural kinds to be homeostatically clustered properties, properties that are 
mutually supporting and reinforcing in the face of external change. Consider the case 
of water. Water is just H₂O. Why does H₂O count as a natural kind? Two atoms of 
hydrogen and one of oxygen unite to form a homeostatic cluster. The chemical bond 
that joins these atoms provides the newly formed unit with a degree of stability that 
is not found in just any random collection of atoms… The reason natural kinds support 
inductive inference is that the properties that are homeostatically clustered play a 
significant role in producing such a wide range of associated properties, and in 
thereby explaining the kind’s characteristic interactions (Kornblith, 2002, pp. 61-62). 
Kornblith further argues: 
The various information-processing capacities and information-gathering abilities 
that animals possess are attuned to the animals’ environment by natural selection, 
and it is thus that the category of beliefs that manifest such attunement -cases of 
knowledge-are rightly seen as natural category, a natural kind (Kornblith, 2002, p. 63).  
299 
 
The most important point here is the idea of homeostasis. According to this idea, 
while there may be different behaviours and traits in different social contexts and 
consequently different forms of knowledge, it is arguable that the natural or 
evolutionary constraints are similar. Kornblith sees these “natural constraints”, 
which he called “the belief-desire psychology”, as a kind of “homeostasis” which 
serves as the “cause” of  different forms of human knowledge (2002, pp. 28-69).142 
More importantly, this “homeostasis” is also responsible for changes and “stability” 
in all forms of knowledge across cultures and time. This is a characteristic that is 
not found in merely true beliefs.  
 In addition, as pointed out by Kumar in his defence of Kornblith, taking knowledge 
as a natural kind does not entail that knowledge is whatever we take to be 
knowledge. “Paradigm cases of knowledge must support the causal/explanatory 
roles assigned to knowledge in our best empirical understanding of the mind” 
(Kumar, 2014, p. 456). For him, whether a belief is true, justified or reliably 
produced, has “no immediate effect upon a subject’s physical environment” 
unless it involves human actions that are directed towards his interests (Kumar, 
2014, p. 441). Kornblith and Kumar are specific on what this interest is - what 
enhances the survival of the animal species. Consequently, the major argument is 
that the survival of animals (or their successful adaptation) in their environment is 
fundamentally due to successful behaviour. For him, “animals’ knowledge of their 
environment” plays a causal role in the choice of behaviour that allows them to 
fulfil their biological needs. For him, only knowledge guarantees the possibility of 
successful behaviour because it is necessarily or ultimately in accordance with 
facts. Philosophers such as Quine have made a similar point.143  
How does this cause-effect explanation connect with the concept of knowledge? 
Kornblith’s answer is that knowledge is closely connected with successful human 
                                                     
142 Ellen Markman, for instance, argues that one of the most distinctive characteristics of natural 
kinds is the remarkable richness of their correlated structure (1994, p. 77). What she means by this 
point is that the properties that make up a natural kind are closely associated. This relationship 
was usually defined in terms of necessity and sufficiency until Boyd introduced the notion of 
homeostatic cluster property. 
143 W.V.O. Quine, for instance, wrote that “creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a 
pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind” (Quine, 1994b, p. 66).  
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actions. The fact that this success must be consistent to bring about the continued 
survival of the animal species, cannot be over-emphasised. Justification is defined 
in terms of how a behaviour or trait has led to the successful navigation, 
adaptation, and survival of the species. Kornblith’s contention is that these 
characteristics are found wanting in false beliefs. In Kumar’s exploration of 
Kornblith’s view, he argues that true belief is more likely than false belief to lead 
to successful action “because it enables one to capitalize on genuine causal 
relations that are instrumentally relevant to the satisfaction of desires and 
interests” (Kumar, 2014, p. 441). 
However, there are two questions for Kornblith. Firstly: What about true beliefs 
that are not known? How do we account for their influence on successful human 
actions or established traits? This is the hard case for Kornblith. Secondly, 
Kornblith and his supporters rely on cause-effect analysis to link the ‘naturalness’ 
of knowledge with successful human adaptational actions and retention of traits 
on one hand, and the dictates of evolutionary process on the other hand. However, 
Kornblith must contend with the position of philosophers such as Hume, Kant and 
Wittgenstein who have rejected the idea that justification is the same as 
causation.144  Contemporary philosophers such as Keith Lehrer have described 
theories that allow for causal considerations as a causal fallacy.145 
In response, I think we need to extricate Kornblith’s position from several closely 
related epistemological positions. One way of doing this is to explore his notions 
of reflection and belief and how they suggest that his position is distinct from 
traditional epistemology and modern epistemological theories such as reliabilism. 
For present purposes, I concentrate on his notion of belief and explore how it 
provides a theory of animal knowledge in which: (i) there is no need for the knower 
to be aware of all her true beliefs and (ii) the traditional demarcation between 
                                                     
144 For instance, Wittgenstein follows Hume’s idea of causation by stating that our best causal 
account cannot make space for the basic normative distinction between what is justified or not 
justified. In his words, “superstition is the belief in the causal nexus” (See fragments 5.135-5.1362, 
6.3, 6.36311-6.372, Wittgenstein, 1922).  
145 Lehrer argues that such theories “confuse the reason a person has for believing something with 
the cause of his believing it”(1990, p. 169).  
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justification and causation becomes insignificant. 146  My contention is that 
understanding these differences can enable a deeper understanding and a more 
critical appraisal of Kornblith’s position. 
6.2.3 Understanding Kornblith’s naturalist theory of knowledge as a rival to 
mainstream epistemology 
Kornblith’s conception of the category of belief as an important 
causal/explanatory category in psychology, is one of the most important 
frameworks upon which his entire position rests. The importance lies, most 
significantly in how the causal and explanatory roles attributed to ‘beliefs’ in 
psychology, is essential for ‘philosophical’ understanding of the category of animal 
knowledge. What are the peculiar features in the psychological notion of belief 
that are important for his position? What are the peculiarities in the philosophical 
notions of belief that are hindrances? 
 As noted by Eric Schwitzgebel, beliefs in philosophy represent our attitudes to 
what we take to be the case. However, he emphasises that the standard 
philosophical usage does not imply any uncertainty, any active or extended 
reflection about the matter in question (Schwitzgebel, 2015). Three important 
facts are to be noted. Firstly, beliefs are personal or private opinions or, in 
epistemological terms, they are personal attitudes to propositions. Beliefs, 
naturally, are uncritical and unstable. Secondly, there is a distinction between 
beliefs and knowledge in the sense that, while a belief can be true or false, 
true/falsity do not apply to knowledge. Thirdly, in the process for justifying a belief, 
the one who believes is expected to show that it is true and justified before it can 
be regarded as knowledge. This process is usually described as the practice of 
asking and giving reasons for holding a belief.   
We now turn to notions about beliefs in psychology. An insightful comparative 
approach to definitions of beliefs in psychology is provided by Nathan McCullough 
                                                     
146 In a way, it is arguable that both (i) and (ii) bear on the consciousness or awareness of the 
knower about her knowing state. However, for clarity sake, I will keep the issues separate. 
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(2012). He cites Richardson’s definition of beliefs in terms of “psychologically held 
understanding, premises, or propositions about the world that are felt to be true” 
(Richardson, 1986, p. 103). He also cites Sigel, who defines beliefs in terms of 
“mental constructions of experience, often condensed and integrated into 
schemata or concepts that are held to be true and guide behaviour”(Sigel, 1985, 
pp. 83-103). He also cites Abelson, who defines beliefs “in terms of people 
manipulating knowledge for a particular purpose or under a necessary 
circumstances” (Abelson, 1979, pp. 355-366). However, the description of beliefs 
in psychology that shows a contrast with its meaning and usage in philosophy was 
given by Jonathan Leicester who stated that in psychology “the purpose of belief 
is to guide action and not to indicate truth”(2008). 
Four points are notable concerning these notions of beliefs in psychology. Firstly, 
seeing beliefs in terms of “integrated schemata”, diagrams or mental 
constructions of the world is different from having attitudes to propositions. The 
second point follows from the first; the distinction between beliefs and knowledge 
in psychology is not as radically distinct as it is in philosophy. The third is that the 
well-noted interest of epistemologists in distinguishing between true beliefs and 
false ones is not a priority in psychology. The fourth and most important notion 
concerning beliefs in psychology is that, they are regarded as indispensable in 
causal explanations of the presence of behavioural patterns. Cognitive ethology 
(and by extension, cognitive psychology, and cognitive science in general) focuses 
on identifying similar cognitive mechanisms across different animal species rather 
than individual animals. 
Let us look at the nature of ‘beliefs’ in Kornblith.147 What is this causal/explanation 
feature of beliefs in psychology that Kornblith is so interested in? Is it the 
                                                     
147  My emphasis points to the fact that the conceptions of belief and justification (and 
consequently, knowledge) that Kornblith maintains in Knowledge and its Place in Nature, are 
radically incompatible with his earlier conceptions of these phenomena. For instance, on 
justification, he once argued that we cannot rely solely on the reliability of our belief-forming 
mechanisms. That we need to examine the character of the epistemic agent by examining “the 
etiology of his actions” (Kornblith, 1983, p. 38). This point was made to check the radical version 
of externalism that is expressed in the reliabilist position of epistemologists such as Alvin Goldman. 
See (Goldman, 1993a). 
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mechanisms that cause these beliefs or what these beliefs (cognitively) can cause, 
such as human behaviours? Why did he think that beliefs, as an important 
causal/explanatory category in psychology, provides cues for understanding how 
the category of knowledge turns out to be an important causal/explanatory 
category in cognitive ethology? I will address these questions by stating that 
Kornblith rejects the notion of beliefs in philosophy because, by being private and 
unstable, they are inadequate for his project.  
Kornblith wants us to see “the psychology of animals” in terms of “creatures with 
beliefs”. He has two reasons for this. First, to argue that all animals have cognitive 
mechanisms that are responsible for forming “beliefs’. Secondly, Kornblith’s larger 
target is to establish some causal and explanatory links between evolutional or 
environmental informational demands, animal beliefs, animals’ cognitive 
capacities and human/animal species; in a way to establish natural kinds. Thus, 
the unique role that beliefs play in Kornblith’s theory of knowledge lies in the fact 
that he seems to attribute representative capacity to beliefs by presenting them 
as human schemata about nature. He gives the impression that all beliefs describe 
or represent some features of the world, although some beliefs may accurately 
describe while others may be less accurate or inaccurate. In instances where 
beliefs accurately describe the world, we have cases of knowledge. From this view, 
epistemology is still normative because we still need to differentiate between 
situations when a belief constitutes knowledge and when it fails to do so. 
How is this different from any other epistemology? The analysis of Kornblith’s 
position provided by Jose Luis Bermudez gives some important insights. According 
to Bermudez (Bermudez, 2006, p. 302), Kornblith is looking for a causal and 
explanatory category that can link human behaviour and cognitive capacities (at 
the species level) with nature. Consequently, Kornblith thinks that the notion of 
belief in psychology is more appropriate in the sense that it explains individuals’ 
behaviours (rather than individuals’ attitudes to propositions that characterise the 
notion of belief in epistemology). In addition, concentrating on the notion of belief 
in psychology, “the notion of knowledge comes into play when we move beyond 
individuals’ behaviours to consider the patterns that they display and the cognitive 
304 
 
capacities that make them possible” (Bermudez, 2006, p. 302). The point is that, 
while “a theory of knowledge” (as justified true belief in traditional epistemology) 
links the cognitive activities of individual knowers to a community of knowers, a 
theory of knowledge envisaged by Kornblith (with a psychological background) 
links natural facts about animal species with nature.  
In addition, as noted by Bermudez, Kornblith is not thinking of justification in terms 
of what can be added to a belief to count as knowledge but rather in terms of 
capacities that give rise to true beliefs. While a standard version of reliabilism will 
endorse the notion of belief in epistemology (for instance, recognise inputs from 
reliable mechanisms for a belief to count as knowledge), Kornblith’s position 
recognises only the attunement of belief mechanisms by nature (Bermudez, 2006, 
p. 300). Consequently, from Bermudez’s point of view, Kornblith has abandoned 
the peculiar notions of belief in epistemology for what obtains in psychology and 
cognitive ethology. 
However, my contention is that Kornblith wavers between psychological and 
philosophical notions of belief in his work and because these two notions are 
incompatible, it becomes problematic for Kornblith to explain the process of belief 
formation and what he calls the attunement of belief to the world. While a 
traditional epistemologist may agree that the external world can contribute 
directly to the emergence of some of our beliefs (I see a bird and believe it is a Kiwi 
and not a flamingo), he will however contend that many of our beliefs are 
dependent on our subjective dispositions (I believe his love for China is not 
genuine). However, most epistemologists seem to regard the subjective aspects 
of belief-formation as decisive. In contrast to the epistemological tradition, 
Kornblith seems to be emphasising the aspects of belief formation that are caused 
and regulated by nature. More importantly, Kornblith’s description of the 
justification of animals’ beliefs in terms of “attunement cases” of some category 
of beliefs seems to imply a nature-regulated notion of justification rather than in 
terms of human rationally conscious efforts. In Bermudez’s words, he is projecting 
a kind of un-reflective knowledge” (Bermudez, 2006, p. 299). This point will 
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become clearer as we now turn to discuss how Kornblith rejects traditional 
approaches to justification. 
Kornblith’s theory of justification shows how he rejects the traditional and modern 
approaches to the justification of beliefs in two significant ways: both 
individualistic and socialistic approaches. I will provide only a sketch of this view. 
Firstly, Kornblith argues that the common practice of self-consciously considering 
the epistemic credentials of one’ beliefs is not a prerequisite of knowledge 
(Kornblith, 2002, p. 164). He argues that introspection is implicated in all such 
theories of justification. Introspection plays a central role in Cartesian methodic 
doubt as a medium of evaluation of beliefs (Kornblith, 2002, p. 107).  Introspection 
also plays a central role in the internalist quest for self-evident truths typified by 
Roderick Chisolm’s position (Kornblith, 2002, p. 109) and in coherentist positions 
typified by Laurence Bonjour (Kornblith, 2002, p. 110). Why is Kornblith against 
introspection? Is it because of his empiricist leanings? I think the reason is deeper 
than this. 
Kornblith’s argument is that all subscribers to the traditions that priotize 
introspection think that introspection is indispensable because of its advantages. 
Firstly, they all think that introspection can be called upon for “corrective” 
measures: 
… to reveal the defects of our current epistemic situation, to provide the will with the 
appropriate materials with which to remedy the situation, and to certify that those 
defects have been remedied (Kornblith, 2002, pp. 107-108).  
Secondly, a “constructive” usefulness of introspection is derived from its 
corrective role; the ability of the human mind to identify the sources of errors and 
provide remedies. Introspection aids the epistemic self-improvement of epistemic 
agents given the assumption that,  
… the responsible epistemic agent is truth-seeking and that in attempting to improve 
his epistemic situation he is attempting to improve his reliability; he wishes to be 
more effective in getting at the truth (Kornblith, 2002, p. 120).  
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However, Kornblith argues that the fact that all these epistemological traditions 
have not solved the problems of knowledge shows that introspectionism has failed 
as a methodological approach (2002, pp. 116-120). For him, introspection fails 
most significantly because “our processes of belief acquisition, and indeed mental 
processes in general, are largely unavailable to introspection” (Kornblith, 2002, p. 
120).  In chapter 3 of Knowledge and Its Place in Nature, Kornblith rejects two 
notions that traditional epistemology regards as prerequisites of justification and 
thus knowledge. The first is that there is need for self-conscious reflection which 
he called individual metacognition. This is “some sort of reflection on the 
epistemic status of one’s beliefs”. The second is the need for social metacognition 
“in the form of engagement in the social practice of giving and asking for reasons 
(Kornblith, 2002, p. 70). Here, I focus only on his notion of social metacognition. 
One can argue that Kornblith defines reflection strictly or stipulatively in terms of 
inner processes of introspection. On the contrary, one might say that “reflections” 
involve both covert actions (in terms of psychological processes) and overt actions 
(in terms of physical manifestations of those inner psychological processes). For 
instance, when I reflect about a belief, my aim is to show why I should hold it or 
not. When reflecting on that, I think about what possibly could serve as evidence. 
My reflections may involve others in dialogue, argumentations, and the practice 
of asking and giving reasons for holding a belief. This inevitably points to some 
social practices which go beyond introspection. It may also involve putting 
together material evidence for accepting the belief as true rather than false; for 
instance, in cases where my beliefs are about empirical claims. Is Kornblith denying 
this argument? No, I don’t think so. Rather, I think he is challenging the relevance 
of the overt or social dimensions of introspection to knowledge, of “engaging in 
the social practices of giving and asking for reasons” as prerequisites for 
knowledge (Kornblith, 2002, p. 162).  
Finally, Kornblith’s position has been challenged on the ground that it deprives 
epistemology of its normative force. For instance, Bermudez notes that Kornblith’s 
position resembles standard reliabilism in its focus on cognitive capacities that 
reliably generate true beliefs about a domain. What sets his position apart from 
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standard reliabilism is that we need not ask what we can add (through reflections 
on argument and evidence) to a true belief for it to count as knowledge. 
Consequently, he thinks his position has produced an account of knowledge that 
is non-reflective (Bermudez, 2006, p. 300). Kornblith contends that his approach 
does not deprive epistemology of its normative force but rather emphasizes it by 
“grounding knowledge in the world and seeing it as an evolutionary product of 
animals’ information needs (Kornblith, 2002, pp. 165-166). He contends that we 
cannot deny that reflective activities that produce successful animal/human 
behaviour (in terms retaining habits and developing traits for survival) exhibit high 
level of rationality or are based on normative principles and considerations. 
However, it is arguable that Kornblith begs the question when we consider that 
human history is not only about successful human behaviour and actions intended 
for successful adaptation. Many activities that are best described as “trial and 
error” loom large in real human life. People commit mistakes by misinterpreting 
their environment but nonetheless learn from those errors. Some belief-forming 
processes are more reliable than some others. One of the motivations of 
traditional epistemology is to identify and avoid such errors so that knowledge can 
be consistently attained. This is what necessitates the quest for an objective, truth-
conducive or truth- tracking theory of justification. However, the concept of 
justification in Kornblith’s thesis is defined in terms of conduciveness of animals’ 
behaviour to their survival rather than to truth. In Kornblith’s words; “faced with 
a choice between two processes, natural selection will favour the more conducive 
for survival, and less truth-conducive process” (Kornblith, 2002, p. 59).  
However, Kornblith realises that his position can be interpreted to mean that 
“conduciveness to survival is the only thing that is ever selected for”, which he 
admitted to be too sweeping and finds no support from current biological practice 
(Kornblith, 2002, p. 60). He argues that what his position really affirms is that “any 
conception of sophisticated animal behaviour” will present animal cognitive 
equipment as “serving the goal of picking up and processing information” 
(Kornblith, 2002, p. 60). He may be right about this but the fact remains that the 
concept of justification in his thesis is decisively defined in terms of “survival” and 
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the concept of “truth” is totally omitted. It is at this point that turning to Dewey’s 
instrumentalist conception of knowledge, truth and justification can strengthen 
Kornblith’s position.  
In the next section, I compare Kornblith and Dewey’s accounts of pre-reflective 
animal interaction with nature and argue that Kornblith’s position needs a full-
blown ontological theory of animal/nature interaction to present a more 
convincing account of animal knowledge. Secondly, I discuss the advantage of 
Dewey’s concentration on human traits (which can be supplemented with a wider 
account of animal traits) to build a scientific theory of (animal) knowledge over 
Kornblith’s wavering between psychological and philosophical notions of beliefs.  
6.3 Dewey on natural kinds 
In this section, I articulate some arguments in Dewey’s work that show the idea of 
natural kind he favours. Such arguments include seeing natural kinds in terms of 
evolving biological and behavioural traits rather than in terms of rigid taxonomy 
such as fixed essences or properties. I also link these arguments to both his 
conception of nature as dynamic and ‘reality’ as characterised by a series of 
historical events and his subscription to evolutionary theory. From this point of 
view on evolution, how human actions, thoughts, and ability to retain certain traits 
or behaviour and the development of cognitive abilities were compared with 
Kornblith’s notion of the influence of nature on animal behaviour. More 
importantly, the theories of knowledge in both positions will be compared. 
However, the section concludes that Dewey’s emphasis on knowledge as a natural 
transaction rather than as a natural kind (as emphasised in Kornblith’s position) 
makes a huge difference. It also concludes that Dewey’s conception of knowledge 
as natural transactions offers a better prospect for a scientific theory of knowledge. 
This is arguably an aim that informed Kornblith’s struggle to present knowledge as 
a natural kind. I start my discussion with Dewey’s critique of some conceptions of 
natural kinds. 
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6.3.1 Dewey’s critique of natural kinds; between the notions of essentialism and 
evolving biological and behavioural traits 
In Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Dewey rejects the classification of natural kinds in 
terms of what he called “rigid taxonomy”. This simply means a rejection of the 
idea that entities in nature “naturally” possess some fixed “essences” or some 
“necessary and sufficient properties” that can be used to classify them into natural 
kinds. Rather he favours explanation of natural kinds in terms of “genetic 
classification” or what Laporte calls “shared history” (Laporte, 2004, p. 64): 
As long as kinds were supposed to be ontological species marked off in nature, rigid 
taxonomic classification was inevitable. The substitution for such schemes of flexible 
relational kingdoms, orders, families, species, varieties, etc., in zoology and biology, 
was equivalent to determination of the relation of kinds on the ground of relationship 
to regulated systematic inference... However, the discovery of progressive derivation, 
through differentiation under environing conditions, from a common ancestor, 
institutes an objective basis. In comparison with the theory of fixed species, it marks 
restoration of an objective status of classification but upon different basis. Externally, 
the difference is marked by the substitution of belief in “the origin of species” for the 
assumption of fixed natural kinds. The logical equivalent of this change is a working 
postulate viz., that the arrangement of singulars in the classes which promote and 
control extensive inference, is that of genetic derivation or descent, where derivation 
into kinds is conjoined with differentiations of environing conditions. On this basis, 
reptiles, for example, are found to be more nearly akin to birds than to toads and 
salamanders, with which they were originally classified (J. Dewey, 1991, p. 295).   
Two points are important in Dewey’s notion of natural kinds which not only show 
the continued relevance of his position in contemporary discussions but contain 
some unique claims which can be explored in the debate on knowledge as a 
natural kind. The first point is that, rather than seeing natural kinds as determined 
by rigidly fixed essences, Dewey’s classification, and explanation of them depends 
ultimately on facts concerning evolution which includes “interaction” between 
species and “environing conditions”. According to this position, entities in nature 
are to be treated as kinds in respect of the evolving biological and behavioural 
traits they share. A pointer to this fact, according to Dewey, is the notion of 
“transitivity” that is indispensable in an account of natural kinds. This is 
exemplified in kinds where “an extensive or inclusive kind has been determined 
with respect to include kinds in an order of progression”. For example,  “when 
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whales have been determined to be mammals and mammals to be vertebrates, 
there is warranted transitivity from whales to vertebrates” (J. Dewey, 1991, p. 330). 
From this, it follows that other factors that have been suggested as criteria for the 
classification of natural kinds (such as “essences” or Kripke’s “internal structures” 
or “chromosome structures” (Kripke, 1980, pp. 120-121)) are also to be explained 
in reference to evolutional history of natural selection.148 In this regard, Dewey’s 
position on natural kinds can be compared with the view of modern day biologists 
who have explained how DNA and genes are modified in mutations.  
The second point concerns Dewey’s view about why the cognitive study of natural 
kinds is important. For him, “scientific natural inquiry is notoriously concerned to 
establish related kinds”. However, for him, this concern is not final but rather is a 
means to an end. Two interrelated purposes are identifiable. Firstly, it is to have a 
systemic account or explanation of the world in a way that evolutional progress is 
accounted for. Secondly, it is to provide a framework for controlling nature (J. 
Dewey, 1991, p. 331). Again, it is important to note how Dewey’s emphasis on the 
purposeful study of natural kinds is connected with his other ideas about nature 
(in general) which include the idea that nature is an instrument for 
experimentations (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 102-137). 
What follows from these two points is that Dewey takes the classifications of 
entities in the world into natural kinds as primarily an ontological matter. He 
emphasises on the point that kinds and their relationships in nature are discovered 
and described. He argues that “qualities which descriptively determine kinds are 
traits or characteristics” of existence (J. Dewey, 1991, p. 259). These traits are 
descriptions of reality. Facts about inner structures of kinds and evolutional factors 
                                                     
148 However, an objection can be raised against the classification of natural kinds in terms of 
“shared history” or “interactions” by pointing out that the classification is either too 
anthropocentric or applies only to living organisms and does not describe appropriately the 
relationship between elements in non-living entities such as oxygen and nitrogen in water and the 
relationship of elements that make up other entities such as gold and jade. The classifications of 
these non-living entities into natural kinds arguably are based on fixed properties or essences. 
Although, exploring this objection deeper is important for a comprehensible metaphysics of 
natural kinds, what I needed to establish at this point is the relevance of Dewey’s position among 
contemporary scholars with focus on the consideration of human knowledge as a natural kind.    
311 
 
(interactions and environing conditions) combine to form homeostatic structures 
for classifying species and entities into kinds. However, epistemological 
considerations become prominent when he argues that kinds are manipulated for 
human purposes. He contends that they are instruments. More importantly, he 
contends that the “real nature” of some natural objects such as crude ores, copper, 
pure metals and so on, do not lie in their immediate qualities but in what we get 
when we treat them as materials for getting something else (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 
111). His point is that a proliferation of kinds is actuated in human experimental 
transactions with nature. Furthermore, his more contentious claim is that the 
relations between entities are as real as entities themselves.  
What I regard as most important at this point is drawing attention to some of 
Dewey’s descriptions of natural kinds that arguably are identical with his 
descriptions of the nature of human knowledge. For instance, both are regarded 
as descriptions of reality, traits of existence and instruments for manipulating 
nature. In addition, facts about evolution loom large in the identification of both 
natural kinds and human knowledge and generate their homeostatic structures.  
In the next section, I articulate and explore the similarities in Dewey’s descriptions 
of the nature of natural kinds and human knowledge that are prominent in his 
work and consider to what extent these descriptions are parallels to some 
descriptions of knowledge as natural kinds in Kornblith’s work.   
6.3.2 Some parallel arguments in Dewey and Kornblith’s conception of 
knowledge as a natural phenomenon 
In chapter three, we discussed how Dewey described the employment of the word 
“knowledge” by mainstream epistemologists as too wide and vague (J. Dewey & 
Bentley, 1949, pp. 48, 296). His contention is that there are several traditional 
accounts of “knowledge” where the word has been used ambiguously; as an 
abstract concept, as synonymous with experience or contemplation or meditation. 
He also cites instances where distinctions are made between propositional or 
factual knowledge (knowledge-that), practical or technical knowledge 
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(knowledge-how), and empirical knowledge (knowledge-what) (J. Dewey & 
Bentley, 1949, p. 296). He identifies these ambiguities as the cause of most of the 
recurring “problems of knowledge”. Dewey rejects all these depictions on the 
ground that they all miss the natural, empirical and practical nature of knowledge. 
However, there are some features of knowledge that he takes to be definite. 
Among the most emphasized are: (i) knowledge as a mode of interaction between 
humans and nature (ii) knowledge as ultimately a human activity and (iii) 
indicating something the organism produces rather than possesses (J. Dewey & 
Bentley, 1949, p. 296) and (iv) knowledge as successful human behaviour. It is 
notable that these descriptions of knowledge also dominate Kornblith’s discussion 
of knowledge as a natural kind. 
The central claim in Dewey’s Experience and Nature is that knowledge consists in 
interactions between humans and nature. Dewey describes the interaction as 
“natural transactions”. This view arguably is implicated in Kornblith’s Knowledge 
and Its Place in Nature where he describes knowledge in terms of animal 
responses to environmental constraints. Both philosophers explain these 
transactions in terms of human/animal purpose-oriented responses to challenges 
in nature. It is in this sense that knowledge is taken to be an action-doing word 
and not a concept or a proposition. In addition, both philosophers explain these 
human activities in terms of behaviours. In Knowing and the Known, Dewey argues 
that “knowings are behaviours” and that “neither inquiry into knowing nor inquiry 
into behaviours can expect satisfactory results unless the other goes with it hand 
in hand (J. Dewey & Bentley, 1949, p. 74). The point is that knowledge refers to 
existential phenomena. In his explanation of this point, Dewey analysed the 
concept of “knowledge” from two words - “knowing” and the “known”. According 
to him, “knowings” are “organic phases of transactionally observed behaviours” (J. 
Dewey & Bentley, 1949, p. 296). By this, he meant that “knowing” is essentially a 
practical or physical activity involving observable manipulations of nature. It is 
organic in the sense that it involves nature-human symbiotic relationship. In this 
regard, “knowings” (or cases of knowledge) are points of convergence or 
cumulative effects of inquiry; descriptions of concrete state of affairs in nature. 
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On the other hand, the “knowns” are “environmental phases of transactionally 
observed behaviours” (J. Dewey & Bentley, 1949, p. 297). Dewey uses these 
‘definitions’ of “knowns” and “knowings” to stress the continuity between the 
“knower” and the “known”- as phases of a common process.149 Both, described in 
Deweyan sense, are inseparable parts of nature.  
From the foregoing, it is evident that both Dewey and Kornblith are avowed radical 
empiricist-naturalist philosophers who reject a priori knowledge. Both 
philosophers defend knowledge as a natural phenomenon by appealing to the 
causal link between nature (in terms of environmental challenges), human 
thought, and actions. Specifically, they appeal to facts about evolutionary theory 
to explain knowledge. More importantly, both philosophers define knowledge 
significantly in terms of practical activities and link it with successful human 
behaviour. Let us recall what Dewey said in his description of the general link 
between human knowledge and a successful manipulation or re-ordering of 
nature. 
When the things which exist around us, which we touch, see, hear, and taste are 
regarded as interrogations for which an answer must be sought (and must be sought 
by means of deliberate introduction of changes till they are reshaped into something 
different), nature as it already exists ceases to be something which must be accepted, 
and submitted to, endured or enjoyed, just as it is. It is now something to be modified, 
to be intentionally controlled. It is material to act upon so as to transform it into new 
objects which better answer our needs. Nature as it exists at any particular time is a 
challenge, rather a completion; it provides possible starting points and opportunities 
rather than final ends (J. Dewey, 1930, pp. 97-98). 
In this passage, Dewey presents nature as both the cause and object of our 
philosophical reflections, which commence when Nature poses a challenge. This 
reflection becomes knowledge when it brings about inquiries and actions that 
result in solutions to the problem. Consequently, successful human activity is 
determined (in Deweyan sense) by its manipulative or restructuring impacts in 
nature and (in Kornblith’s sense) by the navigational correctness of the animal. 
                                                     
149  Dewey prefers using the concept “transaction” rather than “interaction” to express the 
symbiotic relation between human species and nature on the ground that “interaction” implies 
two distinct and detachable entities relating with one another. “Transaction”, on the other hand, 
is meant to show that human species is part of nature (J. Dewey & Bentley, 1949, p. 304). 
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Both philosophers appeal to the successful evolutional progress of the human 
species as a justification for this success. Their point is that only a correct 
description of nature can guarantee human survival. For Dewey and Kornblith, 
knowledge designates characters of existential reference. This simply means that 
knowledge reflects natural continuity or natural events. The thrust of their 
argument is that, given that knowledge is inherently connected with actions or 
activities going on in nature (i.e. modifications of existence), it is a description of 
what obtains in nature. This position offers a good argument for stating that 
knowledge is a natural phenomenon and that studying human knowledge 
(epistemology) is a legitimate scientific enterprise just like the study of atoms and 
other elements whose re-arrangements or re-configurations bring about changes 
in the structure of reality. 
Furthermore, one can appeal to some of the implications of Dewey’s 
reconceptualization of the concept of “experience” and his rejection of “the 
spectator theory of knowledge” to underscore the point that his position favours 
the claim that knowledge is part of the world. In chapter two, we discussed how 
Dewey rejected the traditional conception of “experience” as indicating subjective 
human awareness of nature and replaced this conception with the idea that 
human experience forms an integral part of nature. Again, we recall his radical 
reconceptualization of human “experience” as “double-barrelled” in that “it 
recognizes in its primary integrity no division between act and material, subject 
and object, but contains them both in an unanalysed totality” (J. Dewey, 1925, pp. 
10-11). Again, he writes: 
The reader will recall that in our general procedure of inquiry no radical separation is 
made between that which is observed and the observer in the way is common in the 
epistemologies and in standard psychologies and psychological constructions. Instead, 
observer and observed are held in close organization….Our position is simply that 
since man as an organism has evolved among other organisms in an evolution called 
“natural,” we are willing under hypothesis to treat all of his behavings, including his 
most advanced knowings, as activities not of himself alone, not even as primarily his, 
but as process of the full situation of organism-environment; and to take this full 
situation as one which is before us within the knowings, as well as being the situation 
in which the knowings themselves arise (J. Dewey & Bentley, 1949, pp. 103-104). 
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The major contention from Dewey and Bentley here, is that, although knowledge 
is indubitably geared towards human interest, it need not be so - if the traditional 
conceptualization that contrasts human beings with nature is discarded. With 
Dewey’s symbiotic conception, human beings, their interests, knowings and 
activities, are “organic phases” of some processes in nature.  
Another important aspect of Dewey’s conception of experience that supports 
Kornblith’s position is the distinction between primary experience and secondary 
human experience. Dewey describes primary human experience or encounter 
with nature as “raw” and non-reflective because things are just had, used or eaten. 
However, reflective, and continued inquiry characterises secondary experience. 
The point is that what is “primary” for Dewey has much to do with whether or not 
a reflective (and/or inquirential) process is underway and forefront of all overall 
consideration. The absence of purposive reflective inquiry in Dewey’s primary 
experience can be compared with Kornblith’s contention that reflection plays no 
significant role in the formation of animal knowledge. Both philosophers started 
their accounts of animal/human knowledge on the basis that nature serves as the 
cause of certain animal/human conditions and that they (humans/animals) 
respond in certain ways such as retained traits or behaviour. From these positions, 
the usual distinction between human and animal knowledge based on the 
supposed higher reflective capacities of the former, seems to be momentarily 
dismissible. Here, the link between Dewey’s and Kornblith’s conceptions of 
knowledge as a natural phenomenon is undeniable.  
With these similarities in Dewey and Kornblith’s positions on knowledge, the 
question to be considered is, are both philosophers in agreement that knowledge 
is a natural kind? The answer is no. There are several major differences between 
Dewey’s position and Kornblith’s position that can be used to underscore this 
point and can provide a basis for a critique of Kornblith’s theory of knowledge as 
a natural kind. I now discuss some of these differences and their implications.  
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6.3.3 Dewey and the contention that knowledge is a natural kind 
One of the major differences is that while Dewey claims that knowledge is a 
natural phenomenon, Kornblith claims that it is a natural kind. What is the 
difference? For Dewey, experience and knowledge depict natural occurrences or 
what happens in nature. While the former refers to the totality of human activities 
in nature, knowledge describes some specific or purposeful human activities that 
are successful, such as manipulating or re-ordering nature in some specific ways  
(J. Dewey, 1925, p. 134). In this regard, it is arguable that knowledge is an 
evaluative term describing human activities and not what we can call carving 
nature at its joints. 
In addition, in Dewey’s explanation of how knowledge is attained or how an 
indeterminate or problematic situation is brought to settlement, there are many 
possible ways of achieving this goal. Consequently, human beings have to choose 
between several alternatives (which Dewey referred to as hypotheses) in the 
process of inquiry. For Dewey, knowledge is attained through trial and error. This 
is a process that is dynamic because nature and the challenges it brings are 
dynamic. When attained, knowledge is an instrument to be used objectively in 
solving problems emanating from human transaction within nature. Consequently, 
reflection plays a significant role in inquiry or discovery of knowledge and in the 
instrumental applications of knowledge. Dewey describes the purpose of 
knowledge as “effecting modifications of existence on behalf of conclusions that 
are reflectively preferred”  (J. Dewey, 1925, p. 134).  The fact that in Dewey’s 
theory of experience, inquiry and the discovery of knowledge is in the secondary 
and reflective experience corroborates this idea that knowledge requires 
reflection. Miller et al give a succinct description of Dewey’s notion of inquiry and 
knowledge (its product) and how they are inseparable from reflection: 
Intelligent inquiry mediates human responses to the challenges of the living. In so 
doing, it frees human beings from reliance on instinct and fixed routines; it enhances 
the power to achieve desired results (Miller, Fins, & Bacchetta, 1996, p. 33). 
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Thus, I argue that higher level of reflection is needed for human purposes such as 
desire for quality life, moral living, and dominating nature. This requirement 
necessarily creates a huge difference between human and animal knowledge. This 
is a distinction that Kornblith’s position arguably obliterates.  
Furthermore, we have different forms of problematic situations across different 
social contexts and consequently there are different exemplifications or “warrants” 
of truth and knowledge. However, there are characteristics shared by them all. 
Consequently, paradigm cases of knowledge are found in actual human situations, 
human problems and human transactions in the world. In this regard, it is 
noteworthy that Dewey will agree with Kornblith on the point that evolutional 
processes have impacts on numerous physiological and psychological parts of 
human beings which includes their cognitive apparatuses such as the brain and 
perceptual organs. He will also agree with Kornblith that raw animal needs such 
as means of sustenance and environmental adaptations influence their thoughts 
and actions.  
However, Dewey’s conception of knowledge is equally fundamentally built around 
social concepts (such as community of inquirers) and organised social activities 
(such as social interactions, social inquiries and social goals). It is arguable that 
these factors influence Dewey’s notion of knowledge and tilt it more towards the 
category of what we can call a “social kind” rather than a natural kind. This focus 
on the social nature of knowledge ( in terms of social organization and actuated 
by social needs) is absent in Kornblith’s position which is deliberately focused 
more on those animal behaviours, bodily actions and natural needs that humans 
share with the lower animals rather than those aspects he describes as 
“sophisticated aspects of human knowledge (Kornblith, 2002, p. 29). 150 
Consequently, Dewey’s thesis on the instrumentality of knowledge will be 
incompatible with any position that places the creation and application of human 
                                                     
150 We can reiterate our earlier discussion of Kornblith’s attempt to establish some level ground 
between human knowledge and animal knowledge. He discards the objection that human 
knowledge is higher or more social and consequently more philosophically interesting than animal 
knowledge (Kornblith, 2002, p. 29). 
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knowledge strictly in the control of nature. In this sense, Dewey’s theory of 
knowledge makes a distinction between what originates from natural selection 
and what originates from human natural transactions in the world.  
 It follows from this that knowledge and nature are two different things just as we 
can separate “means” from “ends” and “instruments” from what they are used 
for. If knowledge is a natural kind or a part of fabric of nature, the kind of 
relationship that obtains between water and the combination of hydrogen and 
oxygen (that makes “water” a natural kind) is absent in Dewey’s description of 
knowledge. In my understanding of the two positions, Kornblith seems to have 
interpreted evolutionary theory in a way that human choice of actions or the 
development of human cognitive capacities and properties are totally dependent 
on evolution. This emphasis is absent in Dewey’s position. 
From the foregoing, it is evident that Dewey’s contention that Knowledge depicts 
natural human transactions in nature raises some challenges to Kornblith’s 
contention that knowledge is a natural kind. However, it is arguable that both 
contentions are meant to serve one purpose - to provide a naturalistic and 
scientific theory of human knowledge. Which position provides a stronger 
argument for this claim? I now discuss the claim that Dewey’s position offers 
better prospects. 
6.3.4 Dewey’s conception of knowledge as natural transaction and the prospects 
for a normative scientific epistemology 
In this section, I explore the argument that the root of Kornblith’s contention that 
knowledge is a natural kind and Dewey’s contention that knowledge is human 
natural transaction lies in the quest to establish a scientific epistemology. However, 
my main target is to establish that Dewey’s conception of knowledge as human 
natural transaction arguably fulfils this purpose more than Kornblith’s position. 
My contention is that Dewey’s position offers a more comprehensible scientific 
epistemology because of the more detailed and comprehensible account of 
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naturalism it has as a background. I start by recalling the naturalist background to 
the positions of both philosophers.   
In Knowledge and Its Place in Nature, one of Kornblith’s major aims is to identify 
some paradigmatic similarities between the animal behaviours studied by 
cognitive ethologists and human knowledge studied by naturalizing 
epistemologists for the purpose of inferring that the latter is equally a legitimate 
scientific category (Kornblith, 2002, p. 29).  Kornblith’s tactical approach is to 
demonstrate how epistemology can be linked with science through the adoption 
of a version of naturalism he endorses: 
The investigation of the phenomenon of knowledge, on the naturalist’s view, is an 
empirical investigation, the legitimacy of epistemic terminology depends on its 
properly latching on to genuine, theoretically unified kinds. That is all that naturalistic 
scruples require…. Their terminology earns its keep in just the way that chemical or 
biological or physical terminology earns its keep: it must be part of a successful 
empirical theory. The fact that terms such as ‘knowledge’ are not parts of physics or 
chemistry does not show that they are not naturalistically acceptable. Rather, the 
question for naturalists is whether knowledge turns out to be a theoretically unified 
phenomenon, and this gives every appearance of being a legitimate and tractable 
empirical question (Kornblith, 2002, p. 24). 
The key issue in this passage is the claim that a naturalistic investigation of 
knowledge involves theoretical unification. However, it is arguable that the phrase 
is ambiguous. Does it mean that an approach to the phenomenon of knowledge is 
naturalistic if it is theoretically linked with some other theories in science which is 
regarded as a successful empirical theory? Or, does it mean that presenting 
knowledge in a naturalistic way requires that the phenomenon must help in 
explaining other phenomena that would have remained otherwise 
incomprehensible; just as gravity explains motions of the planets in theoretical 
physics or chemicals are combined in chemistry to produce a chemical reaction or 
change?  I think Kornblith wavers between the two interpretations. One obvious 
target is making knowledge a legitimate subject-matter of scientific discourse. 
How does this work out? Two apparently easy ways are not available to Kornblith. 
First, given that scientists do not focus directly on the term knowledge, the 
possibility of seeing all inquiries about knowledge as “scientific” is foreclosed. A 
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special case needed to be made such as “naturalizing” knowledge. Second, 
Kornblith cannot appeal to methodological naturalism by claiming that the 
methods for studying atom, amoeba and force fields in science are equally 
applicable to animal knowledge because he wants a theory that is free from the 
allegation of scientism and more importantly that is philosophically interesting.  
Kornblith chooses to demonstrate that knowledge is homeostatic like any other 
natural kind; homeostatic unity that plays a “causal and explanatory” role among 
kinds (2002, pp. 28-29). Concerning animal knowledge, the causal role concerns 
the formation of the kind’s characteristic properties and behaviour by natural 
propensity. The explanatory role is specifically explained in terms of a bi-
conditional relation between the process of natural selection and its outcome 
(survival or adaptationability of animals). He argues that without understanding 
knowledge in this sense, it will become impossible to explain how numerous and 
seemingly unrelated animal behaviours are causally linked up with one another or 
can be given meaningful explanations and predictions. This is Kornblith’s 
naturalism. He thinks this makes inevitable the notion of knowledge as a natural 
kind. 
It is arguable that this version of naturalism links the study of animal knowledge 
with the biological structures of animals’ cognitive mechanisms and animal 
behaviour which are legitimate scientific phenomena. However, it is arguable that 
it does so at the expense of having a distinctively philosophical enterprise. 
Kornblith sets out (Kornblith, 2002, p. 29) to refute scholars such as Bealer and 
BonJour who have argued that naturalism must be rejected in a distinctively 
philosophical enterprise (Kornblith, 2002, pp. 25-27) but ended up with the claim 
that epistemology is “nothing more than a branch of cognitive ethology” 
(Kornblith, 2002, p. 172).  
However, this version of naturalism faces several problems. First, it narrows down 
“animal behaviour” to what can be described as “less-reflective behaviour” or 
instinct-based behaviour. These are behaviours that philosophers such as Ernest 
Sosa will describe as incapable of engendering the kind of knowledge that requires 
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“perspectival endorsement of the reliability of one’s sources” (Sosa, 2001, p. 194). 
However, a more pressing problem is that Kornblith will find it difficult (using the 
approach of the cognitive ethologists) to transcend from animal knowledge to 
human knowledge. There will be a vacuum created by the absence of a 
comprehensible theory of human reflective activities. I think Kornblith’s major 
problem is that his naturalism needs a corresponding naturalistic metaphysics that 
will serve as a background. His presentation of knowledge playing the 
“homeostatic” role in animal life seems to imply that knowledge is the only means 
of engaging the world.  
Dewey has a naturalistic metaphysics that serves as a “foundation” and 
complement for both his naturalistic epistemology and any form of scientific 
inquiry. An account of Dewey’s naturalist exploration has been the focus of 
chapters 1– 3 of this work. However, we can reiterate some basic aspects of the 
discussion. The uniqueness in Dewey’s naturalism begins with how he developed 
an empirical metaphysics that entails a naturalist epistemology. For him, an 
empirical metaphysics is a precondition for a naturalist epistemology. 
Consequently, he starts with rendering an empirical account of human experience 
which he takes to be primarily a metaphysical (ontological) issue. He 
reconceptualised human nature and human experience to show that both are 
integral parts of nature. He also contends that for both naturalist metaphysicians 
and natural scientists, “experience” is the only pathway to unravel and control 
nature. For him, “experience” signifies the entire history of human endeavour to 
understand and cope with nature. With human experience in nature becoming a 
legitimate scientific subject-matter, all cognitive endeavours (philosophy, science, 
logic and so on) are interpreted as instruments purposely designed for “human 
transactions with nature”. Every successful application of these “instruments” in 
human transactions with nature is called “knowledge”.  
Dewey argues for a major difference between humans and animals’ knowledge by 
citing Rignano’s view that lower organisms strive to get back to their previous 
environment or to those identical with the previous one they are used to (when 
their state is disturbed or after searching for food) which he describes as a 
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“conservative tendency”. According to him, the higher organisms on the other 
hand, strive to institute “an integrated relation” by modifying their environment 
(J. Dewey, 1991, pp. 34-35). For Dewey, while there is a “conservative tendency” 
in higher organisms, the differences in the rates in which changes occur in respect 
of their needs make a huge difference in their behaviour. For him, “unless this fact 
is recognized, development becomes abnormal feature”, and “with change in 
need comes a change in exploratory and searching activities; and that change is 
followed by a change in fulfilment or satisfaction” (J. Dewey, 1991, p. 35).  
Secondly, Dewey argues that biological structures or factors (the sensory organs: 
eyes, ears, and the brains) “prepare the way for deliberate inquiry” and 
consequently both constitute what he called “continuity” between “the lower 
(less complex) and higher (more complex) activities and forms”. More importantly, 
he argues that this “continuity” is not self-explanatory (J. Dewey, 1991, p. 30). 
Consequently, an adequate naturalist approach to knowledge will not treat the 
formation and development of the biological structures, their operations and 
inquiry separately. These two points arguably raise questions concerning the 
adequacy of Kornblith’s version of naturalism in two ways. First, the problems 
render Kornblith’s naturalist epistemology impoverished. Second, his version of 
naturalism is a form of scientism because it focuses on biological structures alone. 
These problems are absent in Dewey’s theory of knowledge as natural transaction. 
Moreover, Dewey’s instrumentalist and experimentalist conception of knowledge 
seems to suggest that the human knowledge he deals with (reflective and practical 
knowledge) is constructed or invented and not discovered.  For instance, as rightly 
noted by Larry Hickman, Dewey sometimes describes “knowing as artifact of 
inquiry”. The aim is to emphasize its function in terms of manipulating or 
restructuring nature (1990, pp. 70-71). Consequently, we can describe how human 
beings come to understand how the brain, liver or blood function as discoveries 
and contrast this “knowledge” with technological knowledge about how to build 
skyscrapers, dams, and automobiles as discovery. From this view, “practical 
knowledge” is invented and performs the same instrumental role as buttons, 
objects, steel, and so on. This points to the fact that Dewey’s position poses a 
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challenge to Kornblith who argues that knowledge is a natural kind; given that 
natural kinds are discovered rather than invented or constructed. In addition, 
Dewey sees knowledge as “warranted assertibility” that is attained at the end of 
inquiry. From this view, it follows that what is assertible or warrantable is 
contextual - limited to some specific time and place. While this dynamic notion of 
knowledge is consistent with the evolutionary theory that is at the base of Dewey’s 
naturalism, it is at odds with the notion of natural kind.151 It also follows that 
knowledge remains unknown until inquiry comes to a (contextual) terminal point. 
Knowledge depends on the community of inquirers who adjudges or approves. 
From the foregoing, one can argue that what offers “theoretical unity” in Dewey’s 
theory of knowledge and conception of the relation between philosophy and 
science is not knowledge but the symbiotic relation between nature and human 
beings, the problematic situations that emanate from human transactions with 
nature and engender reflective and experimental philosophical and scientific 
inquiry. From this view, knowledge in both philosophy and science plays an 
instrumental role. Inquiries in both fields are collaborative and consequentially 
social. This adds up to the recognition of knowledge as inherently a social 
phenomenon. The focus on higher-order human interests is significant in the 
naturalness of human knowledge. This runs contrary to Kornblith’s argument that, 
were human interests to impose upon knowledge, it would fall short of the 
category of natural kinds because human interests are parochial (2002, p. 65). 
However, for Dewey, knowledge in any cognitive studies is inevitably instrumental 
and social. 
For Dewey, epistemological or philosophical knowledge complements scientific 
knowledge. While natural sciences such as biology, chemistry and medicine are 
regarded as cognitive endeavours with focus on some specific aspects of human 
transactions, epistemology focuses on more general aspects. This general focus 
                                                     
151 It is arguable that this view begs the question given the fact that both Dewey and Kornblith 
reject natural kinds in terms of fixed properties or properties in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. However, the notion of dynamic change embedded in Dewey’s evolutionary knowledge 
implies a kind of regular and persistent change that runs contrary to changes that have been 
observed about natural kinds. 
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marks the distinctiveness of epistemology (philosophy) from science. Like 
Kornblith, Dewey draws from evolutionary theory, and envisaged a scientific 
philosophy. Unlike Kornblith, he develops a naturalism that does not reduce 
philosophy to science. However, Dewey’s account of knowledge is more 
naturalistic and scientific because it presents the entire history of human kind 
(biological, physiological, psychological, social, and environmental) as the subject-
matter of science. 
6.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter considered the continuing relevance of Dewey in contemporary 
philosophy by engaging him in the debate about the consideration of knowledge 
as a natural kind. I identified the motive for considering knowledge as a natural 
kind as the quest to establish human knowledge as a substantive subject-matter 
of science from which the naturalistic and scientific nature of epistemology can be 
based. I identified a similar quest in Dewey’s naturalist epistemology. This 
similarity of focus prompted the exploration of other similarities, articulation of 
possible differences and most importantly, examination of which position is more 
plausible.  
I started the chapter by articulating various standard views about features of 
natural kinds with paradigms in biology, botany, physics, and chemistry. I also 
mentioned some psychologists and sociologists who have contended that there 
are psychological and sociological kinds. I identified the idea that nature can be 
carved at its joints and that natural kinds made up these joints, as the most 
significant among the defining features of natural kinds. Consequently, natural 
kinds are regarded as entities grouped together by nature in contrast with entities 
that are grouped together for theoretical purposes, or created by human beings.  
I then considered the debate among epistemologists on whether knowledge is a 
natural kind or not as one attempt to determine the possibility of a scientific 
epistemology. I explored Kornblith’s position as a paradigm philosophical case for 
the possibility of presenting knowledge as a natural kind on two grounds. Firstly, 
325 
 
his attempt to make “human knowledge” an “extension” or “enlargement” of the 
animal knowledge that cognitive ethologists are studying, is commendable. 
Secondly, his thesis focused on epistemological concepts such as truth, 
justification, and beliefs. These considerations make Kornblith’s position more 
interesting than other positions which approach natural kinds through theories of 
reference (Putnam, 1975) (Kripke, 1980).   
I considered the success of this position and found two of his central arguments 
defensible. He argued that understanding animal beliefs must be in terms of how 
the environment impacts on their belief-forming psychological mechanisms and 
results in animal behaviour. He also argued that justification of a belief lies in 
“successful human behaviour” measurable in terms of animal/human survival, and 
that it is this success that all forms of knowledge have in common. Both claims find 
corroboration in cognitive ethology and evolutionary biology, respectively.  
However, I argued that how Kornblith inferred that knowledge is a natural kind 
from these arguments, is controversial. I identified a problem in his position - his 
analogy between animal and human knowledge. In his endeavour to present 
human and non-human animal knowledge as belonging to a natural kind, he 
became committed to two positions that are challengeable. Firstly, he abandoned 
the notions of belief in philosophy that are characterised with subjectivity and 
insecurity and adopted the notion of belief in psychology that appears to be more 
secure (being products of some reliable psychological mechanisms), having causal 
and explanatory links to human behaviour and at the level of species rather than 
individual. Secondly, he denied the need and role of reflection and the social 
practice of giving and asking for reasons, as prerequisites for the process of 
justifying beliefs to constitute knowledge. I drew five conclusions from these 
claims.  
Firstly, Kornblith’s reliance on the notion of belief in psychology and his denial of 
the role of reflections and social inputs in the justification of beliefs led him to a 
theory of justification that is determined by nature-controlled mechanisms rather 
than being products of human rationality. Secondly, by concentrating on the 
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biological and ecological constraints at the expense of the reflective animal 
activities, his position is confronted with the problem of how to transcend from 
animal knowledge that ecologists are studying to the phenomenon of knowledge 
in epistemology. Besides, I argued that he succeeded in providing a naturalism that 
reduces epistemology (philosophy) to science. Thirdly, by concentrating on 
knowledge as the “homeostatic point” of the animal/human behaviour, I argued 
that he presented knowledge as the only means of engaging the world. I argued 
that this is false because animal/ human histories are full of numerous 
unsuccessful behaviours, many false beliefs that are sometimes useful and actions 
that are based on blind guess or chance that Kornblith’s position seems to 
obliterate. Fourthly, to appreciate Kornblith’s position, his epistemology must be 
considered as a rival to mainstream epistemology, although he wavered between 
two distinct and incompatible epistemologies. Finally, I argued that he only 
succeeded in presenting knowledge as a natural phenomenon rather than a 
natural kind. These problems prompted the idea of engaging Dewey in the 
consideration of knowledge as a natural kind.  
In engaging Dewey in this debate, two approaches were explored. In the first 
approach, I considered the possibility of interpreting some themes in Dewey’s 
naturalist metaphysics and epistemology as offering arguments for the claim that 
knowledge is a natural kind. I explored his presentation of human experience as 
part of nature (from which he derived his claim that knowledge is a natural 
phenomenon) and his position on “traits of existence”. I considered how Dewey 
and Kornblith’s subscription to evolutionary theory brings about some remarkable 
similarities in their theories of knowledge. Both scholars emphasised how nature 
constrains animals/humans. 
However, despite these similarities, I have argued that Dewey made a distinction, 
to a degree, between “knowing” and the “known” even though he insisted that 
the “knower” forms an integral part of the “known”. From Dewey’s analogy of the 
relation between “knowledge” and nature as means-ends or his conception of 
knowledge as an “instrument for multiple control”, I argued that Dewey’s theory 
of knowledge offers a critique of Kornblith’s claim that knowledge is a natural kind 
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rather than supporting it. Besides, I have argued that Kornblith’s pursuit of the 
argument that knowledge is imposed by nature and devoid of human interests and 
inputs from social interactions among people, not only marks the incompatibility 
of his position with Dewey’s position but equally renders his naturalist account of 
humans suspect. 
In the second approach, I considered the argument that Dewey’s analysis of 
knowledge as “natural human transactions’ is more appropriate in his work than 
the consideration of knowledge as a natural kind.  I also explored the argument 
that Dewey’s conception of “knowledge as a natural transaction” offers brighter 
prospects for a scientific (and non-reductive) epistemology. The reason I gave for 
this is that Dewey’s theory of knowledge is deeply rooted in a comprehensive and 
empirical metaphysics. It is arguable that Dewey’s position is not only clearer but 
offers an account of epistemology that is more robust and more science-inclined. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
Philosophers have made several attempts to establish an epistemology that can 
be described as scientific. A challenge in this quest is that philosophers are keenly 
interested in preserving the normative focus entrenched in traditional 
epistemology. They have argued that keeping this normative concern fosters the 
uniqueness of a philosophical approach to knowledge (Goldman, 1993b; Kim, 1985, 
1994; Stroud, 1985).  
The most common approach focuses on how resources in the sciences can be used 
in solving epistemological problems. Another approach can be seen in the quest 
to adopt the methodologies of the sciences. These approaches include the quest 
for the unity of science movement within logical positivism and also philosophers’ 
subscription to methodological naturalism. Another approach can be seen in 
Quine’s naturalized epistemology in which epistemology is identified as part of 
psychology (1994a). However, in this thesis, I explore and defend Dewey’s 
approach as more successful than others.  I identify three strategies in his 
approach: (i) adopting relevant scientific methods, (ii) modelling a methodology 
(after scientific methods) to address phenomena that cannot be investigated 
through standard scientific methods and (iii) presenting all inquiries as motivated 
by uniform or similar quests and serving uniform or similar purposes.   
I began the thesis by identifying the quest for a scientific epistemology as the main 
theme in naturalism. I argued that differences in their approaches split naturalists 
into different camps. For instance, all naturalists agree that adopting scientific 
methods is a means of making philosophy scientific. However, while radical 
methodological naturalists favour the use of only scientific methods in 
philosophical inquiries, moderate naturalists defend the relevance of non-
scientific a priori methodologies such as the use of analysis, argumentation, and 
intuitive reasoning. Moderate naturalists argue that scientific methods are 
incapable of shedding light on phenomena such as norms that feature prominently 
in epistemological inquiries. I criticised the radical naturalists for taking a reductive 
approach to apparently non-scientific phenomena such as emotion and religious 
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claims and beliefs. On the other hand, moderate naturalists were criticised 
because their claim to naturalism becomes ambiguous when compared with those 
of non-naturalists who are also disposed to the idea of adopting at least some 
scientific methods in philosophical inquiries. The same problem was noted in 
metaphysical or ontological naturalism which is the attempt to establish a 
scientific philosophy by adopting the ontology of science.  
Focusing on the version of naturalism that dominates Dewey’s later work, I set up 
Dewey’s version of naturalism as a critique of other versions. I established his 
version of naturalism as an account of how human experience serves as a guide to 
understanding the nature of reality and the knowledge of how it can be 
transformed. I then considered the prospects for a normative scientific 
epistemology through this view.  
How does a naturalist understanding of human experience engender a scientific 
and normative epistemology? I argued that the first step towards establishing a 
scientific epistemology is to understand how Dewey’s theory of experience 
engenders a naturalist, empirical, and scientific metaphysics. Unlike traditional 
epistemologists who understood human experience in terms of human subjective 
encounters with or awareness of reality, Dewey analyses experience as the total 
history of nature which includes human transaction within nature. Rather than 
seeing human experience as human subjective awareness of the world, Dewey 
sees it as an aspect of nature or events in nature’s history. This is because he sees 
human experiences as comprising both subjective and implicit actions (such as the 
awareness of the radiation of the sensory nerves) and overt actions (such as the 
constructions of dams and skyscrapers) For him, both are continuous with other 
natural occurrences such as plants responding to sunlight, rain-induced erosion or 
volcanic eruptions caused by plate movements. Dewey argues that human 
experience derives its features from being part of nature. Such features include a 
mixture of dynamically precarious and settled events. Understanding human 
experience as transaction within dynamic nature is Dewey’s naturalist 
metaphysics. I argued that this metaphysics is scientific in terms of being empirical 
and experimental. It has all of nature as its subject-matter - just like science. I 
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argued that the strength of this metaphysics lies in its mutual complementary 
relation with science. 
In setting up Dewey’s epistemology, which I called epistemological naturalism, I 
explored how his conceptions of the subject-matter and methods of epistemology 
engender stronger prospects for a normative scientific epistemology than other 
attempts. On the subject-matter, I discussed how Dewey’s naturalist conceptions 
of reality and human experience (metaphysics) provide a road-map for his 
naturalist epistemology. I explored how his arguments that the world is a mixture 
of interchanging stable and precarious events, and his description of human 
experience as transaction within nature (with the aim of manipulating or 
regulating some stability), set the stage for defining all forms of inquiry as 
problem-driven and knowledge as ultimately practical and instrumental. I argued 
that this conception of knowledge is ideal for the traditional goal of epistemology 
identified as attainment of truth and avoidance of error. For instance, seeing 
knowledge as essential for human survival emphasises the difference between 
knowledge and false beliefs or lucky guesses.   
I also explored how Dewey’s position challenges traditional epistemology by 
replacing the traditional theoretical or conceptual approach to knowledge with a 
practical and experimental approach. I discussed how this view necessitates 
practical and empirical methodologies. I also discussed how this approach to 
knowledge makes paradigms of knowledge in technological science more relevant 
to epistemology rather than those of the natural sciences. 
With respect to his conception of methodologies for epistemology, I discussed 
Dewey’s arguments that because epistemological inquiries are about 
manipulating or transforming nature, the appropriate methods are ultimately 
empirical and experimental. However, this claim does not rule out the heuristic 
usefulness of non-empirical methods such as analysis or argumentation. I noted 
Dewey’s disagreement with traditional epistemology for regarding some aspects 
in human experience (such as emotion) as opposing reason and consequently 
outside the scope of epistemology. I also noted his disagreement with the 
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classification of some phenomena such as magic and religious experience as 
unscientific because the empirical methods of science are incapable of explaining 
them. I discussed Dewey’s introduction and analysis of denotative empirical 
methodology for the understanding of the origin, roles, and importance of these 
phenomena in the experience of human beings. With this method, the origin of 
these phenomena in human transaction within nature and the functions they 
denote in human attempts to cope with nature, are made accessible to empirical 
investigations. 
On both suggestions, I argued that Dewey’s approach is distinctly different from 
the approaches taken by the radical or moderate methodological naturalists. My 
more important claim is that it is stronger, being non-reductive and because it 
engenders how some important aspects of human experience (esthetic 
experience: emotion, religious experience, and phenomena such as magic) can be 
empirically studied and thus freed from being regarded as sophistries or as 
unscientific. 
I concluded by arguing that seeing knowledge as an instrument purposely 
established to solve some practical problems in human transaction within nature 
engenders a normative theory in which the justification of a belief or the 
confirmation of a hypothesis is based on how those problems are solved. I also 
argued that Dewey’s position makes epistemology an empirical and experimental 
discipline. Hypotheses are formulated by drawing of the possible solutions for 
solving a recalcitrant human situation. They are tested for the purpose of 
identifying and selecting the hypothesis that offers the best solution. Predictions 
are engendered when facts about the causes of a situation are empirically laid out 
and projections about solutions are made. 
After establishing Dewey’s naturalist metaphysics and epistemology and how the 
former provides a road-map for the latter, I turned to explore the continuity of 
Dewey’s original ideas in two ways. First, how they are preserved in Richard 
Rorty’s neo-pragmatism. Neo-pragmatism is usually regarded as the successor 
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tradition of pragmatists such as Dewey. Second, I explored the extent to which 
these ideas are relevant to debates about knowledge in contemporary philosophy.  
Addressing the connection between Dewey’s philosophy and Rorty’s neo-
pragmatism, I explored how both Dewey’s and Rorty’s rejection of 
foundationalism, representationalism, and the traditional conception of 
knowledge as conceptual, qualify Rorty as a Deweyan. However, I argued that 
Dewey provided alternative theories to every position he rejected and redefined 
every problem he contended was wrongfully formulated, putting them in the 
proper framework before providing solutions to them. I argued that this is an 
acknowledgement of the genuineness of many traditional problems of philosophy. 
For instance, Dewey rejects the dualist way that Descartes formulated the mind-
body problem without denying the reality of human mind. He also rejects how 
Pyrrho formulated the problem of universal scepticism while admitting the 
seriousness of sceptical challenges. I also argued that Rorty’s popular position, 
that Philosophy must transcend itself to become cultural criticism has no basis in 
Dewey’s philosophy. Given these fundamental differences, I argued that Rorty’s 
work is best described as post-pragmatism rather than neo-pragmatism.  
I also considered how Dewey’s analyses of human experience, human-nature 
symbiotic relations and the social nature of inquiry resolve some disagreements 
between radical social epistemologists (such as Fuller) and moderate social 
epistemologists (such as Goldman and Kornblith) on the nature and subject-
matter of social epistemology. Dewey’s identification of problematic human 
transactions with nature as the common factor in all forms of inquiry and his 
consequent presentation of metaphysics as a road-map for epistemology, cause 
Fuller’s argument that social epistemology is a new discipline in sociology or social 
science to lose its strength. Dewey’s claim that a social epistemology is continuous 
with traditional epistemology is further supported by the preservation of the 
traditional conception of normativity (in terms of attainment of truth and 
avoidance of error) in his epistemological naturalism. With Dewey placing inquiry 
in the secondary cognitive experience (the point where concerted and cooperative 
efforts are socially employed and the best form of hypotheses for solving 
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problematic situation are collectively ascertained), the social nature of knowledge 
is established. From this perspective, the stalemate between radical and moderate 
social epistemologists on whether social or individual factors should be the focus 
of epistemological inquiry is bypassed. 
Moreover, I also considered the possibility of establishing what could be regarded 
as the basis for all human knowledge from Dewey’s locating the quest for 
knowledge in problematic human natural transaction within nature. The 
importance of this position was explored in terms of how it prevents the relativism 
that becomes unavoidable when the scope of epistemology is made relative to 
different social contexts as suggested by radical social epistemologists such as 
Fuller.  
Finally, I considered how Dewey’s conception of knowledge (as an instrument for 
manipulating nature) contributes to contemporary debates about whether 
knowledge is a natural kind. The first point that I established about this debate 
was that it is ultimately about whether a scientific epistemology can be established 
if knowledge is established as a natural kind. I then compared the plausibility of 
Kornblith’s contention that knowledge is a natural kind with Dewey’s contention 
that knowledge is a natural transaction and argue that the latter offers more 
tenable prospects for a normative scientific epistemology. I argued that 
Kornblith’s identifying animal knowledge as the subject-matter of both cognitive 
ethology and epistemology and then arguing that both are legitimate scientific 
disciplines is plausible but not strong enough. I identified the weakness of his 
position as lying in his claim that the human practice of asking for and giving 
reasons for claims does not mark any significance difference between human 
knowledge and lower animal knowledge. On the other hand, Dewey’s 
identification of nature as the only subject-matter for both scientists and 
epistemologists is more plausible. In addition, Dewey’s argument that all forms of 
knowledge play an instrumental or problem-solving role in a way that predictions 
are engendered, offers the strongest justification that epistemology needs to 
qualify as a science. Finally, taking a Deweyan approach to knowledge engenders 
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an inter-disciplinary approach which makes resources in sociology, anthropology, 
biology, and technological science relevant to epistemology.  
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